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This chapter begins with a brief introduction to research on the intersection of international criminal justice and history. It details the methodology used to dissect ICTY judgments and applies an abbreviated form of it to the Rule 98bis Decision. It then combines this analysis with findings in other ICTY cases that intersect with Milošević to see how much history can be salvaged from the trial.

Covers the origins of the Kosovo crisis and violations of international human rights standards, with special focus on the period from the abrogation of Kosovo's autonomous status in 1989 to February 1998. The chapter covers post‐World War II history of Serbian policy in Kosovo, Slobodan Milosevic's rise to power in the late 1980s, Albanian resistance under the League for a Democratic Kosovo (LDK), the establishment of a parallel system of Albanian underground self‐governance and the rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In discussing the breakout of violence in 1998–99, the chapterpoints to failures of “early warning” lessons and the missed opportunities by the international community to prevent the conflict.

Chapter six covers the military confrontation launched by the NATO alliance against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia) in 1999. It explains why and under what conditions Slobodan Milošević’s regime rejected a peaceful settlement to the Kosovo conflict. It does so by highlighting how antagonisms in Kosovo presented a unique domestic crisis, giving Milošević an opportunity to seize power and ride on the popular sentiment, but also limited Milošević’s ability to compromise with Kosovo Albanians. To retain regime stability and popularity, Milošević resisted compromising on Kosovo. In addition, he was given foreign support by Russia, which opposed NATO intervention at a diplomatic level. Once the conditions change, a counter-factual analysis shows that so does their causal power, further strengthening the findings.

This chapter looks at the way in which the ad hoc Tribunals have sought to balance the right of an accused to represent themselves with the interests of justice and the expeditious conduct of proceedings. It undertakes an in depth analysis of the current jurisprudence on the matter and documents the strategies adopted by the bench in dealing with self-representing accused such as Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić, and Vojislav Šešelj. It is evident that in dealing with such issues as disruptive or ill self-representing accused the bench of the ad hoc Tribunals has had to engage in a creative interpretation of the relevant substantive and procedure law in order to come to a ‘fair’ resolution in the interests of the accused and justice more generally.

This chapter examines the factors that contributed to the deterioration of the ICTY's public image during the Milošević trial and the choices that media outlets made based on those factors. It identifies two dominant frames in the media coverage of Milošević. One, which fundamentally supported international criminal law and its prevalence over municipal law (“pro-ICL”), was deployed by most Western, liberal-democratic media outlets, as well as some in the former Yugoslavia. The other involved frames used by nationalist media from the former Yugoslavia and some radical left-wing outlets from Western Europe (“anti-ICL”), which promoted national sovereignty rather than international law.

This chapter details Milošević's trial. It considers some of the major challenges and controversies that arose during its various phases, from indictment through termination. The discussions include Milošević indictment on 22 May 1999 for crimes in Kosovo; the Prosecution phase which proceeded in three parts, beginning with Kosovo (which lasted until the end of September 2002); then Croatia and then Bosnia (which ran until the Prosecution rested in February 2004); the defense phase; and the termination of the trial proceeding on 14 March 2006.

Assesses the success of the two humanitarian interventions in the Balkans – Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 – from the perspective of humanitarian organizations. It argues how, ironically, the effectiveness of organizations such as UNHCR can dissuade powerful states from taking the necessary steps to address the root causes of massive human rights violations. Slow and ambiguous action from the international community can raise false expectations on the part of suffering civilians, and embolden those who commit atrocities. The author argues that the political, military, and humanitarian strands of interventions are always closely interwoven, and draws a series of lessons from the Balkans experience: the need for the international community to act early, credibly, and consistently; the importance of preserving the identity of a humanitarian operation; the imperative to end the impunity of those who orchestrate and commit massive violations of human rights; and the importance of engaging the United Nations.

This chapter examines the meaning of the terminated Milošević trial in relation to the idea that courts produce consequential narratives. In particular, it looks at efforts to deploy and interpret the one document from Milošević that, more than any other, was thought of as a substitute for judgment: the Trial Chamber's Rule 98bis Decision on the Motion to Acquit.

Describes the fatal spiral of hardening Serb intransigence and growing Kosovar Albanian armament that followed the abolishment of Kosovo's autonomy in 1990 and led to escalation of the conflict. The chapter identifies important military activities and sites of mass murder, most importantly the early Serbian military operation in Drenice/Drenica and the later execution of 45 Albanians in Recak/Racak. The chapter discusses the rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and describes how the efforts by the UN Security Council and the Contact Group led to an agreement between US envoy Richard Holbrooke and Slobodan Milosevic to implement a cease‐fire and introduce the Kosovo Verification Mission. But this agreement was broken and further diplomatic efforts in Rambouillet and Paris failed to bring about cession of hostilities.

