Jonathan M. Schoenwald
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195157260
- eISBN:
- 9780199849390
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195157260.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
Ronald Reagan was the most dynamic force in American political conservatism in 1965, and any group that wanted to make a big media splash, raise funds for its cause, or simply energize its members, ...
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Ronald Reagan was the most dynamic force in American political conservatism in 1965, and any group that wanted to make a big media splash, raise funds for its cause, or simply energize its members, got the former Democrat to stop by on, as he called it, his “mashed potato circuit”. Like William F. Buckley, Jr.'s followers, Reagan's supporters saw him as a means to regrouping and partially reconfiguring the conservative movement. California was the perfect place to test whether conservatism had indeed weathered the storm. Reagan's campaign was engineered to spark wide-scale conservatism by capturing the most valuable state in the union. For many conservative Californians and non-Californians, Reagan embodied the hope for a conservative country. Reagan represented the conviction that conservatism could leave the realm of the extraordinary to become the ordinary, the status quo rather than the enfant terrible. The growth of conservative interest groups rose from a combination of the migration of extremists out of their own circles into areas devoted to more mainstream issues and years of work behind the scenes.Less
Ronald Reagan was the most dynamic force in American political conservatism in 1965, and any group that wanted to make a big media splash, raise funds for its cause, or simply energize its members, got the former Democrat to stop by on, as he called it, his “mashed potato circuit”. Like William F. Buckley, Jr.'s followers, Reagan's supporters saw him as a means to regrouping and partially reconfiguring the conservative movement. California was the perfect place to test whether conservatism had indeed weathered the storm. Reagan's campaign was engineered to spark wide-scale conservatism by capturing the most valuable state in the union. For many conservative Californians and non-Californians, Reagan embodied the hope for a conservative country. Reagan represented the conviction that conservatism could leave the realm of the extraordinary to become the ordinary, the status quo rather than the enfant terrible. The growth of conservative interest groups rose from a combination of the migration of extremists out of their own circles into areas devoted to more mainstream issues and years of work behind the scenes.
Keren Yarhi-Milo
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780691181288
- eISBN:
- 9781400889983
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691181288.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This chapter assesses the extent to which reputational concerns shaped President Ronald Reagan's discourse, decision making, and policies during international crises. It focuses on four of these ...
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This chapter assesses the extent to which reputational concerns shaped President Ronald Reagan's discourse, decision making, and policies during international crises. It focuses on four of these international crises: the escalation in Afghanistan, the intervention in Lebanon, the invasion of Grenada, and the air strikes against Libya. Each posed a challenge, real or perceived, to US reputation for resolve and so are good tests of the dispositional theory. A review of Reagan's self-monitoring tendencies and beliefs about the use of force place him closest to the ideal-type high self-monitor hawk, and thus, one should expect his behavior to be consistent with that of a reputation crusader. However, his behavior and discourse during the crises covered cannot be convincingly explained simply by highlighting his hawkish tendencies. In order to fully appreciate Reagan's policies, rhetoric, and state of mind, one must look at how these hawkish tendencies interacted with his high self-monitoring disposition.Less
This chapter assesses the extent to which reputational concerns shaped President Ronald Reagan's discourse, decision making, and policies during international crises. It focuses on four of these international crises: the escalation in Afghanistan, the intervention in Lebanon, the invasion of Grenada, and the air strikes against Libya. Each posed a challenge, real or perceived, to US reputation for resolve and so are good tests of the dispositional theory. A review of Reagan's self-monitoring tendencies and beliefs about the use of force place him closest to the ideal-type high self-monitor hawk, and thus, one should expect his behavior to be consistent with that of a reputation crusader. However, his behavior and discourse during the crises covered cannot be convincingly explained simply by highlighting his hawkish tendencies. In order to fully appreciate Reagan's policies, rhetoric, and state of mind, one must look at how these hawkish tendencies interacted with his high self-monitoring disposition.
David Domke and Kevin Coe
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195326413
- eISBN:
- 9780199870431
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195326413.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
Religion has always been a part of American politics, but something profound has changed in recent decades. This book demonstrates that, beginning with the election of Ronald Reagan as president in ...
