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This chapter explores the aftereffects of Black Friday throughout east Asia, where jurisdiction over troops, America's supposed superiority complex, and racism were controversial issues. From a U.S. standpoint, Black Friday had two negative impacts that could potentially threaten foreign alliances: the removal of diplomatic immunity from MAAG advisors and increased pressure to grant jurisdiction. The situation in Taiwan particularly highlighted the case of William Girard, a GI who was involved in the death of a Japanese civilian two months prior to the Reynolds incident. Unlike in Taiwan, Girard's case was assessed by a Joint Committee, but after word spread that Japan was granted jurisdiction, Americans became outraged and Dulles reconsidered his decision. When Black Friday occurred at this impasse, Japanese citizens wrote newspapers threatening action similar to the Reynolds riots. Jurisdiction was also questioned in the Phillipines, Korea, and Thailand, where relations with the U.S. deteriorated. Ultimately, the riots in Taiwan undercut Eisenhower's containment policy and raised questions about the Girard case, GI placement abroad, and existing SOFAs.

Chapter 13 examines how the Eisenhower administration handled U.S. foreign policy in east Asia following events such as Black Friday and the Girard case. Eisenhower recognized the need to placate both foreign allies and voters at the same time, since many Americans opposed SOFAs and sought to pass legislation, such as the Bow Amendment, that would prohibit GIs from being tried in foreign courts. In an effort to ease tensions, he approved a plan that would determine the number of Americans living overseas, made plans to withdraw troops from Taiwan and Japan, and considered placing more tactical nuclear weapons abroad to compensate; yet these were all long-term solutions to immediate problems. To preserve integrity, Ike officially decided to hand Girard over to Japan, resulting in a heavy critique of his administration. Though Girard hired attorneys to contest the decision, the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the U.S. was justified in waiving its jurisdiction. In November, Girard was found guilty by a Japanese court and given a three-year sentence. Despite the ruling, diplomatic immunity and the large number of military personnel abroad still remained important issues in the aftermath.

Chapter 14 describes the political climate of fear and resentment that lingered between the United States and the ROC, despite open displays of goodwill. Eisenhower often questioned the placement of American troops overseas, but insisted that the U.S. position was essential to containing the spread of communism abroad, especially in Taiwan. Now that mutual confidence was undermined, any interest in SOFA negotiations with Taiwan was lost. Both sides took measures to prevent another incident like the Taiwan riots. While the ROC vowed to promote citizenship (rather than nationalism), train its police force in riot control, and offer conciliatory speeches and pamphlets, the U.S. vowed to teach Chinese customs more comprehensively, reduce personnel, decrease the size of MAAG, and encourage liability insurance for American drivers. Still, accidents continued to occur, and the situation in Taiwan remained particularly tense when many began to observe a breakdown in the discipline of American troops and an actual increase in American personnel living overseas. Though efforts at appeasement persisted, the riots of Black Friday afforded no lasting change and the highly contentious policy of diplomatic immunity remained in effect.

This chapter discusses how the Taiwan protests were a warning then and now of the dangers of putting U.S. soldiers that are immune to local justice into other countries. In the context of the Cold War and decolonization in Asia, the reliance on thousands of advisors, as opposed to dozens, who were protected by diplomatic immunity or demanding exclusive jurisdiction for U.S. forces was a form of playing with political fire. Threat of court-martial aside, putting U.S. troops beyond local laws does not encourage soldiers to respect the laws of a host nation. Rather, it promotes a contrary lack of discipline and prejudice against locals. It also undermines America's culture and values, not only in solidifying allied support but in winning friends from other nations. If the United States does not want to face future backlashes like the Taiwan protests, it needs to give host nations more jurisdictional voice. Moreover, this chapter argues that if the United States remains committed to pursuing a policy of mutual security, it must show that it is committed to the cause of justice, for its soldiers and its allies alike.

This chapter discusses the reasons behind, the alternatives to, and the consequences of, American military personnel and their families enjoying diplomatic immunity in Taiwan. Chapter 5 argues that giving immunity to these groups (as opposed to only members of the embassy) was an abuse of a sacred principle in international relations. The chapter also explains how unfortunate it is that the U.S. government did not sign a SOFA with the ROC. Despite the concerns raised by U.S. military and diplomatic personnel, inertia or willful refusal prevented bureaucrats from taking problems seriously. If Taiwan was so vital to U.S. containment policy, the United States should have been willing to give the ROC a SOFA with the NATO-Netherlands formula rather than humiliate its ally and demand exclusive jurisdiction. Moreover, Chapter 5 purports that the United States should have worked to establish safeguards, due process, and justice if an American brought harm to any of the Taiwanese people: not as colonial subjects, but as equals before the law. Such measures could have prevented the chaos that would erupt after Sergeant Robert Reynolds shot and killed an ROC national.

Sepsis is defined as life- threatening organ dysfunction caused by a detrimental host response to infection. Septic shock is a subset of sepsis in which underlying circulatory and cellular abnormalities are profound enough to substantially increase mortality. Septic shock is characterized by: ● The need for vasopressors to maintain mean arterial pressure (MAP) > 65mmHg despite adequate volume resuscitation. ● A serum lactate > 2mmol/L In lay terms, it is hypoperfusion with evidence of metabolic derangement. The mortality for both criteria is ~40%, compared to 20–30% for a single item. Please also refer to: https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/indevelopment/gid-cgwave0686 The old definitions of sepsis described a heterogeneous group of patients and did not discriminate between infectious and non- infectious causes such as pancreatitis and trauma. The new definitions also allow easier recognition, based on a combination of symptoms and signs. Key parameters include: decreased level of consciousness, rigors, severe myalgia, high or low temperature, pulse > 130/min, systolic blood pressure < 90mmHg, respiratory rate (RR) > 25/ min, creatinine > 170μmol/ L, platelets < 100 x 109/l and bilirubin > 33μmol/ L. The Clinical Quality Commission recommend that NHS trusts use the national early warning score (NEWS), and a score > 5 is an indication to consider moving a patient to critical care. SIRS is defined as any of the two following criteria: acutely altered mental state, temperature < 36°C or > 38°C, pulse > 90/ min, RR > 20/ min, WCC > 12 or < 4 x 109/L and hyperglycaemia in the absence of diabetes mellitus. In the former definitions (1991 and 2001), sepsis was defined as infection plus SIRS. SIRS, however, was not good at separating infected patients who died from those who recovered from infection. SIRS was often an appropriate reaction to infection and many hospitalized patients meet the SIRS criteria. Also, as many as one in eight patients admitted to critical care units with infection and new organ failure did not have two SIRS criteria required to fulfil the sepsis definition. SIRS is no longer part of the new definitions.