Barry Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286690
- eISBN:
- 9780191604065
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286698.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the status of Tarskian truth. It argues that because of its connections with behaviour and psychology through the notion of translation, it is properly classified as a ...
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This chapter examines the status of Tarskian truth. It argues that because of its connections with behaviour and psychology through the notion of translation, it is properly classified as a substantial, rather than a formal, account of truth. It also contends that Common-sense Realism might be modified by replacing the commitment it made to a formal account of truth with commitment to a substantial alternative capable of playing a part in the Fregean model of meaning. Tarskian truth, with its bland neutrality, is the obvious candidate for the replacement role. The resulting position, dubbed ‘Quietist Realism’, proves on examination to be that of John McDowell in Mind and World. Moreover, its characteristic principles, borrowed by Putnam for Common-sense Realism, are no optional extra to Tarskian truth as McDowell deploys it, but play an essential role in his defence of the notion as suitable for use in the Fregean model, against attacks mounted by Dummett.Less
This chapter examines the status of Tarskian truth. It argues that because of its connections with behaviour and psychology through the notion of translation, it is properly classified as a substantial, rather than a formal, account of truth. It also contends that Common-sense Realism might be modified by replacing the commitment it made to a formal account of truth with commitment to a substantial alternative capable of playing a part in the Fregean model of meaning. Tarskian truth, with its bland neutrality, is the obvious candidate for the replacement role. The resulting position, dubbed ‘Quietist Realism’, proves on examination to be that of John McDowell in Mind and World. Moreover, its characteristic principles, borrowed by Putnam for Common-sense Realism, are no optional extra to Tarskian truth as McDowell deploys it, but play an essential role in his defence of the notion as suitable for use in the Fregean model, against attacks mounted by Dummett.
Charles S. Chihara
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198239758
- eISBN:
- 9780191597190
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198239750.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
A continuation of the study of mathematical existence begun in Ontology and the Vicious‐Circle Principle (published in 1973); in the present work, Quine's indispensability argument is rebutted by the ...
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A continuation of the study of mathematical existence begun in Ontology and the Vicious‐Circle Principle (published in 1973); in the present work, Quine's indispensability argument is rebutted by the development of a new nominalistic version of mathematics (the Constructibility Theory) that is specified as an axiomatized theory formalized in a many‐sorted first‐order language. What is new in the present work is its abandonment of the predicative restrictions of the earlier work and its much greater attention to the applications of mathematics in science and everyday life. The book also contains detailed discussions of rival views (Mathematical Structuralism, Field's Instrumentalism, Burgess's Moderate Realism, Maddy's Set Theoretical Realism, and Kitcher's Ideal Agent account of mathematics), in which many comparisons with the Constructibility Theory are made.Less
A continuation of the study of mathematical existence begun in Ontology and the Vicious‐Circle Principle (published in 1973); in the present work, Quine's indispensability argument is rebutted by the development of a new nominalistic version of mathematics (the Constructibility Theory) that is specified as an axiomatized theory formalized in a many‐sorted first‐order language. What is new in the present work is its abandonment of the predicative restrictions of the earlier work and its much greater attention to the applications of mathematics in science and everyday life. The book also contains detailed discussions of rival views (Mathematical Structuralism, Field's Instrumentalism, Burgess's Moderate Realism, Maddy's Set Theoretical Realism, and Kitcher's Ideal Agent account of mathematics), in which many comparisons with the Constructibility Theory are made.
Andreas Osiander
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780198294511
- eISBN:
- 9780191717048
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198294511.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This book challenges the habit of conventional historiography of taking the ‘essential’ state – a ‘bounded entity’ equipped with a ‘sovereign’ central power — for granted in any period and of not ...
