Anandi Hattiangadi
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199219025
- eISBN:
- 9780191711879
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219025.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book provides a response to the argument for meaning scepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke asks what makes it the case that anybody ever means ...
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This book provides a response to the argument for meaning scepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke asks what makes it the case that anybody ever means anything by any word, and argues that there are no facts of the matter as to what anybody ever means. Kripke's argument has inspired a lively and extended debate in the philosophy of language, as it raises some of the most fundamental issues in the field: namely, the reality, privacy, and normativity of meaning. The book argues that in order to achieve the radical conclusion that there are no facts as to what a person means by a word, the sceptic must rely on the thesis that meaning is normative, and that this thesis fails. Since any ‘sceptical solution’ to the sceptical problem is irremediably incoherent, the book concludes that there must be a fact of the matter about what we mean. In addition to providing an overview of the debate on meaning and content scepticism, this book presents a detailed discussion of the contributions made by Simon Blackburn, Paul Boghossian, Robert Brandom, Fred Dretske, John McDowell, and Crispin Wright, among others, to the controversy surrounding Kripke's argument. The issues considered include the normativity of meaning and its relation to the normativity of moral judgments, reductive and non-reductive theories of meaning, deflationism about truth and meaning, and the privacy of meaning.Less
This book provides a response to the argument for meaning scepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke asks what makes it the case that anybody ever means anything by any word, and argues that there are no facts of the matter as to what anybody ever means. Kripke's argument has inspired a lively and extended debate in the philosophy of language, as it raises some of the most fundamental issues in the field: namely, the reality, privacy, and normativity of meaning. The book argues that in order to achieve the radical conclusion that there are no facts as to what a person means by a word, the sceptic must rely on the thesis that meaning is normative, and that this thesis fails. Since any ‘sceptical solution’ to the sceptical problem is irremediably incoherent, the book concludes that there must be a fact of the matter about what we mean. In addition to providing an overview of the debate on meaning and content scepticism, this book presents a detailed discussion of the contributions made by Simon Blackburn, Paul Boghossian, Robert Brandom, Fred Dretske, John McDowell, and Crispin Wright, among others, to the controversy surrounding Kripke's argument. The issues considered include the normativity of meaning and its relation to the normativity of moral judgments, reductive and non-reductive theories of meaning, deflationism about truth and meaning, and the privacy of meaning.
Nathan Salmon
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199284726
- eISBN:
- 9780191713774
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter defends the theory proffered in the author's Frege's Puzzle against criticisms made by Saul Kripke and Stephen Schiffer. The assumption that invariably one would be justified in ...
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This chapter defends the theory proffered in the author's Frege's Puzzle against criticisms made by Saul Kripke and Stephen Schiffer. The assumption that invariably one would be justified in inferring logically valid consequences is challenged. A weakened variant is proposed. A complex example of Schiffer's concerning iterated belief attribution is analyzed.Less
This chapter defends the theory proffered in the author's Frege's Puzzle against criticisms made by Saul Kripke and Stephen Schiffer. The assumption that invariably one would be justified in inferring logically valid consequences is challenged. A weakened variant is proposed. A complex example of Schiffer's concerning iterated belief attribution is analyzed.
Scott Soames
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691160726
- eISBN:
- 9781400850464
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691160726.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, American Philosophy
This chapter discusses Saul Kripke’s treatment of the necessary a posteriori and concomitant distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibility. It extracts the enduring lessons of his ...