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Religion has always been a part of American politics, but something profound has changed in recent decades. This book demonstrates that, beginning with the election of Ronald Reagan as president in 1980, US politicians have employed religion as a partisan weapon, using it in a no-holds-barred calculus designed to attract voters, identify enemies, and solidify power. The book reveals this political approach by identifying four crucial religious signals used by leading Republicans and Democrats, from Reagan to Bill Clinton to George W. Bush to the front-running candidates for the 2008 presidential election. In their emphasis on God and faith in public addresses, commemorations of tragedies and requests for divine blessing for the nation, the issue agendas pursued, and even the audiences addressed and the nature of Christmas celebrations, today's political leaders use religion for partisan gain in a manner distinct from those who came before. These signals become apparent through analysis of thousands of public communications by American politicians over the past seventy-five years, the tracking of public sentiment on several topics during the same period, and the perspectives of interest groups and political strategists. The result of these developments is an environment in the United States in which religion and politics have become almost inseparably intertwined — an outcome which benefits savvy politicians but endangers the vitality of church, state, and the entire American experiment in democracy. Less
Religion has always been a part of American politics, but something profound has changed in recent decades. This book demonstrates that, beginning with the election of Ronald Reagan as president in 1980, US politicians have employed religion as a partisan weapon, using it in a no-holds-barred calculus designed to attract voters, identify enemies, and solidify power. The book reveals this political approach by identifying four crucial religious signals used by leading Republicans and Democrats, from Reagan to Bill Clinton to George W. Bush to the front-running candidates for the 2008 presidential election. In their emphasis on God and faith in public addresses, commemorations of tragedies and requests for divine blessing for the nation, the issue agendas pursued, and even the audiences addressed and the nature of Christmas celebrations, today's political leaders use religion for partisan gain in a manner distinct from those who came before. These signals become apparent through analysis of thousands of public communications by American politicians over the past seventy-five years, the tracking of public sentiment on several topics during the same period, and the perspectives of interest groups and political strategists. The result of these developments is an environment in the United States in which religion and politics have become almost inseparably intertwined — an outcome which benefits savvy politicians but endangers the vitality of church, state, and the entire American experiment in democracy.
Tony Smith
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691154923
- eISBN:
- 9781400842025
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691154923.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter examines Ronald Reagan's commitment to the tenets of liberal democratic internationalism, and in particular his promotion of a global “democratic revolution” characterized by an apparent ...
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This chapter examines Ronald Reagan's commitment to the tenets of liberal democratic internationalism, and in particular his promotion of a global “democratic revolution” characterized by an apparent contradiction between activism and moderation in American foreign policy. It begins with a discussion of the Reagan administration's strategy that called for a a minimal effort on its part to realize its vision of a world order dominated by democratic governments, with emphasis on three key operational programs: “constructive engagement”; the push for antistatist, free markets abroad; and the Reagan Doctrine. The chapter then considers the role played by the Reagan administration's policies to the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and the succeeding prestige of democratic governance worldwide. It argues that the American role in the spread of democracy worldwide in the twentieth century was a necessary, but not sufficient, cause for the current strength of democratic government.Less
This chapter examines Ronald Reagan's commitment to the tenets of liberal democratic internationalism, and in particular his promotion of a global “democratic revolution” characterized by an apparent contradiction between activism and moderation in American foreign policy. It begins with a discussion of the Reagan administration's strategy that called for a a minimal effort on its part to realize its vision of a world order dominated by democratic governments, with emphasis on three key operational programs: “constructive engagement”; the push for antistatist, free markets abroad; and the Reagan Doctrine. The chapter then considers the role played by the Reagan administration's policies to the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and the succeeding prestige of democratic governance worldwide. It argues that the American role in the spread of democracy worldwide in the twentieth century was a necessary, but not sufficient, cause for the current strength of democratic government.
Richard F. Kuisel
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151816
- eISBN:
- 9781400839971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151816.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter blends the narrative of relations between Paris and Washington with the response of the French media, elites, and public. Despite the outward appearance of strong ties between the two ...
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This chapter blends the narrative of relations between Paris and Washington with the response of the French media, elites, and public. Despite the outward appearance of strong ties between the two countries, there were sharp disagreements, mutual mistrust, and even some nasty spats—which occurred mostly off camera. It is argued that the degrees of separation from the United States, more than the strength of the partnership, determined self-esteem and France's role as a major player in global affairs. Independence helped define what it was to be “French” on the international stage, and it was the U.S. superpower that deprived France of attaining this status. The chapter begins by sketching a picture of French attitudes toward American power, policy, and leaders on the eve of the elections of presidents Reagan and Mitterrand.Less
This chapter blends the narrative of relations between Paris and Washington with the response of the French media, elites, and public. Despite the outward appearance of strong ties between the two countries, there were sharp disagreements, mutual mistrust, and even some nasty spats—which occurred mostly off camera. It is argued that the degrees of separation from the United States, more than the strength of the partnership, determined self-esteem and France's role as a major player in global affairs. Independence helped define what it was to be “French” on the international stage, and it was the U.S. superpower that deprived France of attaining this status. The chapter begins by sketching a picture of French attitudes toward American power, policy, and leaders on the eve of the elections of presidents Reagan and Mitterrand.
