Srinivasa Rao
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198079811
- eISBN:
- 9780199081707
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198079811.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Traditional Advaita holds that we experience false entities as is evident from rope-snake illusion. This chapter argues this thesis to be wrong on the ground that since the false snake is merely an ...
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Traditional Advaita holds that we experience false entities as is evident from rope-snake illusion. This chapter argues this thesis to be wrong on the ground that since the false snake is merely an imagined entity and a construction of our thought, it can never be an object of experience; it can only be regarded as an object of thought. Likewise, if the world is actually experienced by us, it has to be real and not false. Conversely, if it is false, it cannot be experienced by us. The very idea that something which is false is also experienced by us is absurd. Therefore the claim that the world is false and it is sublated upon our intuiting the Ultimate Reality should be rejected as wrong, illogical and completely groundless.Less
Traditional Advaita holds that we experience false entities as is evident from rope-snake illusion. This chapter argues this thesis to be wrong on the ground that since the false snake is merely an imagined entity and a construction of our thought, it can never be an object of experience; it can only be regarded as an object of thought. Likewise, if the world is actually experienced by us, it has to be real and not false. Conversely, if it is false, it cannot be experienced by us. The very idea that something which is false is also experienced by us is absurd. Therefore the claim that the world is false and it is sublated upon our intuiting the Ultimate Reality should be rejected as wrong, illogical and completely groundless.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195151886
- eISBN:
- 9780199867189
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195151887.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Explores the metaphysical question of the relation between reality and human perceptions, thoughts and beliefs with reference to colours. Posits an absolute independent reality of which knowledge is ...
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Explores the metaphysical question of the relation between reality and human perceptions, thoughts and beliefs with reference to colours. Posits an absolute independent reality of which knowledge is sought through the testing of beliefs about it, and analyses physicalism and scientific explanation in an attempt to argue that, though colour's reality may be rejected, colour cannot be properly referred to or explained through exclusive reference to scientific facts and physicalism or through the language of science since colour is understood as belonging to the realm of psychological facts. Utilises the concepts of perception, thoughts and beliefs in investigating psychological facts, and rejects the possibility of both a direct and an indirect connection between objects of perception and thoughts on the colour of these objects. Presents the argument that the metaphysical question cannot be fully answered in a subjectivist or objectivist manner or through metaphysical error theory, as abstraction from all beliefs about colour is neither possible nor desirable, and outlines the failure of the project of unmasking perceptions of colour. Concludes that disengagement from the world is needed for an answer to the metaphysical question of whether colours are objectively real, but the answer is unattainable.Less
Explores the metaphysical question of the relation between reality and human perceptions, thoughts and beliefs with reference to colours. Posits an absolute independent reality of which knowledge is sought through the testing of beliefs about it, and analyses physicalism and scientific explanation in an attempt to argue that, though colour's reality may be rejected, colour cannot be properly referred to or explained through exclusive reference to scientific facts and physicalism or through the language of science since colour is understood as belonging to the realm of psychological facts. Utilises the concepts of perception, thoughts and beliefs in investigating psychological facts, and rejects the possibility of both a direct and an indirect connection between objects of perception and thoughts on the colour of these objects. Presents the argument that the metaphysical question cannot be fully answered in a subjectivist or objectivist manner or through metaphysical error theory, as abstraction from all beliefs about colour is neither possible nor desirable, and outlines the failure of the project of unmasking perceptions of colour. Concludes that disengagement from the world is needed for an answer to the metaphysical question of whether colours are objectively real, but the answer is unattainable.
Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199281701
- eISBN:
- 9780191713088
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199281701.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The main focus in this chapter is the relationship between Plotinus' ontology and his epistemology. It is argued that at the level of Intellect being and knowledge coincide, that to be is to be known ...
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The main focus in this chapter is the relationship between Plotinus' ontology and his epistemology. It is argued that at the level of Intellect being and knowledge coincide, that to be is to be known or thought. It is further argued that this is a necessary consequence of a principle in Plotinus' philosophy claiming that to know something as it is in itself is to know that thing from its internal activity, and that this kind of knowledge is impossible unless the activity of the knower coincides with the activity constituting the being known.Less
The main focus in this chapter is the relationship between Plotinus' ontology and his epistemology. It is argued that at the level of Intellect being and knowledge coincide, that to be is to be known or thought. It is further argued that this is a necessary consequence of a principle in Plotinus' philosophy claiming that to know something as it is in itself is to know that thing from its internal activity, and that this kind of knowledge is impossible unless the activity of the knower coincides with the activity constituting the being known.