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This book challenges the habit of conventional historiography of taking the ‘essential’ state – a ‘bounded entity’ equipped with a ‘sovereign’ central power — for granted in any period and of not taking period political terminology seriously. It refutes the idea, current both in historiography and in International Relations theory (in particular Realism), that the fundamental nature of ‘international’ politics is historically immutable. Nothing akin to what we call the ‘state’ existed before the 19th century: it is a recent invention and the assumption that it is timeless, necessary for society, is simply part of its legitimating myth. The development over the past three millennia of the political structures of western civilization is shown here to have been a succession of unrepeatable but path-dependent stages. In examining structural change, the book adopts a constructivist approach based on the analysis of period political discourse. This approach both reflects and illuminates the evolution of western political thought: on the one hand, political thought is a vehicle of the political discourse of its period. On the other hand, the assumption that political theory must in any age somehow be centred on the ‘state’ has forced our understanding of it into a straight-jacket: abandoning this assumption permits fresh and unexpected insights into the political thinking of earlier eras. Close attention, however, is also paid to the material constraints and opportunities (e.g., ecological and economic factors, or military technology) impacting on the evolution of society.Less
This book challenges the habit of conventional historiography of taking the ‘essential’ state – a ‘bounded entity’ equipped with a ‘sovereign’ central power — for granted in any period and of not taking period political terminology seriously. It refutes the idea, current both in historiography and in International Relations theory (in particular Realism), that the fundamental nature of ‘international’ politics is historically immutable. Nothing akin to what we call the ‘state’ existed before the 19th century: it is a recent invention and the assumption that it is timeless, necessary for society, is simply part of its legitimating myth. The development over the past three millennia of the political structures of western civilization is shown here to have been a succession of unrepeatable but path-dependent stages. In examining structural change, the book adopts a constructivist approach based on the analysis of period political discourse. This approach both reflects and illuminates the evolution of western political thought: on the one hand, political thought is a vehicle of the political discourse of its period. On the other hand, the assumption that political theory must in any age somehow be centred on the ‘state’ has forced our understanding of it into a straight-jacket: abandoning this assumption permits fresh and unexpected insights into the political thinking of earlier eras. Close attention, however, is also paid to the material constraints and opportunities (e.g., ecological and economic factors, or military technology) impacting on the evolution of society.
Barry Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286690
- eISBN:
- 9780191604065
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286698.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses formal theories of truth: the redundancy theory and its ilk, distinguished by the attempt to characterize truth in terms of its structural properties, in the context of the ...
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This chapter discusses formal theories of truth: the redundancy theory and its ilk, distinguished by the attempt to characterize truth in terms of its structural properties, in the context of the position adopted by Putnam in his John Dewey Lectures, here styled ‘Common-sense Realism’. This position is described, combining two principles called the Thesis of the Internality (according to which the elements of a representational system are internally related to their content) and the Thesis of World-Embeddedness (which holds that content is dependent on the world in a more than causal way), with a formal account of truth. It is argued that Common-sense Realism, along with all theories comprising a formal account of truth, should be committed to the flames, because they are cut off from exploiting the Fregean model of meaning, based on a recursion on truth.Less
This chapter discusses formal theories of truth: the redundancy theory and its ilk, distinguished by the attempt to characterize truth in terms of its structural properties, in the context of the position adopted by Putnam in his John Dewey Lectures, here styled ‘Common-sense Realism’. This position is described, combining two principles called the Thesis of the Internality (according to which the elements of a representational system are internally related to their content) and the Thesis of World-Embeddedness (which holds that content is dependent on the world in a more than causal way), with a formal account of truth. It is argued that Common-sense Realism, along with all theories comprising a formal account of truth, should be committed to the flames, because they are cut off from exploiting the Fregean model of meaning, based on a recursion on truth.
Andreas Osiander
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780198294511
- eISBN:
- 9780191717048
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198294511.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This introductory chapter criticizes the amateurish way in which history is used to corroborate International Relations theory, in particular Realism. Conversely, it criticizes conventional ...
