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Assesses the success of the two humanitarian interventions in the Balkans – Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 – from the perspective of humanitarian organizations. It argues how, ironically, the effectiveness of organizations such as UNHCR can dissuade powerful states from taking the necessary steps to address the root causes of massive human rights violations. Slow and ambiguous action from the international community can raise false expectations on the part of suffering civilians, and embolden those who commit atrocities. The author argues that the political, military, and humanitarian strands of interventions are always closely interwoven, and draws a series of lessons from the Balkans experience: the need for the international community to act early, credibly, and consistently; the importance of preserving the identity of a humanitarian operation; the imperative to end the impunity of those who orchestrate and commit massive violations of human rights; and the importance of engaging the United Nations.

Examines the conditions determining the effectiveness of regional communities of democratic states in fostering convergence towards democratization, not merely through the accession to membership on the part of states eager to democratize but in relation to the handling of recalcitrant states, whose non‐democratic government are reluctant to cede power. The historical evidence suggests that the process may take generations, especially with hard cases such as Cuba and Serbia.

Covers the origins of the Kosovo crisis and violations of international human rights standards, with special focus on the period from the abrogation of Kosovo's autonomous status in 1989 to February 1998. The chapter covers post‐World War II history of Serbian policy in Kosovo, Slobodan Milosevic's rise to power in the late 1980s, Albanian resistance under the League for a Democratic Kosovo (LDK), the establishment of a parallel system of Albanian underground self‐governance and the rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In discussing the breakout of violence in 1998–99, the chapterpoints to failures of “early warning” lessons and the missed opportunities by the international community to prevent the conflict.

Discusses the aims and the conduct of the NATO bombing campaign against the Yugoslavia; the refugee crisis and civilian casualties of the campaign; and the diplomatic events leading to the final peace agreement. The chapter argues that the NATO campaign did not itself provoke Serbian military's attacks on Kosovo civilians, but that the intervention and the removal of ground monitors may have created an internal environment that made Belgrade government's cleansing operation feasible. The chapter concludes that the intervention failed to achieve its avowed aim of preventing massive ethnic cleansing, that the Kosovar Albanian population had to endure tremendous suffering before finally achieving their freedom and that Milosevic remained in power, however, as an indicted war criminal.

Kosovo came under international administration in 1999 by a UN civilian mission, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). This chapter explores the ways in which the UNMIK mission has played a critical role in promoting and shaping democratization in Kosovo, and identifies the mechanisms of influence used by the international mission in a range of political arenas. It demonstrates that the mode of transition in Kosovo has entailed a combination of a joint international and domestic pact on the democratic project, as international and domestic actors have frequently worked together to guide political development. However, while UNMIK has worked closely with local actors on the political transition, it has also regularly felt the need to rely both on the use of conditionality and, at times, the imposition of political decisions against the wishes of domestic actors. Overshadowing all developments in Kosovo has been its complicated status issue, which continues to present obstacles to democratic consolidation.

This chapter expands our view to include music produced in other countries. A preliminary survey of the popular music of countries with widely differing political economies, music cultures, and levels of development revealed that the four genre forms (avant-garde, scene-based, industry-based, and traditionalist) do exist to greater or lesser degrees across the globe. However, there proved to be another widely distributed form that was not found in the U.S. sample: the government-purposed genre. Musics in this genre receive substantial financial support from the government or oppositional groups with a direct interest in the ideological content of popular music. There are two major types: those sponsored directly by governments, which benefit from national distribution and legal protections, and an antistate type supported by an opposition party or constituency. The chapter examines four nation-cases to advance the argument: the People's Republic of China, Chile, Serbia, and Nigeria.

The Serb threat and its potential patron in independent Serbia was the largest concern throughout the Austro-Hungarian colonial occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was particularly true under Benjamin von Kállay's rule. This chapter shows how, for a government paranoid about pan-Serbian nationalism, Kállay brought to a battle for influence over the Bosnian Serb Masses, a distinctive approach reflecting his self-confidence and his belief in personal, rather than bureaucratic, dealings with Balkan ‘particularism’.

The first part of the chapter gives a brief account of the bloody fratricidal war fought in Croatia and Bosnia‐Herzegovina in 1991–5, which resulted from ethnic nationalistic revolutions aimed at destroying the multiethnic federation of Yugoslavia founded by the communists, and establishing independent homogeneous states. Further wars would continue in 1998 (between the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo) and in 2001 (between Albanians and Macedonians in Macedonia). The main part of the chapter discusses religion and nationalism in these successor states – Islam and Muslim nationalism in Bosnia‐Herzegovina, Catholicism (the Madonna of Medjugorje) and Croatian nationalism in Bosnia‐Herzegovina and Croatia, and the Orthodox Church in Serbia (and Kosovo), Macedonia, and Montenegro. The remaining two sections of the chapter discuss saint making in Croatia in the late 1990s, and the role of religious organizations in the international peace process.

The beginning of the chapter briefly discusses the degradation of the Balkan successor states to Yugoslavia, and the despise with which they were held by the West (except for Slovenia) – Serbia and Croatia came into conflict with the West, while Bosnia‐Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia became Western protectorates. The two main parts of the chapter discuss the role of the Catholic Church in the return of Croatia to the West, and the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in relation to the West and the failure of the Serbian revolution under Milošević. The last part of the chapter discusses the legacy of Yugoslavia, and current attitudes to Balkan nationalism, which has undergone heavy blows from demography (a diminishing population of children and young people) and migration to the West – which have replaced Marxism as the new key menace to the Churches.

