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This chapter begins with a discussion of British policy towards Ireland in the period between the invasion of France in May 1940 and the German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. It then discusses the immediate threat of German invasion in May-June 1940, the development of Anglo-Irish security liaison and German espionage, covert counterespionage and intelligence-gathering in Ireland, the fading of the IRA threat, the fighting services and intelligence on Ireland, SOE and Ireland, British propaganda, and intelligence activities of foreign diplomats in Ireland.

This chapter studies the economic, political, and institutional determinants of privatization. The analysis begins with a discussion of the link between privatization and economic development, then it studies the role of government’s budget constraints, showing how public finance conditions may bear on the decision to privatize. The chapter then focuses on the role of financial markets and governments’ political orientation in triggering divestiture. Finally, it takes into account institutional aspects, such as a country’s legal tradition, and political regimes. The various hypotheses are discussed sequentially. Their empirical validity, however, is assessed through an original panel data econometric analysis.

This chapter begins by framing the theoretical debate about the legitimacy and efficiency of state ownership of business enterprises, and then examines the empirical evidence for and against state ownership. Since the evidence overwhelmingly indicates that state ownership is less efficient than private ownership in most real industrial settings, the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by measures short of privatization, such as exposing state enterprises to competition or imposing hard budget constraints is assessed. While some economic reforms can be effective in their own right, the question of whether these reforms would be more effective if coupled with a shift to private ownership remains unanswered. Thus, many countries have decided to launch large-scale privatization programs. The fiscal and macroeconomic impact of these programs on the public finances of divesting countries are examined.

This chapter examines the practical aspects of privatizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It identifies the key issues that governments must confront in determining which SOEs to divest, and then describes the steps involved in commercializing and preparing a state-owned enterprise for privatization. Governments wishing to privatize one or more state enterprises must follow a fairly standardized process of first preparing the company for sale, then deciding on the optimal method of sale and the offering price, and finally actually selling the firm to private investors. Each step in this process has its own challenges and hazards, and is almost always steeped in controversy.

This chapter begins by discussing the creation of a clandestine opposition against Germany, combining violence and veiled agitation, which could be sustained by British resources. It then notes that the BBC, trying to embrace aggressive propaganda, was already proposing London broadcasts to give advice on sabotage in enemy-occupied countries. Duff Cooper called for a campaign, not realizing what was at stake in a Whitehall discussion of subversion which was explained to him as a problem about intelligence. In March 1938 a ‘Section D’ was established by the SIS to study the use of commercial contacts and facilities for sabotage of German economic interests. A year later Section D was licensed to introduce propaganda material into Germany. They spread into the Balkans, with a license to agitate and bribe, and conducted a political struggle against German influence. This chapter also discusses the responsibilities of the SIS and SOE.

Egil Larsen committed the first important act of sabotage in Denmark. Previously skeptical informants admitted that the RAF raid was approved by most Danes. The legal press showed why Denmark was unique — they applied the rule that if Germany was above criticism so was Britain. The election, by seeming to strengthen official collaboration, was certainly a challenge to the clandestine opposition. Turnbull produced the Stockholm version saying that the August disturbances were provoked by the Germans to justify martial law. The Freedom Council was more determined than London to push for active resistance. The SOE had bouts of unease about becoming the British support service of the Freedom Council, but PWE were content.

Anthony Eden and Orme Sargent had doubts if the British policy made sense. They were willing to reconsider Mihailović, but neither wanted to abandon non-communist resistance. In Cairo, Vellacott offered the shocking suggestion that the SOE should worry less about political matters. He assured Lockhart that SOE Cairo had no dealings with policy, were ill-informed, and had no intelligence about Slovenia or Croatia. The Chetniks fought badly or not at all, and their leaders were simply outfoxed. Bailey, considering that distance alone would keep Chetniks and Partisans from each other's throats, suggested that the Partisans should be asked to confine themselves to Croatia and Slovenia leaving Bosnia and Serbia to Mihailović. SOE London still saw Bailey's mission to Mihailović as the centre of their work in Yugoslavia and they grew angry at the BBC.

