Jeffrey Kahn
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246991
- eISBN:
- 9780191599606
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246998.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
This book examines the development of Russia's current federal system of government from its Soviet origins, through Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, to the presidencies of Boris Yeltsin and the early ...
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This book examines the development of Russia's current federal system of government from its Soviet origins, through Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, to the presidencies of Boris Yeltsin and the early years of Vladimir Putin. The theoretical relationship between democracy, law, and federalism is examined with a focus on its application to the study of post‐authoritarian state systems. Federal institutions shape political agendas in the constituent units of a federation just as much as those units influence the shape of the federal whole. Case studies focus on Russia's 21 ethnic ‘republics’ (out of 89 units in a complicated multi‐level federal hierarchy) using previously unpublished primary source materials, including official documents and interviews with key participants on a variety of institutional levels.Less
This book examines the development of Russia's current federal system of government from its Soviet origins, through Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, to the presidencies of Boris Yeltsin and the early years of Vladimir Putin. The theoretical relationship between democracy, law, and federalism is examined with a focus on its application to the study of post‐authoritarian state systems. Federal institutions shape political agendas in the constituent units of a federation just as much as those units influence the shape of the federal whole. Case studies focus on Russia's 21 ethnic ‘republics’ (out of 89 units in a complicated multi‐level federal hierarchy) using previously unpublished primary source materials, including official documents and interviews with key participants on a variety of institutional levels.
Archie Brown
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780192880529
- eISBN:
- 9780191598876
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0192880527.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
Gorbachev was able to have a decisive impact on the development of ideas concerning the Soviet Union's relationship with the outside world and on the actual conduct of Soviet foreign policy by virtue ...
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Gorbachev was able to have a decisive impact on the development of ideas concerning the Soviet Union's relationship with the outside world and on the actual conduct of Soviet foreign policy by virtue of half a dozen key appointments. These were the elevation of Eduard Shevardnadze to the post of Foreign Minister, in succession to Andrey Gromyko, in the summer of 1985; the replacement of Boris Ponomarev as head of the International Department of the Central Committee by Anatoly Dobrynin in 1986; the promotion of Alexander Yakovlev to Politburo and Secretariat membership (with oversight of international affairs from the autumn of 1988); the replacement of Konstantin Rusakov by Vadim Medvedev as head of the Socialist Countries Department of the Central Committee in 1986; the appointment of Anatoly Chernyaev as Gorbachev's principal foreign policy aide in 1986; and the appointment of Georgy Shakhnazarov as another close aide two years later. These appointments both reflected and facilitated Gorbachev's adoption of new thinking in the foreign policy sphere with, for example, a concern for mutual security and an emphasis on interdependence taking the place of an antagonistic ‘class approach’ to international relations; a novel emphasis on universal interests and values that undercut the traditional ‘two camps’ approach; and ‘reasonable sufficiency’ becoming the criterion for justifying Soviet military expenditure. The sources of the new thinking are discussed, and in the conduct of state‐to‐state relations, particular attention is paid to the Soviet‐United States relationship and to relations with Europe, both West and East. The changes Gorbachev introduced in Soviet foreign policy made possible the transformation of the East European political landscape and it is especially notable that he refused to attempt to stem the democratic tide that flowed across the Eastern part of the continent even when it threatened to overwhelm him.Less
Gorbachev was able to have a decisive impact on the development of ideas concerning the Soviet Union's relationship with the outside world and on the actual conduct of Soviet foreign policy by virtue of half a dozen key appointments. These were the elevation of Eduard Shevardnadze to the post of Foreign Minister, in succession to Andrey Gromyko, in the summer of 1985; the replacement of Boris Ponomarev as head of the International Department of the Central Committee by Anatoly Dobrynin in 1986; the promotion of Alexander Yakovlev to Politburo and Secretariat membership (with oversight of international affairs from the autumn of 1988); the replacement of Konstantin Rusakov by Vadim Medvedev as head of the Socialist Countries Department of the Central Committee in 1986; the appointment of Anatoly Chernyaev as Gorbachev's principal foreign policy aide in 1986; and the appointment of Georgy Shakhnazarov as another close aide two years later. These appointments both reflected and facilitated Gorbachev's adoption of new thinking in the foreign policy sphere with, for example, a concern for mutual security and an emphasis on interdependence taking the place of an antagonistic ‘class approach’ to international relations; a novel emphasis on universal interests and values that undercut the traditional ‘two camps’ approach; and ‘reasonable sufficiency’ becoming the criterion for justifying Soviet military expenditure. The sources of the new thinking are discussed, and in the conduct of state‐to‐state relations, particular attention is paid to the Soviet‐United States relationship and to relations with Europe, both West and East. The changes Gorbachev introduced in Soviet foreign policy made possible the transformation of the East European political landscape and it is especially notable that he refused to attempt to stem the democratic tide that flowed across the Eastern part of the continent even when it threatened to overwhelm him.
