Timothy McCarthy
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195145069
- eISBN:
- 9780199833436
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145062.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Attempts to offer a response to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and translation by developing an original theory of radical interpretation, i.e. the project of characterising ...
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Attempts to offer a response to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and translation by developing an original theory of radical interpretation, i.e. the project of characterising from scratch the language and attitudes of an unknown agent or population. Ch. 1 situates the theory put forward in the context of the recent history of the subject and offers arguments against its main competitors, namely, Kripkean theories of reference and Dummettian verificationist accounts. Ch. 2 introduces the constitutive principles of McCarthy's own theory of radical interpretation, exploiting the constraints on interpretation suggested by Davidson and Lewis as the starting point of discussion. Chs 3 and 4 apply McCarthy's framework to theories of reference and the interpretation problem for the philosophy of logic, offering original accounts of how the reference of expressions in specific problem categories, in particular, proper names, observational predicates, and natural kind terms, is determined, and how the logical devices of a language can be characterized on the basis of data provided by an interpretation of its speakers.Less
Attempts to offer a response to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and translation by developing an original theory of radical interpretation, i.e. the project of characterising from scratch the language and attitudes of an unknown agent or population. Ch. 1 situates the theory put forward in the context of the recent history of the subject and offers arguments against its main competitors, namely, Kripkean theories of reference and Dummettian verificationist accounts. Ch. 2 introduces the constitutive principles of McCarthy's own theory of radical interpretation, exploiting the constraints on interpretation suggested by Davidson and Lewis as the starting point of discussion. Chs 3 and 4 apply McCarthy's framework to theories of reference and the interpretation problem for the philosophy of logic, offering original accounts of how the reference of expressions in specific problem categories, in particular, proper names, observational predicates, and natural kind terms, is determined, and how the logical devices of a language can be characterized on the basis of data provided by an interpretation of its speakers.
Barry Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286690
- eISBN:
- 9780191604065
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286698.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter sets out the relevant core of Putnam’s case. Section 3.1 extracts three arguments from Putnam’s writings: the Arguments from Cardinality, Completeness, and Permutation. Of these, section ...
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This chapter sets out the relevant core of Putnam’s case. Section 3.1 extracts three arguments from Putnam’s writings: the Arguments from Cardinality, Completeness, and Permutation. Of these, section 3.2 argues that only the second is of direct relevance. Section 3.3 examines attempts to frame constraints based on causal and psycho-behavioural reductions of reference. Section 3.4 investigates the Translational Reference Constraint (TRC), a constraint on reference which does not rely on a reduction of reference but makes essential use of translation (from object language to metalanguage) to sort out the models which get reference right. The claims made in this section, however, require foundation in a theory of translation, sufficient to sustain the assumptions it makes about that controversial and opaque notion. This foundation is supplied in section 3.5, whose general tenor is Davidsonian, its key notion being that of a ‘hermeneutic theory’, i.e., a Davidsonian theory of interpretation cast into model-theoretic terms. With Translational Truth Constraint (TTC) now identified as the most fundamental constraint on intendedness, it remains to see if it will suffice to rule out as unintended all the models of ideal theory whose existence the Completeness Theorem guarantees. The issue is examined in section 3.6.Less
This chapter sets out the relevant core of Putnam’s case. Section 3.1 extracts three arguments from Putnam’s writings: the Arguments from Cardinality, Completeness, and Permutation. Of these, section 3.2 argues that only the second is of direct relevance. Section 3.3 examines attempts to frame constraints based on causal and psycho-behavioural reductions of reference. Section 3.4 investigates the Translational Reference Constraint (TRC), a constraint on reference which does not rely on a reduction of reference but makes essential use of translation (from object language to metalanguage) to sort out the models which get reference right. The claims made in this section, however, require foundation in a theory of translation, sufficient to sustain the assumptions it makes about that controversial and opaque notion. This foundation is supplied in section 3.5, whose general tenor is Davidsonian, its key notion being that of a ‘hermeneutic theory’, i.e., a Davidsonian theory of interpretation cast into model-theoretic terms. With Translational Truth Constraint (TTC) now identified as the most fundamental constraint on intendedness, it remains to see if it will suffice to rule out as unintended all the models of ideal theory whose existence the Completeness Theorem guarantees. The issue is examined in section 3.6.
Lucinda Miller
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199606627
- eISBN:
- 9780191731716
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606627.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law
The emergence of a European contract law is one of the more significant legal developments in Europe today. The complexities that lie at its heart also make it one of the more fascinating areas of ...