Ted Gest
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195103434
- eISBN:
- 9780199833887
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195103432.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
By 1980, the violence rate had reached its highest level in memory, including a modern record of more than 23,000 homicides. The victor in the presidential race that year, Ronald Reagan, was ...
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By 1980, the violence rate had reached its highest level in memory, including a modern record of more than 23,000 homicides. The victor in the presidential race that year, Ronald Reagan, was surrounded by key supporters and advisers who wanted to make crime a high administration priority. The administration named a violent crime task force that called in August 1981 for a stronger federal role and changes in the law to favor the prosecution side. Three years later, a coalition of Republicans and moderate Democrats used a parliamentary maneuver to enact the most far‐ranging federal anticrime law in 16 years. Key players in pushing the anticrime agenda included Republicans like Edwin Meese, a longtime Reagan aide who later became Attorney General; Representative Dan Lungren of California, and prosecutor/crime victims advocate Lois Herrington; on the Democratic side were Senators Joseph Biden of Delaware and Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, and Representative William Hughes of New Jersey. An important provision of the law was a requirement that “sentencing guidelines” restrict federal judges’ power to set penalties in criminal cases. Others created a federal fund to support programs that aided crime victims and set up a “forfeiture” procedure by which law enforcers could seize the assets of suspects and convicts.Less
By 1980, the violence rate had reached its highest level in memory, including a modern record of more than 23,000 homicides. The victor in the presidential race that year, Ronald Reagan, was surrounded by key supporters and advisers who wanted to make crime a high administration priority. The administration named a violent crime task force that called in August 1981 for a stronger federal role and changes in the law to favor the prosecution side. Three years later, a coalition of Republicans and moderate Democrats used a parliamentary maneuver to enact the most far‐ranging federal anticrime law in 16 years. Key players in pushing the anticrime agenda included Republicans like Edwin Meese, a longtime Reagan aide who later became Attorney General; Representative Dan Lungren of California, and prosecutor/crime victims advocate Lois Herrington; on the Democratic side were Senators Joseph Biden of Delaware and Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, and Representative William Hughes of New Jersey. An important provision of the law was a requirement that “sentencing guidelines” restrict federal judges’ power to set penalties in criminal cases. Others created a federal fund to support programs that aided crime victims and set up a “forfeiture” procedure by which law enforcers could seize the assets of suspects and convicts.
Richard F. Kuisel
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151816
- eISBN:
- 9781400839971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151816.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
This chapter discusses the warmth of French towards America, and much associated with America, in the 1980s as a prelude to the creeping chilliness in perceptions and relations that followed, while ...
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This chapter discusses the warmth of French towards America, and much associated with America, in the 1980s as a prelude to the creeping chilliness in perceptions and relations that followed, while watching the underlying rivalry that generated controversies. It examines how the French responded to the American model—principally Reagan's domestic policies. Among the reasons for transatlantic amity was the admirable way Washington navigated the end of the Cold War. The splendid performance of the U.S. economy in the mid-1980s and the personal appeal of Reagan enhanced America's reputation. French domestic politics also contributed when the attempt at advancing socialism crashed and “Reaganomics,” at least to some French conservatives, briefly seemed attractive.Less
This chapter discusses the warmth of French towards America, and much associated with America, in the 1980s as a prelude to the creeping chilliness in perceptions and relations that followed, while watching the underlying rivalry that generated controversies. It examines how the French responded to the American model—principally Reagan's domestic policies. Among the reasons for transatlantic amity was the admirable way Washington navigated the end of the Cold War. The splendid performance of the U.S. economy in the mid-1980s and the personal appeal of Reagan enhanced America's reputation. French domestic politics also contributed when the attempt at advancing socialism crashed and “Reaganomics,” at least to some French conservatives, briefly seemed attractive.
Ted Gest
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195103434
- eISBN:
- 9780199833887
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195103432.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
Violent crime is committed disproportionately by young men, but government never has conducted a coherent, aggressive campaign against serious juvenile delinquency. The fragmentation has been evident ...