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This introductory chapter criticizes the amateurish way in which history is used to corroborate International Relations theory, in particular Realism. Conversely, it criticizes conventional historiography for its neglect of political theory. A case in point is the constructivist insight that political structures are created through political discourse. The political discourse underlying present-day political structures is so ubiquitous as to render those structures largely immune to manipulation. But since to most people the everyday political discourse of past eras is now unfamiliar, historians feel free, indeed obliged, to describe past political structures using the political concepts and assumptions of our own day. What they fail to realize is that unlike present-day political structures the political structures of past ages do change when anachronistic terminology is used to describe them: they come to look more like our own than they were.Less
This introductory chapter criticizes the amateurish way in which history is used to corroborate International Relations theory, in particular Realism. Conversely, it criticizes conventional historiography for its neglect of political theory. A case in point is the constructivist insight that political structures are created through political discourse. The political discourse underlying present-day political structures is so ubiquitous as to render those structures largely immune to manipulation. But since to most people the everyday political discourse of past eras is now unfamiliar, historians feel free, indeed obliged, to describe past political structures using the political concepts and assumptions of our own day. What they fail to realize is that unlike present-day political structures the political structures of past ages do change when anachronistic terminology is used to describe them: they come to look more like our own than they were.
Andreas Osiander
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780198294511
- eISBN:
- 9780191717048
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198294511.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The final chapter provides a general overview, in light of the findings of this study, of the manifestations and causes of systemic structural change in the history of western civilization. It argues ...
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The final chapter provides a general overview, in light of the findings of this study, of the manifestations and causes of systemic structural change in the history of western civilization. It argues that since the structural evolution of the western political system at large has consistently shown a path-dependent succession of unrepeatable stages, rather than variations on the underlying theme of the ‘state’, there can be no ‘grand theory’ of international relations or political systems in general: the search for nomothetic political theory, for timeless patterns in the historical record, is doomed to failure. Whatever their worth, present-day theory, such as Realism in International Relations, cannot validly invoke history as corroboration, nor offer predictions about the future.Less
The final chapter provides a general overview, in light of the findings of this study, of the manifestations and causes of systemic structural change in the history of western civilization. It argues that since the structural evolution of the western political system at large has consistently shown a path-dependent succession of unrepeatable stages, rather than variations on the underlying theme of the ‘state’, there can be no ‘grand theory’ of international relations or political systems in general: the search for nomothetic political theory, for timeless patterns in the historical record, is doomed to failure. Whatever their worth, present-day theory, such as Realism in International Relations, cannot validly invoke history as corroboration, nor offer predictions about the future.
Simon Morrison
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195181678
- eISBN:
- 9780199870806
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195181678.003.0003
- Subject:
- Music, History, Western
This chapter chronicles Prokofiev's activities from the spring of 1938 to the winter of 1939, a period that witnessed the loss of his ability to travel abroad, the arrest (at the height of the ...
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This chapter chronicles Prokofiev's activities from the spring of 1938 to the winter of 1939, a period that witnessed the loss of his ability to travel abroad, the arrest (at the height of the Stalinist purges) of his mentor Vsevolod Meyerhold, his embrace of the aesthetic of Socialist Realism in his opera Semyon Kotko, and his composition of a cantata in honor of Stalin's sixtieth birthday for Soviet Radio (the signing of the Molotov-Rippentrop non-aggression pact in 1939 necessitated a rewriting of the libretto of Semyon Kotko). Beyond these conformist works, the chapter also discusses Prokofiev's unknown music for athletic display.Less
This chapter chronicles Prokofiev's activities from the spring of 1938 to the winter of 1939, a period that witnessed the loss of his ability to travel abroad, the arrest (at the height of the Stalinist purges) of his mentor Vsevolod Meyerhold, his embrace of the aesthetic of Socialist Realism in his opera Semyon Kotko, and his composition of a cantata in honor of Stalin's sixtieth birthday for Soviet Radio (the signing of the Molotov-Rippentrop non-aggression pact in 1939 necessitated a rewriting of the libretto of Semyon Kotko). Beyond these conformist works, the chapter also discusses Prokofiev's unknown music for athletic display.
