Gregory A. Staley
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195387438
- eISBN:
- 9780199866809
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387438.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
As both a literary genre and a view of life, tragedy has from the very beginning spurred a dialogue between poetry and philosophy. Plato wanted to ban tragedians from his ideal community because he ...
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As both a literary genre and a view of life, tragedy has from the very beginning spurred a dialogue between poetry and philosophy. Plato wanted to ban tragedians from his ideal community because he believed that they dabbled in the philosopher’s business but had no “idea” what they were doing. Aristotle set out to answer Plato’s objections by arguing that fiction offers a faithful image of the truth and promotes emotional health through the mechanism of catharsis. This book argues that Aristotle’s definition of tragedy actually had its greatest impact not on Greek tragedy itself but on the later history of the idea of tragedy, beginning with the tragedies of the Roman poet and Stoic philosopher Seneca (4 bc–ad 65), whose Latin plays were known and read in the Renaissance for centuries before the now more famous Greek tragedies were rediscovered. When Sir Philip Sidney (1554–1586) composed An Apology for Poetry, he borrowed from Seneca the word idea to designate what we would now label as a “theory” of tragedy. Through Sidney, Seneca’s plays came to exemplify an idea of tragedy that was at its core Aristotelian. Senecan tragedy enacts Aristotle’s conception of the genre as a vivid image of the truth and treats tragedy as a natural venue in which to explore the human soul.Less
As both a literary genre and a view of life, tragedy has from the very beginning spurred a dialogue between poetry and philosophy. Plato wanted to ban tragedians from his ideal community because he believed that they dabbled in the philosopher’s business but had no “idea” what they were doing. Aristotle set out to answer Plato’s objections by arguing that fiction offers a faithful image of the truth and promotes emotional health through the mechanism of catharsis. This book argues that Aristotle’s definition of tragedy actually had its greatest impact not on Greek tragedy itself but on the later history of the idea of tragedy, beginning with the tragedies of the Roman poet and Stoic philosopher Seneca (4 bc–ad 65), whose Latin plays were known and read in the Renaissance for centuries before the now more famous Greek tragedies were rediscovered. When Sir Philip Sidney (1554–1586) composed An Apology for Poetry, he borrowed from Seneca the word idea to designate what we would now label as a “theory” of tragedy. Through Sidney, Seneca’s plays came to exemplify an idea of tragedy that was at its core Aristotelian. Senecan tragedy enacts Aristotle’s conception of the genre as a vivid image of the truth and treats tragedy as a natural venue in which to explore the human soul.
James Ker
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195387032
- eISBN:
- 9780199866793
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387032.003.0012
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Literary Studies: Classical, Early, and Medieval
The epilogue briefly reiterates the rationale behind looking at Seneca's death simultaneously through the different ancient historical narratives, through Seneca's own writings, and through the ...
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The epilogue briefly reiterates the rationale behind looking at Seneca's death simultaneously through the different ancient historical narratives, through Seneca's own writings, and through the numerous subsequent receptions. It also speculates on where future discoveries about Seneca's death are most likely to come. It closes by noting the heuristic limitations on the capacity of Seneca's death to inform our own individual experience of death.Less
The epilogue briefly reiterates the rationale behind looking at Seneca's death simultaneously through the different ancient historical narratives, through Seneca's own writings, and through the numerous subsequent receptions. It also speculates on where future discoveries about Seneca's death are most likely to come. It closes by noting the heuristic limitations on the capacity of Seneca's death to inform our own individual experience of death.
Robert S. Miola
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198112648
- eISBN:
- 9780191670831
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198112648.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, Shakespeare Studies
This book charts the influence of Seneca — both as specific text and inherited tradition — through an analysis of Shakespeare's tragedies. Discerning patterns in previously attested borrowings and ...