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Violent crime is committed disproportionately by young men, but government never has conducted a coherent, aggressive campaign against serious juvenile delinquency. The fragmentation has been evident since the late 1960s, when federal authority was divided between health and justice agencies. A 1974 law created a federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) to take charge. The law set progressive standards, but the administration of Ronald Reagan tried to kill the agency in the early 1980s and downgraded it after Congress refused to end funding. The Reagan Justice Department did forge an alliance with the MacArthur Foundation to start a long‐term study of juvenile crime's causes. Meanwhile, a steady increase in arrests of juveniles prompted to require that more teen suspects be tried in adult courts, even when studies showed the tactic ineffective in preventing repeat criminality. Congressional Republicans helped enact a large “juvenile accountability” program designed to provide federal aid to programs that got tough on young lawbreakers. Some measures failed on a broad scale, such as ‘boot camps’ aimed at instilling more discipline in delinquents. Despite many promising crime prevention programs, the Congress under Republicans control starting in 1995 generally refused to fund them. Juvenile crime arrests declined sharply since the mid‐1990s, but there was no solid proof of what caused the change, whether government programs, the improved economy, or a lower number of teens in the population.Less
Violent crime is committed disproportionately by young men, but government never has conducted a coherent, aggressive campaign against serious juvenile delinquency. The fragmentation has been evident since the late 1960s, when federal authority was divided between health and justice agencies. A 1974 law created a federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) to take charge. The law set progressive standards, but the administration of Ronald Reagan tried to kill the agency in the early 1980s and downgraded it after Congress refused to end funding. The Reagan Justice Department did forge an alliance with the MacArthur Foundation to start a long‐term study of juvenile crime's causes. Meanwhile, a steady increase in arrests of juveniles prompted to require that more teen suspects be tried in adult courts, even when studies showed the tactic ineffective in preventing repeat criminality. Congressional Republicans helped enact a large “juvenile accountability” program designed to provide federal aid to programs that got tough on young lawbreakers. Some measures failed on a broad scale, such as ‘boot camps’ aimed at instilling more discipline in delinquents. Despite many promising crime prevention programs, the Congress under Republicans control starting in 1995 generally refused to fund them. Juvenile crime arrests declined sharply since the mid‐1990s, but there was no solid proof of what caused the change, whether government programs, the improved economy, or a lower number of teens in the population.
Michael Schaller
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195090499
- eISBN:
- 9780199854196
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195090499.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter sums up the key findings of this study on the accomplishments and achievements of Ronald Reagan as U.S. president. Reagan achieved many of the symbolic goals he had pledged to strive ...
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This chapter sums up the key findings of this study on the accomplishments and achievements of Ronald Reagan as U.S. president. Reagan achieved many of the symbolic goals he had pledged to strive for, including the reduction of federal tax rates and improved relations with the Soviet Union. He retired with a public approval rating of 70 percent, higher than any president since Franklin Roosevelt. However, Reagan also left a number of economic, social and environment problems. These include the Iran-Contra affair and an increase in federal debt. In addition, his administration's approach to a variety of social problems, such as teenage pregnancy and AIDS remained essentially negative.Less
This chapter sums up the key findings of this study on the accomplishments and achievements of Ronald Reagan as U.S. president. Reagan achieved many of the symbolic goals he had pledged to strive for, including the reduction of federal tax rates and improved relations with the Soviet Union. He retired with a public approval rating of 70 percent, higher than any president since Franklin Roosevelt. However, Reagan also left a number of economic, social and environment problems. These include the Iran-Contra affair and an increase in federal debt. In addition, his administration's approach to a variety of social problems, such as teenage pregnancy and AIDS remained essentially negative.
Andrew L. Johns and Kenneth Osgood (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813034669
- eISBN:
- 9780813038742
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813034669.003.0009
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Media Studies
Ronald Reagan's proposal, officially called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), dramatically illustrates the power of a president to shape the public discourse on issues of war and peace. It ...
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Ronald Reagan's proposal, officially called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), dramatically illustrates the power of a president to shape the public discourse on issues of war and peace. It grabbed the attention of not only the military establishment, arms control advocates, nuclear strategists, and members of Congress but also the media and the general public. In a 1985 opinion poll, 84 percent of Americans said they had heard of Reagan's proposal. Reagan's nuclear abolitionism, while sincere, also involved wishful thinking, reflecting his tendency to blur reality and Hollywood fantasy. By suggesting that nuclear weapons could be rendered powerless through technology, Reagan played on American fears to manipulate public opinion in his favor.Less
Ronald Reagan's proposal, officially called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), dramatically illustrates the power of a president to shape the public discourse on issues of war and peace. It grabbed the attention of not only the military establishment, arms control advocates, nuclear strategists, and members of Congress but also the media and the general public. In a 1985 opinion poll, 84 percent of Americans said they had heard of Reagan's proposal. Reagan's nuclear abolitionism, while sincere, also involved wishful thinking, reflecting his tendency to blur reality and Hollywood fantasy. By suggesting that nuclear weapons could be rendered powerless through technology, Reagan played on American fears to manipulate public opinion in his favor.
