John W. Young
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198203674
- eISBN:
- 9780191675942
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203674.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
This chapter discusses Stalin, who died of a stroke on March 6, 1953. It reviews the reactions of the British and Americans to the death of Stalin, and even looks at several Soviet leaders in ...
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This chapter discusses Stalin, who died of a stroke on March 6, 1953. It reviews the reactions of the British and Americans to the death of Stalin, and even looks at several Soviet leaders in relation to the Soviet dictator. Eisenhower's speech, which was dubbed ‘Chance for Peace’, was revealed to have gone through a series of drafts. The resulting speech stated that the West welcomed peace with the Soviets, but blamed the Soviets for the Cold War.Less
This chapter discusses Stalin, who died of a stroke on March 6, 1953. It reviews the reactions of the British and Americans to the death of Stalin, and even looks at several Soviet leaders in relation to the Soviet dictator. Eisenhower's speech, which was dubbed ‘Chance for Peace’, was revealed to have gone through a series of drafts. The resulting speech stated that the West welcomed peace with the Soviets, but blamed the Soviets for the Cold War.
Paul C. Avey
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781501740381
- eISBN:
- 9781501740398
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501740381.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter assesses Soviet behavior during the Berlin Crisis. The Soviet Union proceeded cautiously throughout the period of American atomic monopoly. That restraint continued during the Berlin ...
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This chapter assesses Soviet behavior during the Berlin Crisis. The Soviet Union proceeded cautiously throughout the period of American atomic monopoly. That restraint continued during the Berlin crisis and is attributable in part to US nuclear monopoly. The Soviets avoided a direct challenge to the United States outside their immediate sphere of influence prior to 1948. From the Soviet perspective, the worsening security situation in Germany in 1948 necessitated action. The subsequent Berlin blockade was designed to exert considerable pressure on the Americans. As a conventionally capable nonnuclear power, though, the Soviets imposed tight constraints on their actions for fear of fighting a war with the United States that would turn nuclear. As a result, no war occurred despite the Soviet ability to inflict a rapid military defeat on the United States in a key area of the world for both countries. Consistent with the framework developed in Chapter 1, Soviet leaders took steps to reduce the benefits of nuclear use for the Americans by reducing the danger to the United States during the crisis and taking steps to hedge against an American nuclear attack.Less
This chapter assesses Soviet behavior during the Berlin Crisis. The Soviet Union proceeded cautiously throughout the period of American atomic monopoly. That restraint continued during the Berlin crisis and is attributable in part to US nuclear monopoly. The Soviets avoided a direct challenge to the United States outside their immediate sphere of influence prior to 1948. From the Soviet perspective, the worsening security situation in Germany in 1948 necessitated action. The subsequent Berlin blockade was designed to exert considerable pressure on the Americans. As a conventionally capable nonnuclear power, though, the Soviets imposed tight constraints on their actions for fear of fighting a war with the United States that would turn nuclear. As a result, no war occurred despite the Soviet ability to inflict a rapid military defeat on the United States in a key area of the world for both countries. Consistent with the framework developed in Chapter 1, Soviet leaders took steps to reduce the benefits of nuclear use for the Americans by reducing the danger to the United States during the crisis and taking steps to hedge against an American nuclear attack.
Iurii Shapoval
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300076356
- eISBN:
- 9780300128093
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300076356.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
This chapter chronicles Khrushchev's career in Ukraine, providing new information about his early years—including a 1923 Trotskyite “deviation” that haunted Khrushchev as long as Stalin lived; his ...
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This chapter chronicles Khrushchev's career in Ukraine, providing new information about his early years—including a 1923 Trotskyite “deviation” that haunted Khrushchev as long as Stalin lived; his initial ties with his mentor, Lazar Kaganovich; and early evidence of both Khrushchev's Stalinism and his budding anti-Stalinism. Most significantly, it shows how Khrushchev's Ukrainian experience influenced his later behavior as Soviet leader.Less
This chapter chronicles Khrushchev's career in Ukraine, providing new information about his early years—including a 1923 Trotskyite “deviation” that haunted Khrushchev as long as Stalin lived; his initial ties with his mentor, Lazar Kaganovich; and early evidence of both Khrushchev's Stalinism and his budding anti-Stalinism. Most significantly, it shows how Khrushchev's Ukrainian experience influenced his later behavior as Soviet leader.
Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780300230819
- eISBN:
- 9780300255607
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300230819.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Russian and Former Soviet Union History
How do local leaders govern in a large dictatorship? What resources do they draw on? This book examines these questions by looking at one of the most important authoritarian regimes of the twentieth ...
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How do local leaders govern in a large dictatorship? What resources do they draw on? This book examines these questions by looking at one of the most important authoritarian regimes of the twentieth century. Starting in the early years after the Second World War and taking the story through to the 1970s, the book charts the strategies of Soviet regional leaders, paying particular attention to the forging and evolution of local trust networks. The book begins with an explanation of what dictatorship is and how it works, and it analyzes how countries move from one form of dictatorship to another. It also looks at the most important dictatorships of the modern era in a new perspective. It focuses on the personal dictatorship that formed in the Soviet Union from the 1930s that center on the supreme leader, Joseph Stalin, and talks about substate dictators that were nested in Stalin's statewide dictatorship. The book builds on recent developments in the theory of dictatorship, such as the distinction between the dictator's problem of controlling threats from the masses, the problem of authoritarian control, and the problem of authoritarian power sharing. It discusses the challenges that substate leaders faced after the war and the party-based tools they used to forge networks. The book moves on to examine the stabilization of hierarchies and the changing balance between co-optation and political exclusion after the war, and explores the various ways in which substate leaders responded to new impulses at a regional level. It looks at the succession struggle in Moscow and its effects on the environment in which substate leaders operated. The book's conclusion suggests how a public discursive framework can help provide a benchmark for comparing the Soviet Union with other regimes, including that of contemporary post-communist Russia. It summarizes how substate leaders and their strategies can shed light on dictatorship and on how it changes over time. It also explains that the Soviet case falls into two broad categories, one empirical and historical, the other comparative and theoretical. The chapter draws attention to a parallel act of delegation at the regional level. It also recounts how Joseph Stalin handed over power on a provisional basis to regional leaders due to his inability to penetrate the inner recesses of local administration.Less
How do local leaders govern in a large dictatorship? What resources do they draw on? This book examines these questions by looking at one of the most important authoritarian regimes of the twentieth century. Starting in the early years after the Second World War and taking the story through to the 1970s, the book charts the strategies of Soviet regional leaders, paying particular attention to the forging and evolution of local trust networks. The book begins with an explanation of what dictatorship is and how it works, and it analyzes how countries move from one form of dictatorship to another. It also looks at the most important dictatorships of the modern era in a new perspective. It focuses on the personal dictatorship that formed in the Soviet Union from the 1930s that center on the supreme leader, Joseph Stalin, and talks about substate dictators that were nested in Stalin's statewide dictatorship. The book builds on recent developments in the theory of dictatorship, such as the distinction between the dictator's problem of controlling threats from the masses, the problem of authoritarian control, and the problem of authoritarian power sharing. It discusses the challenges that substate leaders faced after the war and the party-based tools they used to forge networks. The book moves on to examine the stabilization of hierarchies and the changing balance between co-optation and political exclusion after the war, and explores the various ways in which substate leaders responded to new impulses at a regional level. It looks at the succession struggle in Moscow and its effects on the environment in which substate leaders operated. The book's conclusion suggests how a public discursive framework can help provide a benchmark for comparing the Soviet Union with other regimes, including that of contemporary post-communist Russia. It summarizes how substate leaders and their strategies can shed light on dictatorship and on how it changes over time. It also explains that the Soviet case falls into two broad categories, one empirical and historical, the other comparative and theoretical. The chapter draws attention to a parallel act of delegation at the regional level. It also recounts how Joseph Stalin handed over power on a provisional basis to regional leaders due to his inability to penetrate the inner recesses of local administration.
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226816647
- eISBN:
- 9780226816661
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226816661.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
This chapter deals with the associations between peace campaigners and Soviet leaders that made it possible for Bruno Pontecorvo to leave the West, and also considers important questions, such as who ...