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This book charts the influence of Seneca — both as specific text and inherited tradition — through an analysis of Shakespeare's tragedies. Discerning patterns in previously attested borrowings and discovering new indebtedness, it presents an integrated and comprehensive assessment. Familiar methods of source study and an understanding of intertextuality are employed to re-evaluate the much maligned Seneca in the light of his Greek antecedents, Renaissance translations and commentaries, and dramatic adaptations, especially those of Chapman, Jonson, Marston, Garnier, Cinthio, and Dolce. Three broad categories organize the discussion — Senecan revenge, tyranny, and furore — and each is illustrated by an earlier and later Shakespearean tragedy. The author keeps in view Shakespeare's eclecticism, his habit of combining disparate sources and conventions, as well as the rich history of literary criticism and theatrical interpretation. The book concludes by discussing Seneca's presence in Renaissance comedy and, more important, in the hybrid genre, tragicomedy.Less
This book charts the influence of Seneca — both as specific text and inherited tradition — through an analysis of Shakespeare's tragedies. Discerning patterns in previously attested borrowings and discovering new indebtedness, it presents an integrated and comprehensive assessment. Familiar methods of source study and an understanding of intertextuality are employed to re-evaluate the much maligned Seneca in the light of his Greek antecedents, Renaissance translations and commentaries, and dramatic adaptations, especially those of Chapman, Jonson, Marston, Garnier, Cinthio, and Dolce. Three broad categories organize the discussion — Senecan revenge, tyranny, and furore — and each is illustrated by an earlier and later Shakespearean tragedy. The author keeps in view Shakespeare's eclecticism, his habit of combining disparate sources and conventions, as well as the rich history of literary criticism and theatrical interpretation. The book concludes by discussing Seneca's presence in Renaissance comedy and, more important, in the hybrid genre, tragicomedy.
A. A. Long
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199279128
- eISBN:
- 9780191706769
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199279128.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This book presents eighteen essays on the philosophers and schools of the Hellenistic and Roman periods: Epicureans, Stoics, and Sceptics. The discussion ranges over four centuries of innovative and ...
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This book presents eighteen essays on the philosophers and schools of the Hellenistic and Roman periods: Epicureans, Stoics, and Sceptics. The discussion ranges over four centuries of innovative and challenging thought in ethics and politics, psychology, epistemology, and cosmology. The focus is on the distinctive contributions and methodologies of individual thinkers, notably Epicurus, Zeno, Pyrrho, Arcesilaus, Lucretius, Cicero, Seneca, and Epictetus. Placing their philosophy in its cultural context, and considering it in relation to the earlier ideas of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the author invites readers to imagine themselves choosing between Stoicism and Epicureanism as philosophies of life. All but one of these pieces has been previously published in periodicals or conference volumes, but the author has revised and updated everything, and has also added postscripts to many of the essays.Less
This book presents eighteen essays on the philosophers and schools of the Hellenistic and Roman periods: Epicureans, Stoics, and Sceptics. The discussion ranges over four centuries of innovative and challenging thought in ethics and politics, psychology, epistemology, and cosmology. The focus is on the distinctive contributions and methodologies of individual thinkers, notably Epicurus, Zeno, Pyrrho, Arcesilaus, Lucretius, Cicero, Seneca, and Epictetus. Placing their philosophy in its cultural context, and considering it in relation to the earlier ideas of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the author invites readers to imagine themselves choosing between Stoicism and Epicureanism as philosophies of life. All but one of these pieces has been previously published in periodicals or conference volumes, but the author has revised and updated everything, and has also added postscripts to many of the essays.
Andreas Osiander
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780198294511
- eISBN:
- 9780191717048
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198294511.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Following an analysis of the economic and ecological bases of society in the pre-Christian Mediterranean world, this chapter studies how and why the pre-Persian Greek pólis-world evolved — charting ...
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Following an analysis of the economic and ecological bases of society in the pre-Christian Mediterranean world, this chapter studies how and why the pre-Persian Greek pólis-world evolved — charting the rise of Athens, the rise of Persian Greek kingship, then the rise of Rome and the gradual absorption of the entire Mediterranean region into the Roman empire. It discusses what pre-Christian Greek and Roman authors — such as Plátôn (Plato), Aristotle, Isokrátês (Isocrates), Polýbios (Polybius), Sallust, Seneca, and Tacitus — had to say on the mutual relations of autonomous actors in the Mediterranean world. A special section is dedicated to an analysis of Thukydídês (Thucydides), showing that contrary to received wisdom he was far from an ancestor of Realist International Relations thought. In particular, he did not believe and never said that the ‘Peloponnesian War’ broke out because of a shift in the ‘balance of power’.Less
Following an analysis of the economic and ecological bases of society in the pre-Christian Mediterranean world, this chapter studies how and why the pre-Persian Greek pólis-world evolved — charting the rise of Athens, the rise of Persian Greek kingship, then the rise of Rome and the gradual absorption of the entire Mediterranean region into the Roman empire. It discusses what pre-Christian Greek and Roman authors — such as Plátôn (Plato), Aristotle, Isokrátês (Isocrates), Polýbios (Polybius), Sallust, Seneca, and Tacitus — had to say on the mutual relations of autonomous actors in the Mediterranean world. A special section is dedicated to an analysis of Thukydídês (Thucydides), showing that contrary to received wisdom he was far from an ancestor of Realist International Relations thought. In particular, he did not believe and never said that the ‘Peloponnesian War’ broke out because of a shift in the ‘balance of power’.