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This chapter discusses Saul Kripke’s treatment of the necessary a posteriori and concomitant distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibility. It extracts the enduring lessons of his treatment of these matters and disentangles them from errors and confusions that mar some of his most important discussions. It argues that there are two Kripkean routes to the necessary a posteriori—one correct and philosophically far-reaching; the other incorrect, philosophically misleading, and the source of damaging errors that persist to this day. It connects two false principles involved in the second, unsuccessful, route to the necessary a posteriori with the plausible and potentially correct idea that believing a singular proposition that o is F always involves also believing a richer more descriptively informative proposition in which some further property plays a role in the agent’s thoughts about o. It explains why this idea will not save the failed second route to the necessary a posteriori and suggests that it may help reconcile Kripke’s insights with the lessons of Frege’s puzzle.Less
This chapter discusses Saul Kripke’s treatment of the necessary a posteriori and concomitant distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibility. It extracts the enduring lessons of his treatment of these matters and disentangles them from errors and confusions that mar some of his most important discussions. It argues that there are two Kripkean routes to the necessary a posteriori—one correct and philosophically far-reaching; the other incorrect, philosophically misleading, and the source of damaging errors that persist to this day. It connects two false principles involved in the second, unsuccessful, route to the necessary a posteriori with the plausible and potentially correct idea that believing a singular proposition that o is F always involves also believing a richer more descriptively informative proposition in which some further property plays a role in the agent’s thoughts about o. It explains why this idea will not save the failed second route to the necessary a posteriori and suggests that it may help reconcile Kripke’s insights with the lessons of Frege’s puzzle.
Sanford Shieh
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195139167
- eISBN:
- 9780199833214
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019513916X.003.0019
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Saul Kripke’s “modal argument” against the description theory of proper names turns on a distinction between reference-fixing and meaning-giving. In this essay Shieh argues first that without further ...
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Saul Kripke’s “modal argument” against the description theory of proper names turns on a distinction between reference-fixing and meaning-giving. In this essay Shieh argues first that without further explanation of meaning-giving, it is unclear how this argument shows that the meanings of names cannot be given by descriptions. Second, Shieh shows that an explanation of meaning-giving sufficient to sustain the modal argument requires a notion of modal properties of meaning. This notion, in turn, yields a notion of rigidity of names that can be explained in terms of Gareth Evans’s notion of deep necessity. Shieh concludes that Kripke’s modal argument is not based simply on untutored linguistic intuitions or facts of ordinary language use but presupposes substantial metaphysical commitments.Less
Saul Kripke’s “modal argument” against the description theory of proper names turns on a distinction between reference-fixing and meaning-giving. In this essay Shieh argues first that without further explanation of meaning-giving, it is unclear how this argument shows that the meanings of names cannot be given by descriptions. Second, Shieh shows that an explanation of meaning-giving sufficient to sustain the modal argument requires a notion of modal properties of meaning. This notion, in turn, yields a notion of rigidity of names that can be explained in terms of Gareth Evans’s notion of deep necessity. Shieh concludes that Kripke’s modal argument is not based simply on untutored linguistic intuitions or facts of ordinary language use but presupposes substantial metaphysical commitments.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The distinction between natural necessity and metaphysical necessity is examined. An account is advanced of the logical form of statements of natural law, contrasting with that of D. M. Armstrong. ...
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The distinction between natural necessity and metaphysical necessity is examined. An account is advanced of the logical form of statements of natural law, contrasting with that of D. M. Armstrong. The relationship between law-statements and counterfactual conditionals is discussed. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is challenged as resting on a questionable account of the identity conditions of properties. It is argued that Saul Kripke’s model of a posteriori knowledge of necessary truths does not enable us to understand how knowledge of natural laws is possible on the scientific essentialist view of them.Less
The distinction between natural necessity and metaphysical necessity is examined. An account is advanced of the logical form of statements of natural law, contrasting with that of D. M. Armstrong. The relationship between law-statements and counterfactual conditionals is discussed. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is challenged as resting on a questionable account of the identity conditions of properties. It is argued that Saul Kripke’s model of a posteriori knowledge of necessary truths does not enable us to understand how knowledge of natural laws is possible on the scientific essentialist view of them.
Scott Soames
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691138664
- eISBN:
- 9781400833931
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691138664.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter discusses the contributions of Saul Kripke and David Kaplan, which are leading elements of a body of work that changed the course of analytic philosophy. It first deals with the views of ...
