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This chapter rejects the “white backlash” thesis that attributes the South's embrace of the Republican Party to racial issues, and white working-class abandonment of the Democratic Party over civil rights, taxation, welfare, and affirmative action. Backlash implies that the South's move from the Democrats to the GOP was reactionary, but this chapter argues that angst over civil rights alone did not guarantee a Republican realignment. Instead it stresses the building of Republican organization in the South—resources, field workers, communications infrastructure, and leadership—beginning with the 1944 campaign of Thomas Dewey, and culminating in Herbert Brownell's mastery of such organization on behalf of Dwight Eisenhower that shook the southern GOP out of its “post office politician” mentality. Unlike the presidential campaign of 1968, in which Richard Nixon amassed a “silent majority” around the concept of law and order, this chapter argues, the Republicans' first southern strategy was not based on race.

This chapter examines the motivation and method behind conservatives’ adoption of China as a signature foreign policy issue from the Chinese Revolution through the Korean War. During that transition period, leaders of the “old” right began to see the rapidly disintegrating situation in East Asia as a political opportunity and looked to past events like Yalta to clarify their positions on foreign policy. Both exemplified and led by Sen. Robert A. Taft, they were awakened to the possibilities of internationalism by events in East Asia, and of China as exception to the rule of bipartisan foreign policy. As this chapter argues, it was a process that saw difficult, and sometimes bewildering, change for an old guard that sought to challenge both Democrats as well as moderate Eisenhower Republicans. Taft’s own evolution from isolationist to internationalist presidential candidate illustrated the swift change China wrought upon national politics.

At the beginning of 1952, Robert Taft seemed destined to finally secure the presidential nomination he craved. His reelection in 1950 made him the triumphant symbol of resurgent conservatism. Although claiming without much conviction that he had no interest in running, it was apparent that Taft's reelection made him not just a potential presidential candidate, but the man most likely to secure the Republican nomination. This chapter focuses on the elections of the 1952, wherein the conservative faction of the Republican Party rooted for Robert Taft, a candidacy which was dreaded by African Americans. Taft repeatedly courted the South and was the de facto leader of the GOP in a Congress that had pointedly failed to pass any civil rights legislation. The unattractiveness and the lack of appeal of the Taft candidacy among black voters forced the Republicans to seek another presidential candidate in Dwight Eisenhower.

Stassen’s failure to win the Republican nomination for president in June 1948 did not quench his thirst for high office. Robert T. McCracken, chairman of the University of Pennsylvania’s Board of Trustees, offered Stassen the university presidency in July, and the board elected him on September 17, 1948. The enthusiasm he aroused among college students as a Republican candidate convinced him that higher education had always been in the forefront of his ambitions. Stassen saw himself in the same light as Eisenhower, who had accepted the presidency of Columbia University. As the president of a prestigious Ivy League university, he could ensure his prominence in national affairs. For four years, Stassen walked a delicate line between his university obligations and his political ambitions. Inevitably, he had to confront criticism over his extracurricular activities. However, the possibility of a cabinet appointment in a Dewey administration became irrelevant when President Truman won the election in November.

The socialist phase in the history of the American left was mainly over by the 1940s, but in the latter part of that decade Republican politicians seeking political advantage alleged that the Democratic Party was still nurturing “creeping socialism”. The chapter details the Great Scare and persecution of genuine left-wing figures like the actor Charlie Chaplin. It shows how Democratic politicians were smeared for allegedly voting the same way as Vito Marcantonio. The presidential candidate Senator Robert Taft rode the wave of anti-socialist rhetoric. Senator Robert Wagner’s attempt to round out the welfare state by introducing universal medical insurance foundered in this hostile climate, as did left-led attempts to end Jim Crow.

This chapter focuses on the politics of foreign policy. It recounts the bitter, and ultimately crippling, political brawls that Eisenhower, Bush, and Obama fought over their foreign policies. The chapter dives into Eisenhower’s battle with “America First” nationalists and his disagreements over national security with Senators Robert A. Taft and Joseph McCarthy. It discusses some of the forces undergirding Bush’s humiliating defeat after only one term in office, including the wounds inflicted by a resurgent “America First” movement and populist leaders such as Pat Buchanan and Ross Perot. The chapter documents the political turbulence of the Obama years, including his defining struggle against those who ridiculed his foreign policies as weak and defeatist. Finally, the chapter charts the role of Taft, McCarthy, Buchanan, and Perot in shaping the combustible politics of foreign policy in the 2010s and today.