Rebecca Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199284030
- eISBN:
- 9780191712500
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284030.001.0001
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Poetry and Poets: Classical, Early, and Medieval, Literary Studies: Classical, Early, and Medieval
This book studies in detail the representations of Pasiphae, Ariadne, and Phaedra in Latin poetry. It investigates both the literary history of the myths (the Greek roots, the interactions between ...
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This book studies in detail the representations of Pasiphae, Ariadne, and Phaedra in Latin poetry. It investigates both the literary history of the myths (the Greek roots, the interactions between Roman versions) and their cultural resonance. In addition to close readings of the major treatments of each woman's story (in Catullus, Virgil, Ovid, and Seneca), the book offers extended thematic explorations of the importance of memory, wildness, and morality in the myths. By extending the net to encompass three women (all from the same ill-fated family), the book gives a clear picture of the complexity and fascinating interconnectedness of myths and texts in Ancient Rome.Less
This book studies in detail the representations of Pasiphae, Ariadne, and Phaedra in Latin poetry. It investigates both the literary history of the myths (the Greek roots, the interactions between Roman versions) and their cultural resonance. In addition to close readings of the major treatments of each woman's story (in Catullus, Virgil, Ovid, and Seneca), the book offers extended thematic explorations of the importance of memory, wildness, and morality in the myths. By extending the net to encompass three women (all from the same ill-fated family), the book gives a clear picture of the complexity and fascinating interconnectedness of myths and texts in Ancient Rome.
Richard Sorabji
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199256600
- eISBN:
- 9780191712609
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The Stoics (Chrysippus, Seneca, Epictetus) tell us how to get rid of unwanted emotions by re-evaluating situations (cognitive therapy). In their view, an emotion is a pair of value judgements that ...
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The Stoics (Chrysippus, Seneca, Epictetus) tell us how to get rid of unwanted emotions by re-evaluating situations (cognitive therapy). In their view, an emotion is a pair of value judgements that harm or benefit if at hand, and that it is appropriate to react. Bodily and mental shocks (e.g., crying) are not part of the emotion. One Stoic, Posidonius, protested that such judgements are neither necessary nor sufficient for emotion, not necessary, for example, for emotion produced by melody, or in animals. Seneca replied that what is produced by music and the arts, or in animals, is only preliminary shocks or ‘first movements’. Others (Galen) suggested that bodily factors are important and need separate physical treatment, and recent brain studies (LeDoux) explain why. But the Stoics are right that cognitive therapy can often on its own remove unwanted emotion. Moreover, their two judgements are the right targets for re-evaluation, and it is a muddle to be sad (William James) because I cry. Crying is only a shock. We need not share the Stoic ideal of apatheia — freedom from all emotions — just freedom from unwanted ones. Some Christians (Origen, Evagrius) took up the idea of first movements and converted them from preliminary shocks into preliminary ‘bad thoughts’, which act as temptations. They worked out a whole art of nipping them in the bud to achieve the Stoic ideal of apatheia. But Augustine favoured Aristotle's emotion in moderation, except for example for lust, which he saw as disobedient to will.Less
The Stoics (Chrysippus, Seneca, Epictetus) tell us how to get rid of unwanted emotions by re-evaluating situations (cognitive therapy). In their view, an emotion is a pair of value judgements that harm or benefit if at hand, and that it is appropriate to react. Bodily and mental shocks (e.g., crying) are not part of the emotion. One Stoic, Posidonius, protested that such judgements are neither necessary nor sufficient for emotion, not necessary, for example, for emotion produced by melody, or in animals. Seneca replied that what is produced by music and the arts, or in animals, is only preliminary shocks or ‘first movements’. Others (Galen) suggested that bodily factors are important and need separate physical treatment, and recent brain studies (LeDoux) explain why. But the Stoics are right that cognitive therapy can often on its own remove unwanted emotion. Moreover, their two judgements are the right targets for re-evaluation, and it is a muddle to be sad (William James) because I cry. Crying is only a shock. We need not share the Stoic ideal of apatheia — freedom from all emotions — just freedom from unwanted ones. Some Christians (Origen, Evagrius) took up the idea of first movements and converted them from preliminary shocks into preliminary ‘bad thoughts’, which act as temptations. They worked out a whole art of nipping them in the bud to achieve the Stoic ideal of apatheia. But Augustine favoured Aristotle's emotion in moderation, except for example for lust, which he saw as disobedient to will.