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This chapter discusses the contributions of Saul Kripke and David Kaplan, which are leading elements of a body of work that changed the course of analytic philosophy. It first deals with the views of Kripke. The necessity featured in Naming and Necessity is the nonlinguistic notion needed for quantified modal logic and the modal de re. Kripke's articulation of this notion is linked to his discussion of rigid designation, and metaphysical essentialism. The remainder of the chapter deals with Kaplan, focusing on the tension between logic and semantics; the basic structure of the logic of demonstratives; direct reference and rigid designation; and English demonstratives vs. “dthat”-rigidified descriptions.Less
This chapter discusses the contributions of Saul Kripke and David Kaplan, which are leading elements of a body of work that changed the course of analytic philosophy. It first deals with the views of Kripke. The necessity featured in Naming and Necessity is the nonlinguistic notion needed for quantified modal logic and the modal de re. Kripke's articulation of this notion is linked to his discussion of rigid designation, and metaphysical essentialism. The remainder of the chapter deals with Kaplan, focusing on the tension between logic and semantics; the basic structure of the logic of demonstratives; direct reference and rigid designation; and English demonstratives vs. “dthat”-rigidified descriptions.
Joseph Almog and Paolo Leonardi (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199844845
- eISBN:
- 9780199933501
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199844845.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Keith Donnellan of UCLA is one of the founding fathers of contemporary philosophy of language, along with David Kaplan and Saul Kripke. Donnellan was and is an extremely creative thinker whose ...
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Keith Donnellan of UCLA is one of the founding fathers of contemporary philosophy of language, along with David Kaplan and Saul Kripke. Donnellan was and is an extremely creative thinker whose insights reached into metaphysics, action theory, the history of philosophy, and of course the philosophy of mind and language. This volume collects the best critical work on Donnellan’s forty-year body of work. The pieces by such noted philosophers as Tyler Burge, David Kaplan, and John Perry, discuss Donnellan’s various insights particularly offering new readings of his views on language and mind.Less
Keith Donnellan of UCLA is one of the founding fathers of contemporary philosophy of language, along with David Kaplan and Saul Kripke. Donnellan was and is an extremely creative thinker whose insights reached into metaphysics, action theory, the history of philosophy, and of course the philosophy of mind and language. This volume collects the best critical work on Donnellan’s forty-year body of work. The pieces by such noted philosophers as Tyler Burge, David Kaplan, and John Perry, discuss Donnellan’s various insights particularly offering new readings of his views on language and mind.
Scott Soames
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691160726
- eISBN:
- 9781400850464
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691160726.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, American Philosophy
This chapter is devoted to one of the most fascinating figures of the twentieth century, David Lewis. The key to understanding this author of so many works in so many areas of philosophy is to see ...
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This chapter is devoted to one of the most fascinating figures of the twentieth century, David Lewis. The key to understanding this author of so many works in so many areas of philosophy is to see how his views are related to those of his colleague Saul Kripke as well as to those of his teacher W. V. O. Quine. Like Kripke, Lewis embraced the modalities (necessity and a priority) that Quine rejected. Also like Kripke, Lewis had no sympathy for Quine’s early verificationism or his flights from intension and intention, and he was straightforwardly a realist about science in general. However, despite these similarities with Kripke, Lewis’s analysis of necessity could not be more different from Kripke’s. Quine taught that vindicating naturalism and extensionalism required eliminating intensional facts and rejecting intensional constructions, his student Lewis, however, tried to show that intensional facts are just a species of extensional facts, and that intensional constructions in language are no threat to the integrity of an austere, naturalistic vision of reality.Less
This chapter is devoted to one of the most fascinating figures of the twentieth century, David Lewis. The key to understanding this author of so many works in so many areas of philosophy is to see how his views are related to those of his colleague Saul Kripke as well as to those of his teacher W. V. O. Quine. Like Kripke, Lewis embraced the modalities (necessity and a priority) that Quine rejected. Also like Kripke, Lewis had no sympathy for Quine’s early verificationism or his flights from intension and intention, and he was straightforwardly a realist about science in general. However, despite these similarities with Kripke, Lewis’s analysis of necessity could not be more different from Kripke’s. Quine taught that vindicating naturalism and extensionalism required eliminating intensional facts and rejecting intensional constructions, his student Lewis, however, tried to show that intensional facts are just a species of extensional facts, and that intensional constructions in language are no threat to the integrity of an austere, naturalistic vision of reality.
