Robert Gellately
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198205609
- eISBN:
- 9780191676697
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198205609.003.0011
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter discusses the end of Hitler's dictatorship. Social support for Hitler and for National Socialism steadily eroded as the war encroached more and more into German life, and many people ...
More
This chapter discusses the end of Hitler's dictatorship. Social support for Hitler and for National Socialism steadily eroded as the war encroached more and more into German life, and many people certainly became fed up. Nazi propaganda played upon German fears about what would happen if or when the Soviets arrived on German territory, in order to try to strengthen the determination to resist. The warning of retribution to come for Nazi barbarities committed in the Soviet Union led many Germans to flee to the west. Those who could not or would not go were overrun by the Soviet advance. Hitler's political testament, written up on 29 April in the bunker, stated that he would rather die than be taken prisoner and deposed, and he asked his successors to do what they could to strengthen the spirit of resistance and continue the war. Before he committed suicide, he appointed a new government and stripped Himmler and Göring of their offices for opening negotiations with the Allies.Less
This chapter discusses the end of Hitler's dictatorship. Social support for Hitler and for National Socialism steadily eroded as the war encroached more and more into German life, and many people certainly became fed up. Nazi propaganda played upon German fears about what would happen if or when the Soviets arrived on German territory, in order to try to strengthen the determination to resist. The warning of retribution to come for Nazi barbarities committed in the Soviet Union led many Germans to flee to the west. Those who could not or would not go were overrun by the Soviet advance. Hitler's political testament, written up on 29 April in the bunker, stated that he would rather die than be taken prisoner and deposed, and he asked his successors to do what they could to strengthen the spirit of resistance and continue the war. Before he committed suicide, he appointed a new government and stripped Himmler and Göring of their offices for opening negotiations with the Allies.
John W. Young
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198203674
- eISBN:
- 9780191675942
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203674.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
This chapter discusses Churchill's Washington visit, where he met President Harry Truman. It highlights the fact that the Americans during this time were not interested in any conference with the ...
More
This chapter discusses Churchill's Washington visit, where he met President Harry Truman. It highlights the fact that the Americans during this time were not interested in any conference with the Soviets or in attending a Summit that was based on the highly personal approach to diplomacy taken by Churchill.Less
This chapter discusses Churchill's Washington visit, where he met President Harry Truman. It highlights the fact that the Americans during this time were not interested in any conference with the Soviets or in attending a Summit that was based on the highly personal approach to diplomacy taken by Churchill.
Jussi Hanhimäki
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195172218
- eISBN:
- 9780199849994
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195172218.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter illustrates the negotiations that occurred between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho to settle an end to the Vietnam War. However, by the spring of 1970 no such agreement was yet in sight. The ...
More
This chapter illustrates the negotiations that occurred between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho to settle an end to the Vietnam War. However, by the spring of 1970 no such agreement was yet in sight. The chapter also shows how the Cambodian invasion by the United States and South Vietnam in May 1970 expanded the war, resulting in more bombing and bloodshed. As a result of this maneuver, the ongoing process of Vietnamization was curtailed due to the negative reactions it faced, not only from Americans, but from the Chinese as well, which led to the closing down of the promising Warsaw channel of Sino-American contacts, and the Soviets diminishing eagerness for an early move towards détente.Less
This chapter illustrates the negotiations that occurred between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho to settle an end to the Vietnam War. However, by the spring of 1970 no such agreement was yet in sight. The chapter also shows how the Cambodian invasion by the United States and South Vietnam in May 1970 expanded the war, resulting in more bombing and bloodshed. As a result of this maneuver, the ongoing process of Vietnamization was curtailed due to the negative reactions it faced, not only from Americans, but from the Chinese as well, which led to the closing down of the promising Warsaw channel of Sino-American contacts, and the Soviets diminishing eagerness for an early move towards détente.
Jussi Hanhimäki
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195172218
- eISBN:
- 9780199849994
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195172218.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Through Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier was able to send his message to Kissinger regarding his government's willingness to have a direct meeting or discussions with ...
