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The peace between Britain and America was the achievement on the British side of Lord Shelburne. He had opposed the war and hoped that the Americans would return to a close relationship with Britain short of full independence. Initially he was prepared to give them generous terms over their territorial and other claims. He was, however, to discover that the Americans would not compromise on full independence, which he reluctantly conceded, and that any settlement with them would involve highly contentious issues, such as what was to be done for loyalists who had sided with Britain or what were to be the boundaries of the remaining British American colonies. To attain a quick peace, Britain yielded on most points. Concessions were denounced in the press and in parliament leading to Shelburne’s resignation.

This chapter turns to the second Earl of Shelburne, William Petty. He was referred to as Lord Shelburne during his life, and by his many antagonists as ‘Malagrida’, after the notorious Portuguese Jesuit Gabriel Malagrida, who had described the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 as the judgement of God upon a sinful people, and who was later executed for purported involvement in a plot to assassinate King José I. Shelburne was likened to Malagrida for calling himself a patriot while encouraging faction and opposition to George III, for associating with so-called republicans and levellers, for supporting John Wilkes's campaign for reinstatement as a member of parliament, and for lacking any sense of humour. For Shelburne's opponents, he was a dangerous Whig, a constitutional meddler, a friend to radicals and dissenters, and likely to cause the collapse of the country if he ever gained power. For the Genevan rebels, Shelburne's involvement in Whig politics was to have profound consequences.

Blackstone was now fully committed to a career at the London bar, and enjoyed some measure of success, both as an advocate and in out-of-court practice. He nevertheless continued lecturing at Oxford, where the headship of New Inn Hall partly compensated for the All Souls fellowship he had forfeited upon marriage. His ambiguous role in the university's chancellorship election of 1762, when he failed to support the candidate backed by his own aristocratic patrons Bute and Shelburne, did nothing to further his chances of preferment. These patrons may also have been disappointed by his performance in the House of Commons, notwithstanding his exceptionally diligent service on committees. But the main reasons why Blackstone failed to win a judgeship were probably a lack of judicial vacancies, combined with his relative youth and inexperience, and the political instability of the 1760s.

With the fall of North, Rockingham returned to power in 1782. Burke was admitted to the Privy Council and became Paymaster-General of the Forces. Rockingham's death in July 1782 and his replacement as Prime Minister by Shelburne put an end to his administration after only a few months. However, Burke managed to pass two Acts. The Paymaster General Act of 1782 ended the post as a lucrative sinecure. The Civil List and Secret Service Money Act of 1782 was a watered down version of Burke's original intentions as outlined in his famous Speech on Economical Reform. In February 1783, Burke resumed the post of Paymaster of the Forces when Shelburne's government was replaced by a coalition headed by North, including Charles James Fox. Though Burke did not break with Fox until 1791, in 1784 he was already unhappy with the direction in which Fox had taken the old Rockingham party.

This chapter describes the historical context which led to the formation of the New Geneva settlement. Attacked as anarchists and democrats by the French during the eighteenth century, the Genevan rebels were invited to come to Britain. Britain offered to help to create a New Geneva, proving that it remained supportive of liberty, whatever the republicans in America might declare. The plan, of course, was not simply to abandon an old city and to found a new one. The move was accompanied by great expectations, for the transformation of Ireland, for the growth of wealth and of virtue and for the reform of the empire of Britain itself. In short, the transfer of republicans from Geneva was expected to inaugurate an era of radical reform and reformation. The result was a remarkable experiment at the ancient city and significant port of Waterford in southern Ireland. New Geneva was established at the site of a village called Passage, located near Waterford. The settlement was to be peopled by rebels.

This chapter focuses on the regime of William Pitt as British prime minister, who was designated by George III as the First Earl of Chatham. Pitt was disposed to retain those office-holders who wished to stay because he lacked sufficient followers to form an administration. He made appointments without regard for connections but perceived merit. Some of Pitt's key appointments include Charles Townshend as Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Second Earl of Shelburne as Secretary of State for the Home Department.

