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This chapter discusses how for African Americans, the events of the mid-1970s only served to reinforce an already contentious relationship with the Grand Old Party (GOP)—frustrations that were born out of the party's years of equivocation over issues of black concern. The GOP's extreme electoral woes with African Americans were rooted in Goldwater's enduring legacy. More than a decade later, black voters still held an image of a national party driven by states' rights advocates, white southern conservatives, anti-civil rights politicians, and wealthy elites who disdained the “common man.” The Washington Post observed that the Republican Party appeared to be a political machine engaged in constant antagonisms and reactionary battles and had done very little to dispel its negative identity with black communities.

This chapter examines the Republican Party's efforts to organize the House of Representatives and build a lasting coalition following the election of Nathaniel Banks as Speaker in the 34th Congress. It first considers the organization of the 34th House, focusing on the election of House officers and the appointment of the standing committees, before discussing the Republicans' fortunes in the 35th Congress. It shows that the Republicans lost control of the chamber to the Democrats in the 35th Congress, but reemerged as the plurality party in the 36th Congress. In particular, it explores how the party weathered another extended speakership race in 1859–1860 before winning all major House officer positions, with the exception of the Sergeant at Arms and the Printer. The chapter suggests that the Republicans succeeded in organizing all aspects of the House by compromising with the Anti-Lecomptons and changing party nominees midstream when necessary.

In this chapter, the theory of relative advantage is examined using detailed case study analyses. Through state newspapers of record, archival materials, and personal interviews, the history and development of the Republican state parties in Georgia and Virginia during the pivotal period leading up to, and during, the civil rights era are documented. The case studies describe the evolution of GOP development in these two states, including leadership, issue positions and platforms, congruity with the national party, and the specific coalitions that comprised party membership over time. The descriptive results reported in this chapter provide a great deal of support for the theory of relative advantage, given historical evidence pointing to the fact that both white conservatives and blacks were acting politically in their own self-interests.

This introductory chapter introduces key figures across a spectrum of black Republican politics and examines their ongoing struggles to effect meaningful change both for African Americans and within the Republican Party over the course of nearly half a century. It illustrates the ways in which black Republicans were conservative and not conservative, and how their ideas overlapped and clashed with even the most reactionary wing of the Republican Party. In no uncertain terms, black Republicans offer a dilemma of sorts; they were far more conservative than their Democratic counterparts but far less conservative than white reactionary Republicans. Above all else, most held fast to a pragmatic ideology that was informed by their day-to-day racial experience rather than by an abstract, dogmatic interpretation of American politics.

This chapter examines the formal structure of the Republican Party from county precinct committeemen and committeewomen to the staffing and organization of the state Party. It provides an analysis of the social part of the network that includes the Republican Clubs, the Federation of Republican Women, and the Young Republicans and their contributions. The chapter also introduces the individuals who became elected and appointed officials through their participation in the formal Republican Party structure and identifies their paths to office. The chapter outlines the foundations of the Republican political philosophy, describes campaign fundraising and techniques, and discusses the conversion of Democratic voters to the Republican network.

This chapter reflects on the workings of the God strategy, and on what its omnipresence means for American democracy. The God strategy's “golden rule” — exhibit faith, but don't be too strident or nakedly partisan in doing so — is discussed in relation to the 1992 presidential election and the 2006 midterm elections. In both cases, Republicans pushed too hard with the God strategy while Democrats responded with a religious politics of their own. And in both cases, the result was Democratic electoral gains. The chapter then discusses how America's current brand of religious politics puts at risk the Founding Fathers' vision for a democracy that would protect the church from the state and the state from the church. The chapter concludes by considering the role that mass media, the public education system, and religious institutions can play in preserving Constitutional protections.

This chapter examines the Ohio gubernatorial election of 1867 and how it influenced national politics, the presidential election of 1868, and the Democratic Party's monetary positions. It first traces the origins of the Republican Party, certain components of its ideology, and its antagonistic relationship with New York's financial groups as well as the Democrats' appropriation of the issue of currency inflation. It then considers the shifting monetary positions of Democrats and Republicans during the 1868 presidential election, with particular emphasis on elite Democrats' views on the financial issue and the Republicans' endorsement of bureaucracy. It also discusses the Republican Party's belief that the Democrats, led by George Pendleton, had reintroduced monetary policy into postbellum American political debate. The chapter concludes by explaining how the Democrats' new monetary activism resulted in a new willingness to use the federal government to become more involved in the national economy.

This chapter examines how legislators associated with the conservative movement thrived in a congressional process that liberals had helped to create. It first considers how Congress was reformed in the 1970s, focusing on its transition from the committee era to the contemporary era and how the reform coalition of 1958–1974 helped end the committee era. It then compares the contemporary Congress to the committee-era Congress and how the new legislative process contributed to the fortunes of the conservative movement. It also discusses the decentralization and centralization fostered by congressional reforms, the creation of the Conservative Opportunity Society in 1983 by young mavericks in the Republican Party, congressional conservatives' disappointment with the presidency of George H. W. Bush, and the Republican congressional reforms of 1995. The chapter argues that the state endured despite the political success of American conservatism in Congress.

Chapter 2 details the evolution of the conservative movement and its interaction with the Republican Party from 1945 to the present. It provides a periodization of the modern American right which divides its growth into four distinct time spans. It distinguishes between the different strands of the conservative movement and it delineates the role of intellectuals, political leaders, organizational professionals and publicists as well as the role of specific components such as the neo-conservatives and the religious right. Particular attention is paid to the building of the conservative movement's infrastructure. Comparisons are made with developments on the right in other political systems, notably the United Kingdom. The chapter offers an interpretation of the causes of disunity on the right and their possible resolution.