More
Through Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier was able to send his message to Kissinger regarding his government's willingness to have a direct meeting or discussions with the United States. Thus, a breakthrough had arrived. All that remained was to decide on who would go and when. In this chapter, the author examines what prompted Kissinger's secret trip, codenamed Polo I, rather than an open one despite Zhou's April 27 message. It explores ideas about whether the secrecy of Kissinger's trip to China grew from a mixture of domestic political motives, international calculations, or personal ambition. Other breakthroughs discussed in this chapter are ping-pong diplomacy and the Soviets' decision to accelerate the détente process.Less
Through Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier was able to send his message to Kissinger regarding his government's willingness to have a direct meeting or discussions with the United States. Thus, a breakthrough had arrived. All that remained was to decide on who would go and when. In this chapter, the author examines what prompted Kissinger's secret trip, codenamed Polo I, rather than an open one despite Zhou's April 27 message. It explores ideas about whether the secrecy of Kissinger's trip to China grew from a mixture of domestic political motives, international calculations, or personal ambition. Other breakthroughs discussed in this chapter are ping-pong diplomacy and the Soviets' decision to accelerate the détente process.
Tom Buchanan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199570331
- eISBN:
- 9780191741425
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570331.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Asian History, British and Irish Modern History
This chapter shows how the British left was mobilised in support of China during the Chinese Nationalist movement (KMT) in its confrontation with Britain during 1925–1928. The May 30th incident in ...
More
This chapter shows how the British left was mobilised in support of China during the Chinese Nationalist movement (KMT) in its confrontation with Britain during 1925–1928. The May 30th incident in 1925, when Chinese strikers were shot dead by British-officered police in Shanghai, represented a turning point for both Anglo-Chinese relations and the interest of the British left in China. The chapter explores the ‘Hands off China’ movement of this period, and places it in the context of the tensions between Communists and non-Communists on the left in Britain. A concluding section deals with the period 1928-31, when relations improved between Britain and China, but when the Chinese Communists began to control substantial rural ‘Soviets’.Less
This chapter shows how the British left was mobilised in support of China during the Chinese Nationalist movement (KMT) in its confrontation with Britain during 1925–1928. The May 30th incident in 1925, when Chinese strikers were shot dead by British-officered police in Shanghai, represented a turning point for both Anglo-Chinese relations and the interest of the British left in China. The chapter explores the ‘Hands off China’ movement of this period, and places it in the context of the tensions between Communists and non-Communists on the left in Britain. A concluding section deals with the period 1928-31, when relations improved between Britain and China, but when the Chinese Communists began to control substantial rural ‘Soviets’.
Kathryn C. Statler
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813124407
- eISBN:
- 9780813134772
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813124407.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This chapter discusses the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference. The Geneva conferees had a number of agendas. The Soviets undoubtedly hoped to enhance international communist prestige through ...
More
This chapter discusses the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference. The Geneva conferees had a number of agendas. The Soviets undoubtedly hoped to enhance international communist prestige through their support of China, Vietnam, and peaceful coexistence and create some discord among the Western allies at the same time. China, on the other hand, planned to make the most of its first international conference, and Vietminh simply wanted a cease-fire.Less
This chapter discusses the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference. The Geneva conferees had a number of agendas. The Soviets undoubtedly hoped to enhance international communist prestige through their support of China, Vietnam, and peaceful coexistence and create some discord among the Western allies at the same time. China, on the other hand, planned to make the most of its first international conference, and Vietminh simply wanted a cease-fire.
Geoffrey P. R. Wallace
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801453434
- eISBN:
- 9780801455742
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801453434.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter considers how territorial motives lead to the terrorizing of captives. In early April 1940, Soviet forces executed over twenty thousand Polish military officers and other elites across ...