John G. Gunnell
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- September 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780226661278
- eISBN:
- 9780226661308
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226661308.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This book is an exploration of the relationship between philosophy and various forms of political inquiry and is specifically and primarily devoted to advancing an argument for conventional realism. ...
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This book is an exploration of the relationship between philosophy and various forms of political inquiry and is specifically and primarily devoted to advancing an argument for conventional realism. The thesis is that everything we designate as “real,” whether natural or social, is rendered conventionally. This entails a rejection of the widely accepted distinction between what is natural and what is conventional as a way of demarcating natural science and social science. The argument is presented in an opposition to the deep-seated influence of representational philosophy on political science and political theory and particularly to the claim that the mind is the source and repository of meaning, that language is primarily a vehicle of thought and a means of communication, and that reality resides in some physical or metaphysical realm that stands behind our discursive practices. Both mentalism and realism have been embraced by political theorists in a perennial search for a foundation of epistemic authority as a means of gaining practical purpose. Although this is not principally a book about Ludwig Wittgenstein, the argument for conventional realism and the critique of mentalism and traditional realism are viewed as entailments of his work and of others who embraced his conception of philosophy as an interpretive endeavor and a form of social inquiry rather than undertaking the construction of a metaphysical “super-order.” In a brief conclusion, the book discusses the normative implications of conventional realism.Less
This book is an exploration of the relationship between philosophy and various forms of political inquiry and is specifically and primarily devoted to advancing an argument for conventional realism. The thesis is that everything we designate as “real,” whether natural or social, is rendered conventionally. This entails a rejection of the widely accepted distinction between what is natural and what is conventional as a way of demarcating natural science and social science. The argument is presented in an opposition to the deep-seated influence of representational philosophy on political science and political theory and particularly to the claim that the mind is the source and repository of meaning, that language is primarily a vehicle of thought and a means of communication, and that reality resides in some physical or metaphysical realm that stands behind our discursive practices. Both mentalism and realism have been embraced by political theorists in a perennial search for a foundation of epistemic authority as a means of gaining practical purpose. Although this is not principally a book about Ludwig Wittgenstein, the argument for conventional realism and the critique of mentalism and traditional realism are viewed as entailments of his work and of others who embraced his conception of philosophy as an interpretive endeavor and a form of social inquiry rather than undertaking the construction of a metaphysical “super-order.” In a brief conclusion, the book discusses the normative implications of conventional realism.
Michael Epperson
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823223190
- eISBN:
- 9780823235551
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823223190.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
In Process and Reality and other works, Alfred North Whitehead struggled to come to terms with the impact the new science of quantum mechanics would have on metaphysics. This book is ...
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In Process and Reality and other works, Alfred North Whitehead struggled to come to terms with the impact the new science of quantum mechanics would have on metaphysics. This book is the first extended analysis of the intricate relationships between relativity theory, quantum mechanics, and Whitehead's cosmology. Illuminated here is the intersection of science and philosophy in Whitehead's work, and details of Whitehead's attempts to fashion an ontology coherent with quantum anomalies. Including a non-specialist introduction to quantum mechanics, the book adds an essential new dimension to our understanding of Whitehead.Less
In Process and Reality and other works, Alfred North Whitehead struggled to come to terms with the impact the new science of quantum mechanics would have on metaphysics. This book is the first extended analysis of the intricate relationships between relativity theory, quantum mechanics, and Whitehead's cosmology. Illuminated here is the intersection of science and philosophy in Whitehead's work, and details of Whitehead's attempts to fashion an ontology coherent with quantum anomalies. Including a non-specialist introduction to quantum mechanics, the book adds an essential new dimension to our understanding of Whitehead.
Rushmir Mahmutćehajić
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823227518
- eISBN:
- 9780823237029
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823227518.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
Truth for a person means his existence through what he is. The human self is thus identified with its essence. However, thought is incapable of surpassing ontological objectification and fundamental ...