Penelope Maddy
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199273669
- eISBN:
- 9780191706264
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273669.003.0026
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Though extra-mathematical philosophy is irrelevant to the methodological decisions of mathematics, a second-philosophical understanding of the human practice of mathematics requires answers to ...
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Though extra-mathematical philosophy is irrelevant to the methodological decisions of mathematics, a second-philosophical understanding of the human practice of mathematics requires answers to traditionally philosophical questions of metaphysics and epistemology. This chapter explores three broad schools of thought on these questions: Robust Realism, Thin Realism, and Arealism. One familiar version of Robust Realism is Gödel's platonism, which raises an equally familiar epistemological objection associated with Benacerraf. Thin Realism reorients the epistemological discussion by beginning from the idea that the way to find out about mathematical things is to do mathematics; the Second Philosopher argues that traditional characterizations (objective, nonspatiotemporal, acausal) are retained while the proper methods are just those ratified by mathematical goals and values (as in §IV.3). Arealism embraces the very same mathematical methods as Thin Realism, the very same choices and decisions in practice, but includes no added claims of truth or existence. The Second Philosopher argues that Robust Realism is problematic (though not for strictly Benacerrafian reasons), that Thin Realism and Arealism are viable, and indeed that Thin Realism and Arealism are cosmetic variants of the same view.Less
Though extra-mathematical philosophy is irrelevant to the methodological decisions of mathematics, a second-philosophical understanding of the human practice of mathematics requires answers to traditionally philosophical questions of metaphysics and epistemology. This chapter explores three broad schools of thought on these questions: Robust Realism, Thin Realism, and Arealism. One familiar version of Robust Realism is Gödel's platonism, which raises an equally familiar epistemological objection associated with Benacerraf. Thin Realism reorients the epistemological discussion by beginning from the idea that the way to find out about mathematical things is to do mathematics; the Second Philosopher argues that traditional characterizations (objective, nonspatiotemporal, acausal) are retained while the proper methods are just those ratified by mathematical goals and values (as in §IV.3). Arealism embraces the very same mathematical methods as Thin Realism, the very same choices and decisions in practice, but includes no added claims of truth or existence. The Second Philosopher argues that Robust Realism is problematic (though not for strictly Benacerrafian reasons), that Thin Realism and Arealism are viable, and indeed that Thin Realism and Arealism are cosmetic variants of the same view.
John G. Gunnell
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- September 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780226661278
- eISBN:
- 9780226661308
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226661308.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This book is an exploration of the relationship between philosophy and various forms of political inquiry and is specifically and primarily devoted to advancing an argument for conventional realism. ...
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This book is an exploration of the relationship between philosophy and various forms of political inquiry and is specifically and primarily devoted to advancing an argument for conventional realism. The thesis is that everything we designate as “real,” whether natural or social, is rendered conventionally. This entails a rejection of the widely accepted distinction between what is natural and what is conventional as a way of demarcating natural science and social science. The argument is presented in an opposition to the deep-seated influence of representational philosophy on political science and political theory and particularly to the claim that the mind is the source and repository of meaning, that language is primarily a vehicle of thought and a means of communication, and that reality resides in some physical or metaphysical realm that stands behind our discursive practices. Both mentalism and realism have been embraced by political theorists in a perennial search for a foundation of epistemic authority as a means of gaining practical purpose. Although this is not principally a book about Ludwig Wittgenstein, the argument for conventional realism and the critique of mentalism and traditional realism are viewed as entailments of his work and of others who embraced his conception of philosophy as an interpretive endeavor and a form of social inquiry rather than undertaking the construction of a metaphysical “super-order.” In a brief conclusion, the book discusses the normative implications of conventional realism.Less
This book is an exploration of the relationship between philosophy and various forms of political inquiry and is specifically and primarily devoted to advancing an argument for conventional realism. The thesis is that everything we designate as “real,” whether natural or social, is rendered conventionally. This entails a rejection of the widely accepted distinction between what is natural and what is conventional as a way of demarcating natural science and social science. The argument is presented in an opposition to the deep-seated influence of representational philosophy on political science and political theory and particularly to the claim that the mind is the source and repository of meaning, that language is primarily a vehicle of thought and a means of communication, and that reality resides in some physical or metaphysical realm that stands behind our discursive practices. Both mentalism and realism have been embraced by political theorists in a perennial search for a foundation of epistemic authority as a means of gaining practical purpose. Although this is not principally a book about Ludwig Wittgenstein, the argument for conventional realism and the critique of mentalism and traditional realism are viewed as entailments of his work and of others who embraced his conception of philosophy as an interpretive endeavor and a form of social inquiry rather than undertaking the construction of a metaphysical “super-order.” In a brief conclusion, the book discusses the normative implications of conventional realism.