This chapter examines the Republican Party. It highlights the fact that local expressions of the issues of the war and its aftermath at times require reference to the larger national context. Indeed, it was the Republican Party's relentless attention to reconstructing the Union from the very start of the war, even as it evolved as a political party during and after the conflict, that added to and aggravated the local issues that continued through the war and into Reconstruction in places such as Alabama and Kentucky.

This chapter examines leadership selection after the Reed Rules and the persistence of the organizational cartel in the House of Representatives during the period 1891–2011. It begins by discussing factional divisions and further threats to the caucus organization before considering the progressive Republicans' 1910 revolt against Speaker Joseph G. Cannon as well as the Democrats' return to power and control of the House from the 62nd through 65th Congresses (1911–1919). It then analyzes the rift between progressive and conservative elements in the Republican Party that challenged the party monopoly over the House's makeup. Despite these problematic events and other issues, along with severe regional divisions within the majority Democratic Party, the chapter shows that the binding party caucus and organizational cartel survived and flourished through the present day.

This conclusion summarizes the book's main findings and considers their implications for the areas of race, immigration, and American politics. The results confirm the important role that immigration plays in American politics and also highlight the enduring though shifting role of race in the nation. Where African Americans once dominated the political calculus of white Americans, Latinos appear more likely to do so today. The movement of so many white Americans to the right has wide-ranging ramifications for both the future balance of partisanship and likely trajectory of race relations in the country. With a clear majority of the white population now leaning towards the Republican Party and a clear majority of the minority population now favoring the Democratic Party, political conflict in the United States is increasingly likely to be synonymous with racial conflict—a pattern that threatens ever-greater racial tension.

This chapter examines the speakership elections of 1849 and 1855–1856, the most chaotic instances of officer selection in the history of the House of Representatives. It considers how the Second Party System weakened and eventually collapsed as the slavery issue overwhelmed the interregional partisanship that had been in place for two decades. It also discusses the emergence of new political parties, such as the Free-Soil Party, the American Party, and the Republican Party, that created new avenues for coalitional organization. In particular, it looks at the rise of the Republican Party as the primary opposition party to the Democrats. Finally, it describes how the rising popularity of the new parties in congressional elections affected politicians in both the Whig Party and the Democratic Party.

This chapter examines the emergence of the organizational cartel based on caucus decision making during the period 1861–1891. It considers how the caucus-induced, organizational arrangement solved the lingering instability that had often plagued speakership decisions during the antebellum era. It also shows how the binding party caucus on organizational matters institutionalized and evolved into an equilibrium institution, with both the Republican Party and the Democratic Party embracing the practice of keeping the organization of the House of Representatives “in the family” rather than risking potential complications on the floor. In short, the majority party had finally become an organizational cartel. The chapter explains how the organizational cartel allowed the majority party to control the election of the Speaker and other House officers, as well as the more general makeup of the chamber.

This chapter examines how competition between Methodists and Catholics reinforced a moderately conservative civic ethos across Kansas during the 1880s and 1890s. Whatever their disagreements might be, Methodists and Catholics alike had a stake in promoting what they regarded as good citizenship. Congregations brought people together, creating what later scholars would call social capital, helping them to make friends, conduct business, and care for the needy. The chapter first provides an overview of how the Republican Party dominated local and state politics in Kansas before discussing Populism and religious politics in the state. It then considers the position of Populists and church members regarding inequality, the emergence of a Republican faction known as “antiboss” Republicans, and the rise of a grassroots movement for law and order. It also explores the debate over the issue of education in Kansas.

Chapter five examines the passage of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003—a major social policy reform that delegates responsibility for a Medicare prescription drug benefit to commercial firms. The chapter argues that the Republican Congressional leadership used this form of delegated governance to reconcile competing electoral and free-market aims. Republicans faced intense pressure to address popular demands for a drug benefit but needed a policy that furthered long-term goals of marketization or even privatization of federal entitlements. To help build support for the reform, the Republican leadership enlisted interest group allies like the pharmaceutical and insurance industries, and they delegated powers to private actors with these groups in mind. They also used administrative design as a way to reconcile the competing preferences of conservatives worried about the creation of a vast new entitlement and mass public demand for a universal benefit. The result was a complex system of delegated governance, an extraordinarily complicated piece of legislation designed to meet the desires of many different factions.

This chapter examines how voter ignorance influenced elections and monetary policy in the immediate postbellum period by focusing on Democrat George Pendleton's use of greenback inflation as a campaign issue in the Ohio gubernatorial election of 1867. Pendleton and fellow Democrat Clement Vallandigham, who opposed the greenbacks when they were initially introduced, took a leading role in demanding currency inflation. The Democratic Party's adoption of inflationary monetary policy forced the Republican Party to defend deflationary monetary policies and the gold standard. This chapter first considers Treasury Department Secretary Hugh McCulloch's decision to withdraw greenbacks from circulation following the end of the Civil War before discussing greenback inflation as a campaign strategy employed by Pendleton in his attempt to become the frontrunner for the Democratic presidential nomination of 1868. It also explores the ramifications of the Democrats' adoption of currency inflation for the development of bureaucratic authority in the Treasury Department.