At the beginning of 1782, Britain was preoccupied with trying to suppress the revolt of its American colonies while waging war with France, Spain, and the Netherlands. The task of making peace and ending the War of American Independence required the efforts of no fewer than five British ministries. The peace brokered in 1783 was essentially framed during the Shelburne ministry. William, earl of Shelburne, was himself heavily involved in the peace negotiations, assisted by his foreign and home secretaries, Lord Grantham and Thomas Townshend. This book examines the peace of 1783, focusing upon the Anglo-French negotiations and the role of the coalition between by British foreign secretary Charles James Fox and Frederick, Lord North. It looks at the peace overtures of the North ministry and reconstructs the substantive negotiations of the Rockingham, Shelburne, and Fox–North ministries. The book also considers the influence of traditional foreign policy, the domestic political context, and the individuals involved in the negotiations themselves.

In analysing the peace negotiations between Britain and America, Richard Morris suggests that American independence was the most important issue at stake at the time. He notes that the Americans won an outstanding peace settlement because the American peace envoys were more clever and more moral than their European counterparts. While Morris is correct in claiming that America gained independence and received generous concessions in terms of boundaries, fisheries, and other interests, this chapter challenges the assumption that Americans outwitted crafty but stupid Old World diplomats to put an end to the War of American Independence. It first considers Britain's willingness to make concessions due to two factors: Britain's concern with the European balance of power; and the peculiar, albeit visionary, beliefs of the earl of Shelburne. The chapter then discusses the role of France and Spain, America's suspicion of French intentions with regards to the peace negotiations, the creation of a commission headed by Richard Oswald, and British resistance and concessions.

Richard Morris's account of the peace negotiations of 1782–1784 that ended the War of American Independence is incomplete with respect to the Anglo-American settlement, and is also inadequate in terms of Britain's negotiations with France, Spain, and the Netherlands. By depicting America as the centre around which all diplomatic efforts revolved, Morris exaggerates the excitement and novelty of the birth of America, and glosses over the fact that, for contemporaries, the European negotiations were considerably much more significant. This chapter examines the peace negotiations of 1782–1784 by focusing on compromise and the role of Europe. In particular, it looks at the roles played by the earl of Shelburne and French foreign minister Charles Gravier Vergennes in making the peace between Britain and America a reality.

Hopes for a reconciliation between France and Britain did not last long. Although the British Parliament pledged to uphold the peace settlement, it censured the terms that had been agreed. The earl of Shelburne lost office in February 1783, and Charles James Fox, returning as foreign secretary, immediately reversed his policies, and in favour of the much more traditional anti-Bourbon standpoint. Charles Gravier Vergennes, the French foreign minister, continued to suggest joint action over the Crimea, but Fox responded by revealing Vergennes's overtures to Russia and his pursuit of the mirage of a continental alliance between Russia and Prussia. This chapter examines the peace negotiations of 1782–1784 that ended the War of American Independence in the context of British domestic politics. It first considers British political opinion regarding the negotiations before turning to the support provided by King George III and British foreign secretary Thomas Robinson Grantham to the earl of Shelburne concerning a rapprochement with France. The chapter then discusses the Cabinet opposition to Shelburne's way of thinking.

Historical discussions of the peace negotiations that ended the War of American Independence have focused on the signing of the preliminary treaties on January 20, 1783. According to Jonathan Dull, the definitive peace treaties that were signed essentially ratified the preliminary agreement. However, this fails to consider the fact that Charles James Fox, the British foreign secretary, made a very genuine and concerted attempt to change a number of the preliminary articles. The way in which the 1783 negotiations were conducted reinforces some of the conclusions already drawn about France's motivations and underlying concerns. This chapter examines the peace negotiations and compares Fox's foreign policy to that of the earl of Shelburne. It first discusses the relative unimportance of America in the peace talks before turning to the rapprochement pursuit by French foreign minister Charles Gravier Vergennes.

By August 1782, the earl of Shelburne and French foreign minister Charles Gravier Vergennes were both predisposed to a quick settlement as part of the peace negotiations. In the process, the two men had to establish a relationship of considerable trust and confidence. Each leader continued to seek the best possible outcome for his country while showing a willingness to compromise rival claims in the expectation of future co-operation. As a result, a relatively rapid and comprehensive peace, one that entitled both leaders to claim a measure of success, was realised. In Britain and France, Shelburne and Vergennes were both criticised for conceding more than was justified. Nevertheless, the negotiators were well satisfied with the final results. This chapter examines the peace negotiations that ended the War of American Independence and gave birth to America as a new republic.