Julian E. Zelizer
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691150734
- eISBN:
- 9781400841899
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691150734.003.0017
- Subject:
- History, American History: early to 18th Century
This chapter examines how domestic politics shaped the foreign policy of détente during the 1970s. It first considers Richard Nixon's pursuit of détente as part of his national security agenda and ...
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This chapter examines how domestic politics shaped the foreign policy of détente during the 1970s. It first considers Richard Nixon's pursuit of détente as part of his national security agenda and the role played by Henry Kissinger both under Nixon and Gerald Ford. It then explains how the national security centrism of Nixon and Ford failed to create a stable political majority within the Republican Party and shows how both presidents collided with two factions in the burgeoning conservative movement: neoconservatives from the Democratic Party and hawkish Republicans. It also discusses the 1976 Republican presidential primaries that dealt the final blow to détente within the GOP and suggests that Ronald Reagan's victory in the 1980 presidential election led Republicans to adopt a more militaristic outlook toward international affairs.Less
This chapter examines how domestic politics shaped the foreign policy of détente during the 1970s. It first considers Richard Nixon's pursuit of détente as part of his national security agenda and the role played by Henry Kissinger both under Nixon and Gerald Ford. It then explains how the national security centrism of Nixon and Ford failed to create a stable political majority within the Republican Party and shows how both presidents collided with two factions in the burgeoning conservative movement: neoconservatives from the Democratic Party and hawkish Republicans. It also discusses the 1976 Republican presidential primaries that dealt the final blow to détente within the GOP and suggests that Ronald Reagan's victory in the 1980 presidential election led Republicans to adopt a more militaristic outlook toward international affairs.
Dee Garrison
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195183191
- eISBN:
- 9780199788804
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183191.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter analyzes the second period of civil defense hype, which peaked in President Reagan's first term when he announced his seven-year, $4.2 billion plan for an expanded urban evacuation ...
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This chapter analyzes the second period of civil defense hype, which peaked in President Reagan's first term when he announced his seven-year, $4.2 billion plan for an expanded urban evacuation program. Time and again, the press reported that the host rural areas not only knew nothing about the hundreds of thousands of city people directed their way, but also had no shelter, water, or food supplies with which to assist the escaping urban masses. As a result a huge grassroots movement against civil defense swept the United States. By 1985, twenty-four states and 120 major cities formally refused to participate in crisis relocation planning. As the peace movement rapidly expanded in the United States and Europe, Reagan announced the birth of the Star Wars defense program.Less
This chapter analyzes the second period of civil defense hype, which peaked in President Reagan's first term when he announced his seven-year, $4.2 billion plan for an expanded urban evacuation program. Time and again, the press reported that the host rural areas not only knew nothing about the hundreds of thousands of city people directed their way, but also had no shelter, water, or food supplies with which to assist the escaping urban masses. As a result a huge grassroots movement against civil defense swept the United States. By 1985, twenty-four states and 120 major cities formally refused to participate in crisis relocation planning. As the peace movement rapidly expanded in the United States and Europe, Reagan announced the birth of the Star Wars defense program.
Virginia Garrard‐Burnett
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195379648
- eISBN:
- 9780199869176
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379648.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter uses newly declassified documents to examine how the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala turned a blind eye to the excesses of the Ríos Montt regime in order to help advance U.S. strategic goals ...