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The emergence of a European contract law is one of the more significant legal developments in Europe today. The complexities that lie at its heart also make it one of the more fascinating areas of legal study. European Contract Law: Exploring Europeanization examines the origins of the discipline and its subsequent evolution. It brings the discussion up-to-date with full analysis of the debate on the Common Frame of Reference and the future that this ambiguous instrument may have in the contemporary European legal framework. One of the central themes of the book is exploration of the multi-level, open architecture of the EU legal order and the implications of such governance arrangements for the EU’s private law programme. The book demonstrates that the key to understanding European contract law in the 21st century lies in adopting a perspective and mechanisms suitable for a legal order populated by multiple sources of private law. Legal pluralism is offered as a theoretical construct in relation to which the future of European private law might be shaped. Legal pluralism forces consideration of diversity’s normative appeal and readjusts the analytical spotlight beyond the traditional, centralised, legislative, ‘command and control’ means of regulation. In so doing, softer mechanisms are introduced for the governance of contract law; mechanisms that enable coordination between the different sites at which contract law operates. This reorientation in thinking about European contract law, indeed about Europeanization itself, enables the inevitable diversity and pluralism that is a feature of multi-level Europe to be captured within a framework that maximises the opportunities for mutual transformations and learning.Less
The emergence of a European contract law is one of the more significant legal developments in Europe today. The complexities that lie at its heart also make it one of the more fascinating areas of legal study. European Contract Law: Exploring Europeanization examines the origins of the discipline and its subsequent evolution. It brings the discussion up-to-date with full analysis of the debate on the Common Frame of Reference and the future that this ambiguous instrument may have in the contemporary European legal framework. One of the central themes of the book is exploration of the multi-level, open architecture of the EU legal order and the implications of such governance arrangements for the EU’s private law programme. The book demonstrates that the key to understanding European contract law in the 21st century lies in adopting a perspective and mechanisms suitable for a legal order populated by multiple sources of private law. Legal pluralism is offered as a theoretical construct in relation to which the future of European private law might be shaped. Legal pluralism forces consideration of diversity’s normative appeal and readjusts the analytical spotlight beyond the traditional, centralised, legislative, ‘command and control’ means of regulation. In so doing, softer mechanisms are introduced for the governance of contract law; mechanisms that enable coordination between the different sites at which contract law operates. This reorientation in thinking about European contract law, indeed about Europeanization itself, enables the inevitable diversity and pluralism that is a feature of multi-level Europe to be captured within a framework that maximises the opportunities for mutual transformations and learning.
Jonardon Ganeri
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199652365
- eISBN:
- 9780191740718
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy
This chapter analyses the philosophy of mind in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika thinkers. The lead idea in their work is that occupying a first‐person stance has centrally to do with the bearing of reason of the ...
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This chapter analyses the philosophy of mind in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika thinkers. The lead idea in their work is that occupying a first‐person stance has centrally to do with the bearing of reason of the whole of one's mental life. The chapter outlines Praśastapāda's five arguments against the thesis that mental states are properties of the body (and so, indirectly, against materialism). The arguments are all attempts to give voice to a single thought: that the relationships of inhabitation and endorsement that are implied by the idea of owning a mental state, and so of occupying a first‐person stance, are fundamentally different in kind from any relation of physical exemplification. This phase in the argument is one of negative dialectic, its function to show that the apparent simplicity of the Cārvāka view that mental properties are just properties of the physical body comes at a high price when the debts of explanation it incurs are appreciated..Less
This chapter analyses the philosophy of mind in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika thinkers. The lead idea in their work is that occupying a first‐person stance has centrally to do with the bearing of reason of the whole of one's mental life. The chapter outlines Praśastapāda's five arguments against the thesis that mental states are properties of the body (and so, indirectly, against materialism). The arguments are all attempts to give voice to a single thought: that the relationships of inhabitation and endorsement that are implied by the idea of owning a mental state, and so of occupying a first‐person stance, are fundamentally different in kind from any relation of physical exemplification. This phase in the argument is one of negative dialectic, its function to show that the apparent simplicity of the Cārvāka view that mental properties are just properties of the physical body comes at a high price when the debts of explanation it incurs are appreciated..
Howard Wettstein
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199844845
- eISBN:
- 9780199933501
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199844845.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
In “Reference and Definite Descriptions,” Donnellan deepened Strawson’s classic critique of Russell’s theory of descriptions. For Russell, definite descriptions involve generality and quantification; ...