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Truth for a person means his existence through what he is. The human self is thus identified with its essence. However, thought is incapable of surpassing ontological objectification and fundamental duality. Duality may be resolved in the following demand: to know only what is—God; to be only what is known—the Self. In a man there are two identities present that are not reducible to a common measure: the anima, which strives toward happiness and survival in happiness, and the spiritus, or pure Intellect, whose identity is rooted in fullness. The human being is positioned on three levels—body, soul, and spirit. In all its thinking about itself and the world, the “I” confirms and preserves this border, for the “I” cannot exist without it. Hence the human “I” longs and yearns for what lies beyond that border that is, release from duality. “I” is related to “you”, and this relation is transformed into the admission of full otherness, which, by means of its oneness, passes through and surpasses all multiplicity.Less
Truth for a person means his existence through what he is. The human self is thus identified with its essence. However, thought is incapable of surpassing ontological objectification and fundamental duality. Duality may be resolved in the following demand: to know only what is—God; to be only what is known—the Self. In a man there are two identities present that are not reducible to a common measure: the anima, which strives toward happiness and survival in happiness, and the spiritus, or pure Intellect, whose identity is rooted in fullness. The human being is positioned on three levels—body, soul, and spirit. In all its thinking about itself and the world, the “I” confirms and preserves this border, for the “I” cannot exist without it. Hence the human “I” longs and yearns for what lies beyond that border that is, release from duality. “I” is related to “you”, and this relation is transformed into the admission of full otherness, which, by means of its oneness, passes through and surpasses all multiplicity.
Kristyn Gorton
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748624171
- eISBN:
- 9780748670956
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748624171.001.0001
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Media Studies
An engaging and original study of current research on television audiences and the concept of emotion, this book offers a unique approach to key issues within television studies. Topics discussed ...
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An engaging and original study of current research on television audiences and the concept of emotion, this book offers a unique approach to key issues within television studies. Topics discussed include: television branding; emotional qualities in television texts; audience reception models; fan cultures; 'quality' television; television aesthetics; reality television; individualism and its links to television consumption. The book is divided into two sections: the first covers theoretical work on the audience, fan cultures, global television, theorising emotion and affect in feminist theory and film and television studies. The second half offers a series of case studies on television programmes in order to explore how emotion is fashioned, constructed and valued in televisual texts. The final chapter features original material from interviews with industry professionals in the UK and Irish Soap industries along with advice for students on how to conduct their own small-scale ethnographic projects.Less
An engaging and original study of current research on television audiences and the concept of emotion, this book offers a unique approach to key issues within television studies. Topics discussed include: television branding; emotional qualities in television texts; audience reception models; fan cultures; 'quality' television; television aesthetics; reality television; individualism and its links to television consumption. The book is divided into two sections: the first covers theoretical work on the audience, fan cultures, global television, theorising emotion and affect in feminist theory and film and television studies. The second half offers a series of case studies on television programmes in order to explore how emotion is fashioned, constructed and valued in televisual texts. The final chapter features original material from interviews with industry professionals in the UK and Irish Soap industries along with advice for students on how to conduct their own small-scale ethnographic projects.
Chris Baldick
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198122494
- eISBN:
- 9780191671432
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198122494.003.0009
- Subject:
- Literature, 19th-century and Victorian Literature
Like Herman Melville, Wilkie Collins has whetted the appetite for medical villainy, only to dispel the experimenter's Gothic allure by reminding us of the real mundane fallibility of chemists and ...
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Like Herman Melville, Wilkie Collins has whetted the appetite for medical villainy, only to dispel the experimenter's Gothic allure by reminding us of the real mundane fallibility of chemists and doctors: accident, incompetence, timidity, and the paltry distractions of worldly existence all bar the physician's path to heroic transgression. Traps of this kind are a typical parodic ploy of literary realism. From Don Quixote to Ulysses and beyond, the tradition of the novel has relied heavily upon bathetic deflation of romance or sentimentality, but in the nineteenth century this tendency flourished to the point at which it became a dominant novelistic ethic. Among the more promising candidates for this ritual sacrifice of the Romantic ego to the Reality Principle was the figure of the aspiring doctor, anatomist, or chemist.Less
Like Herman Melville, Wilkie Collins has whetted the appetite for medical villainy, only to dispel the experimenter's Gothic allure by reminding us of the real mundane fallibility of chemists and doctors: accident, incompetence, timidity, and the paltry distractions of worldly existence all bar the physician's path to heroic transgression. Traps of this kind are a typical parodic ploy of literary realism. From Don Quixote to Ulysses and beyond, the tradition of the novel has relied heavily upon bathetic deflation of romance or sentimentality, but in the nineteenth century this tendency flourished to the point at which it became a dominant novelistic ethic. Among the more promising candidates for this ritual sacrifice of the Romantic ego to the Reality Principle was the figure of the aspiring doctor, anatomist, or chemist.