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This chapter uses newly declassified documents to examine how the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala turned a blind eye to the excesses of the Ríos Montt regime in order to help advance U.S. strategic goals in the region. Then it examines the support that Ríos Montt enjoyed from conservative evangelicals in Reagan‐era America, who saw the general as a “Christian soldier” and ally in the Central American Cold War. Last, this chapter analyzes foreign and domestic media coverage of Guatemala in the early 1980s. The chapter suggests that because this coverage was nearly nonexistent, particularly compared to coverage of El Salvador and Nicaragua, it allowed policymakers, foreign evangelicals, and urban Guatemalans to ignore or claim willful ignorance of the events that were taking place in their name in the countryside. This chapter is based primarily on declassified State Department and U.S. Embassy documents made available through the National Security Archives.Less
This chapter uses newly declassified documents to examine how the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala turned a blind eye to the excesses of the Ríos Montt regime in order to help advance U.S. strategic goals in the region. Then it examines the support that Ríos Montt enjoyed from conservative evangelicals in Reagan‐era America, who saw the general as a “Christian soldier” and ally in the Central American Cold War. Last, this chapter analyzes foreign and domestic media coverage of Guatemala in the early 1980s. The chapter suggests that because this coverage was nearly nonexistent, particularly compared to coverage of El Salvador and Nicaragua, it allowed policymakers, foreign evangelicals, and urban Guatemalans to ignore or claim willful ignorance of the events that were taking place in their name in the countryside. This chapter is based primarily on declassified State Department and U.S. Embassy documents made available through the National Security Archives.
David Domke and Kevin Coe
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195326413
- eISBN:
- 9780199870431
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195326413.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter describes two key moments that signaled the rise of a new religious politics in America: the presidential nomination acceptance addresses of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and Bill Clinton in ...
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This chapter describes two key moments that signaled the rise of a new religious politics in America: the presidential nomination acceptance addresses of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and Bill Clinton in 1992. It then briefly identifies a series of changes that have taken place over the past several decades, all of which point to an increasingly close relationship between religion and politics. Political leaders have taken advantage of and contributed to these changes by employing the God strategy, in which they carefully craft their public communications to appeal to people of faith.Less
This chapter describes two key moments that signaled the rise of a new religious politics in America: the presidential nomination acceptance addresses of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and Bill Clinton in 1992. It then briefly identifies a series of changes that have taken place over the past several decades, all of which point to an increasingly close relationship between religion and politics. Political leaders have taken advantage of and contributed to these changes by employing the God strategy, in which they carefully craft their public communications to appeal to people of faith.
David Ryan
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780813169057
- eISBN:
- 9780813177267
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813169057.003.0013
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
Despite Reagan’s favorable treatment in the recent historiography and his close association in contemporary public discourse with democracy promotion, key elements of the Reagan Doctrine presented an ...
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Despite Reagan’s favorable treatment in the recent historiography and his close association in contemporary public discourse with democracy promotion, key elements of the Reagan Doctrine presented an electoral liability in the run-up to the 1984 elections. This chapter examines the impact of regional conflicts in Nicaragua and Lebanon on the overall attempts to modify Reagan’s image for the 1984 elections. While foreign policy issues were rarely a primary concern during the election, Reagan’s pollsters and strategists wanted to diminish the early 1980s association in the public of the candidate as a warmonger as confrontation with the Soviet Union still resonated. Moreover, the prospects of intervention in Nicaragua frequently invoked the negative memories and reverberations of the Vietnam War. As Reagan’s identity was recast across 1984 through overtures to China and the Soviet Union, it was imperative to operate a form of damage control over the issues of Nicaragua and Lebanon. Keeping these issues out of the electoral discourse was considered to be crucial.Less
Despite Reagan’s favorable treatment in the recent historiography and his close association in contemporary public discourse with democracy promotion, key elements of the Reagan Doctrine presented an electoral liability in the run-up to the 1984 elections. This chapter examines the impact of regional conflicts in Nicaragua and Lebanon on the overall attempts to modify Reagan’s image for the 1984 elections. While foreign policy issues were rarely a primary concern during the election, Reagan’s pollsters and strategists wanted to diminish the early 1980s association in the public of the candidate as a warmonger as confrontation with the Soviet Union still resonated. Moreover, the prospects of intervention in Nicaragua frequently invoked the negative memories and reverberations of the Vietnam War. As Reagan’s identity was recast across 1984 through overtures to China and the Soviet Union, it was imperative to operate a form of damage control over the issues of Nicaragua and Lebanon. Keeping these issues out of the electoral discourse was considered to be crucial.
Robert D. Schulzinger
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195365924
- eISBN:
- 9780199851966
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195365924.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
During the campaign leading to the election of 1980, Ronald Reagan referred regularly to the lessons of the Vietnam War. He insisted that the Vietnam War had been “a noble cause” in which Americans ...