More
This chapter considers how territorial motives lead to the terrorizing of captives. In early April 1940, Soviet forces executed over twenty thousand Polish military officers and other elites across several sites. These killings became collectively known as the Katyn massacre, or Katyn Forest massacre, one of the most notorious atrocities from the Second World War. It is argued that the killings were motivated by the Soviet Union's desire to permanently annex long-sought-after Polish territories. The method of violence employed, the timing of the killings, and the selection of which captives to kill and which to spare all suggest that concerns over conquest largely drove this extreme prisoner abuse. When territorial motives were less present, Soviet conduct toward captives improved significantly, even if the lot for prisoners remained far from ideal.Less
This chapter considers how territorial motives lead to the terrorizing of captives. In early April 1940, Soviet forces executed over twenty thousand Polish military officers and other elites across several sites. These killings became collectively known as the Katyn massacre, or Katyn Forest massacre, one of the most notorious atrocities from the Second World War. It is argued that the killings were motivated by the Soviet Union's desire to permanently annex long-sought-after Polish territories. The method of violence employed, the timing of the killings, and the selection of which captives to kill and which to spare all suggest that concerns over conquest largely drove this extreme prisoner abuse. When territorial motives were less present, Soviet conduct toward captives improved significantly, even if the lot for prisoners remained far from ideal.
Konstantin Akinsha, Grigorij Kozlov, and Sylvia Hochfield
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300110272
- eISBN:
- 9780300144970
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300110272.001.0001
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Cultural Studies
This book surveys two centuries of Russian history through a succession of ambitious architectural projects designed for a single construction site in central Moscow. Czars, Bolshevik rulers, and ...
More
This book surveys two centuries of Russian history through a succession of ambitious architectural projects designed for a single construction site in central Moscow. Czars, Bolshevik rulers, and contemporary Russian leaders alike have dreamed of glorious monuments to themselves and their ideologies on this site. The history of their efforts reflects the story of the nation itself and its repeated attempts to construct or reconstruct its identity and to repudiate or resuscitate emblems of the past. In the nineteenth century, Czar Alexander I began to construct the largest cathedral (and the largest building) in the world at the time. His successor, Nicholas I, changed both the site and the project. Completed by Alexander III, the cathedral was demolished by Stalin in the 1930s to make way for the tallest building in the world, the Palace of Soviets, but that project was ended by the war. During the Khrushchev years the excavation pit was transformed into an outdoor heated swimming pool—the world's largest, of course—and under Yeltsin's direction the pool was replaced with a reconstruction of the destroyed cathedral. The book explores each project intended for this ideologically-charged site and documents with 60 illustrations the grand projects that were built as well as those that were only dreamed.Less
This book surveys two centuries of Russian history through a succession of ambitious architectural projects designed for a single construction site in central Moscow. Czars, Bolshevik rulers, and contemporary Russian leaders alike have dreamed of glorious monuments to themselves and their ideologies on this site. The history of their efforts reflects the story of the nation itself and its repeated attempts to construct or reconstruct its identity and to repudiate or resuscitate emblems of the past. In the nineteenth century, Czar Alexander I began to construct the largest cathedral (and the largest building) in the world at the time. His successor, Nicholas I, changed both the site and the project. Completed by Alexander III, the cathedral was demolished by Stalin in the 1930s to make way for the tallest building in the world, the Palace of Soviets, but that project was ended by the war. During the Khrushchev years the excavation pit was transformed into an outdoor heated swimming pool—the world's largest, of course—and under Yeltsin's direction the pool was replaced with a reconstruction of the destroyed cathedral. The book explores each project intended for this ideologically-charged site and documents with 60 illustrations the grand projects that were built as well as those that were only dreamed.
Eric Grynaviski
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801452062
- eISBN:
- 9780801454653
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801452062.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This concluding chapter argues that cooperation is often best secured because of misperception. When actors hold flase intersubjective beliefs (FIBs)—in which agents wrongly believe that their ...
More
This concluding chapter argues that cooperation is often best secured because of misperception. When actors hold flase intersubjective beliefs (FIBs)—in which agents wrongly believe that their understanding of a relationship is shared—cooperation may be much more likely to happen, especially if there are principled differences or conflicts of interest. The case of détente—the most robust period of cooperation between the superpowers—was only possible because of FIBs. Détente to the Soviets meant that they could safely support national liberation movements without US meddling. On the other hand, the Nixon administration thought that Soviet strategic parity meant that military competition had been replaced by political competition.Less
This concluding chapter argues that cooperation is often best secured because of misperception. When actors hold flase intersubjective beliefs (FIBs)—in which agents wrongly believe that their understanding of a relationship is shared—cooperation may be much more likely to happen, especially if there are principled differences or conflicts of interest. The case of détente—the most robust period of cooperation between the superpowers—was only possible because of FIBs. Détente to the Soviets meant that they could safely support national liberation movements without US meddling. On the other hand, the Nixon administration thought that Soviet strategic parity meant that military competition had been replaced by political competition.
