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This chapter covers the developments prior to 1801, the Imperial Army during the reign of Alexander I, the origins and programmes of the revolutionary ‘military intelligentsia’ from 1815 to 1825; the Caucasus Corps and the Second Army during 1816 to 1825; the character and policy of Nicholas I and the struggle against the ‘Russian Party’. The regime's belief in the existence of a Russian party certainly aids in understanding tsarist Eastern policy under Nicholas. On one hand, the regime attempted to defuse nationalist passions by presenting the war as a dispute between two courts. Alternatively, the domestic benefits of a forward Eastern policy were well understood. By leading his troops to a short and glorious war, Nicholas could enhance his image and deliver a public rebuke to Metternich.

Boris Khavkin presents the traditional military and historical view of Russia as the “steamroller” of the Entente that fought the war “down to the last Russian soldier.” The Western Powers, according to this perspective, used the Russian military as a counterbalance to the German offensive in France. The chapter argues that Russia made a major contribution to the victory of the Entente despite the Russian Army’s material inferiority and the fact that Russian leaders had been repeatedly obliged by their allies to enter into unprepared offensives. These events helped create the preconditions for the Revolution of 1917.

This chapter outlines the strategic implications of Russia's support of the Porte during the Mohammed Ali crisis and, following the formation of an anti-Russian Anglo-French coalition, Nicholas l's attempts to solve the army's manpower problems. The great event challenging Russia's somewhat guarded commitment to the preservation of the Ottoman Empire came in 1832–3 with the onset of the Mohammed Ali crisis. The ambitious Pasha of Egypt dreamed of conquering the Middle East to create an Arab empire and, like Mustafa, sought as his allies Muslims discontented by the Sultan's reforms. With France supporting Mohammed, the Sultan had little choice but to turn to Russia. The chapter also considers the Russian response and the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi and its consequences.

This book aims to examine the role of the Russian army, government, and society in the Russo-Turkish and Russo-Persian military and diplomatic struggle in the Near East — the Balkans, Caucasus and Transcaucasia — between 1815 and 1833. It focuses on the ideas and activities of tsars Alexander I (r. 1801–25) and Nicholas 1 (r. 1825–55), the Russian Foreign Ministry and its diplomatic corps, the high command of the Second Army and Caucasus Corps, and domestic political groupings and educated society toward Eastern affairs. This chapter outlines the main trends in English and Russian historical writings.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the diplomatic crisis that preceded the war and the reasons for Russian involvement in the Austro-Serbian dispute. It continues with a description of the early battles of the war in East Prussia, Poland, and Galicia. It then focuses on the social and political impact of the war on these combat zones. The everyday life of the Russian soldier is described, and it is followed by a treatment of the civilian experience of war in Poland and Ukraine. It argues that the imposition of martial law began a process of state failure in the region that led to greater physical insecurity and economic disaster. At the same time, and in response to this crisis, the state and many citizens engaged in ever more violent practices of ethnopolitics, targeting outcast minority groups for violence and plunder.

Chapter five focuses on the asymmetric conflict between Moldova and the Russian forces which supported separatists in Transnistria. The purpose was to uncover why Mircea Snegur’s Moldovan regime seemed unyielding to Russian demands, which resulted in armed conflict. The underlying argument is primarily based on the necessary condition, namely that Chisinau had a domestic crisis that needed immediate attention. Moldova was trying to claim its sovereignty, where an important step entailed establishing a common identity and territorial control. While Snegur’s presidency was stable and popular, it was dependent on nationalists’ support. Such dependency required policies that marginalised minorities and fuelled conflict with Russia, which wanted to retain Moldova within its sphere of influence. However, having perceived numerous crises unfolding in the late Soviet Union and emerging Russia, Snegur made a calculatable gamble that Russia would not be able to commit to a conflict. In other words, Snegur perceived a window of opportunity. The gamble failed, however. Nonetheless, with a counter-factual assessment, these findings are further strengthened.

This chapter presents a translation of the Russian-language transcripts of the two-part interview with Lev StepanovichTugan-Baranovskii (1880–1955), a Colonel of the General Staff in the Russian imperial army. From the morning of 28 February 1917 until his transfer to the War Ministry two months later, Tugan-Baranovskii was one of the most senior and influential officers on the Duma Military Commission and devoted his inordinate energies and fine-tuned political instincts to the monumental task of democratizing the old army. This interview represents his only known testimony. It covers the last years of his service in the General Staff, his tenure on the MC during and after the February Revolution, and the efforts by the first Provisional Government to reform the imperial officer corps and the internal organization of the army more generally. Tugan-Baranovskii's account of the political maneuverings leading to Kerenskii's appointment as War Minister is particularly revealing and unprecedented.

This chapter addresses the impact of the war on relations between Warsaw's two principal and competing national groups, Poles and Jews, by exploring themes that take into account the dramatically different attitudes of the Russian and German regimes toward the Jewish population. To be sure, the actions of the Russian Army were largely responsible for the large Jewish refugee population in the city during the first part of the war, one of the main contributing factors to Polish–Jewish tensions. By contrast, the principal goal of the German occupation regime was to maintain stability, which required a balancing act between Poles and Jews in Warsaw—an approach that many Poles interpreted as serving Jewish interests.

This chapter evaluates the reactions of military personnel towards War and Peace on its publication in the nineteenth-century. While praising Leo Tolstoy's unrivaled understanding of the psychology of the Russian army and his portrait of Russian everyday life, critics attacked his theory of history and especially his military theory. General Mikhail Dragomirov, the author of the most extensive review of War and Peace, castigated Tolstoy's take on strategy, tactics, and logistics. In different ways, Tolstoy's military readers objected to his historical determinism and especially to his denial of the possibility of control of the battlefield. The chapter also explores an important limitation in the perspective of the military readers and defends an aspect of Tolstoy's psychology that they rejected as harmful to their task as soldiers.

This chapter assesses the wave of pogroms of 1903–06. The pogrom in Siedlce, which took place in September of 1906, was the last outbreak of the wave of violence which began in Kishinev in April of 1903. The main railway line from Warsaw to Terespol and on to Moscow ran through the town and was responsible for its expansion in the last part of the nineteenth century. It also accounted both for its strategic importance and for the presence there of a significant socialist movement. These factors explain the role of the Russian army, and in particular the Libau regiment, as well as the Monarchist League in organizing the pogrom. Estimates of Jewish casualties range from twenty-three dead to 100 dead and 300 wounded. The chapter highlights an account written in Russian by Józef Bekker, who was a well-known Yiddish journalist. Bekker's account illustrates many aspects of the problems raised by the wave of pogroms of 1903–06, in particular the vexed question of the degree to which this was orchestrated centrally and the role of the army and local tsarist officials in initiating anti-Jewish violence.