Elizabeth M. Kraus
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780823217953
- eISBN:
- 9780823284924
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823217953.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, American Philosophy
This book styles itself as “a Sherpa guide to Process and Reality, whose function is to assist the serious reader in grasping the meaning of the text and to prevent falls into misinterpretation.” ...
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This book styles itself as “a Sherpa guide to Process and Reality, whose function is to assist the serious reader in grasping the meaning of the text and to prevent falls into misinterpretation.” Although originally published in 1925, Process and Reality has perhaps even more relevance to the contemporary scene in physics, biology, psychology, and the social sciences than it had in the mid-twenties. Hence, its internal difficulty, its quasi-inaccessibility, is all the more tragic, since, unlike most metaphysical endeavors, it is capable of interpreting and unifying theories in the above sciences in terms of an organic world view, instead of selecting one theory as the paradigm and reducing all others to it. Because Alfred North Whitehead is so crucial to modern philosophy, this book plays an important role in making Process and Reality accessible to a wider readership.Less
This book styles itself as “a Sherpa guide to Process and Reality, whose function is to assist the serious reader in grasping the meaning of the text and to prevent falls into misinterpretation.” Although originally published in 1925, Process and Reality has perhaps even more relevance to the contemporary scene in physics, biology, psychology, and the social sciences than it had in the mid-twenties. Hence, its internal difficulty, its quasi-inaccessibility, is all the more tragic, since, unlike most metaphysical endeavors, it is capable of interpreting and unifying theories in the above sciences in terms of an organic world view, instead of selecting one theory as the paradigm and reducing all others to it. Because Alfred North Whitehead is so crucial to modern philosophy, this book plays an important role in making Process and Reality accessible to a wider readership.
Peter Otto
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199567676
- eISBN:
- 9780191725364
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567676.003.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, 19th-century Literature and Romanticism, Film, Media, and Cultural Studies
Following a discussion of the online world, ‘Second Life’, the introduction provides a preliminary survey of the virtual realities of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries; an overview ...
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Following a discussion of the online world, ‘Second Life’, the introduction provides a preliminary survey of the virtual realities of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries; an overview of the historical circumstances that conditioned their production, proliferation and reception; and an account of recent attempts to historicize virtual reality. It distinguishes late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century discourses of virtual reality from those of earlier periods, while also sketching some of the ways in which they anticipate those of contemporary culture. The introduction concludes by proposing that contemporary discourses of virtual reality draw on the conflicting rhetorics of Enlightenment and Romanticism. They conclude a tradition of representation inspired by the former, break with this tradition, but by this means return to the latter. The mechanical age concludes with an apparently oxymoronic return to its beginning.Less
Following a discussion of the online world, ‘Second Life’, the introduction provides a preliminary survey of the virtual realities of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries; an overview of the historical circumstances that conditioned their production, proliferation and reception; and an account of recent attempts to historicize virtual reality. It distinguishes late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century discourses of virtual reality from those of earlier periods, while also sketching some of the ways in which they anticipate those of contemporary culture. The introduction concludes by proposing that contemporary discourses of virtual reality draw on the conflicting rhetorics of Enlightenment and Romanticism. They conclude a tradition of representation inspired by the former, break with this tradition, but by this means return to the latter. The mechanical age concludes with an apparently oxymoronic return to its beginning.
Srinivasa Rao
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198079811
- eISBN:
- 9780199081707
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198079811.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The very idea of non-duality stands seriously violated in the post-Śānkarite orthodoxy and to correct this severe aberration, an entirely new framework is introduced in this chapter. Based on ...