Alexis G. Burgess and John P. Burgess
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691144016
- eISBN:
- 9781400838691
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691144016.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter examines Saul Kripke's mathematically rigorous, paradox-free treatment of truth for certain formal languages. Kripke adds hints about how his formal construction might model some ...
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This chapter examines Saul Kripke's mathematically rigorous, paradox-free treatment of truth for certain formal languages. Kripke adds hints about how his formal construction might model some features of natural language, but his hints steer a path between an inconsistency view and a vindicationist one. The chapter first compares Kripke's notion of truth with that of Alfred Tarski before discussing what Kripke calls the minimum fixed point, the first level where no new sentences get classified as true that were not already so classified at some earlier level. It also considers the ungroundedness of a sentence, along with the concepts of transfinite construction, revision theories, and axiomatic theories of truth.Less
This chapter examines Saul Kripke's mathematically rigorous, paradox-free treatment of truth for certain formal languages. Kripke adds hints about how his formal construction might model some features of natural language, but his hints steer a path between an inconsistency view and a vindicationist one. The chapter first compares Kripke's notion of truth with that of Alfred Tarski before discussing what Kripke calls the minimum fixed point, the first level where no new sentences get classified as true that were not already so classified at some earlier level. It also considers the ungroundedness of a sentence, along with the concepts of transfinite construction, revision theories, and axiomatic theories of truth.
Robert C. Stalnaker
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199251483
- eISBN:
- 9780191602320
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251487.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This paper explores the relationship between theses and questions about reference, necessity, and possibility. The analysis focuses on the theses Saul Kripke defends about individuals and their ...
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This paper explores the relationship between theses and questions about reference, necessity, and possibility. The analysis focuses on the theses Saul Kripke defends about individuals and their names. It is argued that Kripke’s contribution was to separate metaphysical and semantic issues. Kripke’s theses on proper names and reference do not presuppose any controversial metaphysical theories. No metaphysical conclusions are derived from theses about reference and names, although clarifications on the nature of reference helps in rebuttals to arguments against metaphysical theses that Kripke defends.Less
This paper explores the relationship between theses and questions about reference, necessity, and possibility. The analysis focuses on the theses Saul Kripke defends about individuals and their names. It is argued that Kripke’s contribution was to separate metaphysical and semantic issues. Kripke’s theses on proper names and reference do not presuppose any controversial metaphysical theories. No metaphysical conclusions are derived from theses about reference and names, although clarifications on the nature of reference helps in rebuttals to arguments against metaphysical theses that Kripke defends.
Herman Philipse
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199697533
- eISBN:
- 9780191738470
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697533.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Natural theologians often claim that God exists necessarily, so that his (alleged) existence does not need an explanation. Various notions of necessity are analysed in order to determine in which ...