Jerzy Borzęcki
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300121216
- eISBN:
- 9780300145014
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300121216.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter discusses the following events: the limited Soviet offensive in Belarus; the Soviet minor offensive in Ukraine; the Soviets and the Ukrainian issue; the Soviet major offensive in ...
More
This chapter discusses the following events: the limited Soviet offensive in Belarus; the Soviet minor offensive in Ukraine; the Soviets and the Ukrainian issue; the Soviet major offensive in Belarus; the Spa agreement; the Curzon note; Soviet peace treaties with Lithuania and Latvia; the reestablishment of Soviet Belarus; Soviet military successes and strategic errors; Soviet diplomatic delays and peace proposals; the Battle of Warsaw; and the Minsk peace conference.Less
This chapter discusses the following events: the limited Soviet offensive in Belarus; the Soviet minor offensive in Ukraine; the Soviets and the Ukrainian issue; the Soviet major offensive in Belarus; the Spa agreement; the Curzon note; Soviet peace treaties with Lithuania and Latvia; the reestablishment of Soviet Belarus; Soviet military successes and strategic errors; Soviet diplomatic delays and peace proposals; the Battle of Warsaw; and the Minsk peace conference.
Jerzy Borzęcki
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300121216
- eISBN:
- 9780300145014
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300121216.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter focuses on the preliminary peace talks between the Soviets and Poles. It discusses the Battle of the Niemen; the instructions for the Polish peace delegation; the peace delegations in ...
More
This chapter focuses on the preliminary peace talks between the Soviets and Poles. It discusses the Battle of the Niemen; the instructions for the Polish peace delegation; the peace delegations in Riga; Soviet preparations for the Riga negotiations; the beginning of negotiations and the VTsIK declaration; and; Ioffe's draft of the preliminary peace.Less
This chapter focuses on the preliminary peace talks between the Soviets and Poles. It discusses the Battle of the Niemen; the instructions for the Polish peace delegation; the peace delegations in Riga; Soviet preparations for the Riga negotiations; the beginning of negotiations and the VTsIK declaration; and; Ioffe's draft of the preliminary peace.
Jerzy Borzęcki
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300121216
- eISBN:
- 9780300145014
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300121216.003.0009
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter discusses Soviet relations with Lithuania and Belarus; the treatment of prisoners of war; distrust and tension between the Poles and Soviets; stalemate over the gold reserves issue; the ...
More
This chapter discusses Soviet relations with Lithuania and Belarus; the treatment of prisoners of war; distrust and tension between the Poles and Soviets; stalemate over the gold reserves issue; the Soviet note to Lithuania; the crisis of the negotiations; Chicherin's struggle with the Moscow specialists; continued crisis in Riga; Krasin's payment schemes; the agreement on repatriation; agreement on the remaining issues; Moscow's attempt to delay the signing of the definitive peace with Poland; and signing of the definitive on 18 March.Less
This chapter discusses Soviet relations with Lithuania and Belarus; the treatment of prisoners of war; distrust and tension between the Poles and Soviets; stalemate over the gold reserves issue; the Soviet note to Lithuania; the crisis of the negotiations; Chicherin's struggle with the Moscow specialists; continued crisis in Riga; Krasin's payment schemes; the agreement on repatriation; agreement on the remaining issues; Moscow's attempt to delay the signing of the definitive peace with Poland; and signing of the definitive on 18 March.
Yanek Mieczkowski
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801451508
- eISBN:
- 9780801467936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801451508.003.0009
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter examines Senator Lyndon Johnson's views on space. The senator was considered a the rival of Eisenhower, and was described as “second in power only to the President of the U.S.” by the ...
