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This chapter explores the ways in which structural condition such as political institutions, historical legacies and economic realities shape the limits of what is possible in mediation and resulting peace processes. Mediation scholarship focusing on international diplomacy and formal processes has paid little attention to the interplay between contested political processes ats regime level and the collective action of ordinary people in demonstrations, protests and revolutions. Yet both regime type and previous patterns of mobilisation and protest impact the space for manoeuvre in mediation. The chapter highlights how pre-existing configurations of political contestation, as well as unexpected manifestations of political agency affect what is deemed possible by both the regime and outside contenders, making these dynamics important aspects of a peace mediation process.

The Iraq War was a mixed outcome for the United States: a military success but diplomatic failure. Militarily, America sought the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime with a minimal amount of combat power expended in the effort. Diplomatically, top policymakers sought to create the conditions for the emergence of a stable and democratic Iraqi state. The U.S. achieved its military objective, but it did so at the expense of its diplomatic objective as the effort to foster a democratic regime succumbed to the rise of a Sunni-based insurgency. This chapter argues that this mixed outcome resulted from America's moderately truncated information institution. President George W. Bush, Richard Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld received the vast majority of their strategic intelligence from U.S. Central Command headed by General Tommy Franks. This “empowered stovepipe” produced a military strategy that resulted in regime change, but which undermined post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

This chapter sketches the contours of the political and intellectual contexts in which contemporary Islamic thinking in Post-Suharto Indonesia has evolved. It discusses the final years of Suharto’s New Order Regime and the failures of the early years of political reformation; the resilience of existing power structures and longevity of political elites; the Islam factor in Indonesian politics and the role of Islamic parties after regime change. For the intellectual-historical setting, this book suggests progressive and reactionary Muslims as alternative categories for other problematic terms, such as liberal and moderate, and for fundamentalist, extremist and radical Islam respectively. To offset a previous lack of scholarly attention, the chapter ends with a sketch of the formative years of progressive Islamic discourse in Indonesia.

Most of the democratic transitions that have occurred in human history took place in ancient Greece. Thanks to Mogens Hansen’s and Thomas Nielsen’s monumental Inventory of Archaic and Classical Period Poleis (augmented by Josiah Ober and his Stanford colleagues), a fascinating data set documenting ancient Greek political transitions now exists. But the data present an extraordinary challenge to empirical research, because so much remains unknown about so many poleis. Furthermore, and very importantly, one cannot treat missing information as if it were caused by chance destruction of records. The objectives of this chapter are threefold: first, to illustrate the feasibility of useful statistical analysis, even when applied to data as uncertain in origin and/or interpretation as those from ancient Greece; second, to provide additional evidence of the value of a systematic database, such as that derived from Hansen and Nielsen’s work; third, to contribute to literature on political transition in ancient Greece.

This chapter describes the inherent complexity of the transition process that follows regime change. It finds that polarization can stem from pre-regime issues, repression of the now-defunct regime, the sudden influx of political actors and activity, and revolutions themselves. The chapter argues that to transition to sustainable peace and stability, Arab Spring societies must deal with their deep rifts by engaging in an inclusive and genuine national reconciliation process. It defines national reconciliation as the process of addressing the grievances of parties to a conflict with the aim of redefining their relationships and forging a new social contract. In Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia, the national reconciliation process must include a national dialogue among primary stakeholders, seeking the truth of what really happened in the past, reparations for victims’ past injuries, holding the former regime accountable for its actions, and the reform of state institutions. The chapter also outlines the other layers of post-conflict or post-regime change transitions: transitional justice, post-conflict reconstruction, and post-conflict development.

The Introduction lays out the groundwork for the book. It introduces the topic and the author’s argument, provides an overview of the problem at hand, and surveys the existing literature. The book argues that far from a clear and complete break from the past, Iran’s security thinking and policies since the Islamic Revolution have been marked by key elements of continuity. This continuity, Tabatabai posits, is due to the country’s lessons learned from its historical experiences, to include war and peace, as well as diplomatic efforts, which have shaped the contours of Iranian decision-makers’ thinking for generations.

This chapter describes the start of the US-led coalition intervention (Odyssey Dawn) as the prelude to NATO involvement, aimed at reducing Gaddafi’s combat forces, especially his air defences, command and control nodes and fielded forces. It lays out how NATO became finally the body executing the UN mandate despite French, German, Turkish and African Union reticence. The chapter also discusses the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, which became the NATO mandate but did not include regime change or removal of Gaddafi from power. The chapter concludes describing deepening resolve by Gaddafi to remain in power, political maneuvering across the global stage and the final preparations by NATO to integrate forces into its command and control and begin combat operations.

Chapter 1 focuses on Libya’s transition following the eight-month revolution against Colonel Muammar Qaddafi in 2011 that ended his 42-year reign. It finds that Libya has since been plagued by instability as subsequent governments have been struggled to rule effectively in the face of state collapse and aggressive militias. The chapter identifies four major issues preventing genuine reconciliation in Libya. First is the “culture of the victor,” which has led to the classification of entire towns and tribes as either revolutionaries or loyalists, sharply dividing Libyan society. Second is disarmament, as revolutionaries that successfully toppled Qaddafi have refused to disarm and become part of the country’s new state structure, instead challenging the state and establishing fiefdoms, purportedly to protect the revolution. Conflict between these militias escalated until a new, multilateral civil war broke out in 2014 with several alliances being formed and two governments vying for power. The related final issue is displacement, as some 60,000 Libyans were never able to return home after the original 2011 conflict, and approximately 400,000 fled fighting in 2014.