Vladislav M. Zubok and Hope M. Harrison
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Khrushchev was the first Soviet leader to realize that nuclear bipolarity dictated permanent ’peaceful coexistence’ between two antagonistic social systems. Although he never abandoned the idea of ...
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Khrushchev was the first Soviet leader to realize that nuclear bipolarity dictated permanent ’peaceful coexistence’ between two antagonistic social systems. Although he never abandoned the idea of the usability of nuclear weapons, he regarded them primarily as a positive force and was eager to use them in his gamble for peace – an attempt to negotiate a permanent truce with the US, which would have liberated Soviet resources for the construction of communism and the assistance of ’progressive’ movements and regimes around the world. Khrushchev had little doubt that behind the nuclear shield, the Soviet Union would win a peaceful economic competition with the capitalist camp.Less
Khrushchev was the first Soviet leader to realize that nuclear bipolarity dictated permanent ’peaceful coexistence’ between two antagonistic social systems. Although he never abandoned the idea of the usability of nuclear weapons, he regarded them primarily as a positive force and was eager to use them in his gamble for peace – an attempt to negotiate a permanent truce with the US, which would have liberated Soviet resources for the construction of communism and the assistance of ’progressive’ movements and regimes around the world. Khrushchev had little doubt that behind the nuclear shield, the Soviet Union would win a peaceful economic competition with the capitalist camp.
Ted Hopf
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199858484
- eISBN:
- 9780199933426
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199858484.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter assesses how much the societal discourse of Soviet identity informed Soviet foreign relations with China, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, Eastern Europe, the developing world, and the West. ...
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This chapter assesses how much the societal discourse of Soviet identity informed Soviet foreign relations with China, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, Eastern Europe, the developing world, and the West. There was a revolution in Soviet foreign policy after Stalin’s death. It was made possible by the empowerment of a new Soviet identity, the central feature of which was an understanding of socialism that permitted variety and did not demand the strictest adherence to the Soviet model. This alternative discourse of difference had been maintained in society during the postwar Stalin years, often in official Soviet institutions. This change in Soviet identity had profound effects in Eastern Europe, where Stalinist regimes had been in power for years and had adopted Stalinist policies and practices, most often at the behest of Moscow.Less
This chapter assesses how much the societal discourse of Soviet identity informed Soviet foreign relations with China, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, Eastern Europe, the developing world, and the West. There was a revolution in Soviet foreign policy after Stalin’s death. It was made possible by the empowerment of a new Soviet identity, the central feature of which was an understanding of socialism that permitted variety and did not demand the strictest adherence to the Soviet model. This alternative discourse of difference had been maintained in society during the postwar Stalin years, often in official Soviet institutions. This change in Soviet identity had profound effects in Eastern Europe, where Stalinist regimes had been in power for years and had adopted Stalinist policies and practices, most often at the behest of Moscow.
Julie Newton
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199276141
- eISBN:
- 9780191603341
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199276145.003.0014
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
A bibliography of the complete works of Archie Brown is presented from the mid-1960s to the present. These provide valuable insights on the nature of the Soviet Union, its transition from Communism, ...
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A bibliography of the complete works of Archie Brown is presented from the mid-1960s to the present. These provide valuable insights on the nature of the Soviet Union, its transition from Communism, and on post-Soviet Russia’s ambiguous process of democratisation. Annotations are divided into nine thematic categories: links between Scottish and Russian enlightenments; Czechoslovakia, 1963-1968, and Eastern Europe under Soviet power; Soviet politics pre-1985; the Gorbachev Era; Russian politics and transition, 1992-2004; works spanning the Soviet and post-Soviet eras, 1917-2004; British Politics; other writings; and examples of substantial reviews and review articles.Less
A bibliography of the complete works of Archie Brown is presented from the mid-1960s to the present. These provide valuable insights on the nature of the Soviet Union, its transition from Communism, and on post-Soviet Russia’s ambiguous process of democratisation. Annotations are divided into nine thematic categories: links between Scottish and Russian enlightenments; Czechoslovakia, 1963-1968, and Eastern Europe under Soviet power; Soviet politics pre-1985; the Gorbachev Era; Russian politics and transition, 1992-2004; works spanning the Soviet and post-Soviet eras, 1917-2004; British Politics; other writings; and examples of substantial reviews and review articles.