More
This chapter examines Senator Lyndon Johnson's views on space. The senator was considered a the rival of Eisenhower, and was described as “second in power only to the President of the U.S.” by the New York Times. The two men had an antithetical opinion on space. For Eisenhower, the satellite launching was a means of space exploration Johnson, however, believed that whoever dominated space “would have the power to control the earth's weather, to cause drought and flood, to change the tides and raise the levels of the sea, to divert the Gulf Stream and change temperature climates to frigid.” He wanted to get on equal footing with the Soviets regardless of cost.Less
This chapter examines Senator Lyndon Johnson's views on space. The senator was considered a the rival of Eisenhower, and was described as “second in power only to the President of the U.S.” by the New York Times. The two men had an antithetical opinion on space. For Eisenhower, the satellite launching was a means of space exploration Johnson, however, believed that whoever dominated space “would have the power to control the earth's weather, to cause drought and flood, to change the tides and raise the levels of the sea, to divert the Gulf Stream and change temperature climates to frigid.” He wanted to get on equal footing with the Soviets regardless of cost.
Yukiko Koshiro
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801451805
- eISBN:
- 9780801467752
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801451805.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
This chapter examines the relationship between Japan and Russia after World War II. Through the war, Japanese leadership and the broader population alike viewed Russians and the Soviet Union with ...
More
This chapter examines the relationship between Japan and Russia after World War II. Through the war, Japanese leadership and the broader population alike viewed Russians and the Soviet Union with respect. Despite the animosity between Russia and their ally, the United States, many Japanese hoped to cultivate cooperation with the Soviets. Moreover, even though the Soviet Union posed a double menace of military force and ideology to the Japanese empire, the two countries shared a pragmatism that facilitated coexistence—a mutual respect for their respective sociopolitical systems and the principle of nonintervention in each other's domestic politics. As such, the Japanese crackdown on communism and its friendship with the Soviet Union were two separate matters.Less
This chapter examines the relationship between Japan and Russia after World War II. Through the war, Japanese leadership and the broader population alike viewed Russians and the Soviet Union with respect. Despite the animosity between Russia and their ally, the United States, many Japanese hoped to cultivate cooperation with the Soviets. Moreover, even though the Soviet Union posed a double menace of military force and ideology to the Japanese empire, the two countries shared a pragmatism that facilitated coexistence—a mutual respect for their respective sociopolitical systems and the principle of nonintervention in each other's domestic politics. As such, the Japanese crackdown on communism and its friendship with the Soviet Union were two separate matters.
John R. Bockstoce
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780300221794
- eISBN:
- 9780300235166
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300221794.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, Economic History
This chapter describes the chaos and disruptions that overtook the Chukchi and Yupik peoples during the Russian Civil War, which culminated with the Soviet takeover of the peninsula in 1923 and was ...
More
This chapter describes the chaos and disruptions that overtook the Chukchi and Yupik peoples during the Russian Civil War, which culminated with the Soviet takeover of the peninsula in 1923 and was followed by the seizure of trading posts and foreign trading vessels and the confiscation of traders’ supplies and money.Less
This chapter describes the chaos and disruptions that overtook the Chukchi and Yupik peoples during the Russian Civil War, which culminated with the Soviet takeover of the peninsula in 1923 and was followed by the seizure of trading posts and foreign trading vessels and the confiscation of traders’ supplies and money.
James J. Lorence
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780252037559
- eISBN:
- 9780252094804
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Illinois Press
- DOI:
- 10.5406/illinois/9780252037559.003.0009
- Subject:
- Sociology, Social Stratification, Inequality, and Mobility
This chapter examines how Jencks' experiences after being cut loose from Mine-Mill only confirmed the worldview that had shaped his career as a social activist since his college years. Now, although ...
More
This chapter examines how Jencks' experiences after being cut loose from Mine-Mill only confirmed the worldview that had shaped his career as a social activist since his college years. Now, although he no longer had ties with the institutional party, he never gave up his commitment to the goal of creating a Socialist society in the United States. Even after he and Virginia were shaken by the brutality of the Soviets in Eastern Europe, Jencks looked to the future. However, his optimism suffered another blow in the San Francisco Bay Area, where he continued to face job discrimination rooted in his personal history of labor militancy and resistance to governmental pressures.Less
This chapter examines how Jencks' experiences after being cut loose from Mine-Mill only confirmed the worldview that had shaped his career as a social activist since his college years. Now, although he no longer had ties with the institutional party, he never gave up his commitment to the goal of creating a Socialist society in the United States. Even after he and Virginia were shaken by the brutality of the Soviets in Eastern Europe, Jencks looked to the future. However, his optimism suffered another blow in the San Francisco Bay Area, where he continued to face job discrimination rooted in his personal history of labor militancy and resistance to governmental pressures.