Runar M. Thorsteinsson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199578641
- eISBN:
- 9780191722868
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199578641.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This study examines the moral teachings of first-century Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism, and compares the two. The study falls into three main parts: Part I introduces and discusses the moral ...
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This study examines the moral teachings of first-century Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism, and compares the two. The study falls into three main parts: Part I introduces and discusses the moral teaching of Roman Stoicism, that is, of Seneca, Musonius Rufus, and Epictetus. Part II presents the moral teaching of Roman Christianity, that is, as it is represented in Paul's Letter to the Romans, the First Letter of Peter, and the First Letter of Clement. On the basis of Parts I and II, then, Part III examines the similarities and differences between Roman Stoicism and Roman Christianity in terms of morality. This is done under the headings of five main themes, including questions of Christian and Stoic views about (1) a particular morality or way of life as proper worship of the deity; (2) certain individuals (like Jesus and Socrates) as paradigms for the proper way of life; (3) the importance of mutual love and care; (4) non-retaliation and ‘love of enemies’; and (5) the social dimension of ethics. It is concluded that there is a fundamental similarity between the moral teachings of Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism. The most basic difference is found in the ethical scope of the two: While the latter teaches unqualified universal humanity, the former seems to condition the ethical scope in terms of religious adherence.Less
This study examines the moral teachings of first-century Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism, and compares the two. The study falls into three main parts: Part I introduces and discusses the moral teaching of Roman Stoicism, that is, of Seneca, Musonius Rufus, and Epictetus. Part II presents the moral teaching of Roman Christianity, that is, as it is represented in Paul's Letter to the Romans, the First Letter of Peter, and the First Letter of Clement. On the basis of Parts I and II, then, Part III examines the similarities and differences between Roman Stoicism and Roman Christianity in terms of morality. This is done under the headings of five main themes, including questions of Christian and Stoic views about (1) a particular morality or way of life as proper worship of the deity; (2) certain individuals (like Jesus and Socrates) as paradigms for the proper way of life; (3) the importance of mutual love and care; (4) non-retaliation and ‘love of enemies’; and (5) the social dimension of ethics. It is concluded that there is a fundamental similarity between the moral teachings of Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism. The most basic difference is found in the ethical scope of the two: While the latter teaches unqualified universal humanity, the former seems to condition the ethical scope in terms of religious adherence.
Richard Sorabji
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199256600
- eISBN:
- 9780191712609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
What is the missing element in the analysis of emotion as value judgement which Posidonius tried to fill with his movements of soul capacities? Perhaps the bodily reactions, only sometimes noticed, ...
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What is the missing element in the analysis of emotion as value judgement which Posidonius tried to fill with his movements of soul capacities? Perhaps the bodily reactions, only sometimes noticed, set up by the amygdala or other parts of the brain. Joseph LeDoux has argued that in fear these can occur independently of, and even before, the judgement of danger. They may be triggered by perception of something that we do not recognize as having been associated with a past danger, so that our bodies are a-tremble without our knowing why, or continue even after we have disowned judgements of danger. They may also correspond to Seneca's first movements before any judgement of danger, and to William James' being sad because we cry. Stoic therapy for emotions is cognitive, and attacks judgements very effectively. But we can see why in some cases a physical therapy may be needed.Less
What is the missing element in the analysis of emotion as value judgement which Posidonius tried to fill with his movements of soul capacities? Perhaps the bodily reactions, only sometimes noticed, set up by the amygdala or other parts of the brain. Joseph LeDoux has argued that in fear these can occur independently of, and even before, the judgement of danger. They may be triggered by perception of something that we do not recognize as having been associated with a past danger, so that our bodies are a-tremble without our knowing why, or continue even after we have disowned judgements of danger. They may also correspond to Seneca's first movements before any judgement of danger, and to William James' being sad because we cry. Stoic therapy for emotions is cognitive, and attacks judgements very effectively. But we can see why in some cases a physical therapy may be needed.
Richard Sorabji
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199256600
- eISBN:
- 9780191712609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Except for committed Stoics, the Stoices do not include their idiosyncratic and unacceptable view in their therapy, castigated by Bernard Williams that everything is indifferent except character and ...