Vladislav M. Zubok
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Stalin understood the military and political significance of atomic weapons and directed all available Soviet resources to obtaining this weapon. However, he remained largely a statesman operating on ...
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Stalin understood the military and political significance of atomic weapons and directed all available Soviet resources to obtaining this weapon. However, he remained largely a statesman operating on the premises and experience of the pre‐nuclear age. For him, the emergence of atomic weapons made the prospect of a future war more terrifying, but no less likely. America's atomic monopoly in the first phase of the Cold War did not play a substantial role in deterring Stalin. He was determined to defend his spheres of influence and to dispel any sign of possible Soviet weakness in the face of America's atomic saber rattling. Stalin, a genius of state terror, power broking, and war diplomacy, was different from statesmen in the democratic countries, but his outlook on world politics was consistent with the realpolitik of the pre‐nuclear age. He had as much inclination as some of his ’liberal’ Western counterparts to regard nuclear power as a means of augmenting military power and, in larger terms, the power of the state.Less
Stalin understood the military and political significance of atomic weapons and directed all available Soviet resources to obtaining this weapon. However, he remained largely a statesman operating on the premises and experience of the pre‐nuclear age. For him, the emergence of atomic weapons made the prospect of a future war more terrifying, but no less likely. America's atomic monopoly in the first phase of the Cold War did not play a substantial role in deterring Stalin. He was determined to defend his spheres of influence and to dispel any sign of possible Soviet weakness in the face of America's atomic saber rattling. Stalin, a genius of state terror, power broking, and war diplomacy, was different from statesmen in the democratic countries, but his outlook on world politics was consistent with the realpolitik of the pre‐nuclear age. He had as much inclination as some of his ’liberal’ Western counterparts to regard nuclear power as a means of augmenting military power and, in larger terms, the power of the state.
Johan F. M. Swinnen
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199288915
- eISBN:
- 9780191603518
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199288917.003.0007
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
This chapter explains why reforms were possible during the 1970s in China under the Communist regime, but not in the Soviet Union. It argues that the reasons are a combination of a change in ...
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This chapter explains why reforms were possible during the 1970s in China under the Communist regime, but not in the Soviet Union. It argues that the reasons are a combination of a change in leadership and grassroots pressure. Different choices were made in China than in the Soviet Union because the countries had different initial conditions in the countryside, particularly in terms of technology, incomes and wealth, and the structure of the economy; all affected the choices of the Communist leadership and the actions of citizens.Less
This chapter explains why reforms were possible during the 1970s in China under the Communist regime, but not in the Soviet Union. It argues that the reasons are a combination of a change in leadership and grassroots pressure. Different choices were made in China than in the Soviet Union because the countries had different initial conditions in the countryside, particularly in terms of technology, incomes and wealth, and the structure of the economy; all affected the choices of the Communist leadership and the actions of citizens.
Keren Yarhi-Milo
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159157
- eISBN:
- 9781400850419
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159157.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines the indicators used by U.S. President Jimmy Carter and two key decision makers in his administration, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus ...
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This chapter examines the indicators used by U.S. President Jimmy Carter and two key decision makers in his administration, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union during the period 1977–1980. Using evidence from U.S. archives and interviews with former U.S. decision makers, it compares the predictions of the selective attention thesis, capabilities thesis, strategic military doctrine thesis, and behavior thesis. After discussing the U.S. decision makers’ stated beliefs about Soviet intentions, the chapter considers the reasoning they employed to justify their intentions assessments. It then describes the policies that individual decision makers advocated and those that the administration collectively adopted. It also explores whether decision makers advocated policies that were congruent with their stated beliefs about intentions and evaluate sthe impact of beliefs about intentions on U.S. foreign policy at the time.Less
This chapter examines the indicators used by U.S. President Jimmy Carter and two key decision makers in his administration, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union during the period 1977–1980. Using evidence from U.S. archives and interviews with former U.S. decision makers, it compares the predictions of the selective attention thesis, capabilities thesis, strategic military doctrine thesis, and behavior thesis. After discussing the U.S. decision makers’ stated beliefs about Soviet intentions, the chapter considers the reasoning they employed to justify their intentions assessments. It then describes the policies that individual decision makers advocated and those that the administration collectively adopted. It also explores whether decision makers advocated policies that were congruent with their stated beliefs about intentions and evaluate sthe impact of beliefs about intentions on U.S. foreign policy at the time.