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In “Reference and Definite Descriptions,” Donnellan deepened Strawson’s classic critique of Russell’s theory of descriptions. For Russell, definite descriptions involve generality and quantification; one is speaking in the general way that quantifiers facilitate. By contrast, Strawson insisted that there was singularity here; descriptions characteristically function as singular terms referring to individuals. Donnellan endorsed and developed the singularity idea, but additionally made room for another kind of use of definite descriptions, an “attributive use,” something closer to what Russell mistakenly thought was their only use. This chapter argues that there is a Russellian strain in Donnellan’s thinking about reference. Reference and the reference-involving de re attitudes require an appropriately strong cognitive connection to the referent. Mere conceptual satisfaction, à la Frege, is not sufficient.Less
In “Reference and Definite Descriptions,” Donnellan deepened Strawson’s classic critique of Russell’s theory of descriptions. For Russell, definite descriptions involve generality and quantification; one is speaking in the general way that quantifiers facilitate. By contrast, Strawson insisted that there was singularity here; descriptions characteristically function as singular terms referring to individuals. Donnellan endorsed and developed the singularity idea, but additionally made room for another kind of use of definite descriptions, an “attributive use,” something closer to what Russell mistakenly thought was their only use. This chapter argues that there is a Russellian strain in Donnellan’s thinking about reference. Reference and the reference-involving de re attitudes require an appropriately strong cognitive connection to the referent. Mere conceptual satisfaction, à la Frege, is not sufficient.
Joseph Almog
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199844845
- eISBN:
- 9780199933501
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199844845.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter focuses on Keith Donnellan’s innovative 1966 paper “Reference and Definite Descriptions.” It suggests that it was in this paper that the now so influential “direct reference” semantic ...
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This chapter focuses on Keith Donnellan’s innovative 1966 paper “Reference and Definite Descriptions.” It suggests that it was in this paper that the now so influential “direct reference” semantic turn originated. It considers Kripe’s analysis of Donnellan, and suggests, contra Kripke, that Donnellan’s notion of referential use is designed to be of semantic significance. Indeed in 1966, Donnellan was submitting in the late sections of his paper, as he was analogizing with Russell’s notion of logically proper names, that referential uses may well be the ground zero of semantic (logical) reference. This is in contrast to Frege’s ground zero of semantics, the notion of denotation.Less
This chapter focuses on Keith Donnellan’s innovative 1966 paper “Reference and Definite Descriptions.” It suggests that it was in this paper that the now so influential “direct reference” semantic turn originated. It considers Kripe’s analysis of Donnellan, and suggests, contra Kripke, that Donnellan’s notion of referential use is designed to be of semantic significance. Indeed in 1966, Donnellan was submitting in the late sections of his paper, as he was analogizing with Russell’s notion of logically proper names, that referential uses may well be the ground zero of semantic (logical) reference. This is in contrast to Frege’s ground zero of semantics, the notion of denotation.
José M. Bernardo
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199694587
- eISBN:
- 9780191731921
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694587.003.0001
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Probability / Statistics
The complete final product of Bayesian inference is the posterior distribution of the quantity of interest. Important inference summaries include point estimation, region estimation and precise ...
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The complete final product of Bayesian inference is the posterior distribution of the quantity of interest. Important inference summaries include point estimation, region estimation and precise hypotheses testing. Those summaries may appropriately be described as the solution to specific decision problems which depend on the particular loss function chosen. The use of a continuous loss function leads to an integrated set of solutions where the same prior distribution may be used throughout. Objective Bayesian methods are those which use a prior distribution which only depends on the assumed model and the quantity of interest. As a consequence, objective Bayesian methods produce results which only depend on the assumed model and the data obtained. The combined use of intrinsic discrepancy, an invariant information‐based loss function, and appropriately defined reference priors, provides an integrated objective Bayesian solution to both estimation and hypothesis testing problems. The ideas are illustrated with a large collection of non‐trivial examples.Less
The complete final product of Bayesian inference is the posterior distribution of the quantity of interest. Important inference summaries include point estimation, region estimation and precise hypotheses testing. Those summaries may appropriately be described as the solution to specific decision problems which depend on the particular loss function chosen. The use of a continuous loss function leads to an integrated set of solutions where the same prior distribution may be used throughout. Objective Bayesian methods are those which use a prior distribution which only depends on the assumed model and the quantity of interest. As a consequence, objective Bayesian methods produce results which only depend on the assumed model and the data obtained. The combined use of intrinsic discrepancy, an invariant information‐based loss function, and appropriately defined reference priors, provides an integrated objective Bayesian solution to both estimation and hypothesis testing problems. The ideas are illustrated with a large collection of non‐trivial examples.