It is argued that the rational processes of political negotiation and diplomacy can never progress very far without taking account of the (cultural) myths underlying the attitudes of all parties (and intervenors) involved. Such myths are often expressed in terms of some idealized self‐image, together with a demonized mythic construct of the “other.” These arguments are illustrated by addressing the contemporary examples of the coup against Milosevic in Serbia, and peacemaking processes in which the author has been involved in Israel/Palestine. The latter covers the work of Rabbi Frohman in Israel, attempts to get the US Administration under Clinton involved in a Jewish–Muslim dialog, and steps toward the Jerusalem Religious Peace Agreement (the Islamic/Jewish treaty).

Introduces the book by discussing the symbolic destruction of churches, monasteries and other monuments and sacred places of the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church in Croatia and Bosnia‐Herzegovina, and the Yugoslav Muslim Religious Organization (Islamic community), and also in Albania that occurred during the various wars in the Yugoslav region in the 1990s. It then discusses myth in relation to the nation‐state. The last and main part of the chapter gives accounts of the four mainstream Yugoslav religious institutions (the Serbian Orthodox Church, Croatian Catholicism, the Muslim Religious Organization (Islamic community), and the Church and Nation of Macedonia), and also discusses the religious minority groups of the region (there are around 40, of which 14 are listed), and interfaith relations.

The chapter starts with a brief account of Albanian anti‐Serbian activities (attacks on Serbian sacred places and monuments, said to be fuelled by religious hatred) in Kosovo in the 1980s. It then goes on to discuss shrines as a powerful symbolic energizer to the Serbian nationalist movement of the 1980s, with accounts of the building of the new cathedral in Belgrade, and notes on the construction of Serbian churches in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo. Next an account is given of the Milošević era, including his initial pacification of Kosovo (which enabled more restoration and building of Serbian sacred sites, and a program of pilgrimages, jubilees, etc.) and his pilgrimage to the thirteenth‐century Hilandar monastery at the holy mountain of Athos in Greece, which paved the way for a new role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the Serbian nationalist movement.

This chapter examines Bosnia-Herzegovina's geopolitical setting in greater depth, most especially its status as a contested space between Serbia and Croatia. Both were not destined to fight over Bosnia-Herzegovina, yet the geopolitical cultures of both featured self-aggrandizing visions of national space that menaced the territorial integrity of Bosnia. All too often these visions were cartographic fantasies grounded not in geographical actualities but in nationalist idealizations. To underscore the implications of this deeply consequential disjuncture, the chapter then examines Bosnia on the eve of war. It contrasts the nationalist coloring of Bosnian space to the more complex human geographies evident from the 1991 census. Pace the maps that reduce Bosnia to a patchwork of national colors, it underscores the shared space, variable settlement geographies, and public culture of tolerance that characterized the actually existing Bosnia. The chapter ends with brief sketches of the three primary locations followed for the rest of the book.

This chapter looks at the history, rationale, current design, and future potential of clinical legal education programs in Central and Eastern Europe. It describes the early developments of clinical legal education in the region, including a discussion of the main sponsors and supporters of these programs. Drawing on experience, it then provides details of several selected programs in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, Russia, and Ukraine, and analyzes these programs' role in preparing a new generation of social justice and human rights lawyers. The chapter concludes by proposing potential directions for future development of clinical legal education in the region, looking at opportunities and challenges within the wider European context as well.

Disraeli's position was weakened by the entry of Serbia and Montenegro into the war against the Ottoman Empire, and especially by the Bulgarian atrocities and the start of the Bulgarian agitation. The resistance of public opinion tied his hands and prevented him from pursuing policies based on decisive moves and sabre‐rattling. Although a significant proportion of public opinion believed that Disraeli was prepared to go to war in the interests of the Ottoman Empire, he was also prepared to take part in its division, provided that Britain's prestige remained intact and that it be given possession of Constantinople together with some other strongholds. The Bulgarian agitation shook him, yet every time that he yielded ground he tried to cover this up with provocative speeches. At the same time, Russia's support for Serbia and Montenegro and her public interest in Bulgaria convinced him that she was his main opponent.

This chapter argues that the Milošević trial proved to be of great legal value to Serbia by preserving the dignity of the Serbian nation. Milošević may have personified Serbia, but he personalized the blame. The work of the ICTY individualized responsibility and thereby helped spare Serbia from collective denunciation as a matter of law.

This chapter sets the Kosovo crisis within the broader historical background of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, tracing the evolution of Kosovo's status from its position as a ‘quasi republic’ under the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, through Serbia's ascendancy within the overall Yugoslav project during the 1980s, to the consequent purported arrogation of Kosovo's autonomy and the latter's subordination to the Serbian republic. It then examines the Kosovar response to these developments, notably, the declaration of independence by its elected assembly in September 1991, and the popular election of a de facto government under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova and Bujar Bukoshi. Central to this historical analysis is an understanding that tensions in the region between ethnic Albanians and Serbians were fuelled by hard political interests, and not by long-standing identity issues.