Ted Hopf
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199858484
- eISBN:
- 9780199933426
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199858484.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
General answers are hard to imagine for the puzzling questions that are raised by Soviet relations with the world in the early years of the Cold War. Why was Moscow more frightened by the Marshall ...
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General answers are hard to imagine for the puzzling questions that are raised by Soviet relations with the world in the early years of the Cold War. Why was Moscow more frightened by the Marshall Plan than the Truman Doctrine? Why would the Soviet Union abandon its ally, Yugoslavia, just when the Cold War was starting? How could Khrushchev’s de-Stalinized domestic and foreign policies at first cause a warming of relations with China, and then lead to loss? What can explain Stalin’s failure to ally with the leaders of the decolonizing world against imperialism and Khrushchev’s enthusiastic embrace of these leaders as anti-imperialist at a time of the first detente of the Cold War? It would seem that only idiosyncratic explanations could be offered for these seemingly incoherent policy outcomes. Or, at best, they could be explained by the personalities of Stalin and Khrushchev as leaders. In fact, the most Stalinist of Soviet leaders, the secret police chief and sociopath, Lavrentii Beria, was the most enthusiastic proponent of de-Stalinized foreign and domestic policies after Stalin’s death in March 1953. This book argues, instead, that it was Soviet identity that explains these anomalies. During Stalin’s rule, a discourse of danger prevailed in Soviet society, where any deviations from the idealized version of the New Soviet Man, were understood as threatening the very survival of the Soviet project itself. But the discourse of danger did not go unchallenged. Even under the rule of Stalin, Soviet society understood a socialist Soviet Union as a more secure, diverse, and socially democratic place. This discourse of difference, with its broader conception of what the socialist project meant, and who could contribute to it, was empowered after Stalin’s death, first by Beria, then by Malenkov, and then by Khrushchev, and the rest of the post-Stalin Soviet leadership. This discourse of difference allowed for the de-Stalinization of Eastern Europe, with the consequent revolts in Poland and Hungary, a rapprochement with Tito’s Yugoslavia, and an initial warming of relations with China. But it also sowed the seeds of the split with China, as the latter moved in the very Stalinist direction at home just rejected by Moscow. And, contrary to conventional wisdom, a moderation of authoritarianism at home, a product of the discourse of difference, did not lead to a moderation of Soviet foreign policy abroad. Instead, it led to the opening of an entirely new, and bloody, front in the decolonizing world.Less
General answers are hard to imagine for the puzzling questions that are raised by Soviet relations with the world in the early years of the Cold War. Why was Moscow more frightened by the Marshall Plan than the Truman Doctrine? Why would the Soviet Union abandon its ally, Yugoslavia, just when the Cold War was starting? How could Khrushchev’s de-Stalinized domestic and foreign policies at first cause a warming of relations with China, and then lead to loss? What can explain Stalin’s failure to ally with the leaders of the decolonizing world against imperialism and Khrushchev’s enthusiastic embrace of these leaders as anti-imperialist at a time of the first detente of the Cold War? It would seem that only idiosyncratic explanations could be offered for these seemingly incoherent policy outcomes. Or, at best, they could be explained by the personalities of Stalin and Khrushchev as leaders. In fact, the most Stalinist of Soviet leaders, the secret police chief and sociopath, Lavrentii Beria, was the most enthusiastic proponent of de-Stalinized foreign and domestic policies after Stalin’s death in March 1953. This book argues, instead, that it was Soviet identity that explains these anomalies. During Stalin’s rule, a discourse of danger prevailed in Soviet society, where any deviations from the idealized version of the New Soviet Man, were understood as threatening the very survival of the Soviet project itself. But the discourse of danger did not go unchallenged. Even under the rule of Stalin, Soviet society understood a socialist Soviet Union as a more secure, diverse, and socially democratic place. This discourse of difference, with its broader conception of what the socialist project meant, and who could contribute to it, was empowered after Stalin’s death, first by Beria, then by Malenkov, and then by Khrushchev, and the rest of the post-Stalin Soviet leadership. This discourse of difference allowed for the de-Stalinization of Eastern Europe, with the consequent revolts in Poland and Hungary, a rapprochement with Tito’s Yugoslavia, and an initial warming of relations with China. But it also sowed the seeds of the split with China, as the latter moved in the very Stalinist direction at home just rejected by Moscow. And, contrary to conventional wisdom, a moderation of authoritarianism at home, a product of the discourse of difference, did not lead to a moderation of Soviet foreign policy abroad. Instead, it led to the opening of an entirely new, and bloody, front in the decolonizing world.