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Natural theologians often claim that God exists necessarily, so that his (alleged) existence does not need an explanation. Various notions of necessity are analysed in order to determine in which sense God’s existence can be called ‘necessary’. Richard Swinburne’s claim that God exists necessarily in the ontological sense boils down to admitting that God’s existence, if he exists, is radically contingent. Furthermore, Swinburne’s use of Kripke’s notion of de re necessity in order to explain in which sense God’s defining properties are ne cessary properties is unconvincing for various reasons. Finally, Swinburne’s introduction of analogy into his use of the term ‘person’ for God in order to resolve a contradiction concerning God’s necessary properties implies that no proof of the coherence of theism is possible. In particular, there is no conceivable indirect proof of the coherence of theism by adducing evidence to the effect that theism is probably true. It follows on the usual criteria for theory choice that theism is not eligible as an existential hypothesis open to empirical confirmation.Less
Natural theologians often claim that God exists necessarily, so that his (alleged) existence does not need an explanation. Various notions of necessity are analysed in order to determine in which sense God’s existence can be called ‘necessary’. Richard Swinburne’s claim that God exists necessarily in the ontological sense boils down to admitting that God’s existence, if he exists, is radically contingent. Furthermore, Swinburne’s use of Kripke’s notion of de re necessity in order to explain in which sense God’s defining properties are ne cessary properties is unconvincing for various reasons. Finally, Swinburne’s introduction of analogy into his use of the term ‘person’ for God in order to resolve a contradiction concerning God’s necessary properties implies that no proof of the coherence of theism is possible. In particular, there is no conceivable indirect proof of the coherence of theism by adducing evidence to the effect that theism is probably true. It follows on the usual criteria for theory choice that theism is not eligible as an existential hypothesis open to empirical confirmation.
John Hawthorne and David Manley
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693672
- eISBN:
- 9780191739002
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693672.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter considers demonstratives and proper names. It begins by arguing for a semantically unified treatment of demonstratives on which they are specific existentials (like specific indefinites ...
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This chapter considers demonstratives and proper names. It begins by arguing for a semantically unified treatment of demonstratives on which they are specific existentials (like specific indefinites and definite descriptions) but have their own distinctive presuppositional profile. Next, the chapter turns to the category of proper names and their various uses. The authors acknowledge that there are shortcomings to semantic orthodoxy, which treats proper names as paradigmatically referential tags, and that standard Kripkean modal arguments are ineffectual against the view that all proper names are semantically predicative. However, the authors finally reject the predicative view in favor of a new alternative to semantic orthodoxy—one that fits well with their preferred accounts of various other noun phrases.Less
This chapter considers demonstratives and proper names. It begins by arguing for a semantically unified treatment of demonstratives on which they are specific existentials (like specific indefinites and definite descriptions) but have their own distinctive presuppositional profile. Next, the chapter turns to the category of proper names and their various uses. The authors acknowledge that there are shortcomings to semantic orthodoxy, which treats proper names as paradigmatically referential tags, and that standard Kripkean modal arguments are ineffectual against the view that all proper names are semantically predicative. However, the authors finally reject the predicative view in favor of a new alternative to semantic orthodoxy—one that fits well with their preferred accounts of various other noun phrases.
John Hawthorne and David Manley
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693672
- eISBN:
- 9780191739002
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693672.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
The discovery of the twin categories of reference and singular thought is widely felt to be one of the landmark achievements of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. On the one hand there is the ...
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The discovery of the twin categories of reference and singular thought is widely felt to be one of the landmark achievements of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. On the one hand there is the distinction between bona fide referential expressions of natural language and those that are about objects only in some looser sense. On the other hand there is a corresponding distinction between a thought that is loosely about an object, and one whose bond with an object is robust enough for it to count as genuinely ‘singular’ or ‘de re’. This chapter tries to shed light on these two ideas by focusing on semantic ideas connected with Russell’s category of logically proper names that have been widely brought to bear on their successors.Less
The discovery of the twin categories of reference and singular thought is widely felt to be one of the landmark achievements of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. On the one hand there is the distinction between bona fide referential expressions of natural language and those that are about objects only in some looser sense. On the other hand there is a corresponding distinction between a thought that is loosely about an object, and one whose bond with an object is robust enough for it to count as genuinely ‘singular’ or ‘de re’. This chapter tries to shed light on these two ideas by focusing on semantic ideas connected with Russell’s category of logically proper names that have been widely brought to bear on their successors.