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Except for committed Stoics, the Stoices do not include their idiosyncratic and unacceptable view in their therapy, castigated by Bernard Williams that everything is indifferent except character and rationality. Health and wealth, they concede, are naturally preferable objectives and must be pursued energetically for oneself and others. But their value lies not in themselves, but in the fact that good character, the only real good, is exercised in the right pursuit of natural objectives. Nor need the unacceptable Stoic view that most emotions include a wrong evaluation of indifferent things as if they were actually good be followed. But something can be learnt from the Stoics, because many of our emotions are unwanted, and for these, the effectiveness of their cognitive therapy is vividly illustrated in Cicero and Seneca.Less
Except for committed Stoics, the Stoices do not include their idiosyncratic and unacceptable view in their therapy, castigated by Bernard Williams that everything is indifferent except character and rationality. Health and wealth, they concede, are naturally preferable objectives and must be pursued energetically for oneself and others. But their value lies not in themselves, but in the fact that good character, the only real good, is exercised in the right pursuit of natural objectives. Nor need the unacceptable Stoic view that most emotions include a wrong evaluation of indifferent things as if they were actually good be followed. But something can be learnt from the Stoics, because many of our emotions are unwanted, and for these, the effectiveness of their cognitive therapy is vividly illustrated in Cicero and Seneca.
Richard Sorabji
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199256600
- eISBN:
- 9780191712609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The ancients offered a huge range of therapeutic exercises. Some ward off future emotion, some deal with emotion that has already arisen from a past occurrence. Chrysippus' emphasis on re-evaluating ...
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The ancients offered a huge range of therapeutic exercises. Some ward off future emotion, some deal with emotion that has already arisen from a past occurrence. Chrysippus' emphasis on re-evaluating situations is a therapy for emotions, whereas Posidonius' reversion to Plato would have helped with moods as well. Pythagoreans, Democritus, Epicureans, Cynics, Aristo of Ceos (Aristotelian), Plutarch, and Galen all make contributions. The poet Ovid parodies the philosophers' therapies. All this is echoed in Christianity, but the Stoics are outstanding, Epictetus the ex-slave sterner, Seneca the aristocrat more adapted to ordinary discomforts. In recent times, Epictetus enabled Admiral Stockdale to withstand torture and solitary confinement, and his account shows how even the sterner therapies could work in practice.Less
The ancients offered a huge range of therapeutic exercises. Some ward off future emotion, some deal with emotion that has already arisen from a past occurrence. Chrysippus' emphasis on re-evaluating situations is a therapy for emotions, whereas Posidonius' reversion to Plato would have helped with moods as well. Pythagoreans, Democritus, Epicureans, Cynics, Aristo of Ceos (Aristotelian), Plutarch, and Galen all make contributions. The poet Ovid parodies the philosophers' therapies. All this is echoed in Christianity, but the Stoics are outstanding, Epictetus the ex-slave sterner, Seneca the aristocrat more adapted to ordinary discomforts. In recent times, Epictetus enabled Admiral Stockdale to withstand torture and solitary confinement, and his account shows how even the sterner therapies could work in practice.
Richard Sorabji
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199256600
- eISBN:
- 9780191712609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.003.0022
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The term ‘free will’ appears first in Lucretius' Latin, but will plays little role in accounts of freedom until Augustine, and that innovation was not clarifying. The concept of will was composed by ...
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The term ‘free will’ appears first in Lucretius' Latin, but will plays little role in accounts of freedom until Augustine, and that innovation was not clarifying. The concept of will was composed by Augustine out of elements that had flourished better in pagan philosophy when separate. ‘Will’ translates Greek boulêsis or thelêsis. Freedom and responsibility are treated together in Plato's Republic, but will power is treated separately, and none are discussed under the name boulêsis by him or until Posidonius. In Aristotle, boulêsis is a rational desire for end not means, and for good not pleasure or honour, but it is not closely connected with freedom, responsibility or will power. A connexion between will (voluntas) and responsibility (voluntarius) emerges in Seneca's Latin, but his will is not distinct from reason. Alexander (Aristotelian) follows Epictetus (Stoic), who first tied responsibility closely to Aristotle's prohairesis, rational desire for means.Less
The term ‘free will’ appears first in Lucretius' Latin, but will plays little role in accounts of freedom until Augustine, and that innovation was not clarifying. The concept of will was composed by Augustine out of elements that had flourished better in pagan philosophy when separate. ‘Will’ translates Greek boulêsis or thelêsis. Freedom and responsibility are treated together in Plato's Republic, but will power is treated separately, and none are discussed under the name boulêsis by him or until Posidonius. In Aristotle, boulêsis is a rational desire for end not means, and for good not pleasure or honour, but it is not closely connected with freedom, responsibility or will power. A connexion between will (voluntas) and responsibility (voluntarius) emerges in Seneca's Latin, but his will is not distinct from reason. Alexander (Aristotelian) follows Epictetus (Stoic), who first tied responsibility closely to Aristotle's prohairesis, rational desire for means.