Archie Brown
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780192880529
- eISBN:
- 9780191598876
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0192880527.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
Of the four transformations outlined in Ch. 6, two of the four had, by the end of the 1980s, been successful beyond the dreams of Soviet dissidents and of the most optimistic Western observers at the ...
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Of the four transformations outlined in Ch. 6, two of the four had, by the end of the 1980s, been successful beyond the dreams of Soviet dissidents and of the most optimistic Western observers at the time Gorbachev came to power. That is to say, the political system had become substantially pluralist and partially democratized and international relations had been still more comprehensively transformed. Economic reform and nationalities policy – along with some bad (as well as good) appointments – were, in contrast, areas of relative failure for Gorbachev. A decisively important achievement, however, was the dismantling of Communism (defined in the chapter) that occurred remarkably peacefully in a country that had been under Communist rule for seven decades. There was nothing inevitable either about the timing of the end of the Soviet state or about the way in which, under Gorbachev's leadership, the system was transformed. Taking all his mistakes and some undoubted failures into account – along, however, with the almost insuperable obstacles he had to overcome – Gorbachev has strong claims to be regarded as one of the greatest reformers in Russian history and as the individual who made the most profound impact on world history in the second half of the 20th century.Less
Of the four transformations outlined in Ch. 6, two of the four had, by the end of the 1980s, been successful beyond the dreams of Soviet dissidents and of the most optimistic Western observers at the time Gorbachev came to power. That is to say, the political system had become substantially pluralist and partially democratized and international relations had been still more comprehensively transformed. Economic reform and nationalities policy – along with some bad (as well as good) appointments – were, in contrast, areas of relative failure for Gorbachev. A decisively important achievement, however, was the dismantling of Communism (defined in the chapter) that occurred remarkably peacefully in a country that had been under Communist rule for seven decades. There was nothing inevitable either about the timing of the end of the Soviet state or about the way in which, under Gorbachev's leadership, the system was transformed. Taking all his mistakes and some undoubted failures into account – along, however, with the almost insuperable obstacles he had to overcome – Gorbachev has strong claims to be regarded as one of the greatest reformers in Russian history and as the individual who made the most profound impact on world history in the second half of the 20th century.
David Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198275282
- eISBN:
- 9780191598739
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198275285.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
International society in the nineteenth century witnessed the assertion of special rights for great powers and some strengthening of the Westphalian bases of international order in the Concert of ...
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International society in the nineteenth century witnessed the assertion of special rights for great powers and some strengthening of the Westphalian bases of international order in the Concert of Europe. The system collapsed with the First World War and faced its strongest challenge to date from the Russian Revolution. The ideological challenge of Marxism and the Russian Revolution stemmed from its claim that class was the motive force of history and that the Communist Party possessed a unique insight into the laws of history. However, revolutionary internationalism in Soviet foreign policy was soon accompanied by more cautious policies, amounting to a partial socialization. This process reached a peak under Mikhail Gorbachev who brought to a crisis point the central paradox of the Soviet state: that its legitimacy rested upon its claim to be the ‘socialist fatherland’ but it could not avoid an identity as an orthodox state.Less
International society in the nineteenth century witnessed the assertion of special rights for great powers and some strengthening of the Westphalian bases of international order in the Concert of Europe. The system collapsed with the First World War and faced its strongest challenge to date from the Russian Revolution. The ideological challenge of Marxism and the Russian Revolution stemmed from its claim that class was the motive force of history and that the Communist Party possessed a unique insight into the laws of history. However, revolutionary internationalism in Soviet foreign policy was soon accompanied by more cautious policies, amounting to a partial socialization. This process reached a peak under Mikhail Gorbachev who brought to a crisis point the central paradox of the Soviet state: that its legitimacy rested upon its claim to be the ‘socialist fatherland’ but it could not avoid an identity as an orthodox state.
Andrew P. N. Eardmann
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
For Eisenhower, it was nuclear weapons’ destructive potential, not the image of a protracted conventional war, that destroyed the ’logic’ of war. He believed that thermonuclear weapons made any ...
