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Even children are entitled to do some things in their own way, but we do not take their autonomy at all as seriously as we do that of an adult. Indeed, we think parents have an obligation to treat them paternalistically. This chapter begins by reviewing some arguments for that view offered by Samantha Brennan and Robert Noggle, and finds these arguments wanting. It then develops new lines of thought. One of these concerns the extent to which a child's character and personality are her own, in a sense important for respecting autonomy. Another draws on obligations that children have themselves, where how they are raised is concerned. The resulting view endorses extensive paternalism toward young children and something much more nuanced toward adolescents.

An account of manipulation is accessed by building on Robert Noggle’s account of manipulative action as the attempt to get someone to fall short of the ideals that, in the view of the influencer, govern the target’s beliefs, desires, and emotions. Through a series of cases, the chapter modifies Noggle’s account, concluding that manipulation is directly influencing someone’s beliefs, desires, or emotions such that she falls short of ideals for belief, desire, or emotion in ways typically not in her self-interest or likely not in her self-interest in the present context. Certain ways of making someone fall short of ideals—certain ways of turning her psychological settings away from the ideal, as Noggle puts it—are manipulative, but other ways aren’t manipulative. Manipulation is moving someone’s settings away from the ideal in ways that are typically not in that person’s self-interest, or likely not in her self-interest in the present context.

This chapter examines manipulation not as a moral but as an aesthetic flaw. Aesthetic manipulation differs from standard cases of interpersonal manipulation in that it is not intended to influence behavior; it can’t be condemned for subverting rationality; and it is generally overt and accepted voluntarily. The chapter argues that a work of art is manipulative if it causes its audience to have an emotional reaction that is unwarranted. We judge emotional responses to a piece of fiction to be appropriate not by considering the events it depicts but, rather, by considering its artistic quality. A manipulative artwork tries to elicit—and often succeeds in eliciting—an emotional response unwarranted by the quality of the work. Thus, the view expressed here supports Robert Noggle’s account of manipulation as an attempt to elicit a response that violates certain “norms and ideals.”