Richard Sorabji
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199256600
- eISBN:
- 9780191712609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Zeno of Citium, the Stoic founder, had tried out other definitions of emotion. One, defended by Chrysippus, was that emotion involves oscillating, like Medea, between accepting the right value ...
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Zeno of Citium, the Stoic founder, had tried out other definitions of emotion. One, defended by Chrysippus, was that emotion involves oscillating, like Medea, between accepting the right value judgement and disobeying it. But disobedience to reason is not the same as mistake. How can it be, and is it ever, combined with mistake? The Stoic Seneca (1st century CE) allows this by distinguishing three movements in anger. The first movement is the appearance that revenge is appropriate and the resulting shock to soul or body. The second is the mistaken assent to the appearance that revenge is appropriate. The third movement — the full emotion — moves from mistake to disobedience with the judgement that revenge is to be pursued, appropriate or not.Less
Zeno of Citium, the Stoic founder, had tried out other definitions of emotion. One, defended by Chrysippus, was that emotion involves oscillating, like Medea, between accepting the right value judgement and disobeying it. But disobedience to reason is not the same as mistake. How can it be, and is it ever, combined with mistake? The Stoic Seneca (1st century CE) allows this by distinguishing three movements in anger. The first movement is the appearance that revenge is appropriate and the resulting shock to soul or body. The second is the mistaken assent to the appearance that revenge is appropriate. The third movement — the full emotion — moves from mistake to disobedience with the judgement that revenge is to be pursued, appropriate or not.
Richard Sorabji
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199256600
- eISBN:
- 9780191712609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
First movements of the soul for the Stoic materialists include bites, which are small contractions of the physical soul sensed in distress. First movements of the body include pallor, tears, and ...
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First movements of the soul for the Stoic materialists include bites, which are small contractions of the physical soul sensed in distress. First movements of the body include pallor, tears, and sexual irritation. All are involuntary shocks unlike the judgements which constitute emotion, and emotional therapy should ignore them as unimportant. First movements are first clearly described by Cicero, bites by Galen. For Seneca (1st century CE), Posidonius' revision of Stoicism around 100 BCE was wrong to say that emotion can occur without the relevant judgements in the case of animals, of disowned judgements, and of emotion changed by wordless music. In all three cases we have not emotion, but only first movements.Less
First movements of the soul for the Stoic materialists include bites, which are small contractions of the physical soul sensed in distress. First movements of the body include pallor, tears, and sexual irritation. All are involuntary shocks unlike the judgements which constitute emotion, and emotional therapy should ignore them as unimportant. First movements are first clearly described by Cicero, bites by Galen. For Seneca (1st century CE), Posidonius' revision of Stoicism around 100 BCE was wrong to say that emotion can occur without the relevant judgements in the case of animals, of disowned judgements, and of emotion changed by wordless music. In all three cases we have not emotion, but only first movements.
Richard Sorabji
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199256600
- eISBN:
- 9780191712609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
According to Seneca, the arts, including tragedy and music, can only produce first movements. So Aristotle's claim that tragedy and comedy produce catharsis by arousing emotion is wrong, as is ...
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According to Seneca, the arts, including tragedy and music, can only produce first movements. So Aristotle's claim that tragedy and comedy produce catharsis by arousing emotion is wrong, as is Posidonius' belief in wordless music changing emotion without changing judgements. But, pace Seneca, there is a residue of cases of genuine emotion about the content of the play or about the melody, and a better defence of Stoicism in these cases would be that the relevant judgements are there. But when wordless music changes emotion, Posidonius prefers to say that the emotion is non-judgemental; Philodemus, his Epicurean contemporary, says that the emotion persists and one is merely distracted. The debate involved Pythagoreans, the Stoics Zeno and Diogenes of Babylon, and later Augustine.Less
According to Seneca, the arts, including tragedy and music, can only produce first movements. So Aristotle's claim that tragedy and comedy produce catharsis by arousing emotion is wrong, as is Posidonius' belief in wordless music changing emotion without changing judgements. But, pace Seneca, there is a residue of cases of genuine emotion about the content of the play or about the melody, and a better defence of Stoicism in these cases would be that the relevant judgements are there. But when wordless music changes emotion, Posidonius prefers to say that the emotion is non-judgemental; Philodemus, his Epicurean contemporary, says that the emotion persists and one is merely distracted. The debate involved Pythagoreans, the Stoics Zeno and Diogenes of Babylon, and later Augustine.