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For Eisenhower, it was nuclear weapons’ destructive potential, not the image of a protracted conventional war, that destroyed the ’logic’ of war. He believed that thermonuclear weapons made any notion of victory incoherent. Meaningful defence could then only be deterrence. Facing this new setting, Eisenhower reassessed the dynamics of international relations and altered his behaviour accordingly. During his first three years as president, he relied on the ’Detroit Deterrent’, the belief that the US industrial capacity would enable it to triumph in any such war of attrition. By 1956, however, the combination of thermonuclear weapons and growing Soviet intercontinental delivery capabilities made Detroit Deterrent obsolete in his mind. By the end of his presidency, therefore, superpower relations had begun to operate according to this new logic, the logic of ’thermonuclear revolution’.Less
For Eisenhower, it was nuclear weapons’ destructive potential, not the image of a protracted conventional war, that destroyed the ’logic’ of war. He believed that thermonuclear weapons made any notion of victory incoherent. Meaningful defence could then only be deterrence. Facing this new setting, Eisenhower reassessed the dynamics of international relations and altered his behaviour accordingly. During his first three years as president, he relied on the ’Detroit Deterrent’, the belief that the US industrial capacity would enable it to triumph in any such war of attrition. By 1956, however, the combination of thermonuclear weapons and growing Soviet intercontinental delivery capabilities made Detroit Deterrent obsolete in his mind. By the end of his presidency, therefore, superpower relations had begun to operate according to this new logic, the logic of ’thermonuclear revolution’.
Steven A. Barnes
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151120
- eISBN:
- 9781400838615
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151120.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, Russian and Former Soviet Union History
This chapter focuses on the Gulag during the Armageddon of the Great Patriotic War. It shows how the institutions, practices, and identities of the Gulag shifted in accord with the demands of total ...
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This chapter focuses on the Gulag during the Armageddon of the Great Patriotic War. It shows how the institutions, practices, and identities of the Gulag shifted in accord with the demands of total war. The war was an era of mass release on an unprecedented scale side by side with the highest mortality rates in the history of the Gulag system. After four years of brutal, exhausting warfare and a disastrous initial stage, the Soviet Union emerged from its Armageddon victorious. The early postwar period offered no indication that the Gulag would cease to be a mass social phenomenon within fifteen years. Rather, the Gulag remained a pillar in the reestablishment of the Soviet system, following the Red Army into liberated territories, so that every liberated district received its own corrective labor colony. By 1944, the camp and colony population began to grow again.Less
This chapter focuses on the Gulag during the Armageddon of the Great Patriotic War. It shows how the institutions, practices, and identities of the Gulag shifted in accord with the demands of total war. The war was an era of mass release on an unprecedented scale side by side with the highest mortality rates in the history of the Gulag system. After four years of brutal, exhausting warfare and a disastrous initial stage, the Soviet Union emerged from its Armageddon victorious. The early postwar period offered no indication that the Gulag would cease to be a mass social phenomenon within fifteen years. Rather, the Gulag remained a pillar in the reestablishment of the Soviet system, following the Red Army into liberated territories, so that every liberated district received its own corrective labor colony. By 1944, the camp and colony population began to grow again.
Pål Kolstø
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199248155
- eISBN:
- 9780191602955
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924815X.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Political leaders in post-Communist Eastern European states have rejected ethnic minority leaders’ calls for territorial autonomy (TA). Two reasons are given for this rejection: TA is viewed as a ...
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Political leaders in post-Communist Eastern European states have rejected ethnic minority leaders’ calls for territorial autonomy (TA). Two reasons are given for this rejection: TA is viewed as a stepping stone to secession, and that the putative minority homeland is no more culturally homogeneous than is the state as a whole. The validity of these two objections to TA is discussed within the context of the history of TA in the Soviet Union, and actual experiences of TA in successor states.Less
Political leaders in post-Communist Eastern European states have rejected ethnic minority leaders’ calls for territorial autonomy (TA). Two reasons are given for this rejection: TA is viewed as a stepping stone to secession, and that the putative minority homeland is no more culturally homogeneous than is the state as a whole. The validity of these two objections to TA is discussed within the context of the history of TA in the Soviet Union, and actual experiences of TA in successor states.
Keren Yarhi-Milo
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159157
- eISBN:
- 9781400850419
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159157.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines the indicators used by U.S. President Jimmy Carter and two key decision makers in his administration, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus ...