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This chapter deals with the associations between peace campaigners and Soviet leaders that made it possible for Bruno Pontecorvo to leave the West, and also considers important questions, such as who helped him in arranging his trip to Sweden, who provided the funding, and who helped him cross the Iron Curtain. The existence of political tensions motivated Pontecorvo to envision a future career in Russia. Emilio Sereni's activities within the Cominform led him to travel frequently to meet “comrades” in Russia and its satellite countries. According to Giulio Seniga, Pontecorvo left Italy with the support of the party's secret committee. Pontecorvo's decision met with general disapproval that was only mildly extenuated by the support received by pacifist campaigners. By the time he openly endorsed the pacifist cause, the political project for which Sereni had worked had fallen into a state of sheer decadence.Less
This chapter deals with the associations between peace campaigners and Soviet leaders that made it possible for Bruno Pontecorvo to leave the West, and also considers important questions, such as who helped him in arranging his trip to Sweden, who provided the funding, and who helped him cross the Iron Curtain. The existence of political tensions motivated Pontecorvo to envision a future career in Russia. Emilio Sereni's activities within the Cominform led him to travel frequently to meet “comrades” in Russia and its satellite countries. According to Giulio Seniga, Pontecorvo left Italy with the support of the party's secret committee. Pontecorvo's decision met with general disapproval that was only mildly extenuated by the support received by pacifist campaigners. By the time he openly endorsed the pacifist cause, the political project for which Sereni had worked had fallen into a state of sheer decadence.
Piero Gleijeses
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- July 2014
- ISBN:
- 9781469609683
- eISBN:
- 9781469612515
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469609683.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History
This chapter shows that Mikhail Gorbachev did not consider Castro a relic of the past. In Havana, Gorbachev was a tactful and respectful guest. The Cubans appreciated that he did not try to lecture ...
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This chapter shows that Mikhail Gorbachev did not consider Castro a relic of the past. In Havana, Gorbachev was a tactful and respectful guest. The Cubans appreciated that he did not try to lecture them, give them advice, or criticize them. At the press conference after the talks, when a journalist asked “What advice did the charming Gorbachev give the Cubans?” Castro quipped, “Gorbachev is charming precisely because he does not tell other countries what to do.” The Soviet leader assured the Cubans of continuing support. “Cuba—it is our revolutionary duty, our destiny to help her,” Gorbachev wrote after leaving the island. His promises rang hollow, however, against the backdrop of the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet bloc.Less
This chapter shows that Mikhail Gorbachev did not consider Castro a relic of the past. In Havana, Gorbachev was a tactful and respectful guest. The Cubans appreciated that he did not try to lecture them, give them advice, or criticize them. At the press conference after the talks, when a journalist asked “What advice did the charming Gorbachev give the Cubans?” Castro quipped, “Gorbachev is charming precisely because he does not tell other countries what to do.” The Soviet leader assured the Cubans of continuing support. “Cuba—it is our revolutionary duty, our destiny to help her,” Gorbachev wrote after leaving the island. His promises rang hollow, however, against the backdrop of the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet bloc.
Polly Jones
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780300185126
- eISBN:
- 9780300187212
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300185126.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, Political History
The Conclusion looks at the legacy of Stalin as it stands now. That post-Soviet leaders and citizens, as in other countries tackling traumatic pasts, continue to grapple with the same questions as ...
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The Conclusion looks at the legacy of Stalin as it stands now. That post-Soviet leaders and citizens, as in other countries tackling traumatic pasts, continue to grapple with the same questions as previous leaders and citizens suggests that it was not only the Soviet limits on discussion that left de-Stalinization unresolved in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, the decade and a half after Stalin's death witnessed a huge variety of approaches to remembering Stalinism. These lent the period its unique blend of hope and disillusionment about the post-Stalinist relaunch of the Soviet project itself.Less
The Conclusion looks at the legacy of Stalin as it stands now. That post-Soviet leaders and citizens, as in other countries tackling traumatic pasts, continue to grapple with the same questions as previous leaders and citizens suggests that it was not only the Soviet limits on discussion that left de-Stalinization unresolved in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, the decade and a half after Stalin's death witnessed a huge variety of approaches to remembering Stalinism. These lent the period its unique blend of hope and disillusionment about the post-Stalinist relaunch of the Soviet project itself.