Phillip Wiebe
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195140125
- eISBN:
- 9780199835492
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195140125.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This book advances three central propositions: (a) Claims about what is real, including a transcendent reality, if it exists, cannot be achieved by short, snappy proofs, but by the hard work of ...
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This book advances three central propositions: (a) Claims about what is real, including a transcendent reality, if it exists, cannot be achieved by short, snappy proofs, but by the hard work of examining phenomena closely, conjecturing about how they might explained, and critically scrutinizing the explanations that are suggested by the phenomena; (b) The methodology that is needed in a critical scrutiny of religion is neither deductive nor inductive argumentation, both of which have been prominent in philosophy of religion, but abductive argumentation, in which unobservable objects are tentatively postulated to exist, in an effort to determine how well they explain otherwise inexplicable phenomena; and (c) The phenomena that ought to be made central to the study of religion are the varied experiences that people have reported and continue to report, especially those that suggest to educated and articulate adults that an order of reality might exist that transcends the known natural one. Empirical grounds for advancing the existence of spirits are examined in several chapters, such as the phenomena of (alleged) demonic possession and exorcism, as well as other phenomena in biblical history and in contemporary life that suggest the existence of holy beings. These phenomena are used to reconstruct the theory of spirits in a critical realist way, according to which the postulated entities are contextually defined by the causal roles these entities are deemed to play. The abductive argumentation to unobservable objects that is advocated is perhaps best known from atomism, but it has also been vital to evolutionary theory, genetic theory, psychoanalysis, and to other well known fields of scientific inquiry. Various objections are examined against the thesis of the book, including the view that the concepts of religion are mythopoeic, the claim that naturalism as it is presently known is adequate to explain all phenomena, and the position that Christian theism is incoherent. The plausibility of contextual realism is defended according to which separate domains of critical inquiry have epistemic independence from one another, so that ontological reduction is neither routinely imposed on religious claims nor deemed to be impossible. The competing claims that theism is properly basic and that probabilistic argument affords the best approach toward theism are resisted. The author calls for “naturalizing epistemology” of religion, following W. V. O. Quine, which requires paying more attention than classical empiricism has given to the circumstances in which educated and articulate adults adopt beliefs, including beliefs that accommodate God and other spirits.Less
This book advances three central propositions: (a) Claims about what is real, including a transcendent reality, if it exists, cannot be achieved by short, snappy proofs, but by the hard work of examining phenomena closely, conjecturing about how they might explained, and critically scrutinizing the explanations that are suggested by the phenomena; (b) The methodology that is needed in a critical scrutiny of religion is neither deductive nor inductive argumentation, both of which have been prominent in philosophy of religion, but abductive argumentation, in which unobservable objects are tentatively postulated to exist, in an effort to determine how well they explain otherwise inexplicable phenomena; and (c) The phenomena that ought to be made central to the study of religion are the varied experiences that people have reported and continue to report, especially those that suggest to educated and articulate adults that an order of reality might exist that transcends the known natural one. Empirical grounds for advancing the existence of spirits are examined in several chapters, such as the phenomena of (alleged) demonic possession and exorcism, as well as other phenomena in biblical history and in contemporary life that suggest the existence of holy beings. These phenomena are used to reconstruct the theory of spirits in a critical realist way, according to which the postulated entities are contextually defined by the causal roles these entities are deemed to play. The abductive argumentation to unobservable objects that is advocated is perhaps best known from atomism, but it has also been vital to evolutionary theory, genetic theory, psychoanalysis, and to other well known fields of scientific inquiry. Various objections are examined against the thesis of the book, including the view that the concepts of religion are mythopoeic, the claim that naturalism as it is presently known is adequate to explain all phenomena, and the position that Christian theism is incoherent. The plausibility of contextual realism is defended according to which separate domains of critical inquiry have epistemic independence from one another, so that ontological reduction is neither routinely imposed on religious claims nor deemed to be impossible. The competing claims that theism is properly basic and that probabilistic argument affords the best approach toward theism are resisted. The author calls for “naturalizing epistemology” of religion, following W. V. O. Quine, which requires paying more attention than classical empiricism has given to the circumstances in which educated and articulate adults adopt beliefs, including beliefs that accommodate God and other spirits.