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This chapter examines the indicators used by U.S. President Jimmy Carter and two key decision makers in his administration, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union during the period 1977–1980. Using evidence from U.S. archives and interviews with former U.S. decision makers, it compares the predictions of the selective attention thesis, capabilities thesis, strategic military doctrine thesis, and behavior thesis. After discussing the U.S. decision makers' stated beliefs about Soviet intentions, the chapter considers the reasoning they employed to justify their intentions assessments. It then describes the policies that individual decision makers advocated and those that the administration collectively adopted. It also explores whether decision makers advocated policies that were congruent with their stated beliefs about intentions and evaluate sthe impact of beliefs about intentions on U.S. foreign policy at the time.Less
This chapter examines the indicators used by U.S. President Jimmy Carter and two key decision makers in his administration, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union during the period 1977–1980. Using evidence from U.S. archives and interviews with former U.S. decision makers, it compares the predictions of the selective attention thesis, capabilities thesis, strategic military doctrine thesis, and behavior thesis. After discussing the U.S. decision makers' stated beliefs about Soviet intentions, the chapter considers the reasoning they employed to justify their intentions assessments. It then describes the policies that individual decision makers advocated and those that the administration collectively adopted. It also explores whether decision makers advocated policies that were congruent with their stated beliefs about intentions and evaluate sthe impact of beliefs about intentions on U.S. foreign policy at the time.
Simon Morrison
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195181678
- eISBN:
- 9780199870806
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195181678.003.0002
- Subject:
- Music, History, Western
This chapter chronicles Prokofiev's relocation to Moscow in the spring of 1936, his reaction to the denunciation of Shostakovich in Pravda; the composition of the ballet Romeo and Juliet and the ...
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This chapter chronicles Prokofiev's relocation to Moscow in the spring of 1936, his reaction to the denunciation of Shostakovich in Pravda; the composition of the ballet Romeo and Juliet and the Cantata for the Twentieth Anniversary of October; the censorship of those two works, and Prokofiev's service as a cultural representative for the Soviet regime during his last two trips abroad. The chapter addresses his collaborations with the director Sergey Radlov (who conceived a happy ending for Romeo and Juliet) and Nataliya Sats (who commissioned Peter and the Wolf for the Moscow Children's Theater), his fraught relationship with the Chairman of the Committee on Arts Affairs Platon Kerzhentsev, and his speeches at the Union of Soviet Composers. The description of his last trip to the United States corrects inaccuracies in the historical record concerning his interest in Hollywood film composition. Prokofiev was monitored throughout the trip by Soviet officials working for the VOKS organization and the Embassies in London and Washington.Less
This chapter chronicles Prokofiev's relocation to Moscow in the spring of 1936, his reaction to the denunciation of Shostakovich in Pravda; the composition of the ballet Romeo and Juliet and the Cantata for the Twentieth Anniversary of October; the censorship of those two works, and Prokofiev's service as a cultural representative for the Soviet regime during his last two trips abroad. The chapter addresses his collaborations with the director Sergey Radlov (who conceived a happy ending for Romeo and Juliet) and Nataliya Sats (who commissioned Peter and the Wolf for the Moscow Children's Theater), his fraught relationship with the Chairman of the Committee on Arts Affairs Platon Kerzhentsev, and his speeches at the Union of Soviet Composers. The description of his last trip to the United States corrects inaccuracies in the historical record concerning his interest in Hollywood film composition. Prokofiev was monitored throughout the trip by Soviet officials working for the VOKS organization and the Embassies in London and Washington.
Jeffrey Kahn
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246991
- eISBN:
- 9780191599606
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246998.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
Although most scholars were quick to puncture the Soviet Union's sham claims to democracy, too many accepted at face value its claim to be a federal state. The shifting debates about federalism in ...
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Although most scholars were quick to puncture the Soviet Union's sham claims to democracy, too many accepted at face value its claim to be a federal state. The shifting debates about federalism in Bolshevik doctrine and communist theory are explored. The formation, systematization, and stagnation of the so‐called ‘Soviet federalism’ is examined and debunked through analysis of the constitutions and political realities that existed under Lenin, Stalin, and Brezhnev.Less
Although most scholars were quick to puncture the Soviet Union's sham claims to democracy, too many accepted at face value its claim to be a federal state. The shifting debates about federalism in Bolshevik doctrine and communist theory are explored. The formation, systematization, and stagnation of the so‐called ‘Soviet federalism’ is examined and debunked through analysis of the constitutions and political realities that existed under Lenin, Stalin, and Brezhnev.
