Michael B. Gill
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- June 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198714033
- eISBN:
- 9780191782480
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714033.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
David Hume argues for a pluralist view of morality. According to his pluralist view, there are different ultimate moral ends, those different moral ends can come into conflict with each other, and ...
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David Hume argues for a pluralist view of morality. According to his pluralist view, there are different ultimate moral ends, those different moral ends can come into conflict with each other, and there is no invariable ordering principle that tells us what to do when those ends conflict. Hume maintains, for instance, that the artificial virtue of justice can sometimes conflict with the natural virtues of benevolence. In some cases, justice will override benevolence, but in other cases, benevolence will override justice, and there are no rules we can rely on to determine which sort of case we are in. Hume’s sentimentalist account of the origins of moral judgment explains these features of morality, and Hume’s sentimentalist explanation of the pluralist character of morality is at least as powerful as the non-naturalist, intuitionist explanation developed by W. D. Ross.Less
David Hume argues for a pluralist view of morality. According to his pluralist view, there are different ultimate moral ends, those different moral ends can come into conflict with each other, and there is no invariable ordering principle that tells us what to do when those ends conflict. Hume maintains, for instance, that the artificial virtue of justice can sometimes conflict with the natural virtues of benevolence. In some cases, justice will override benevolence, but in other cases, benevolence will override justice, and there are no rules we can rely on to determine which sort of case we are in. Hume’s sentimentalist account of the origins of moral judgment explains these features of morality, and Hume’s sentimentalist explanation of the pluralist character of morality is at least as powerful as the non-naturalist, intuitionist explanation developed by W. D. Ross.