Richard Sorabji
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199256600
- eISBN:
- 9780191712609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
For Posidonius, the value judgements proposed by Chrysippus are not sufficient for emotion because they can remain intact while emotion fades through exhaustion, and because emotion requires us also ...
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For Posidonius, the value judgements proposed by Chrysippus are not sufficient for emotion because they can remain intact while emotion fades through exhaustion, and because emotion requires us also to imagine what is judged and to pay attention to it. Posidonius' explanation is that in exhaustion and without imagination, the movements of the irrational capacities are missing. These movements are spatial movements of physical soul, but not yet identified, like Seneca's first movements, with contractions and suchlike. Further, whereas Posidonius' emphasis is that in special cases the movements can be sufficient for emotion, Seneca's emphasis is that first movements need not lead on to emotion at all, because emotion is something of a very different kind, namely judgement.Less
For Posidonius, the value judgements proposed by Chrysippus are not sufficient for emotion because they can remain intact while emotion fades through exhaustion, and because emotion requires us also to imagine what is judged and to pay attention to it. Posidonius' explanation is that in exhaustion and without imagination, the movements of the irrational capacities are missing. These movements are spatial movements of physical soul, but not yet identified, like Seneca's first movements, with contractions and suchlike. Further, whereas Posidonius' emphasis is that in special cases the movements can be sufficient for emotion, Seneca's emphasis is that first movements need not lead on to emotion at all, because emotion is something of a very different kind, namely judgement.
Bernhard Zimmermann
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199232536
- eISBN:
- 9780191716003
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232536.003.0011
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Plays and Playwrights: Classical, Early, and Medieval
This chapter offers a challenge to the classification of Seneca's tragedies as ‘rhetorical tragedies’ or declamations. Although the idea that Seneca's tragedies might have been partially danced had ...
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This chapter offers a challenge to the classification of Seneca's tragedies as ‘rhetorical tragedies’ or declamations. Although the idea that Seneca's tragedies might have been partially danced had been suggested as early as the 1920s, the chapter argues that Seneca's tragedies contain several types of passage that point precisely to the character of a fabula saltata (‘danced story’), and that this suggests that even if Seneca did not write them specifically for pantomime performance, that is as libretti, he may have been influenced by the new aesthetics and conventions of the popular medium in the composition of these scenes. He may have been visualising, as he wrote, a theatrical performance with dance and music rather than a recitation. He may have hoped that his new kind of tragedy, suited to the taste of the Neronian period, could offer a substitute for the popular genres of theatre.Less
This chapter offers a challenge to the classification of Seneca's tragedies as ‘rhetorical tragedies’ or declamations. Although the idea that Seneca's tragedies might have been partially danced had been suggested as early as the 1920s, the chapter argues that Seneca's tragedies contain several types of passage that point precisely to the character of a fabula saltata (‘danced story’), and that this suggests that even if Seneca did not write them specifically for pantomime performance, that is as libretti, he may have been influenced by the new aesthetics and conventions of the popular medium in the composition of these scenes. He may have been visualising, as he wrote, a theatrical performance with dance and music rather than a recitation. He may have hoped that his new kind of tragedy, suited to the taste of the Neronian period, could offer a substitute for the popular genres of theatre.
Alessandra Zanobi
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199232536
- eISBN:
- 9780191716003
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232536.003.0012
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Plays and Playwrights: Classical, Early, and Medieval
In the development of the study of the affinity between parts of Senecan tragedy and what we know about the texts (libretti) danced in pantomime, the author of this chapter (a trained dancer herself) ...