Alex Pravda
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199276141
- eISBN:
- 9780191603341
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199276145.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
This chapter begins with descriptions of the life and accomplishments of Archie Brown, Britain’s foremost expert on Russian politics. In the last 40 years, Brown has gained international recognition ...
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This chapter begins with descriptions of the life and accomplishments of Archie Brown, Britain’s foremost expert on Russian politics. In the last 40 years, Brown has gained international recognition for his scholarly work on leadership and political change in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. Brown’s insights into the sources of within-system reform, the role of Gorbachev in transforming Soviet Communism, and leadership and democratisation in post-Communist Russia are discussed.Less
This chapter begins with descriptions of the life and accomplishments of Archie Brown, Britain’s foremost expert on Russian politics. In the last 40 years, Brown has gained international recognition for his scholarly work on leadership and political change in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. Brown’s insights into the sources of within-system reform, the role of Gorbachev in transforming Soviet Communism, and leadership and democratisation in post-Communist Russia are discussed.
John F. Padgett
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691148670
- eISBN:
- 9781400845552
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691148670.003.0009
- Subject:
- Sociology, Economic Sociology
This chapter compares the political, economic, and social-network dynamics of major economic reform campaigns within communism itself by Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, ...
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This chapter compares the political, economic, and social-network dynamics of major economic reform campaigns within communism itself by Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Mikhail Gorbachev. Over their histories, Soviet, Chinese, and East European communisms frequently had tried to reform themselves economically in a wide variety of ways. The dynamics of economic reform in the climactic 1980s were not as different from what had preceded it as is commonly assumed. It was the outcome more than the process that differed. Hence, the chapter analyzes the transition from communism to “capitalism” not from the outside perspective of capitalism but from the internal perspective of communism.Less
This chapter compares the political, economic, and social-network dynamics of major economic reform campaigns within communism itself by Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Mikhail Gorbachev. Over their histories, Soviet, Chinese, and East European communisms frequently had tried to reform themselves economically in a wide variety of ways. The dynamics of economic reform in the climactic 1980s were not as different from what had preceded it as is commonly assumed. It was the outcome more than the process that differed. Hence, the chapter analyzes the transition from communism to “capitalism” not from the outside perspective of capitalism but from the internal perspective of communism.
Nanci Adler
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199240906
- eISBN:
- 9780191598869
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199240906.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter explores Russia’s attempts to come to terms with its Stalinist past in an endeavour to build a civil society based on the rule of law. It begins by examining the nature of Stalinist ...
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This chapter explores Russia’s attempts to come to terms with its Stalinist past in an endeavour to build a civil society based on the rule of law. It begins by examining the nature of Stalinist repression and the legacy of Soviet terror. It goes on to focus on halted official efforts at truth telling, and persistent unofficial efforts, led by the organization Memorial, at remembering and commemorating; this provides insight into the issues that daunted the quest for moral recovery. The chapter then looks at post-Soviet efforts to come to terms with the Stalinist past, and finally it assesses the impact of the discussion of past injustices, or the politics of memory, on Russia’s subsequent process of democratization. The information presented and the conclusions drawn are necessarily based on a number of scattered sources, including memoirs, interviews and official archives; Russia’s experience is unique, and difficult to compare with other post-authoritarian political systems, especially as democracy has not taken substantial hold, and, since the transition is so new, questions of accountability are only beginning to be addressed.Less
This chapter explores Russia’s attempts to come to terms with its Stalinist past in an endeavour to build a civil society based on the rule of law. It begins by examining the nature of Stalinist repression and the legacy of Soviet terror. It goes on to focus on halted official efforts at truth telling, and persistent unofficial efforts, led by the organization Memorial, at remembering and commemorating; this provides insight into the issues that daunted the quest for moral recovery. The chapter then looks at post-Soviet efforts to come to terms with the Stalinist past, and finally it assesses the impact of the discussion of past injustices, or the politics of memory, on Russia’s subsequent process of democratization. The information presented and the conclusions drawn are necessarily based on a number of scattered sources, including memoirs, interviews and official archives; Russia’s experience is unique, and difficult to compare with other post-authoritarian political systems, especially as democracy has not taken substantial hold, and, since the transition is so new, questions of accountability are only beginning to be addressed.
