Search Results

No one believes that he does not know himself or the world around him because everyone is familiar with both these. Therefore the question naturally arises as to what exactly is meant by the Advaitin’s claim that no one really “knows the Self” and hence everyone must attain Self-knowledge. What is this “Self-knowledge” which everyone is said to be ignorant of? It is argued in this chapter that according to the non-duality thesis, there cannot really be “another” besides the non-dual Self and therefore not knowing this is itself ignorance. If so, naturally, knowing that whatever exists is the Self alone and nothing else (sarvātmabhāva) must truly constitute “Self-knowledge”. Therefore ignorance must truly be not knowing that whatever is, is the Self itself and nothing else. Then, obviously, not only the jīva but the world too is the Self.

How are Catholics to respond to a culture of death? This chapter answers this question by considering the life and thought of Berrigan and Etty Hillesum, a Dutch Jewish woman who died in Auschwitz. This chapter first considers the Church’s articulation of the culture of death in our contemporary world. It then biographically fleshes out the development of an awakened consciousness and conscience both in Berrigan and Hillesum. The chapter concludes with an exploration of their methods of non-violent resistance and peacemaking: the daily practice of prayer, the constant work of self-knowledge, and a commitment to life in community. Berrigan and Hillesum, by breathing new life into ancient practices, show us what non-violent revolutionary love looks like, hence their weighty challenge to Catholic social thought.

This chapter focuses on the ways in which Maryse Condé’s autofictional narratives engage with questions of history and memory, particularly the notion that self-knowledge achieved by filling in the gaps of her personal history is a means to create connections and reconcile with the past. The term herstory is more appropriate in this context given Condé’s attention to understanding her female lineage and her roles as mother, lover and writer. The discussion centers on: Le Coeur à rire et à pleurer: contes vrais de mon enfance [Tales from the Heart: True Stories from My Childhood], Victoire, les saveurs et les mots [Victoire: My Mother’s Mother] and La Vie sans fards. These three narratives have been chosen for their illuminating demonstration of the continuous interchange that exists between the personal and the historical as well as Condé’s emphasis on the importance of connecting histories within one’s own family and with her literary forebears.

Amsterdam’s Doolhoven, or labyrinths, constituted recreational spaces that also forged a strong connection between theatricality and a secular conversional experience by drawing on the idea of the labyrinth as an allegory for progression toward spiritual transformation. The chapter explores both the performative and philosophical components of these early modern labyrinths and the deeper meaning of their many ludic tricks.

This chapter is a study of the efforts of Rishi Valley Institute for Educational Resources (RIVER) to transform teacher education in India; it explores the aims, intents and structure of RIVER’s Teacher Enrichment Programme (RTEP). Through RTEP, RIVER seeks to supplement the implementation of the Diploma in Elementary Education (DElEd) programme in teacher education institutes across Andhra Pradesh. RTEP is grounded in the educational philosophy of Jiddu Krishnamurti and places immense faith in the compassionate role of the teacher; it may be read as RIVER’s application of Krishnamurti’s ideas to the contemporary context of Indian teacher education. In attempting to bring about teacher self-knowledge in its content and form, as well as openness in its method of dissemination, RTEP responds to the existing institutional challenges of teacher education in India. In doing so, this chapter argues, RTEP represents and reflects the tremendous power, foresight, and malleability of Krishnamurti’s philosophical thought.

Self-portraiture is a familiar artistic genre, but it involves complex self relations. Normally the individual’s sense of self is borne partly in the reflection of another person’s gaze. In self-portraiture, however, a layering of multiple subjectivities occurs, as the maker grapples with the task of seeing himself/herself first as an externalized other and then as an intimate construction crafted by the active self. Objecthood and subjecthood collapse a little, the one into the other. This Reflection looks at two very different examples from Caravaggio, one where he presents himself as the severed head of Goliath, another where he presents himself as the beautiful Narcissus, arguably the ‘originator’ of self-portraiture.

This paper deals with self-knowledge as it applies to the contents of phenomenally conscious states. I argue that a plausible view of our epistemic situation with respect to the phenomenal character of our conscious states rules out various kinds of proposals for identifying phenomenal character with external properties. This paper comes at the issue of representationalism about phenomenal character from the angle of what is involved in self-knowledge of phenomenal character. The main problem, as developed here, is that externalist theories of phenomenal character are inherently vulnerable to “Frege cases,” in which we can internally distinguish our representational states even though they pick out the same external property. By pinning our experience on the identity of the referent of our perceptual states, the theory undermines our intimate self-knowledge of experience.