Antonio Negri
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231146821
- eISBN:
- 9780231519427
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231146821.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter presents a historical analysis of Vladimir Lenin’s judgment on the Soviet in the various phases of the Russian revolution. Lenin’s method seems to give prominence to ...
More
This chapter presents a historical analysis of Vladimir Lenin’s judgment on the Soviet in the various phases of the Russian revolution. Lenin’s method seems to give prominence to practical-theoretical reflections on each aspect of the analysis, especially the issue of the doctrinarian Marxist tradition and the theoretical analysis of the specific development of the real movement of class and capital in Russia. Lenin extenuates these analytical aspects, reshapes, and renovates them while always subjecting them to the sectarianism of the practice that innervates his notion of the party and to which he responds. This chapter examines Karl Marx’s views on the relation between the struggle of the working class and the political movement of capital, as well as Lenin’s interpretation of the council tradition and his analysis of the revolution of 1905, and how the working class struggling in the course of the revolution of 1905 invented the Soviets.Less
This chapter presents a historical analysis of Vladimir Lenin’s judgment on the Soviet in the various phases of the Russian revolution. Lenin’s method seems to give prominence to practical-theoretical reflections on each aspect of the analysis, especially the issue of the doctrinarian Marxist tradition and the theoretical analysis of the specific development of the real movement of class and capital in Russia. Lenin extenuates these analytical aspects, reshapes, and renovates them while always subjecting them to the sectarianism of the practice that innervates his notion of the party and to which he responds. This chapter examines Karl Marx’s views on the relation between the struggle of the working class and the political movement of capital, as well as Lenin’s interpretation of the council tradition and his analysis of the revolution of 1905, and how the working class struggling in the course of the revolution of 1905 invented the Soviets.
Antonio Negri
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231146821
- eISBN:
- 9780231519427
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231146821.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter examines Vladimir Lenin’s position on the Soviet between 1905 and 1917. Lenin’s refusal to accept the either-or alternative between Soviet or party, his claim that the Soviet is the ...
More
This chapter examines Vladimir Lenin’s position on the Soviet between 1905 and 1917. Lenin’s refusal to accept the either-or alternative between Soviet or party, his claim that the Soviet is the organism immediately instrumental to insurrection while to the party is entrusted the permanent and final ends of the revolutionary movement in a polemic and demystification of the Menshevik program, and the ambiguity of the Soviet are all further clarified by his writings of the period of 1906 to 1907, the year of the bourgeois recovery. In November 1905 Lenin had hinted at the possibility that the Soviets might assume the function of provisional revolutionary government. Here Lenin conceives of the Soviet as nothing more than an organ of revolutionary struggle. Anticipating a conclusion about Lenin’s consideration of the Soviet of 1917, we can already say that it is here that Lenin begins to define the Soviets as an instrument of proletarian dictatorship. The chapter considers the ambiguous relation between “Soviet as self-government” and “Soviet as organ of struggle” of the proletariat that is established within the relation between democratic struggle and socialist struggle.Less
This chapter examines Vladimir Lenin’s position on the Soviet between 1905 and 1917. Lenin’s refusal to accept the either-or alternative between Soviet or party, his claim that the Soviet is the organism immediately instrumental to insurrection while to the party is entrusted the permanent and final ends of the revolutionary movement in a polemic and demystification of the Menshevik program, and the ambiguity of the Soviet are all further clarified by his writings of the period of 1906 to 1907, the year of the bourgeois recovery. In November 1905 Lenin had hinted at the possibility that the Soviets might assume the function of provisional revolutionary government. Here Lenin conceives of the Soviet as nothing more than an organ of revolutionary struggle. Anticipating a conclusion about Lenin’s consideration of the Soviet of 1917, we can already say that it is here that Lenin begins to define the Soviets as an instrument of proletarian dictatorship. The chapter considers the ambiguous relation between “Soviet as self-government” and “Soviet as organ of struggle” of the proletariat that is established within the relation between democratic struggle and socialist struggle.
