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Establishing the SSC Laboratory near Dallas, Texas, proved much more difficult than anticipated. As Central Design Group leaders did not participate in construction, SSC Director Roy Schwitters turned increasingly to engineers from the US military-industrial complex to fill key posts, leading to clashes with high-energy physicists. A major SSC redesign resulted in cost overruns greater than $2 billion, as the estimated cost grew from $5.9 billion to $8.25 billion. This major cost increase soured relations with DOE officials, especially Secretary James D. Watkins, who began installing trusted lieutenants into SSC leadership positions, such as Edward Siskin as General Manager; it abetted perceptions of an alien, military-industrial culture at the lab. This cost overrun provided ammunition for Congressional SSC opponents, who began accusing the DOE and physicists of project mismanagement. These claims were partly valid, for SSC managers had been laggard in establishing and validating the required computerized project-management control system.

As Congressional opposition grew, SSC construction accelerated in 1992 after a successful superconducting magnet test. Tunnel boring began in January 1993. But William Clinton’s election as President brought a new administration less favorably disposed to the project. At an April 1993 summit with Japanese premier Kiichi Miyazawa, Clinton did not request Japan’s participation in the SSC Laboratory. In June the House voted resoundingly for an amendment to cancel the project, but after heated House and Senate committee hearings, the Senate voted strongly in favor of continuing it. In early October a joint House-Senate committee decided to award the project its full $640 million budget for fiscal 1994. But on October 19, the House dramatically rejected the entire Energy and Water Development bill by a 2-to-1 margin, and Senate support evaporated. The allocated funding was used during the ensuing year to terminate the project and compensate Texas for its investments.

Recognizing that US taxpayers would not cover the entire SSC cost, the Bush Administration began trying to internationalize the laboratory by seeking large foreign contributions. But the only serious prospect was Japan, which was initially hesitant to commit to such a partnership. In 1990, before the extent of the cost overrun was fully recognized, the US House of Representatives capped the federal SSC contribution at $5 billion while requiring at least 20 percent foreign contributions. When estimated total costs grew to $8.25 billion, this stipulation meant that a total of $1.7 billion was needed from other countries. That summer, amendments to terminate the SSC were defeated by comfortable margins in both House and Senate despite worsening public perceptions of the project. But thus chastened, high Administration officials redoubled their efforts that fall to secure a billion-dollar Japanese commitment but obtained only a promise to consider partnering in the SSC laboratory.