Kaushik Roy
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199463534
- eISBN:
- 9780199087181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199463534.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Military History
In terms of size, the Indian Army was much larger than its two sister services: the Royal Indian Navy and the Royal Indian Air Force. Besides ideological (martial race theory), several ...
More
In terms of size, the Indian Army was much larger than its two sister services: the Royal Indian Navy and the Royal Indian Air Force. Besides ideological (martial race theory), several non-ideological factors such as the capacity of the military organization to house, feed, clothe, train, and equip large numbers of men at a time affected the volume of recruitment. Inadequate number of viceroy’s commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers also decelerated enlistment. The absence of homogeneity in India as regards race, religion, and language militated against mixing of classes indiscriminately in the training formations. Chapter 1 shows how the Raj could construct a multi-ethnic volunteer army without resorting to conscription. The British utilized the mercenary tradition inherent in the Indian society to raise 2.5 million men in wartime. The vast demographic resources of India and relatively underdeveloped agrarian economy also aided the Raj to acquire military manpower from the so-called martial as well as non-martial races.Less
In terms of size, the Indian Army was much larger than its two sister services: the Royal Indian Navy and the Royal Indian Air Force. Besides ideological (martial race theory), several non-ideological factors such as the capacity of the military organization to house, feed, clothe, train, and equip large numbers of men at a time affected the volume of recruitment. Inadequate number of viceroy’s commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers also decelerated enlistment. The absence of homogeneity in India as regards race, religion, and language militated against mixing of classes indiscriminately in the training formations. Chapter 1 shows how the Raj could construct a multi-ethnic volunteer army without resorting to conscription. The British utilized the mercenary tradition inherent in the Indian society to raise 2.5 million men in wartime. The vast demographic resources of India and relatively underdeveloped agrarian economy also aided the Raj to acquire military manpower from the so-called martial as well as non-martial races.
Kaushik Roy
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199463534
- eISBN:
- 9780199087181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199463534.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, Military History
The 1942 Burma Campaign was an extension of the Malaya–Singapore Campaign. During the conquest of Burma in the first half of 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) displayed the same tactical skill ...
More
The 1942 Burma Campaign was an extension of the Malaya–Singapore Campaign. During the conquest of Burma in the first half of 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) displayed the same tactical skill which it had displayed in the Malayan jungles and in Singapore. And also during the ‘long retreat’ from Burma, the BURCORPS displayed the same weaknesses which A.E. Percival’s composite army exhibited during their retreat from north Malaya to Singapore. The demands of Japanese grand strategy prevented the IJA from launching a full-scale invasion of India in either late 1942 or during 1943. Japanese inactivity allowed India Command the respite which the latter desperately needed to build up the air assets and for training British and Indian infantry. This chapter shows how India Command and general headquarters from 1943 onwards, through creative rigorous training and propaganda, were able to instil combat professionalism among the Indian soldiery. And they along with the nascent Royal Indian Navy and miniscule Royal Indian Air Force led Field-Marshal Bill Slim’s 14th Army to victory in Mandalay–Meiktila and Rangoon during 1944–5.Less
The 1942 Burma Campaign was an extension of the Malaya–Singapore Campaign. During the conquest of Burma in the first half of 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) displayed the same tactical skill which it had displayed in the Malayan jungles and in Singapore. And also during the ‘long retreat’ from Burma, the BURCORPS displayed the same weaknesses which A.E. Percival’s composite army exhibited during their retreat from north Malaya to Singapore. The demands of Japanese grand strategy prevented the IJA from launching a full-scale invasion of India in either late 1942 or during 1943. Japanese inactivity allowed India Command the respite which the latter desperately needed to build up the air assets and for training British and Indian infantry. This chapter shows how India Command and general headquarters from 1943 onwards, through creative rigorous training and propaganda, were able to instil combat professionalism among the Indian soldiery. And they along with the nascent Royal Indian Navy and miniscule Royal Indian Air Force led Field-Marshal Bill Slim’s 14th Army to victory in Mandalay–Meiktila and Rangoon during 1944–5.