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The very idea of non-duality stands seriously violated in the post-Śānkarite orthodoxy and to correct this severe aberration, an entirely new framework is introduced in this chapter. Based on classical Advaita doctrine that there is an experience dependent on senses and the mind (“experience”) which reveals empirical reality (“reality”), and an experience not so dependent (“Experience”) which reveals the Ultimate Reality (“Reality”), four cognitive possibilities are formulated and then all their logical implications are systematically deduced. One major logical consequence deduced is that the “illusoriness of the world”, a basic idea of traditional Advaita, is not at all allowed as a cognitive possibility duly entailed even by the assumptions made in traditional Advaita. This newly formulated framework of possibilities is adopted in the next chapter specifically to analyze afresh the theory of perceptual illusion in Advaita, with startling results.Less
The very idea of non-duality stands seriously violated in the post-Śānkarite orthodoxy and to correct this severe aberration, an entirely new framework is introduced in this chapter. Based on classical Advaita doctrine that there is an experience dependent on senses and the mind (“experience”) which reveals empirical reality (“reality”), and an experience not so dependent (“Experience”) which reveals the Ultimate Reality (“Reality”), four cognitive possibilities are formulated and then all their logical implications are systematically deduced. One major logical consequence deduced is that the “illusoriness of the world”, a basic idea of traditional Advaita, is not at all allowed as a cognitive possibility duly entailed even by the assumptions made in traditional Advaita. This newly formulated framework of possibilities is adopted in the next chapter specifically to analyze afresh the theory of perceptual illusion in Advaita, with startling results.
Srinivasa Rao
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198079811
- eISBN:
- 9780199081707
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198079811.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Another foundational idea of traditional Advaita is the sadasadvilaksana or “what is different from the real and the unreal”, a peculiar ontological status attributed to the empirical world. Since ...
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Another foundational idea of traditional Advaita is the sadasadvilaksana or “what is different from the real and the unreal”, a peculiar ontological status attributed to the empirical world. Since the world is both experienced by us and also sublated later on by the experience of Ultimate Reality, (1) it has to be different from the unreal since unreal entities are never experienced by us and (2) it has also to be different from the real as it is sublated unlike reality which is never sublated. But such an entity, if existent, has to be other than non-dual reality and hence must contradict it. So, Advaita declares that this “other” never truly exists. In that case it will be no different from asat or non-being. This “reduction” of sadasadvilaksana into asat is an awkward problem and its various dimensions are explored in this chapter.Less
Another foundational idea of traditional Advaita is the sadasadvilaksana or “what is different from the real and the unreal”, a peculiar ontological status attributed to the empirical world. Since the world is both experienced by us and also sublated later on by the experience of Ultimate Reality, (1) it has to be different from the unreal since unreal entities are never experienced by us and (2) it has also to be different from the real as it is sublated unlike reality which is never sublated. But such an entity, if existent, has to be other than non-dual reality and hence must contradict it. So, Advaita declares that this “other” never truly exists. In that case it will be no different from asat or non-being. This “reduction” of sadasadvilaksana into asat is an awkward problem and its various dimensions are explored in this chapter.
Liam Burke
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781628462036
- eISBN:
- 9781626745193
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Mississippi
- DOI:
- 10.14325/mississippi/9781628462036.003.0003
- Subject:
- Literature, Comics Studies
The comic book film adaptation trend ushered in by X-Men in 2000 soon developed into a full-fledged genre. Chapter Two charted the development of this genre and probed its boundaries. Identifying the ...
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The comic book film adaptation trend ushered in by X-Men in 2000 soon developed into a full-fledged genre. Chapter Two charted the development of this genre and probed its boundaries. Identifying the conventions of these films, the chapter defined the comic-book movie as a genre that follows a vigilante or outsider character engaged in a form of revenge narrative, and is pitched at a heightened reality with a visual style marked by distinctly comic book imagery. Refining earlier genre models with a bacterial growth analogy, the development of this genre was plotted and its next phase was predicted.Less
The comic book film adaptation trend ushered in by X-Men in 2000 soon developed into a full-fledged genre. Chapter Two charted the development of this genre and probed its boundaries. Identifying the conventions of these films, the chapter defined the comic-book movie as a genre that follows a vigilante or outsider character engaged in a form of revenge narrative, and is pitched at a heightened reality with a visual style marked by distinctly comic book imagery. Refining earlier genre models with a bacterial growth analogy, the development of this genre was plotted and its next phase was predicted.
Neal Curtis
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780719085048
- eISBN:
- 9781526104434
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719085048.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics
The postscript briefly reviews the argument so far, plotting the rise of the absolutely powerful sovereign and its ultimate collapse into the abyss that accompanies it, but which it constantly ...