The SOE feared that their failure to respond to the Chetnik plea for a few weapons, plus the unwillingness of Radio London to hold a steady pattern of friendly recognition, carried the risk that DM Chetniks would wither away. SOE London kept cautioning that activating Chetniks required a strengthening propaganda for Mihailović. To help Bailey, SOE wanted to stop the pinpricks and keep the word ‘Partisan’ out of the bulletins for a time. But it was too late for courtesies and euphemism. The SOE did not persuade the Bush House to change other than to prefer the word ‘patriot’ to ‘Partisan’. SOE London had lost control of their Cairo Mission but they stuck to the claim that the Chetniks might cooperate if the BBC could control themselves.

The policy priorities of the government went through a gradual shift. Initially, the government left out ownership restructuring from the SOE reform strategies. In the mid-1990s, however, the government attempted to experiment with new strategies through full or partial privatization. Several issues were to the forefront during the period in which China was undergoing the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. This chapter attempts to look at how pacing and sequencing have significantly affected the selection and adjustment in the country's reform strategies through analyzing the historical background, designs, objectives, and the actual effects of alternative reform efforts throughout China's economic development. This chapter looks into the alternative strategies adopted in three stages of SOE reform while examining important debates regarding the reform's direction and methods.

One of the benefits for the Allies of Swedish neutrality and independence was the ability of agents based in Sweden to gather intelligence from, and support resistance in, occupied Europe while all the belligerents gathered intelligence in Sweden. The Swedish authorities were initially extremely nervous about Danish and Norwegian nationals operating as agents on Swedish territory. Sweden rightly anticipated proxy conflicts on Swedish territory or being used as a base for unauthorised armed operations against German forces in occupied Denmark and Norway. There seems to have been a certain amount of clandestine warfare between German agents and Norwegian agents in Stockholm leading to death as well as injury. During 1939–44, almost 2,000 people were arrested for activity against the state with espionage and intelligence activity accounting for 60 per cent, sabotage forming just over 11 per cent and the remaining 29 per cent detained on miscellaneous associated charges.

This chapter explains the fate of brownfield concessions. In the early 1990s, these public-private partnerships (PPPs) served briefly as the flagship of the global PPP movement, and were highly recommended by the development community as “privatization” solutions to many of the problems facing infrastructure utilities in low-income countries. These concessions involve the construction of new infrastructure assets to improve or extend existing facilities, but mostly focus on rehabilitation of existing assets. Theoretically, such projects should be relatively easy to do because risks associated with initial financing and construction are largely eliminated by the time a PPP contract is signed. But since the 1997 Asian crisis, relatively little investment has been generated by these projects. In the poorest countries, very few of these projects have been attempted and much of the related investment has actually come from governments or their development partners. What accounts for the rise and fall in popularity of brownfield concessions?

In this chapter, we explain the paradox of China’s green industry growth in an otherwise “brown” economy. We argue that the promotion of green industries should be viewed not as a commitment to an energy systems transformation, but rather as part of the Chinese government’s efforts to diversify its energy mix and extend the country’s export-led industrialization model. At this time, China lacks the type of coalition between policymakers, environmentalists, and industrialists necessary to drive and sustain a broad green growth strategy. Such a coalition is unlikely to emerge as long as the Chinese government - especially organizations at the lower levels - continue to own polluting industrial assets and suppress grassroots social organization.

This chapter provides background on the origins and evolution of Dibao, as well as basic information on the Dibao program and Dibao in the context of China’s other social welfare policies. The chapter traces the evolution of Dibao and illustrates its changing relationship with political order. Dibao originated as a solution to the problem of urban poverty, which the Chinese regime saw as motivating protest and unrest during economic liberalization. However, as the nature of social mobilization changed, so too did China’s conceptualization of political order and its strategy to pursue it. Instead of a means to achieve modernization, political order became an end in itself. The Dibao program evolved into a tool for controlling specific individuals deemed to pose a future threat to the Chinese regime.

