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This chapter explores Russia's rapid recovery from the strains of revolution and war, and the impact of its return to war in 1914. It argues that this interrevolutionary rally is a striking and curious phenomenon that flies in the face of existing theories that suggest political instability and violence are bad for markets. In exploring the archival record, the chapter shows that investor perceptions of improvements in the real economy, a geopolitical realignment, and factors operating at the level of financial gatekeepers all contributed to the interrevolutionary rally. Yet despite the improving economic indicators and rising security prices, Russia's economy and financial system became increasingly fragile in the decade from 1906 to 1916. Paradoxically, were it not for the fiscal stimulus provided by the armaments buildup that preceded the First World War and the outbreak of the war itself, the Tsarist regime could have faced a potentially disastrous financial crisis in 1913–14.

This chapter tries to capture the predominating view within Russia's defense establishment toward cooperation with China. In particular, it draws as much as possible on published data, but does not shy from introducing some conjecture or opinion where it can fill gaps on this subject. The chapter begins by reviewing the catalysts for Russian–Chinese military cooperation. It considers the Russian understanding of military cooperation and also addresses the bringing of coherence to military cooperation with China. A discussion on the use of military cooperation with China to build the Russian economy is then given. Central Asia, being a nexus of threats common to both Russia and China, quickly showed itself to be the more important stage for military–political and military–practical cooperation. In addition, the Russian–Chinese joint exercises are reported. Finally, the Russian domestic context for military cooperation with China and the future of Russian–Chinese military cooperation are described.

The first section of the chapter describes the role of St. Petersburg as a financial centre of Russian Empire. Major “continental” style banks, presence of a stock exchange, and proximity of all-powerful Russian government provided the necessary conditions for the city to become the focal point of Russian finance. Second section describes the history of St. Petersburg Stock Exchange from its founding in the early 18th century as commodities exchange through to the early 20th century when it became the main stock exchange of the Empire. The last section of the chapter fills a gap in the study of Russian financial markets by constructing a stock index of leading industrial companies traded on the St. Petersburg Exchange in 1897–1914. One of the surprising findings is an intermediate peak, which the index reached in 1905, a period generally considered to be one of crisis and stagnation in Russia.

This chapter looks at the national economy and transition strategies of the Kyrgyz Republic. The Kyrgyz Republic was the most explicit of the Central Asian countries in attempting a rapid transition from central planning. Economic performance was, however, disappointing due to limited resources and poor institutions. The country became highly dependent on revenues from a single goldmine, Kumtor, while other mineral and hydro resources remain poorly developed. The biggest symptom of economic distress was the rise in number of Kyrgyz migrating to Russia for work; by the end of the oil boom, the numbers were commonly thought to be around a million people and in 2014, the Kyrgyz Republic's remittances to GDP ratio was the third highest in the world. This left the country susceptible to Russian pressure to join the Eurasian Economic Union, which it did in 2015, and vulnerable to downturns in the Russian economy.

This chapter looks at the Russian economy as a means of international power projection. It refutes the idea that it is a clear brake on Russia under Putin’s global ambitions. Although the Russian economy is still far too dependent on oil and gas revenues, there has been some modest diversification, and it has grown slowly even under sanctions imposed since 2014 by the United States and Europe. Still, there has been too little investment in the development of new technologies and in Russian higher education, and too often state enterprises are used as instruments in Russian foreign policy under Putin’s autocracy.

This chapter presents a broad overview of the evolution of the Russian economy and politics since the end of the Soviet era. It makes a point of present-day Russian realities having been “lost in translation,” focusing on the experience of the state as the modernizer-in-chief and its chances of continuing to act in that role in the twenty-first century. The chapter presents the book's main theme in a nutshell by eliminating the black-and-white view of Russia in favor of a richer, multicolored vision. This chapter is also a theoretical vignette within the open-ended story of the possible developmental direction of one of the world's most important subsystems.

This chapter presents an analysis of the Russian economy. Russia has proved that it is possible for a market economy to have a worse economic performance than a centrally planned economy. Although Russia has privatized virtually all businesses and set free virtually all prices, powerful forces against reform prevented anything more. Russia has distorted the ground rules for competition to such an extreme that businesses do well not because they do better but for other reasons. These distortions take many forms. They include government subsidies for some firms but not others; preferential taxes for some but not others; forgiving taxes or electricity and gas bills for some but not others; giving government contracts consistently to some but not others; hassling some with red tape but not others; or allowing some to steal intellectual property from others. Sometimes more productive firms cannot expand because government simply orders unproductive firms not to shut down.

This chapter provides a comparative analysis of Chinese and Russian economic interests in Central Asia. Russian economic interests in Central Asia mainly work under the assumption that strengthening economic ties with Central Asia will lead to Eurasian economic integration or Eurasian Alliance with the region, and promote the development of the Russian economy. In contrast, China's economic interests in Central Asia are aimed at facilitating economic development of both sides through bilateral trade and investment with the region. Moreover, Central Asia's prosperity and stability can not only maintain the safety of Xinjiang Province and even the western region of China, but also provide a secure external barrier for China to resist traditional security threats.

This introductory chapter looks at the prospects for modernization in Russia, at the same time shifting the popular focus on Russia as a failure to a more objective perspective in light of the recent economic crisis. There is a broad realization that unless the country curbs its runaway corruption, diversifies its economy—thus diminishing its dependence on energy exports—and builds a knowledge industry, Russia's future might be bleak. The alternative to modernization is marginalization. However, while the shining image of an “ideal Russia” finds few contestants, there is a lot of confusion and vigorous discussion about how to proceed toward that goal.