Jennifer Bann and John Corbett
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780748643059
- eISBN:
- 9781474416085
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748643059.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, English Language
This volume provides a comprehensive survey of the spelling system of Older and Modern Scots, illustrating how this orthographic system has developed partly in response to historical shifts in ...
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This volume provides a comprehensive survey of the spelling system of Older and Modern Scots, illustrating how this orthographic system has developed partly in response to historical shifts in pronunciation, and partly as a result of social and political change.
Spelling Scots acts not only as a wide-ranging reference book to the changing orthography of Scots, but also as an outline of the active interventions in the practices that have guided Scots spelling. The book shows how canonical writers of poetry and fiction in Scots from 1700 to the present day have blended convention and innovation in presenting Scots in literary texts, and it explores the influence of key writers such as Ramsay, Fergusson, Burns, Scott, Hogg and Stevenson. Introducing an innovative method of tracing the use of key spelling variants in a corpus of Scots writing, the book discusses the implication of this method for promoting wider literacy in Scots.
Spelling Scots should be a standard reference volume for all institutions where literature in Scots is studied. It draws on the authors' current research project, the Corpus of Modern Scottish Writing.Less
This volume provides a comprehensive survey of the spelling system of Older and Modern Scots, illustrating how this orthographic system has developed partly in response to historical shifts in pronunciation, and partly as a result of social and political change.
Spelling Scots acts not only as a wide-ranging reference book to the changing orthography of Scots, but also as an outline of the active interventions in the practices that have guided Scots spelling. The book shows how canonical writers of poetry and fiction in Scots from 1700 to the present day have blended convention and innovation in presenting Scots in literary texts, and it explores the influence of key writers such as Ramsay, Fergusson, Burns, Scott, Hogg and Stevenson. Introducing an innovative method of tracing the use of key spelling variants in a corpus of Scots writing, the book discusses the implication of this method for promoting wider literacy in Scots.
Spelling Scots should be a standard reference volume for all institutions where literature in Scots is studied. It draws on the authors' current research project, the Corpus of Modern Scottish Writing.
Scott Soames
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691160726
- eISBN:
- 9781400850464
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691160726.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, American Philosophy
This chapter discusses the achievements of W. V. O. Quine and his place in analytic philosophy. It begins with Carnap’s logical empiricism, which set the context for Quine’s first major article in ...
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This chapter discusses the achievements of W. V. O. Quine and his place in analytic philosophy. It begins with Carnap’s logical empiricism, which set the context for Quine’s first major article in philosophy, “Truth by Convention” (1935). It explains both Quine’s largely effective critique of analyticity and the problems that plagued his combination of holistic verificationism with an underdetermination thesis that paired each consistent empirical theory T with alternative theories logically incompatible with, but empirically equivalent to, T. It discusses the impetus for Quine’s movement from his critique of analyticity to his later doctrines of the Indeterminacy of Translation and the Inscrutability of Reference. The chapter closes with an explication of these radical doctrines, the role played by Quine’s physicalism, and his ineluctable march to a so-called radical and self-undermining semantic eliminativism.Less
This chapter discusses the achievements of W. V. O. Quine and his place in analytic philosophy. It begins with Carnap’s logical empiricism, which set the context for Quine’s first major article in philosophy, “Truth by Convention” (1935). It explains both Quine’s largely effective critique of analyticity and the problems that plagued his combination of holistic verificationism with an underdetermination thesis that paired each consistent empirical theory T with alternative theories logically incompatible with, but empirically equivalent to, T. It discusses the impetus for Quine’s movement from his critique of analyticity to his later doctrines of the Indeterminacy of Translation and the Inscrutability of Reference. The chapter closes with an explication of these radical doctrines, the role played by Quine’s physicalism, and his ineluctable march to a so-called radical and self-undermining semantic eliminativism.
Crispin Wright
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236399
- eISBN:
- 9780191597565
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198236395.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This paper offers a new solution to the concept horse paradox, which arises within a Fregean semantics. First, an explication of the well‐known paradox is given and five constraints on a satisfactory ...
