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This chapter examines alternative democracy promotion frames advocated by Russia and China through their foreign policies toward the Central Asian states, including through regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). By the early 2000s, Central Asia had become the prize in a geopolitical race for influence and control of its vast energy resources, with Russia and China being key competitors. They have not, however, promoted their views on governance as actively as the US and EU have. Neither Russia nor China has openly stated an ambition to impose its practices on other states. In their foreign policy statements and internal security documents, both Russia and China have affirmed their adherence to the principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs of other nations. This chapter outlines the competing ideas and strategies for political development and economic modernization proposed by Russia and China for Central Asia, as well as the attractive models they have presented for maintaining stability and generating prosperity in the region without meaningful democratization. Both powers have disbursed growing amounts of bilateral aid to the Central Asian governments for a mix of humanitarian, economic, and political aims.

This chapter discusses the impact of the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on China-U.S. relations in Central Asia. By reinforcing cooperation in Central Asia, the SCO helps overall ties between China and the United States. This improves relations in Central Asia as well. However, further development of the SCO faces serious challenges in its second decade. The SCO-U.S. relationship is closely linked with the Sino-U.S. relationship, and both influence each other, particularly in Central Asia. Indeed, Sino-U.S. relations in the region would be harmed if there were confrontations between the SCO and the United States in Central Asia. It is foreseeable that the developing trend of the SCO will be important to Sino-U.S. relations in Central Asia for a long time to come.

Some called it Downadup. Others preferred Kido. As soon as the Conficker worm started spreading over the internet on November 20, 2008, security firms agreed that they faced a pandemic and immediately began to cooperate on containing it, but they couldn’t reach a consensus about what to name it. The worm continued to propagate unabated, infecting an estimated 15 million computers, including systems in the German military and British Parliament. By the following April the media had reported on the worm so extensively that PC World compared its notoriety to the celebrity of Paris Hilton, dubbing Conficker “the world’s most famous piece of malware.” Nevertheless several security companies still insisted on calling it Downadup. And though nobody was any closer to eliminating it, the worm had acquired several more identifiers, official codes such as TA08–297A, VU827267, and CVE-2008–4250, seldom referenced by anyone. Conficker will always have conflicting monikers. Most malware does. Despite periodic attempts to standardize the naming process, no system has ever become ubiquitous. Even the first, codified in 1991 when a mere thousand viruses were in circulation, was ignored as often as it was followed by the half-dozen computer firms then in the nascent security business. And no wonder. Mandating the form Family_Name.Group_Name.Major_Variant.Minor_Variant[:Modifier] , it made Linnaean binomials seem, comparatively, to roll off the tongue. A 1999 revision only bloated the nomenclature, requiring that virus platform and malware type also be specified, while ignoring a much deeper problem: even researchers who followed the formula seldom agreed on what to call the groups and families. Each new worm or virus averaged four totally incompatible appellations—generally unpronounceable strings of letters—and every month the number of worms and viruses in the wild increased by thousands. Hackers spread much of the malware by email. You’d get a virus embedded in the attachment to a message ostensibly coming from a personal contact. If you opened the attachment the virus would take over your computer’s email software, automatically forwarding itself, now in your name, to every address on your own contact list, renewing the whole infection process.

This chapter examines the legitimation efforts of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). It shows that despite its very weak institutions and close resemblance to ‘enterprise association’, legitimation offers an important perspective for understanding the roles the SCO plays for its member states. The chapter argues that on the one hand, the SCO legitimates itself with regards to its members by addressing regional functional cooperation problems, by providing an institutionalised framework for managing relations between the region’s hegemonic powers (China and Russia), and by occupying political space in the region that could otherwise be entered by more liberal organisations and states. On the other hand, the SCO also legitimises non-liberal norms (and exceptions to otherwise applicable international norms) that are advanced by its members, especially China and Russia, and provides states that want to escape the scrutiny of Western-dominated international organisations with an institutional alternative and an attractive alternative model.

This Chapter examines the geopolitical context of the China–India relationship. As regional powers, neither China nor India will ever give up their efforts to maximise their respective influence in the region. New Delhi keeps a wary eye on China’s ties with its South Asian neighbours, especially its arms transfers to Pakistan and military cooperation with Myanmar. While Beijing has quarrels with some of its marine neighbours over the South China Sea, New Delhi has embarked on a ‘Look East’ policy to engage the ASEAN states. While there is rivalry between India and China for influence in the region, there is also a cooperative dimension of Sino–Indian relations, built on the cause against terror, expanding sub-regional economic cooperation, and joining the other dominated regional groupings, such as SCO and SAARC. Therefore, from a regional perspective, Sino-Indian relations are a mixture of competition and cooperation, although the latter might be somewhat less noticeable.

This chapter considers the strategic interrelation of the US, China and Russia in Central Asia. It views the region both from the perspective of China’s concerns for the stability of its sensitive western province of Xinjiang, and the prospects for the US to advance its military and strategic position in the region. It looks at the problems of China’s Xinjiang province and the challenge from separatism and Islamic fundamentalism. It demonstrates the growing collaboration of Russia and China in Central Asia, for both security and trade. It concludes that after an advance into the region in the aftermath of the fall of the USSR, accelerated by US and NATO intervention in Afghanistan from 2001, the US is now in retreat from Central Asia, while Russian and Chinese influence has grown.

This chapter examines the strategic interests of China and Russia in Central Asia. During the Yeltsin period, Russia's policies toward Central Asia were aimed at preserving its traditional strategic influence. However, it was also during this period that Russia withdrew strategically from Central Asia. President Putin, on the other hand, espoused a “great power” strategy, which sought to promote the integration of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This aim was in accord with Russia's efforts to recover its traditional levels of geopolitical influence in Central Asia. China realized its strategic interests in Central Asia by two important means: bilaterally and through multilateral regional organization such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).