Keith Hossack
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199206728
- eISBN:
- 9780191709777
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206728.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter outlines a theory of facts, according to which facts are combinations of particulars and universals. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 discusses the relation between the ...
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This chapter outlines a theory of facts, according to which facts are combinations of particulars and universals. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 discusses the relation between the theory of facts and Realism, the traditional metaphysical doctrine of universals. Section 2 places at the centre of the theory of facts and universals the relation of combination, a multigrade relation taking a variable number of terms. Section 3 discusses the ‘vector logic’ of multigrade relations. Section 4 introduces ‘the problem of the unity of the proposition’, i.e., the problem of why it is impossible to judge ‘nonsense’. This turns out to be the same as the problem of the distinction between particulars and universals. Section 5 rejects solutions that invoke extra entities such as propositions or states of affairs. Section 6 offers a solution via the theory of negative facts. Section 7 extends the theory of negative facts to other complex facts, namely conjunctive and general facts. Section 8 further extends the theory of complex facts to allow it to cope with multiple generality, without the need to resort either to ‘logical forms’ or to ‘variables’. Section 9 suggests that an adequate semantic theory for the Predicate Calculus can be developed within the theory of facts.Less
This chapter outlines a theory of facts, according to which facts are combinations of particulars and universals. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 discusses the relation between the theory of facts and Realism, the traditional metaphysical doctrine of universals. Section 2 places at the centre of the theory of facts and universals the relation of combination, a multigrade relation taking a variable number of terms. Section 3 discusses the ‘vector logic’ of multigrade relations. Section 4 introduces ‘the problem of the unity of the proposition’, i.e., the problem of why it is impossible to judge ‘nonsense’. This turns out to be the same as the problem of the distinction between particulars and universals. Section 5 rejects solutions that invoke extra entities such as propositions or states of affairs. Section 6 offers a solution via the theory of negative facts. Section 7 extends the theory of negative facts to other complex facts, namely conjunctive and general facts. Section 8 further extends the theory of complex facts to allow it to cope with multiple generality, without the need to resort either to ‘logical forms’ or to ‘variables’. Section 9 suggests that an adequate semantic theory for the Predicate Calculus can be developed within the theory of facts.
Neil Tennant
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199251605
- eISBN:
- 9780191698057
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251605.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Language
This chapter explores the foundational relationships between manifestation, bivalence and undecidability. It examines all possible positions one might take on the relationships among the decidable, ...
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This chapter explores the foundational relationships between manifestation, bivalence and undecidability. It examines all possible positions one might take on the relationships among the decidable, the knowable, and the true. These positions include moderate anti-realism, Gödelian Optimism, M-Realism, and Orthodox Realism. It suggests that moderate anti-realism is the most viable position and argues that the so-called manifestation argument against the principle of bivalence is entirely unconvincing.Less
This chapter explores the foundational relationships between manifestation, bivalence and undecidability. It examines all possible positions one might take on the relationships among the decidable, the knowable, and the true. These positions include moderate anti-realism, Gödelian Optimism, M-Realism, and Orthodox Realism. It suggests that moderate anti-realism is the most viable position and argues that the so-called manifestation argument against the principle of bivalence is entirely unconvincing.