Structural conditionality is the practice of powerful global actors providing financial assistance to countries with the explicit contingency that they take formally agreed-upon actions to reform their national economic, political, and legal systems. The terms of structural pre-conditionality may often be more vague than those of its more formal counterpart, but the scope and stakes of its application often are bigger. The precondition of structural reform often is experienced as an intervention into the domestic politics of the targeted, less powerful nations. It could also be understood as an instrument of soft power. The international community has used the practice of structural pre-conditionality to obtain cooperation by the governments of the former Yugoslavia, particularly Serbia, with ICTY requests. This chapter examines the use of structural pre-conditionality in the EU intervention, widely credited as leading to the arrest of Slobodan Milošević and his transfer to the ICTY. It analyzes how the exercise of structural pre-conditionality mediated and contextualized Serbian politics in ways that established a political foundation first for the Milošević arrest and, subsequently, for the Karadžić arrest.

This chapter argues that despite the perceived failure of the Milošević trial, subsequent trials at the ICTY and other tribunals demonstrate both the vitality of international criminal law and the ICTY's continuing influence on media and policy practices. The Milošević trial also established a record, both about Milošević's own role and that of the Serb leadership more generally.

This chapter suggests that the ICTY has left the public with a narrative of Milošević and the war that is in many important respects simply wrong. This raises serious questions about the ICTY's role in establishing the truth and changing attitudes in the Balkans.

This chapter examines Milošević's complex political legacy. It discusses how and why the initially successful performance of Milošević at the ICTY did not translate into increased political support for his party or other parties with a nationalist platform. The chapter first explores the impact of the Milošević trial on the Serb audience, It then discusses the decline of the fortunes of Milošević's Socijalistička partija Srbije (Socialist Party of Serbia), and the consequences of Milošević's death for politics in Serbia and for the legacy of his ideas.

Since Miloševićs death, several new trials associated with his regime have begun at the ICTY. They involve principal members of Serbia's or the FRY's state apparatus engaged in the same JCE alleged against Milošević, and mostly build on evidence that was introduced in the Milošević trial. This chapter shows that the Prosecution's strategic choices in the post-Milošević trials have dissociated Serbian and FRY officials from the Srebrenica genocide, thus minimizing the Milošević regime's leadership role in and responsibility for crimes in Bosnia. These choices indicate a politicization of the judicial process—an effort to influence the way evidence should be interpreted outside and beyond the courtroom.

This chapter examines the cooperation between Serbia and the International Criminal tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) though reconstruction of how the OTP obtained records of the Supreme Defence Council (SDC), a collective Commander-in-Chief of the Yugoslav Army (VJ: Vojska Jugoslavije) from 1992 to 2003. Recent experience in the former Yugoslavia, in particular with Serbia, shows that the leading political elites will rarely be open and will do everything possible to control and limit post-conflict narratives. This proposition will be illustrated by analysing the way the de facto and de jure powers of Slobodan Milošević as president of Serbia (1990-1998) and of the FRY (1998-2000) would have been revealed through the SDC collection of documents generated by the highest state bodies in charge of commanding the armed forces during the Croatian, BiH, and Kosovo indictment periods that were incompletely and grudgingly produced by Serbia to the ICTY for its use.

This chapter examines the difficulties faced by the participants in the trial: judges, prosecutors, and defendant. The obstacles confronted by judges include the hybrid rules of procedure, their inexperience, their exaggerated tolerance of Milošević's behavior, and their passivity. Prosecutors made strategic errors and encountered obstacles that either lengthened the trial or weakened their case. Their “Kosovo-first” strategy did both these things, whereas their inability to develop a more assertive strategy on adjudicated facts, better manage witnesses and lengthy accusations, or win greater rights during the examination of witnesses are examples of missed procedural opportunities to shorten the trial. Milošević's behavior in the courtroom also lengthened the trial. The Chamber's recognition of his right of self-defense gave him the freedom to raise an overtly political defense. He managed to attack witnesses and cross-examine them in a way that hampered their credibility. But perhaps the most problematic difficulty connected with the Accused was his ill health, which constantly delayed the trial and ultimately contributed to its termination.

This chapter examines the growing challenge faced by the judicial administration of international courts in dealing with defendants who invoke a right to self-representation, and assesses the extent to which these institutions are responsible for ensuring that defendants have adequate means to put their case. Through the ICTY's institutional efforts to simultaneously accommodate that claim of right, and yet also to engage him in the trial process, Milošević became an active if indirect participant in the process of judicial administration.

This chapter examines the Bosniaks' reactions to the Milošević trial. Analysis of Bosniak media and interviews with Bosniaks shows that the overwhelming response to Milošević's trial and death was anger, disappointment, and regret, with special criticism directed at the international community. The trial also reinforced existing narratives about the war and responsibility for atrocities: Bosniaks viewed the trial as just another event in a long pattern of being on the losing end—harmed by their neighbors and the international community—going back at least to 1992.