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During the campaign leading to the election of 1980, Ronald Reagan referred regularly to the lessons of the Vietnam War. He insisted that the Vietnam War had been “a noble cause” in which Americans had fought and died selflessly. Instead of refraining from the use of military power in the wake of the disaster of Vietnam, Reagan recommended that the United States commit more resources to the armed forces. Reagan easily defeated Jimmy Carter, and for the first time in a generation the Republican Party had a majority in the Senate. The Reagan administration entered the fray in Central America to gain advantages in the competition with the Soviet Union in other areas of the world, while reaffirming its support of the economic embargo against Vietnam. Two problematic issues hindering improvement in diplomatic relations between the two countries were the continuing flow of refugees from Vietnam and service personnel listed as missing in action. Reagan's Vietnam policy rested squarely in the center of American politics.Less
During the campaign leading to the election of 1980, Ronald Reagan referred regularly to the lessons of the Vietnam War. He insisted that the Vietnam War had been “a noble cause” in which Americans had fought and died selflessly. Instead of refraining from the use of military power in the wake of the disaster of Vietnam, Reagan recommended that the United States commit more resources to the armed forces. Reagan easily defeated Jimmy Carter, and for the first time in a generation the Republican Party had a majority in the Senate. The Reagan administration entered the fray in Central America to gain advantages in the competition with the Soviet Union in other areas of the world, while reaffirming its support of the economic embargo against Vietnam. Two problematic issues hindering improvement in diplomatic relations between the two countries were the continuing flow of refugees from Vietnam and service personnel listed as missing in action. Reagan's Vietnam policy rested squarely in the center of American politics.
Thomas J. Sargent
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691158709
- eISBN:
- 9781400847648
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691158709.003.0006
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
This chapter examines the large net-of-interest deficits in the U.S. federal budget that have marked the administration of Ronald Reagan. It explains the fiscal and monetary actions observed during ...
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This chapter examines the large net-of-interest deficits in the U.S. federal budget that have marked the administration of Ronald Reagan. It explains the fiscal and monetary actions observed during the Reagan administration as reflecting the optimal decisions of government policymakers. The discussion is based on an equation whose validity is granted by all competing theories of macroeconomics: the intertemporal government budget constraint. The chapter first considers the government budget balance and the optimal tax smoothing model of Robert Barro before analyzing monetary and fiscal policy during the Reagan years: a string of large annual net-of-interest government deficits accompanied by a monetary policy stance that has been tight, especially before February 1985, and even more so before August 1982. Indicators of tight monetary policy are high real interest rates on government debt and pretax yields that exceed the rate of economic growth.Less
This chapter examines the large net-of-interest deficits in the U.S. federal budget that have marked the administration of Ronald Reagan. It explains the fiscal and monetary actions observed during the Reagan administration as reflecting the optimal decisions of government policymakers. The discussion is based on an equation whose validity is granted by all competing theories of macroeconomics: the intertemporal government budget constraint. The chapter first considers the government budget balance and the optimal tax smoothing model of Robert Barro before analyzing monetary and fiscal policy during the Reagan years: a string of large annual net-of-interest government deficits accompanied by a monetary policy stance that has been tight, especially before February 1985, and even more so before August 1982. Indicators of tight monetary policy are high real interest rates on government debt and pretax yields that exceed the rate of economic growth.
Sarah B. Snyder
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780804798099
- eISBN:
- 9781503600133
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804798099.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, Political History
This chapter explores Ronald Reagan's strategy of “quiet diplomacy” toward the Soviet Union with regard to human rights as a trust-building initiative, arguing that the success of that approach was ...
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This chapter explores Ronald Reagan's strategy of “quiet diplomacy” toward the Soviet Union with regard to human rights as a trust-building initiative, arguing that the success of that approach was key in the developments that finally brought the Cold War to an end. It examines Reagan's efforts for exit visas on behalf of human rights activists, Jewish refuseniks, and religious dissidents such as Pentecostals, following the trail of his strategy through the 1985 Geneva and 1986 Reykjavik summits until his departure from office. The chapter demonstrates how Reagan's promise not to “crow” about his successes in this area and his decision to limit public pressure on Gorbachev about human rights led to increasing concessions by the Soviet Union, which fostered a rising level of trust in their relationship and eventually facilitated the end of the Cold War.Less
This chapter explores Ronald Reagan's strategy of “quiet diplomacy” toward the Soviet Union with regard to human rights as a trust-building initiative, arguing that the success of that approach was key in the developments that finally brought the Cold War to an end. It examines Reagan's efforts for exit visas on behalf of human rights activists, Jewish refuseniks, and religious dissidents such as Pentecostals, following the trail of his strategy through the 1985 Geneva and 1986 Reykjavik summits until his departure from office. The chapter demonstrates how Reagan's promise not to “crow” about his successes in this area and his decision to limit public pressure on Gorbachev about human rights led to increasing concessions by the Soviet Union, which fostered a rising level of trust in their relationship and eventually facilitated the end of the Cold War.
