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In the academy, the so-called Science Wars of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s were waged largely by those on the left who were interested in the theories and findings of the several disciplines in which historical, philosophical, political, and sociological science studies are pursued. These radical critics equated scientific knowledge with power, but made an exception for ecology, which they saw as utopian because they too readily accepted the popular view of ecology as holistic and communitarian, and therefore as radically unlike physics, which has long set the standard for reductive and mechanistic views of nature as well as for objectivity and certainty. Radical critics of science have no faith in the latter, believing instead in the social construction of scientific knowledge, and asserting that the goal of most scientific research and experimentation is the domination of nature. Their confidence in theories of social construction leads them to treat science as just one form of discourse among others, and to dismiss disciplines like sociobiology and genetics as politically suspect. But many of these critics of science — who are variously influenced by Critical Theory, cultural studies, ecofeminism, and so-called social ecology — seem blithely to accept sociological determinism (which would appear to be just as onerous as any other form of determinism) and seem to misunderstand scientific realism, which is a realism not about theories or “discourses” but about entities which cannot be understood as mere effects of meaning or artifacts of signification.

Besides systematic philosophical arguments, there are various extra‐scientific reasons that have been presented for or against realism. This discussion about the relations of knowledge and happiness (good human life) started already among the ancient philosophers (Aristotle, sceptics), and has continued ever since. Such religious, moral, and political considerations do not directly speak in favour or against the truth of scientific realism, but they raise important issues about science policy that have recently been topical in the so‐called Science Wars. Against Rorty's postmodern pragmatism and Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism, it is argued that critical scientific realism, with its commitment to the ethos of science as described by Merton's ethical norms, is in many ways a desirable philosophical outlook in a free, democratic, liberal society.

Issuing a bold and, in light of current preoccupations with AIME, untimely call for the continued relevance of Laboratory Life, David Caudill’s chapter realigns the question of Latour’s value for legal theory. Rather than mapping the unstable, unpredictable movements of the legal trajectory – a term that, in preceding chapters, has taken on several perhaps inconsistent layers of meaning – Caudill proposes to reconsider the relationship between law and the sciences (and revisits some of the drama of the Science Wars) under the auspices of the economics of science, a flourishing sub-field of science studies veritably inaugurated by Laboratory Life’s influential discussion of cycles of credit and credibility. Deftly untangling the law-sciences-economics knot, Caudill stages the matter of Philip Mirowski v. Bruno Latour (and Michel Callon), in which the defendants were accused of complicity with neoliberalism and charged, by proxy, with the allegedly pernicious effects of the increasing commercialisation of research on the scientific establishment. Mirowski’s critique runs out of steam, Caudill shows, and runs off the rails as soon as the details of law’s appropriation of scientific research and evidence are examined. But the often dismaying implications of Science Wars-era disputes – now being recapitulated or replayed in miniature, in the economics wing of the science studies field and in legal studies – continue to haunt contemporary law as well as science policy, because it remains unclear to what extent judges and regulators (and legal academics) appreciate the material contributions of works like Laboratory Life to the improvement of our understanding of the sciences, and to what extent the co-production thesis developed by Latour, Callon and others still registers as a fanciful exercise in debunking.

Rejects the attempt of evolutionary psychology to deny or minimize the importance of human cultural diversity, and argues for the importance of such diversity. This involves an attempt to understand the causal power of culture and the processes of cultural evolution. Compares human cultural diversity with the diversity found among non‐human species. Finally argues that, despite obvious dangers, cultural diversity should, like biological diversity, be valued. Concludes with some reflections on the so‐called Science Wars.

In this introduction, Peter Zachar explores the importance of establishing the reality of psychiatric disorders, noting that debates about the reality and unreality of psychiatric disorders are related to the problem of scientific realism. The passions that accompany discussions of realism are exemplified by the Science Wars of the 1990s. One outcome of the Sciences Wars was a less blunt use of metaphysical concepts such as “real” on the part of those participants who were both scientifically and philosophically inclined. It is argued that debates about the reality of psychiatric disorders are at least as passionate, and likely more relevant to people's everyday lives. In this book, metaphysical concepts such as real, true, and objective will be viewed in pragmatist fashion as conceptual tools that have an important role to play in psychiatry, but in adherence to empiricist minimalism, not treated as transcendent, absolute concepts.

The chapter addresses the popularization of the main acquisitions of social constructionist sociology in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), done by Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch in the volumes of their Golem trilogy, dedicated respectively to science, technology and medicine. The polemical target of the trilogy, the "flip-flop" understanding of science, technology and medicine, that induces the public to oscillate from an unconditioned trust in scientist, engineers and medics as god-like figures, to a complete skepticism and distrust and vice versa. The chapter also addressed the reasons behind the harsh confrontations between constructionist sociologists of science and scientists occurred in the '90s, known as "Science Wars", and some events connected to the confrontations, like the famous hoax by Alan Sokal.