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This paper offers a new solution to the concept horse paradox, which arises within a Fregean semantics. First, an explication of the well‐known paradox is given and five constraints on a satisfactory solution of this paradox are imposed. Second, it discusses and rejects on the basis of these five constraints Dummett's solution to the paradox, as well as the more recently offered alternative approach of Wiggins. In the following, the source of the paradox is identified with the intuitive sounding Reference Principle, i.e. that sameness of reference should ensure sameness of semantic role, which suffices to develop the paradox on a standard Fregean semantics. Lastly, a resolution is offered by distinguishing two kinds of semantic relations, reference for singular terms and ascription for predicates, which resolves the paradox, while retaining the Reference Principle, however it seems subject to other well‐known problems such as the intensional version of Russell's Paradox.Less
This paper offers a new solution to the concept horse paradox, which arises within a Fregean semantics. First, an explication of the well‐known paradox is given and five constraints on a satisfactory solution of this paradox are imposed. Second, it discusses and rejects on the basis of these five constraints Dummett's solution to the paradox, as well as the more recently offered alternative approach of Wiggins. In the following, the source of the paradox is identified with the intuitive sounding Reference Principle, i.e. that sameness of reference should ensure sameness of semantic role, which suffices to develop the paradox on a standard Fregean semantics. Lastly, a resolution is offered by distinguishing two kinds of semantic relations, reference for singular terms and ascription for predicates, which resolves the paradox, while retaining the Reference Principle, however it seems subject to other well‐known problems such as the intensional version of Russell's Paradox.
Stephen Neale
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199247158
- eISBN:
- 9780191598081
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247153.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Discusses the philosophy of Donald Davidson, who appears to have brought the slingshot argument to the current prominence within philosophical discussions. It examines Davidson's semantic programme, ...
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Discusses the philosophy of Donald Davidson, who appears to have brought the slingshot argument to the current prominence within philosophical discussions. It examines Davidson's semantic programme, the relation between semantics and ontology that he champions, his arguments against facts and the scheme–content distinction, and the ways in which he and Richard Rorty assail the notion of representation. The chapter is arranged in nine parts: Introductory Remarks; Meaning and Truth; Reference and Ontology; Content and Other Complications; Facts and Correspondence; The Great Fact; Scheme and Content; Realism and Objectivity; and Representation.Less
Discusses the philosophy of Donald Davidson, who appears to have brought the slingshot argument to the current prominence within philosophical discussions. It examines Davidson's semantic programme, the relation between semantics and ontology that he champions, his arguments against facts and the scheme–content distinction, and the ways in which he and Richard Rorty assail the notion of representation. The chapter is arranged in nine parts: Introductory Remarks; Meaning and Truth; Reference and Ontology; Content and Other Complications; Facts and Correspondence; The Great Fact; Scheme and Content; Realism and Objectivity; and Representation.
Stephen Neale
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199247158
- eISBN:
- 9780191598081
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247153.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Looks at the work of Gottlob Frege on truth and composition. It investigates Frege's idea that a sentence refers to a truth‐value, his Principle of Composition, and his abandonment of what Donald ...
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Looks at the work of Gottlob Frege on truth and composition. It investigates Frege's idea that a sentence refers to a truth‐value, his Principle of Composition, and his abandonment of what Donald Davidson calls ‘semantic innocence’. Neale explains what kinds of slingshotian considerations prevented Frege from accepting facts as denotations of sentences and made him see sentences rather as names of truth‐values. The three sections of the chapter are: Reference and Composition; Innocence Abandoned; and The Reference of a Sentence.Less
Looks at the work of Gottlob Frege on truth and composition. It investigates Frege's idea that a sentence refers to a truth‐value, his Principle of Composition, and his abandonment of what Donald Davidson calls ‘semantic innocence’. Neale explains what kinds of slingshotian considerations prevented Frege from accepting facts as denotations of sentences and made him see sentences rather as names of truth‐values. The three sections of the chapter are: Reference and Composition; Innocence Abandoned; and The Reference of a Sentence.
Dorit Bar-On
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199276288
- eISBN:
- 9780191602894
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199276285.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The uniquely secure status of avowals apparently has something to do with the special way an avowing subject refers to herself by the pronoun ‘I’, as opposed to referring to herself by some ...