John Allan Knight
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199969388
- eISBN:
- 9780199301546
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199969388.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies
Previous chapters have described liberalism’s relationship to descriptivist understandings of language and postliberalism’s relationship to Wittgenstein. This chapter describes serious problems with ...
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Previous chapters have described liberalism’s relationship to descriptivist understandings of language and postliberalism’s relationship to Wittgenstein. This chapter describes serious problems with descriptivism, on the one hand, and Wittgensteinian understandings of meaning, on the other. The chapter argues that the most influential descriptivist theory of meaning, that of Donald Davidson, is fatally flawed. The chapter then argues that satisfaction of descriptive senses cannot be either universally necessary or sufficient for successful reference. Thus, descriptivism is an inadequate account of either meaning or reference. The chapter then provides an analysis and critique of the later Wittgenstein’s understanding of meaning as use. The chapter discusses prominent criticisms of Wittgenstein’s understanding of meaning and concludes that at best it is too vague to be either defended or conclusively refuted. At worst, its problems can be resolved only by abandoning Wittgenstein’s central commitments. Postliberal appropriations of Wittgenstein raise additional serious problems. These center around the failure to distinguish semantics from speech acts and the refusal to allow reference any role in determining meaning. These postliberal moves deprive Frei and Lindbeck of the ability to argue for the truth of theological claims and leave them vulnerable to charges of fideism.Less
Previous chapters have described liberalism’s relationship to descriptivist understandings of language and postliberalism’s relationship to Wittgenstein. This chapter describes serious problems with descriptivism, on the one hand, and Wittgensteinian understandings of meaning, on the other. The chapter argues that the most influential descriptivist theory of meaning, that of Donald Davidson, is fatally flawed. The chapter then argues that satisfaction of descriptive senses cannot be either universally necessary or sufficient for successful reference. Thus, descriptivism is an inadequate account of either meaning or reference. The chapter then provides an analysis and critique of the later Wittgenstein’s understanding of meaning as use. The chapter discusses prominent criticisms of Wittgenstein’s understanding of meaning and concludes that at best it is too vague to be either defended or conclusively refuted. At worst, its problems can be resolved only by abandoning Wittgenstein’s central commitments. Postliberal appropriations of Wittgenstein raise additional serious problems. These center around the failure to distinguish semantics from speech acts and the refusal to allow reference any role in determining meaning. These postliberal moves deprive Frei and Lindbeck of the ability to argue for the truth of theological claims and leave them vulnerable to charges of fideism.
Scott Soames
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691160726
- eISBN:
- 9781400850464
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691160726.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, American Philosophy
This chapter traces the development of analytic philosophy in the United States, starting with the pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and (later) Clarence Irving Lewis, and ...
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This chapter traces the development of analytic philosophy in the United States, starting with the pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and (later) Clarence Irving Lewis, and continuing through the great immigration of philosophers of science, philosophical logicians, and logical positivists from the turn of the twentieth century to the outbreak of World War II. It also provides broad-brush overviews of some of the most important philosophical debates that occupied American analytic philosophers during the last half of the twentieth century, including the Quine–Carnap debate about meaning and analyticity, the struggle over modality, the rise of philosophical logic and its application to the study of natural language, the Davidsonian program, Saul Kripke and the end of the linguistic turn, John Rawls and the resuscitation of normative theory, and a smattering of other, more specialized topics.Less
This chapter traces the development of analytic philosophy in the United States, starting with the pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and (later) Clarence Irving Lewis, and continuing through the great immigration of philosophers of science, philosophical logicians, and logical positivists from the turn of the twentieth century to the outbreak of World War II. It also provides broad-brush overviews of some of the most important philosophical debates that occupied American analytic philosophers during the last half of the twentieth century, including the Quine–Carnap debate about meaning and analyticity, the struggle over modality, the rise of philosophical logic and its application to the study of natural language, the Davidsonian program, Saul Kripke and the end of the linguistic turn, John Rawls and the resuscitation of normative theory, and a smattering of other, more specialized topics.