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In the development of the study of the affinity between parts of Senecan tragedy and what we know about the texts (libretti) danced in pantomime, the author of this chapter (a trained dancer herself) looks at three features in the dramas that have often been criticised: their loose dramatic structure, running commentaries on another participant's actions, and lengthy narrative set‐pieces. In close readings of key texts from several plays, including Troades, Agamemnon and Hercules Furens, the chapter shows how apparently intractable problems related to the possibility of staging the plays disappear entirely if pantomimic performances formed part of the entertainment; moreover, the very verse construction, rhythm, and style display features that would offer great potential for choreographic realization by a dancer. This has important implications for our understanding of Seneca's dramaturgy.Less
In the development of the study of the affinity between parts of Senecan tragedy and what we know about the texts (libretti) danced in pantomime, the author of this chapter (a trained dancer herself) looks at three features in the dramas that have often been criticised: their loose dramatic structure, running commentaries on another participant's actions, and lengthy narrative set‐pieces. In close readings of key texts from several plays, including Troades, Agamemnon and Hercules Furens, the chapter shows how apparently intractable problems related to the possibility of staging the plays disappear entirely if pantomimic performances formed part of the entertainment; moreover, the very verse construction, rhythm, and style display features that would offer great potential for choreographic realization by a dancer. This has important implications for our understanding of Seneca's dramaturgy.
H. M. Hine
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197263327
- eISBN:
- 9780191734168
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197263327.003.0010
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Prose and Writers: Classical, Early, and Medieval
Seneca used poetic vocabulary in his prose. Such statements seem ultimately to be based on the work of Summers and Bourgery. The work of Summers is the best short introduction to Seneca’s prose ...
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Seneca used poetic vocabulary in his prose. Such statements seem ultimately to be based on the work of Summers and Bourgery. The work of Summers is the best short introduction to Seneca’s prose style. Bourgery spread his net rather more widely than Summers, listing first phrases in Seneca’s prose that are reminiscences of specific passages of earlier Latin poets. Five general observations on the methodology used by Summers and Bourgery are shown. The chapter also takes account of these observations as it first revisits the approach of Summers and Bourgery, and then shows how different approaches can be used to look for poetic elements in Seneca’s prose. The categories of word, namely (1) words absent from both Cicero’s and Seneca’s prose, (2) words whose absence from Seneca’s prose is probably accidental, (3) words that are common in earlier prose but not found in Seneca’s prose, and (4) words mainly found in poetry, but also in Cicero’s prose, are described. There have been a number of predominantly poetic words that are used by Cicero in his prose, but not by Seneca in his; and it is seen how genre and context are important for understanding Cicero’s uses of these words.Less
Seneca used poetic vocabulary in his prose. Such statements seem ultimately to be based on the work of Summers and Bourgery. The work of Summers is the best short introduction to Seneca’s prose style. Bourgery spread his net rather more widely than Summers, listing first phrases in Seneca’s prose that are reminiscences of specific passages of earlier Latin poets. Five general observations on the methodology used by Summers and Bourgery are shown. The chapter also takes account of these observations as it first revisits the approach of Summers and Bourgery, and then shows how different approaches can be used to look for poetic elements in Seneca’s prose. The categories of word, namely (1) words absent from both Cicero’s and Seneca’s prose, (2) words whose absence from Seneca’s prose is probably accidental, (3) words that are common in earlier prose but not found in Seneca’s prose, and (4) words mainly found in poetry, but also in Cicero’s prose, are described. There have been a number of predominantly poetic words that are used by Cicero in his prose, but not by Seneca in his; and it is seen how genre and context are important for understanding Cicero’s uses of these words.
Scott McGill
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195175646
- eISBN:
- 9780199789337
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195175646.003.0002
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Poetry and Poets: Classical, Early, and Medieval
This chapter examines the (probably) earliest extant full-length Virgilian cento, Hosidius Geta's Medea, which takes the form of a tragedy. The aim is to explore how Geta accomplishes the feat of ...
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This chapter examines the (probably) earliest extant full-length Virgilian cento, Hosidius Geta's Medea, which takes the form of a tragedy. The aim is to explore how Geta accomplishes the feat of turning Virgil's verses into a tragic poem, and to approach that subject through the lens of genre, as well as of allusion. Focus lies upon interpreting the formal and thematic adaptation of Virgil to a drama on Medea, the use of Virgilian lines to allude to Ovidian and Senecan tragedy, and the intertextual relationship between the cento and Virgil's Aeneid 4, the story of Dido.Less
This chapter examines the (probably) earliest extant full-length Virgilian cento, Hosidius Geta's Medea, which takes the form of a tragedy. The aim is to explore how Geta accomplishes the feat of turning Virgil's verses into a tragic poem, and to approach that subject through the lens of genre, as well as of allusion. Focus lies upon interpreting the formal and thematic adaptation of Virgil to a drama on Medea, the use of Virgilian lines to allude to Ovidian and Senecan tragedy, and the intertextual relationship between the cento and Virgil's Aeneid 4, the story of Dido.