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The uniquely secure status of avowals apparently has something to do with the special way an avowing subject refers to herself by the pronoun ‘I’, as opposed to referring to herself by some description. However, the author argues in this chapter that excessive focus on the way ‘I’ refers has led people astray. In particular, she criticizes the view that we must see ‘I’ as referring to some special object, a Cartesian ego, as well as Anscombe’s view that ‘I’ in fact, does not refer at all. Both accounts fail to respect the Semantic Continuity of avowals with other empirical reports.Less
The uniquely secure status of avowals apparently has something to do with the special way an avowing subject refers to herself by the pronoun ‘I’, as opposed to referring to herself by some description. However, the author argues in this chapter that excessive focus on the way ‘I’ refers has led people astray. In particular, she criticizes the view that we must see ‘I’ as referring to some special object, a Cartesian ego, as well as Anscombe’s view that ‘I’ in fact, does not refer at all. Both accounts fail to respect the Semantic Continuity of avowals with other empirical reports.
Timothy McCarthy
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195145069
- eISBN:
- 9780199833436
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145062.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Serves three main purposes: first, it lays out and attempts to justify the methodological point of view of the investigation. Secondly, it situates the theory put forward in the context of the recent ...
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Serves three main purposes: first, it lays out and attempts to justify the methodological point of view of the investigation. Secondly, it situates the theory put forward in the context of the recent history of the subject, which is dominated by three families of responses to Quine's indeterminacy arguments, namely, Kripkean theories of reference, Dummettian verificationist accounts, and theories of interpretation along the lines of those favoured by Davidson and Lewis. Thirdly, it sketches some of the substantive conclusions reached in the subsequent chapters of the book.Less
Serves three main purposes: first, it lays out and attempts to justify the methodological point of view of the investigation. Secondly, it situates the theory put forward in the context of the recent history of the subject, which is dominated by three families of responses to Quine's indeterminacy arguments, namely, Kripkean theories of reference, Dummettian verificationist accounts, and theories of interpretation along the lines of those favoured by Davidson and Lewis. Thirdly, it sketches some of the substantive conclusions reached in the subsequent chapters of the book.
Wolfram Hinzen and Michelle Sheehan
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199654833
- eISBN:
- 9780191747977
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199654833.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Theoretical Linguistics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics
What is grammar? Why is it there? What difference, if any, does it make to the organization of meaning? This book seeks to give principled answers to these questions. Since grammar is universal in ...
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What is grammar? Why is it there? What difference, if any, does it make to the organization of meaning? This book seeks to give principled answers to these questions. Since grammar is universal in human populations, its topic is ‘universal’ grammar—or the grammatical as such. But while modern generative grammar stands in the tradition of ‘Cartesian linguistics’ as emerging in the seventeenth century, this book re-addresses the question of the grammatical in a broader historical frame, taking inspiration from Modistic and Ancient Indian philosopher-linguists to formulate a different and ‘Un-Cartesian’ programme in linguistic theory. The core claim of this programme is that the organization of the grammar is not distinct from the organization of human thought—a sapiens-specific mode of thought, that is. This mode is uniquely propositional: grammar, therefore, organizes propositional forms of reference and makes knowledge possible. An explanatory programme emerges from this, which regards the grammaticalization of the hominin brain as critical to the emergence of our mind and our speciation. A thoroughly interdisciplinary endeavour, the book seeks to systematically integrate the philosophy of language and linguistic theory. It casts a fresh look at core issues that any philosophy of (universal) grammar will need to address, such as the distinction between lexical and grammatical meaning, the significance of part of speech distinctions, the grammar of reference and deixis, the relation between language and reality, and the dimensions of cross-linguistic and biolinguistic variation.Less
What is grammar? Why is it there? What difference, if any, does it make to the organization of meaning? This book seeks to give principled answers to these questions. Since grammar is universal in human populations, its topic is ‘universal’ grammar—or the grammatical as such. But while modern generative grammar stands in the tradition of ‘Cartesian linguistics’ as emerging in the seventeenth century, this book re-addresses the question of the grammatical in a broader historical frame, taking inspiration from Modistic and Ancient Indian philosopher-linguists to formulate a different and ‘Un-Cartesian’ programme in linguistic theory. The core claim of this programme is that the organization of the grammar is not distinct from the organization of human thought—a sapiens-specific mode of thought, that is. This mode is uniquely propositional: grammar, therefore, organizes propositional forms of reference and makes knowledge possible. An explanatory programme emerges from this, which regards the grammaticalization of the hominin brain as critical to the emergence of our mind and our speciation. A thoroughly interdisciplinary endeavour, the book seeks to systematically integrate the philosophy of language and linguistic theory. It casts a fresh look at core issues that any philosophy of (universal) grammar will need to address, such as the distinction between lexical and grammatical meaning, the significance of part of speech distinctions, the grammar of reference and deixis, the relation between language and reality, and the dimensions of cross-linguistic and biolinguistic variation.