Nicos Stavropoulos
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198258995
- eISBN:
- 9780191681899
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198258995.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter discusses the framework within philosophy of language that is helpful in illuminating issues in the theory of legal interpretation. It argues that the application of concepts is ...
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This chapter discusses the framework within philosophy of language that is helpful in illuminating issues in the theory of legal interpretation. It argues that the application of concepts is sensitive to theory. This overall claim is supported by arguments in the philosophy of language. The chapter examines Saul Kripke's arguments on the semantics of names, Hilary Putnam's generalisation of the argument to the domain of natural kinds, Tyler Burge's generalisation of the argument to cases of virtually any common noun, the arguments of John McDowell and Donald Davidson against the possibility of deriving content from intrinsic mental materials, the possibility of distinguishing between ascription of wrong beliefs about the same concept and ascription of a different concept, legal concepts analogous to the account of natural kinds, and a possible objection to the effect that conceiving legal questions as questions of classification of events or states of affairs, under legal concepts, distorts the nature of legal reasoning.Less
This chapter discusses the framework within philosophy of language that is helpful in illuminating issues in the theory of legal interpretation. It argues that the application of concepts is sensitive to theory. This overall claim is supported by arguments in the philosophy of language. The chapter examines Saul Kripke's arguments on the semantics of names, Hilary Putnam's generalisation of the argument to the domain of natural kinds, Tyler Burge's generalisation of the argument to cases of virtually any common noun, the arguments of John McDowell and Donald Davidson against the possibility of deriving content from intrinsic mental materials, the possibility of distinguishing between ascription of wrong beliefs about the same concept and ascription of a different concept, legal concepts analogous to the account of natural kinds, and a possible objection to the effect that conceiving legal questions as questions of classification of events or states of affairs, under legal concepts, distorts the nature of legal reasoning.
William G. Lycan
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198735595
- eISBN:
- 9780191799631
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198735595.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Modality and Meaning (1994) defended the minority position that nonfactual entities have haecceities (plus whatever other essential properties might be); the descriptions used to introduce them do ...
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Modality and Meaning (1994) defended the minority position that nonfactual entities have haecceities (plus whatever other essential properties might be); the descriptions used to introduce them do not produce or determine substantive essences. In light of Kripke’s John Locke Lectures and some more recent work on fictional characters, it appears that position needs further defending. This chapter rebuts Kripke’s odd view that fictional persons are not possible beings; instead it contends that the author’s original stipulatory model saves Haecceitism about fictional characters from Kripke’s plurality objections. His case against Haecceitism must therefore rest entirely on his pretence view of fictional discourse. But the pretence view does not work either; so Haecceitism survives.Less
Modality and Meaning (1994) defended the minority position that nonfactual entities have haecceities (plus whatever other essential properties might be); the descriptions used to introduce them do not produce or determine substantive essences. In light of Kripke’s John Locke Lectures and some more recent work on fictional characters, it appears that position needs further defending. This chapter rebuts Kripke’s odd view that fictional persons are not possible beings; instead it contends that the author’s original stipulatory model saves Haecceitism about fictional characters from Kripke’s plurality objections. His case against Haecceitism must therefore rest entirely on his pretence view of fictional discourse. But the pretence view does not work either; so Haecceitism survives.
Alexis G. Burgess and John P. Burgess
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691144016
- eISBN:
- 9781400838691
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691144016.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book is a concise introduction to current philosophical debates about truth. Combining philosophical and technical material, the book is organized around, but not limited to, the view known as ...
