Search Results

Inventing the Schlieffen plan

TERENCE ZUBER

in Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning 1871-1914

This chapter traces development of the Schlieffen plan myth. The Schlieffen plan was manufactured in 1920 by the General Staff historical section and senior officers such as Hermann von Kuhl and ... More

This chapter traces development of the Schlieffen plan myth. The Schlieffen plan was manufactured in 1920 by the General Staff historical section and senior officers such as Hermann von Kuhl and Wilhelm Groener (the ‘Schlieffen school’) to explain why the German army failed to win the Marne Campaign in 1914: they said that the Schlieffen plan was practically infallible, but the younger Moltke failed to understand the concept of the plan and ‘watered it down’, reinforcing the left wing at the expense of the decisive right wing. Therefore, the Germans were defeated on the Marne. In order to protect their assertion that the Schlieffen plan was the real war plan, the ‘Schlieffen school’ refused to discuss the details of Schlieffen's war planning from 1891 to 1905 and the German army historical section treated his war plans and war games as classified documents. In April 1945 the German army archive was destroyed in a British bombing raid. In the early 1950s Gerhard Ritter found the original text of the Schlieffen's 1906 Schlieffen Plan Denkschrift (position paper) in the US National Archives, where the US Army had stored it. Ritter used this discovery to turn the General Staff's argument on its head: he said that the Schlieffen plan was the apotheosis of German militarism and the proximate cause of the Great War. Less

The Sword of Damocles: A Two-Front War

Gerhard P. Gross

David T. Zabecki (ed.)

in The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger

Chapter 4 examines Alfred von Schlieffen’s tenure as Chief of the German General Staff and the development of operational thinking that led to the 1905 Schlieffen Plan, a procedure for war against ... More

Chapter 4 examines Alfred von Schlieffen’s tenure as Chief of the German General Staff and the development of operational thinking that led to the 1905 Schlieffen Plan, a procedure for war against France based on the assumption that a two-front war was inevitable. The plan called for the quick destruction of the French army through a series of offensive strikes, culminating in the total envelopment of the French defense. Schlieffen hoped that by annihilating the French army quickly, Germany could force France to surrender and could shift its forces toward Russia in the east. This chapter debunks numerous myths about the plan and points out its flaws, including a lack of political and logistical preparedness. In the end, however, the chapter suggests that German soldiers at the start of World War I did not enter the field with the Schlieffen Plan but with the Moltke Plan, a variation of the Schlieffen Plan devised by then Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, which allowed for the long war of attrition that ensued.Less

Bitter Awakening: World War I

Gerhard P. Gross

David T. Zabecki (ed.)

in The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger

Chapter 5 examines the breakdown of German operational thinking in the face of the harsh realities of World War I. In the first weeks of the war, Schlieffen’s and Moltke’s plans for an annihilating, ... More

Chapter 5 examines the breakdown of German operational thinking in the face of the harsh realities of World War I. In the first weeks of the war, Schlieffen’s and Moltke’s plans for an annihilating, decisive victory on the Western front failed as the Germans were repulsed at the Battle of the Marne. For four years, the German General Staff failed to adapt to positional trench warfare, believing that the misrepresented victories of the Battle of Tannenberg and the Romania Campaign affirmed the superiority of the Schlieffen Plan’s dogmatic focus on a concentrated offensive leading to envelopment. In actuality, both of these operations revealed shortcomings in Germany’s strategy. The German Army lacked mobility, effective communication between rival commanders, and a logistical plan to support millions of troops spread across Europe. Ultimately, as American reinforcements arrived in France, the German high command resorted to stubborn, desperate attempts to break through enemy lines, split Allied forces, and force a maneuver-based war. This chapter explores the singlemindedness of German operational thinking in staking everything on a great battle for France, a battle they had lost from the beginning.Less

Economics

in Castles, Battles, & Bombs: How Economics Explains Military History

In 1914, one of the world's most famous war plans, the Schlieffen Plan, impelled Germany to turn a developing east European squabble into the greatest, most encompassing, and costliest war ... More

In 1914, one of the world's most famous war plans, the Schlieffen Plan, impelled Germany to turn a developing east European squabble into the greatest, most encompassing, and costliest war civilization had ever known: World War I. Almost a century later, the Schlieffen Plan still generates considerable debate. This book uses ideas from economics to help illuminate decision making in war. The Schlieffen Plan encapsulates the six principles of economics that this book employs to examine various episodes in military history, stretching over a thousand years, during the second millennium ad. This chapter is a primer on economics and economic theory. It begins by outlining the development of economic science and then discusses the principles applied in the book (opportunity cost, expected marginal costs and benefits, substitution, diminishing marginal returns, asymmetric information and hidden characteristics, and hidden actions and incentive alignments). It concludes by considering how these principles are mingled with military history.Less

Time in War

Phillip S. Meilinger

in Thoughts on War

The use of time, or timing, in war has always been of crucial importance—great commanders have understood the critical nature of time on the battlefield. It fits here by reflecting a major factor in ... More

The use of time, or timing, in war has always been of crucial importance—great commanders have understood the critical nature of time on the battlefield. It fits here by reflecting a major factor in war that has long been recognized but seldom achieved. The notion of how to telescope time was a quest for greater speed and of achieving physical and psychological surprise and shock. In modern terms, these were force multipliers. It also appears that conquering time is best suited to the rapidity, flexibility, and omniscience of air and space power, and therefore leads to the future of war. Given are several battles throughout history, both on land and in the air, that illustrate the critical nature of time.Less

Decisive Victories and What They Mean

Phillip S. Meilinger

in Thoughts on War

The subject of decisive victory was another subject that caught my attention while at the Naval War College, where we would ask students to list Napoleon’s decisive victories. The term “decisive” is ... More

The subject of decisive victory was another subject that caught my attention while at the Naval War College, where we would ask students to list Napoleon’s decisive victories. The term “decisive” is overused, and too often engagements with only transient strategic significance—despite the number of casualties—were given the term. The number of truly decisive battles throughout history is few. The first step therefore was to define decisive, and the key was to identify victories having long-term significance. After defining the term, listed are what in my view are the Top Eleven throughout history.Less

Victor of Liège and Tannenberg

Jay Lockenour

in Dragonslayer: The Legend of Erich Ludendorff in the Weimar Republic and Third Reich

This chapter begins by discussing Erich Ludendorff’s early career and memoir, the only document containing information about his prewar life. It recounts Ludendorff’s time in Poland, in which he ... More

This chapter begins by discussing Erich Ludendorff’s early career and memoir, the only document containing information about his prewar life. It recounts Ludendorff’s time in Poland, in which he embarks on one brief tangent concerning the pernicious influence of the Catholic Church there, and makes occasional reference to a Masonic plot. The chapter then presents Ludendorff’s role as the section chief, a position of enormous responsibility, from 1908 until 1913. In this role, he oversaw the technical section of the General Staff and was responsible for modernizing Germany’s artillery, managing the army’s communications, and evaluating and incorporating new technologies such as automobiles and aircraft. The chapter also elaborates the details of the Schlieffen Plan and the issue of army enlargement. Ultimately, the chapter discusses how the twin victories at Liège and Tannenberg established Ludendorff’s reputation as a courageous officer and gifted operational commander.Less