Saul A. Kripke
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199730155
- eISBN:
- 9780199918430
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730155.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter discusses some issues inspired by a well-known paper of Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions,”. Donnellan's paper claims to give decisive objections both to Russell's ...
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This chapter discusses some issues inspired by a well-known paper of Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions,”. Donnellan's paper claims to give decisive objections both to Russell's theory of definite descriptions (taken as a theory about English) and to Strawson's. The chapter' concern is not primarily with the question: is Donnellan right, or is Russell (or Strawson)? Rather, it is with the question: do the considerations in Donnellan's paper refute Russell's theory (or Strawson's)? For definiteness, it focuses on Donnellan versus Russell, leaving Strawson aside. And about this issue it draws a definite conclusion, one which will illuminate a few methodological maxims about language.Less
This chapter discusses some issues inspired by a well-known paper of Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions,”. Donnellan's paper claims to give decisive objections both to Russell's theory of definite descriptions (taken as a theory about English) and to Strawson's. The chapter' concern is not primarily with the question: is Donnellan right, or is Russell (or Strawson)? Rather, it is with the question: do the considerations in Donnellan's paper refute Russell's theory (or Strawson's)? For definiteness, it focuses on Donnellan versus Russell, leaving Strawson aside. And about this issue it draws a definite conclusion, one which will illuminate a few methodological maxims about language.
Lucinda Miller
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199606627
- eISBN:
- 9780191731716
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606627.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law
This chapter examines the EU’s broader (non sector-specific) contract law programme. It is primarily concerned with the instrument known as the Common Frame of Reference (CFR) a draft of which has ...
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This chapter examines the EU’s broader (non sector-specific) contract law programme. It is primarily concerned with the instrument known as the Common Frame of Reference (CFR) a draft of which has already been published (DCFR). The CFR is bedevilled with ambiguity concerning such things as its function, form, content and constitutional place within the EU legal framework. There is much speculation over whether it will finally emerge as an Optional Instrument, ‘toolbox’ or even as a European Civil Code and the chapter assesses the legal/constitutional implications of each of these functions. It also addresses the processes associated with the CFR’s creation and the consternation over whether the jurist’s prominent role in lawmaking is legitimate. Finally, the chapter explores the relationship between the Consumer Acquis review and the CFR.Less
This chapter examines the EU’s broader (non sector-specific) contract law programme. It is primarily concerned with the instrument known as the Common Frame of Reference (CFR) a draft of which has already been published (DCFR). The CFR is bedevilled with ambiguity concerning such things as its function, form, content and constitutional place within the EU legal framework. There is much speculation over whether it will finally emerge as an Optional Instrument, ‘toolbox’ or even as a European Civil Code and the chapter assesses the legal/constitutional implications of each of these functions. It also addresses the processes associated with the CFR’s creation and the consternation over whether the jurist’s prominent role in lawmaking is legitimate. Finally, the chapter explores the relationship between the Consumer Acquis review and the CFR.
Jonathan Knowles and Thomas Raleigh (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- December 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198803461
- eISBN:
- 9780191841644
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198803461.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Bertrand Russell famously distinguished between ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance’ and ‘Knowledge by Description’. For much of the latter half of the Twentieth Century, many philosophers viewed the notion ...