Douglas A. Sweeney
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195154283
- eISBN:
- 9780199834709
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195154282.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
A striking emphasis on God's justice and goodness and on the truly moral nature of divine government pervades Taylor's entire corpus. In his famous Concio ad Clerum, Taylor upheld a firm commitment ...
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A striking emphasis on God's justice and goodness and on the truly moral nature of divine government pervades Taylor's entire corpus. In his famous Concio ad Clerum, Taylor upheld a firm commitment to both predestination and general divine providence, which were understood together as the doctrine of the eternal divine decrees. For Taylor, his infralapsarian Calvinistic solution to the problem of theodicy becomes the foundation for his opposition to the high Calvinist's limited and forensic understanding of the atonement. Even though Taylor made use of Scottish Common Sense Realism to arrive at his conclusions, Sweeney argues that this philosophy neither set him apart from his Edwardsian peers nor placed him in league with Old Calvinism.Less
A striking emphasis on God's justice and goodness and on the truly moral nature of divine government pervades Taylor's entire corpus. In his famous Concio ad Clerum, Taylor upheld a firm commitment to both predestination and general divine providence, which were understood together as the doctrine of the eternal divine decrees. For Taylor, his infralapsarian Calvinistic solution to the problem of theodicy becomes the foundation for his opposition to the high Calvinist's limited and forensic understanding of the atonement. Even though Taylor made use of Scottish Common Sense Realism to arrive at his conclusions, Sweeney argues that this philosophy neither set him apart from his Edwardsian peers nor placed him in league with Old Calvinism.
Barbara A. Spellman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195367584
- eISBN:
- 9780199776917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367584.003.0010
- Subject:
- Psychology, Forensic Psychology
Political scientists have shown that one can anticipate how a judge will decide a case more often than chance, or a reading of the facts, might allow by using various predictors such as party ...
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Political scientists have shown that one can anticipate how a judge will decide a case more often than chance, or a reading of the facts, might allow by using various predictors such as party affiliation, gender, or the judge's own decisions on earlier similar cases. The simplest explanation for such behavior is that judges first decide what they want the outcome of the case to be, then go back to find the precedents that justify their opinions. This chapter considers a more nuanced version of the process: judges may choose relevant case analogies as better or worse, applicable or inapplicable, not because of any particular desired outcome but because of their own pre-existing knowledge. The influence of such knowledge on the decision process may be entirely unconscious; therefore, judges may, in fact, be following the idealized decision-making process to the letter, and be unmotivated toward finding a particular result, yet may usually still reach the predicted result.Less
Political scientists have shown that one can anticipate how a judge will decide a case more often than chance, or a reading of the facts, might allow by using various predictors such as party affiliation, gender, or the judge's own decisions on earlier similar cases. The simplest explanation for such behavior is that judges first decide what they want the outcome of the case to be, then go back to find the precedents that justify their opinions. This chapter considers a more nuanced version of the process: judges may choose relevant case analogies as better or worse, applicable or inapplicable, not because of any particular desired outcome but because of their own pre-existing knowledge. The influence of such knowledge on the decision process may be entirely unconscious; therefore, judges may, in fact, be following the idealized decision-making process to the letter, and be unmotivated toward finding a particular result, yet may usually still reach the predicted result.
Emily Sherwin
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195367584
- eISBN:
- 9780199776917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367584.003.0008
- Subject:
- Psychology, Forensic Psychology
Judges confront rules in two ways, as rule-makers and as rule-followers. When a judge decides a case that is not governed by an existing rule, the judge must formulate a rule of decision and ...