Antonio Negri
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231146821
- eISBN:
- 9780231519427
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231146821.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter examines Vladimir Lenin’s theoretical and tactical judgment on the Soviets in 1917. The first motif in Lenin’s judgment on the Soviet in 1917 is a strong emphasis on the spontaneity of ...
More
This chapter examines Vladimir Lenin’s theoretical and tactical judgment on the Soviets in 1917. The first motif in Lenin’s judgment on the Soviet in 1917 is a strong emphasis on the spontaneity of the phenomenon. It must immediately be recognized that such exaltation of spontaneity is all but generic and populist. Lenin wishes to fix in the Soviets the immediate expression and political form of class insubordination to the general experience of exploitation. According to Lenin: “The imperialist war was bound, with objective inevitability, immensely to accelerate and intensify to an unprecedented degree the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie; it was bound to turn into a civil war between the hostile classes.” This chapter considers Lenin’s evaluation and subsequent exaltation of spontaneity, and how they offer the grounds for a definition of the very high degree of development of the revolutionary consciousness of the Russian working class, and of the material conditions of the political planning of the shift from the first to the second phase of the revolution.Less
This chapter examines Vladimir Lenin’s theoretical and tactical judgment on the Soviets in 1917. The first motif in Lenin’s judgment on the Soviet in 1917 is a strong emphasis on the spontaneity of the phenomenon. It must immediately be recognized that such exaltation of spontaneity is all but generic and populist. Lenin wishes to fix in the Soviets the immediate expression and political form of class insubordination to the general experience of exploitation. According to Lenin: “The imperialist war was bound, with objective inevitability, immensely to accelerate and intensify to an unprecedented degree the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie; it was bound to turn into a civil war between the hostile classes.” This chapter considers Lenin’s evaluation and subsequent exaltation of spontaneity, and how they offer the grounds for a definition of the very high degree of development of the revolutionary consciousness of the Russian working class, and of the material conditions of the political planning of the shift from the first to the second phase of the revolution.
Antonio Negri
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231146821
- eISBN:
- 9780231519427
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231146821.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter examines the reformist transformation of praxis in relation to Vladimir Lenin’s concept of the Soviet. The development of the Soviets that emerged from the October revolution was ...
More
This chapter examines the reformist transformation of praxis in relation to Vladimir Lenin’s concept of the Soviet. The development of the Soviets that emerged from the October revolution was subservient to the needs of the development of capitalism in Russia. Instead of becoming a force of innovation of the masses in the path toward communism, the Soviets were actually the place where the masses got mobilized toward production and socialism. The reformist practice of capital comes to terms with the Soviets on the basis of its awareness of the blockage of the revolutionary experience of the Russian Soviets and their recuperation into the structures of a rigid planning. In the experience of the Russian revolution, the Soviets represented, on the one hand, a spontaneous form of workers’ organization of the control of production, a constitutional form; on the other hand, they were an organ of the struggle against autocracy and capital, an organ of insurrection. These two aspects are intimately linked in the specific political composition of the Russian working class and proletariat in the revolutionary period.Less
This chapter examines the reformist transformation of praxis in relation to Vladimir Lenin’s concept of the Soviet. The development of the Soviets that emerged from the October revolution was subservient to the needs of the development of capitalism in Russia. Instead of becoming a force of innovation of the masses in the path toward communism, the Soviets were actually the place where the masses got mobilized toward production and socialism. The reformist practice of capital comes to terms with the Soviets on the basis of its awareness of the blockage of the revolutionary experience of the Russian Soviets and their recuperation into the structures of a rigid planning. In the experience of the Russian revolution, the Soviets represented, on the one hand, a spontaneous form of workers’ organization of the control of production, a constitutional form; on the other hand, they were an organ of the struggle against autocracy and capital, an organ of insurrection. These two aspects are intimately linked in the specific political composition of the Russian working class and proletariat in the revolutionary period.