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This book is a concise introduction to current philosophical debates about truth. Combining philosophical and technical material, the book is organized around, but not limited to, the view known as deflationism. In clear language, the book covers a wide range of issues, including the nature of truth, the status of truth–value gaps, the relationship between truth and meaning, relativism and pluralism about truth, and semantic paradoxes from Alfred Tarski to Saul Kripke and beyond. The book provides a rich picture of contemporary philosophical theorizing about truth, one that will be essential reading for philosophy students as well as philosophers specializing in other areas.Less
This book is a concise introduction to current philosophical debates about truth. Combining philosophical and technical material, the book is organized around, but not limited to, the view known as deflationism. In clear language, the book covers a wide range of issues, including the nature of truth, the status of truth–value gaps, the relationship between truth and meaning, relativism and pluralism about truth, and semantic paradoxes from Alfred Tarski to Saul Kripke and beyond. The book provides a rich picture of contemporary philosophical theorizing about truth, one that will be essential reading for philosophy students as well as philosophers specializing in other areas.
Delia Graff Fara
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199659081
- eISBN:
- 9780191745201
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659081.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This is (fairly) uncontroversial: a is possibly-Φ when a counterpart of a is Φ in some world. It becomes (more) controversial only once the italicized relations are constrained in some way. For Saul ...
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This is (fairly) uncontroversial: a is possibly-Φ when a counterpart of a is Φ in some world. It becomes (more) controversial only once the italicized relations are constrained in some way. For Saul Kripke, the counterpart relation was identity while objects could exist in more than one world. For David Lewis, the counterpart relation was a similarity relation while objects could not exist in more than one world. Further controversy: identity is an equivalence relation but similarity is not. Different constraints are developed here. The counterpart relation is sortal-relative sameness. Individuals may exist in more than one world but can be sortal-relatively the same as something other than themselves in some different possible world. Sortal-relative sameness is a weak equivalence relation. This intermediate version of counterpart theory is put to use in solving a puzzle of material constitution.Less
This is (fairly) uncontroversial: a is possibly-Φ when a counterpart of a is Φ in some world. It becomes (more) controversial only once the italicized relations are constrained in some way. For Saul Kripke, the counterpart relation was identity while objects could exist in more than one world. For David Lewis, the counterpart relation was a similarity relation while objects could not exist in more than one world. Further controversy: identity is an equivalence relation but similarity is not. Different constraints are developed here. The counterpart relation is sortal-relative sameness. Individuals may exist in more than one world but can be sortal-relatively the same as something other than themselves in some different possible world. Sortal-relative sameness is a weak equivalence relation. This intermediate version of counterpart theory is put to use in solving a puzzle of material constitution.
Scott Soames
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691138664
- eISBN:
- 9781400833931
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691138664.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The conception of logical truth as truth in all models is attributed to Tarski, while the conception of analytic truth as one that can be reduced to logical truths is mainly attributed to Frege. We ...
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The conception of logical truth as truth in all models is attributed to Tarski, while the conception of analytic truth as one that can be reduced to logical truths is mainly attributed to Frege. We owe Stalnaker and Lewis for the conception of counterfactual consequence as truth in all “closest” world-states in which the initial set is true. We owe Kripke for the identification of metaphysical necessity, and the clear distinction between necessity and apriority. These advances, sketched in earlier chapters, have changed the face of philosophy. This chapter attempts to extend those lessons by combining the earlier discussions of rigid designation, direct reference, and indexicality with Chapter 5's account of world-states.Less
The conception of logical truth as truth in all models is attributed to Tarski, while the conception of analytic truth as one that can be reduced to logical truths is mainly attributed to Frege. We owe Stalnaker and Lewis for the conception of counterfactual consequence as truth in all “closest” world-states in which the initial set is true. We owe Kripke for the identification of metaphysical necessity, and the clear distinction between necessity and apriority. These advances, sketched in earlier chapters, have changed the face of philosophy. This chapter attempts to extend those lessons by combining the earlier discussions of rigid designation, direct reference, and indexicality with Chapter 5's account of world-states.