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The postscript briefly reviews the argument so far, plotting the rise of the absolutely powerful sovereign and its ultimate collapse into the abyss that accompanies it, but which it constantly disavows. It returns to the issues of the imagination and story-telling briefly referring to a Grant Morrison story from Final Crisis in which the Overmonitor protects the pristine and blank Overvoid only to find it is already stained with the stories of the DC multiverse. The postscript reflects on the feedback loop between stories and reality to ask creators to continue on the path of diverse story-telling in order to create a more diverse world sensitive to issues of ethnicity, gender, and sexuality.Less
The postscript briefly reviews the argument so far, plotting the rise of the absolutely powerful sovereign and its ultimate collapse into the abyss that accompanies it, but which it constantly disavows. It returns to the issues of the imagination and story-telling briefly referring to a Grant Morrison story from Final Crisis in which the Overmonitor protects the pristine and blank Overvoid only to find it is already stained with the stories of the DC multiverse. The postscript reflects on the feedback loop between stories and reality to ask creators to continue on the path of diverse story-telling in order to create a more diverse world sensitive to issues of ethnicity, gender, and sexuality.
Stanley B. Klein
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199349968
- eISBN:
- 9780199369454
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199349968.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology
In this book, I take the position that the self is not a “thing” easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a ...
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In this book, I take the position that the self is not a “thing” easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construed as first-person subjectivity, lacking material instantiation. As a consequence of their potential immateriality, the subjective aspect of self cannot be taken as an object and therefore is not easily amenable to treatment by current scientific methods. I argue that to fully appreciate the self, its two aspects must be acknowledged, since it is only in virtue of their interaction that the self of everyday experience becomes a phenomenological reality. However, given their different metaphysical commitments (i.e., material and immaterial aspects of reality), a number of issues must be addressed. These include, but are not limited to, the possibility of interaction between metaphysically distinct aspects of reality, questions of causal closure under the physical, the principle of energy conservation, and more. After addressing these concerns, I present evidence based on self-reports from case studies of individuals who suffer from a chronic or temporary loss of their sense of personal ownership of their mental states. Drawing on this evidence, I argue that personal ownership may be the factor that closes the metaphysical gap between the material and immaterial selves, linking these two disparate aspects of reality, thereby enabling us to experience a unified sense of self despite its underlying multiplicity.Less
In this book, I take the position that the self is not a “thing” easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construed as first-person subjectivity, lacking material instantiation. As a consequence of their potential immateriality, the subjective aspect of self cannot be taken as an object and therefore is not easily amenable to treatment by current scientific methods. I argue that to fully appreciate the self, its two aspects must be acknowledged, since it is only in virtue of their interaction that the self of everyday experience becomes a phenomenological reality. However, given their different metaphysical commitments (i.e., material and immaterial aspects of reality), a number of issues must be addressed. These include, but are not limited to, the possibility of interaction between metaphysically distinct aspects of reality, questions of causal closure under the physical, the principle of energy conservation, and more. After addressing these concerns, I present evidence based on self-reports from case studies of individuals who suffer from a chronic or temporary loss of their sense of personal ownership of their mental states. Drawing on this evidence, I argue that personal ownership may be the factor that closes the metaphysical gap between the material and immaterial selves, linking these two disparate aspects of reality, thereby enabling us to experience a unified sense of self despite its underlying multiplicity.
Peter Hinchliff
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198263333
- eISBN:
- 9780191682483
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198263333.003.0011
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, History of Christianity
This chapter explores the ideas and writings of B. H. Streeter. Streeter did significant work in three distinct areas: critical New Testament scholarship, relating the Christian faith to modern ...
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This chapter explores the ideas and writings of B. H. Streeter. Streeter did significant work in three distinct areas: critical New Testament scholarship, relating the Christian faith to modern thought, and the Christian attitude to other religions. The three works for which he is best known are The Four Gospels (1924), a seminal work of New Testament scholarship; Reality (1926), an attempt to restate some aspects of Christian doctrine in light of contemporary natural science and psychology; and his lecture The Buddha and the Christ (1932).Less
This chapter explores the ideas and writings of B. H. Streeter. Streeter did significant work in three distinct areas: critical New Testament scholarship, relating the Christian faith to modern thought, and the Christian attitude to other religions. The three works for which he is best known are The Four Gospels (1924), a seminal work of New Testament scholarship; Reality (1926), an attempt to restate some aspects of Christian doctrine in light of contemporary natural science and psychology; and his lecture The Buddha and the Christ (1932).
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195151886
- eISBN:
- 9780199867189
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195151887.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Outlines the philosophical quest for reality, and how humans are related to the real world through perceptions, thoughts and beliefs. A discussion of what constitutes a metaphysical question is ...