This chapter by David Kohnen examines the Allied response to the initial German submarine operations in the Indian Ocean during the Second World War. Roughly forty German submarines sailed for East Asian waters after 1942; U-188 was among the few to navigate the Allied gauntlet in the Atlantic to reach the Indian Ocean. Only three German submarines, including U-188, returned to Europe from operations in the Indian Ocean before the Allied victory in May of 1945. The discussions between key British and American commanders regarding the presence of German submarines in the Indian Ocean provide unique insight into the operations and intelligence organizations of the Admiralty and Navy Department and are examined in detail. The chapter also looks at the Allied submarine tracking rooms, which assisted the Special Operations Executive and Office of Strategic Services in the capture of the skipper of U-188 – thereby securing information on the Imperial Japanese during a critical period in the closing months of the Second World War.

Chapter One examines Labour involvement in the wartime Coalition government and Ministerial access to and use of intelligence. It argues that the Second World War provided an important opportunity for future Ministers in the post-war government to gain knowledge and experience of handling and using intelligence. Within months of the coalition’s formation, Labour Ministers had access to the fruits of British codebreaking. Further, the chapter also suggests that this experience ended any lingering animosity that resulted from the Zinoviev Letter Affair. The chapter places particular emphasis on Attlee’s wartime experiences and provides examples of his use of intelligence and early views on it. It also looks at Labour involvement with the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and Party attempts to add an ideological facet to British special operations in Europe under Hugh Dalton, Minister of Economic Warfare until 1942. Beyond intelligence and special operations, Labour involvement with intelligence and security extended to the domestic front with Herbert Morrison, appointed Home Secretary in November 1940. Already a fierce opponent of British Communists, he received the product of MI5’s surveillance of the Communist Party of Great Britain and provided the Cabinet with information warning of Communist espionage.

This chapter examines national science policy as a case-study in evidence-based policy design. Its reviews the strategy and science of Irish science policy in light of the challenges for such policies in an SOE. The success of knowledge intensive industries depends on access to knowledge. However, private firms tend to underinvest in basic science where much of the benefit spills over to other firms, highlighting an important role for governments. Governments of SOEs face two challenges in devising a strategy for science policy: first, the benefits of science investments are likely to flow disproportionately to other countries; second, small size may limit the benefits of agglomeration economies that are central to many knowledge-intensive industries. Despite obvious spillover and scale challenges – geographical stickiness of new knowledge production and the capacity to absorb knowledge from the global stock depends on being active at the frontiers of knowledge production. The chapter concludes that the national benefit of research is the advantage in being able to access knowledge produced elsewhere.

Description of the northern Malatya plain. The bridge over the Melas, and road beside the Euphrates. Probable sites of Ciaca and Sartona, important in resupply by raft. The Roman road in the Deregezen valley, and the ferry at Keban Maden. Ottoman caravans to Trebizond and Harput. Destruction above the Karakaya dam.

This chapter analyses the different institutional logics surrounding China’s innovation machine, including the ‘visible hand’ of the state and ‘invisible hand’ of the market. The idea of innovation in China resulting from centralized decisions in government is shown to be a myth; instead, it results from the interaction of initial bottom-up innovations and subsequent top-down direction, support, or correction. The cultural roots of China’s multiple institutional logics are explained, including the role of hierarchy, the tolerance of ambiguity, and the search for unity. Balance is sought within Chinese bureaucracies, between central and local governments, and between formal and informal authority. The chapter analyses Chinese policy frameworks for science and technology, innovation, intellectual property, education and talent, environment, industry, and the reform of state-owned enterprises. A case study of the car industry is provided, focusing particularly on how policy instruments are used to encourage carmakers to capitalize on the opportunities presented by the new technology trajectory of new energy vehicles.

This chapter examines the transformation of the electricity sector in China over the past two decades. The changes in the organisational structure in China from the Ministry of Electric Power to SGCC took place against social and political backdrops that were particular to Chinese politics at the time: the desire to reform and an emphasis on incrementalism; a determination to exploit market forces and an equal instinct to resist it; and efforts to encourage local development with decentralised responsibility and strenuous push for horizontal and vertical centralisation to counter local protectionism. These seeming contradictions shaped the discourse, politics, and policy options for economic reform in general and electricity restructuring specifically. This evolution highlights many debates in China at the time and should be understood in this context. If any pattern could be identified underpinning this process, it was perhaps a constant struggle between centrifugal and centripetal forces.