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Bertrand Russell famously distinguished between ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance’ and ‘Knowledge by Description’. For much of the latter half of the Twentieth Century, many philosophers viewed the notion of acquaintance with suspicion, associating it with Russellian ideas that they would wish to reject. However in the past decade or two the concept has undergone a striking revival in mainstream ‘analytic’ philosophy – acquaintance is, it seems, respectable again. This is the first collection of new essays devoted to the topic of acquaintance, featuring contributions from many of the world’s leading experts in this area. The volume showcases the great variety of topics in philosophy of mind, epistemology and philosophy of language for which philosophers are currently employing the notion of acquaintance. This book features an extensive introduction by one of the editors, which provides some historical background as well as summarising the main debates and issues in contemporary philosophy where appeals to acquaintance are currently being made. The remaining thirteen essays are grouped thematically into the following four sections: (1) Phenomenal Consciousness, (2) Perceptual Experience, (3) Reference, (4) Epistemology.Less
Bertrand Russell famously distinguished between ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance’ and ‘Knowledge by Description’. For much of the latter half of the Twentieth Century, many philosophers viewed the notion of acquaintance with suspicion, associating it with Russellian ideas that they would wish to reject. However in the past decade or two the concept has undergone a striking revival in mainstream ‘analytic’ philosophy – acquaintance is, it seems, respectable again. This is the first collection of new essays devoted to the topic of acquaintance, featuring contributions from many of the world’s leading experts in this area. The volume showcases the great variety of topics in philosophy of mind, epistemology and philosophy of language for which philosophers are currently employing the notion of acquaintance. This book features an extensive introduction by one of the editors, which provides some historical background as well as summarising the main debates and issues in contemporary philosophy where appeals to acquaintance are currently being made. The remaining thirteen essays are grouped thematically into the following four sections: (1) Phenomenal Consciousness, (2) Perceptual Experience, (3) Reference, (4) Epistemology.
STEPHEN TIERNEY
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199298617
- eISBN:
- 9780191708855
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199298617.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
This chapter focuses on the Secession Reference. The most dramatic and potentially influential decision to be reached in recent years is the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec ...
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This chapter focuses on the Secession Reference. The most dramatic and potentially influential decision to be reached in recent years is the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference. In this case, the federal government, further to the Quebec referendum on sovereignty in 1995, asked the Supreme Court to offer its opinion on the legality of any future attempt by Quebec to secede unilaterally from Canada. The chapter develops two structural issues which emerged from the Secession Reference. The first concerns the ability of the court to appear sufficiently independent of the different sides involved. The second addresses the relationship between the courts and the constitution itself, and in particular the power which a court has to define, or indeed redefine, the relationship between the written constitution and the unwritten constitutional principles or rules which the judiciary considers underpin that written text.Less
This chapter focuses on the Secession Reference. The most dramatic and potentially influential decision to be reached in recent years is the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference. In this case, the federal government, further to the Quebec referendum on sovereignty in 1995, asked the Supreme Court to offer its opinion on the legality of any future attempt by Quebec to secede unilaterally from Canada. The chapter develops two structural issues which emerged from the Secession Reference. The first concerns the ability of the court to appear sufficiently independent of the different sides involved. The second addresses the relationship between the courts and the constitution itself, and in particular the power which a court has to define, or indeed redefine, the relationship between the written constitution and the unwritten constitutional principles or rules which the judiciary considers underpin that written text.
Arianna Betti
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029216
- eISBN:
- 9780262329644
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029216.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The Conclusion sums up Against Facts’ main findings: in part I and II Armstrong’s truthmaker argument and the argument from nominal reference have been shown to be unsound. The two kinds of ...
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The Conclusion sums up Against Facts’ main findings: in part I and II Armstrong’s truthmaker argument and the argument from nominal reference have been shown to be unsound. The two kinds of methodology used in the two parts of the book are highlighted, and certain enterprises in language-based descriptive metaphysics are criticised, namely enterprises that pretends to discover something about metaphysical entities by citing natural language analyses. It is argued that at least in case of technical philosophical terms like ‘fact’, ‘proposition’, ‘event’, and the like, reference collapses into fixing by stipulation a semantic value for those terms. The methodological proposal is made that we are entitled to take certain (categories of) entities as semantic value of certain expressions only if these entities are best-explanation players for the theoretical roles we deemed must indispensably be played, where indispensability is decided by criteria of theory choice agreed upon by the largest scientific community. It is concluded that defenders of facts have so far failed to show that facts should be given any place in metaphysics.Less
The Conclusion sums up Against Facts’ main findings: in part I and II Armstrong’s truthmaker argument and the argument from nominal reference have been shown to be unsound. The two kinds of methodology used in the two parts of the book are highlighted, and certain enterprises in language-based descriptive metaphysics are criticised, namely enterprises that pretends to discover something about metaphysical entities by citing natural language analyses. It is argued that at least in case of technical philosophical terms like ‘fact’, ‘proposition’, ‘event’, and the like, reference collapses into fixing by stipulation a semantic value for those terms. The methodological proposal is made that we are entitled to take certain (categories of) entities as semantic value of certain expressions only if these entities are best-explanation players for the theoretical roles we deemed must indispensably be played, where indispensability is decided by criteria of theory choice agreed upon by the largest scientific community. It is concluded that defenders of facts have so far failed to show that facts should be given any place in metaphysics.