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Outlines the philosophical quest for reality, and how humans are related to the real world through perceptions, thoughts and beliefs. A discussion of what constitutes a metaphysical question is followed by a brief outline of certain philosophers’ ideas on reality through history, focusing on causality, subjectivity and objectivity, physicalism (or materialism) and giving a critique of correspondence theory. Introduces the subject of whether certain ideas, such as colours and morality, are real both as human perceptions and in a correspondent reality.Less
Outlines the philosophical quest for reality, and how humans are related to the real world through perceptions, thoughts and beliefs. A discussion of what constitutes a metaphysical question is followed by a brief outline of certain philosophers’ ideas on reality through history, focusing on causality, subjectivity and objectivity, physicalism (or materialism) and giving a critique of correspondence theory. Introduces the subject of whether certain ideas, such as colours and morality, are real both as human perceptions and in a correspondent reality.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195151886
- eISBN:
- 9780199867189
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195151887.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Analyses the possibility of objective knowledge of an independent reality, characterised by its independence from knowledge and belief, through a process of testing the correspondence of beliefs to ...
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Analyses the possibility of objective knowledge of an independent reality, characterised by its independence from knowledge and belief, through a process of testing the correspondence of beliefs to reality. Refers to Bernard Williams's idea of the ‘absolute conception of reality’ which highlights the relations between conceptions connected to knowledge and the possibility of an absolute, objective conception of reality through the elimination of partiality and relativity by a process of correction. Aims to test the idea that colours do not belong to independent reality.Less
Analyses the possibility of objective knowledge of an independent reality, characterised by its independence from knowledge and belief, through a process of testing the correspondence of beliefs to reality. Refers to Bernard Williams's idea of the ‘absolute conception of reality’ which highlights the relations between conceptions connected to knowledge and the possibility of an absolute, objective conception of reality through the elimination of partiality and relativity by a process of correction. Aims to test the idea that colours do not belong to independent reality.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195151886
- eISBN:
- 9780199867189
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195151887.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Argues that an absolute conception of reality, starting from a minimal, absolute framework, is needed in order to investigate whether colour belongs to it or is due to human subjectivity. Examines ...
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Argues that an absolute conception of reality, starting from a minimal, absolute framework, is needed in order to investigate whether colour belongs to it or is due to human subjectivity. Examines ideas about the physical world, from Descartes's dualism to the question of what physical facts are in science, and assesses the translational reductionism of 1940s positivistic physicalists, who tried to reduce subjective reality to observable scientific phenomena. Argues against Berkeley's support of the objective existence of colour by stating that things in an independent, physical world have only the properties of physical truths, and therefore no colour. Concludes that physical truths do not consider colour, and therefore the question remains of how to conclude that objects have no colour.Less
Argues that an absolute conception of reality, starting from a minimal, absolute framework, is needed in order to investigate whether colour belongs to it or is due to human subjectivity. Examines ideas about the physical world, from Descartes's dualism to the question of what physical facts are in science, and assesses the translational reductionism of 1940s positivistic physicalists, who tried to reduce subjective reality to observable scientific phenomena. Argues against Berkeley's support of the objective existence of colour by stating that things in an independent, physical world have only the properties of physical truths, and therefore no colour. Concludes that physical truths do not consider colour, and therefore the question remains of how to conclude that objects have no colour.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195151886
- eISBN:
- 9780199867189
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195151887.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Argues against the idea that reality is purely physical and can be totally captured by scientific explanation, thus excluding colour from reality. Counters exclusive physicalism by arguing that ...
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Argues against the idea that reality is purely physical and can be totally captured by scientific explanation, thus excluding colour from reality. Counters exclusive physicalism by arguing that explanation does not necessarily constitute a true account of the world and its supposedly subjective qualities, and scientific language does not go beyond the limits of the physical. Raises questions about the link between physical and psychological phenomena and about the view of perception as separate from what is perceived, and argues that an understanding of the perception of colour is required in order metaphysically to unmask its link to physicality.Less
Argues against the idea that reality is purely physical and can be totally captured by scientific explanation, thus excluding colour from reality. Counters exclusive physicalism by arguing that explanation does not necessarily constitute a true account of the world and its supposedly subjective qualities, and scientific language does not go beyond the limits of the physical. Raises questions about the link between physical and psychological phenomena and about the view of perception as separate from what is perceived, and argues that an understanding of the perception of colour is required in order metaphysically to unmask its link to physicality.