Dan P. McAdams
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195176933
- eISBN:
- 9780199786787
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176933.003.0004
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter begins with an account of the life of Bob Love, a professional basketball star from the early 1970s who struggled for years with a debilitating speech impediment only to emerge, in his ...
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This chapter begins with an account of the life of Bob Love, a professional basketball star from the early 1970s who struggled for years with a debilitating speech impediment only to emerge, in his midlife years, as a corporate spokesman. Love's case provides a moving account of personal redemption and, more importantly, introduces the general idea that people tend to construct stories about their lives in order to provide their lives with unity, purpose, and meaning. Drawing from twenty years of research and theory in personality and developmental psychology, cognitive science, and the narrative study of lives, the chapter traces the development of life stories from the emergence of a sense of self in the second year of life to the revision of life narratives in midlife. The importance of the social audience for a life story is illustrated through the case of former American President Ronald Reagan.Less
This chapter begins with an account of the life of Bob Love, a professional basketball star from the early 1970s who struggled for years with a debilitating speech impediment only to emerge, in his midlife years, as a corporate spokesman. Love's case provides a moving account of personal redemption and, more importantly, introduces the general idea that people tend to construct stories about their lives in order to provide their lives with unity, purpose, and meaning. Drawing from twenty years of research and theory in personality and developmental psychology, cognitive science, and the narrative study of lives, the chapter traces the development of life stories from the emergence of a sense of self in the second year of life to the revision of life narratives in midlife. The importance of the social audience for a life story is illustrated through the case of former American President Ronald Reagan.
Duncan Lindsey
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- April 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195305449
- eISBN:
- 9780199894291
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305449.003.0003
- Subject:
- Social Work, Children and Families, Social Policy
This chapter examines the growing inequality in the United States. According to the Internal Revenue Service, in 2005 the top 1% of income earners received more than twice as much income as everyone ...
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This chapter examines the growing inequality in the United States. According to the Internal Revenue Service, in 2005 the top 1% of income earners received more than twice as much income as everyone in the bottom 50% combined. Two decades earlier, the bottom 50% earned twice as much income as the top 1%. The half century after World War II can essentially be divided into two periods. The first period is called the “era of the middle class.” This was the time when the American middle class emerged in full force. During this period, for the first time in history, a majority of Americans graduated from high school. College and university enrollments tripled. Home ownership increased from 40 to 60% — the highest rate of home ownership in the world. The era of the middle class began to close in 1970 and essentially came to an end by 1980. In 1980, Ronald Reagan became President of the United States and ushered in a new “era of the wealthy class.” During this period tax rates were cut substantially for the wealthiest families, whereas the taxes for middle income families rose. The major federal tax borne by the middle class has been the employment tax, including Social Security and Medicare, and it has increased substantially during this same period. As a result, the wealthiest families have been able to save more and accumulate more wealth, and further improve their relative wealth and prosperity. In contrast, the middle class and the poor have seen their portion of the nation's income and wealth decline. The result has been the most dramatic increase in inequality in the nation's history.Less
This chapter examines the growing inequality in the United States. According to the Internal Revenue Service, in 2005 the top 1% of income earners received more than twice as much income as everyone in the bottom 50% combined. Two decades earlier, the bottom 50% earned twice as much income as the top 1%. The half century after World War II can essentially be divided into two periods. The first period is called the “era of the middle class.” This was the time when the American middle class emerged in full force. During this period, for the first time in history, a majority of Americans graduated from high school. College and university enrollments tripled. Home ownership increased from 40 to 60% — the highest rate of home ownership in the world. The era of the middle class began to close in 1970 and essentially came to an end by 1980. In 1980, Ronald Reagan became President of the United States and ushered in a new “era of the wealthy class.” During this period tax rates were cut substantially for the wealthiest families, whereas the taxes for middle income families rose. The major federal tax borne by the middle class has been the employment tax, including Social Security and Medicare, and it has increased substantially during this same period. As a result, the wealthiest families have been able to save more and accumulate more wealth, and further improve their relative wealth and prosperity. In contrast, the middle class and the poor have seen their portion of the nation's income and wealth decline. The result has been the most dramatic increase in inequality in the nation's history.
