John J. Coughlin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199756773
- eISBN:
- 9780199932177
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756773.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
During the twentieth century the personalist perspective developed in the canon law of marriage. “Personalism” designates a broad philosophical movement that is opposed to an overly materialist ...
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During the twentieth century the personalist perspective developed in the canon law of marriage. “Personalism” designates a broad philosophical movement that is opposed to an overly materialist conception in which the human person is depicted as merely a body that consists of particles of matter. It emphasizes the person as the fundamental category for explaining reality, and posits that the material universe is insignificant apart from the person's experience of it. This chapter suggests that the development of the personalist perspective in the canon law of marriage logically proceeds from the Augustinian traditional goods of marriage and emerged in response to history. The chapter consists of three major sections. First, it discusses the historical development of Augustine's traditional three goods. Second, it summarizes the classical theory of marriage developed during the medieval period and its subsequent demise with the secularization of marriage. Third, it presents the personalist perspective on marriage as a response to secularization, and offers some examples of the ways in which the jurisprudence of the Roman Rota has integrated the personalist perspective.Less
During the twentieth century the personalist perspective developed in the canon law of marriage. “Personalism” designates a broad philosophical movement that is opposed to an overly materialist conception in which the human person is depicted as merely a body that consists of particles of matter. It emphasizes the person as the fundamental category for explaining reality, and posits that the material universe is insignificant apart from the person's experience of it. This chapter suggests that the development of the personalist perspective in the canon law of marriage logically proceeds from the Augustinian traditional goods of marriage and emerged in response to history. The chapter consists of three major sections. First, it discusses the historical development of Augustine's traditional three goods. Second, it summarizes the classical theory of marriage developed during the medieval period and its subsequent demise with the secularization of marriage. Third, it presents the personalist perspective on marriage as a response to secularization, and offers some examples of the ways in which the jurisprudence of the Roman Rota has integrated the personalist perspective.
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226077598
- eISBN:
- 9780226077611
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226077611.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, European Medieval History
The presiding officer of the consistory court of a bishop or lesser prelate was an ordinary judge usually styled the “official.” Prelates by definition possessed the right of “ordinary jurisdiction,” ...
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The presiding officer of the consistory court of a bishop or lesser prelate was an ordinary judge usually styled the “official.” Prelates by definition possessed the right of “ordinary jurisdiction,” which is to say that they were the usual and customary judges of disputes or disciplinary infractions among the faithful who were subject to them. At the pinnacle of the church's hierarchy, the pope claimed ordinary jurisdiction over all Christians, although in practice he normally authorized the auditors of the Roman Rota, the Audientia litterarum contradictarum, and other papal tribunals to exercise it on his behalf. Similarly, archbishops, bishops, abbots, archdeacons, deans, and other lesser prelates routinely deputized officials and commissary judges to deal with most matters that fell under their jurisdiction.Less
The presiding officer of the consistory court of a bishop or lesser prelate was an ordinary judge usually styled the “official.” Prelates by definition possessed the right of “ordinary jurisdiction,” which is to say that they were the usual and customary judges of disputes or disciplinary infractions among the faithful who were subject to them. At the pinnacle of the church's hierarchy, the pope claimed ordinary jurisdiction over all Christians, although in practice he normally authorized the auditors of the Roman Rota, the Audientia litterarum contradictarum, and other papal tribunals to exercise it on his behalf. Similarly, archbishops, bishops, abbots, archdeacons, deans, and other lesser prelates routinely deputized officials and commissary judges to deal with most matters that fell under their jurisdiction.