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Judges confront rules in two ways, as rule-makers and as rule-followers. When a judge decides a case that is not governed by an existing rule, the judge must formulate a rule of decision and calculate the effects of the rule in future cases. Rule-making is a highly deliberative process, in which the judge must select the rule that will best realize relevant values over the range of cases to which it applies. When a judge decides a case that is governed by a precedent rule, the judge is expected to treat the precedent rule as authoritative. To do this, the judge must follow the rule mechanically, without reflecting on the relationship between the outcome of the rule and the values on which the rule is based. These two tasks — rule-making and rule-following — make different, and possibly conflicting, cognitive demands on judges.Less
Judges confront rules in two ways, as rule-makers and as rule-followers. When a judge decides a case that is not governed by an existing rule, the judge must formulate a rule of decision and calculate the effects of the rule in future cases. Rule-making is a highly deliberative process, in which the judge must select the rule that will best realize relevant values over the range of cases to which it applies. When a judge decides a case that is governed by a precedent rule, the judge is expected to treat the precedent rule as authoritative. To do this, the judge must follow the rule mechanically, without reflecting on the relationship between the outcome of the rule and the values on which the rule is based. These two tasks — rule-making and rule-following — make different, and possibly conflicting, cognitive demands on judges.
David Hershinow
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781474439572
- eISBN:
- 9781474477017
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474439572.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
The Truth-Teller makes the case that Shakespeare repeatedly responds to sixteenth-century debates over the revolutionary potential of Cynic critical activity—debates that persist in later centuries ...
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The Truth-Teller makes the case that Shakespeare repeatedly responds to sixteenth-century debates over the revolutionary potential of Cynic critical activity—debates that persist in later centuries and that inform major developments in Western intellectual history. To live one’s truth may have been a radical (and controversial) proposition for ancient Greek democracy, but Shakespeare reveals it to be an equally vexed task for drama, which aimed both to represent political truths and warn against the dangers of over-identifying with the figure of the lone truth teller. The book contends that aspiring critics from the sixteenth century to the present cathect onto the figure of the Cynic because they mistake literary character for viable political formula. Shakespeare, the book argues, works to diagnose this interpretive error through his Cynic characterizations of Lear’s Fool, Hamlet, and Timon of Athens. Offering new ways of thinking about early modernity’s engagement with classical models as well as literature’s engagement with politics, The Truth-Teller insists upon the necessity of literary thinking to political philosophy.Less
The Truth-Teller makes the case that Shakespeare repeatedly responds to sixteenth-century debates over the revolutionary potential of Cynic critical activity—debates that persist in later centuries and that inform major developments in Western intellectual history. To live one’s truth may have been a radical (and controversial) proposition for ancient Greek democracy, but Shakespeare reveals it to be an equally vexed task for drama, which aimed both to represent political truths and warn against the dangers of over-identifying with the figure of the lone truth teller. The book contends that aspiring critics from the sixteenth century to the present cathect onto the figure of the Cynic because they mistake literary character for viable political formula. Shakespeare, the book argues, works to diagnose this interpretive error through his Cynic characterizations of Lear’s Fool, Hamlet, and Timon of Athens. Offering new ways of thinking about early modernity’s engagement with classical models as well as literature’s engagement with politics, The Truth-Teller insists upon the necessity of literary thinking to political philosophy.
Mary L. Mullen
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781474453240
- eISBN:
- 9781474477116
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474453240.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
Novel Institutions rethinks the politics of institutions by reinterpreting the most institutional of literary forms: nineteenth-century British realism. Although realist novels, like institutions, ...
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Novel Institutions rethinks the politics of institutions by reinterpreting the most institutional of literary forms: nineteenth-century British realism. Although realist novels, like institutions, mediate social life through a set of formal conventions and informal expectations, they also offer strategies for more capacious political imagining through their prevalent anachronisms. These anachronisms—untimely chronologies, obsolete practices, and out-of-date characters—unsettle the shared time of institutions and the consensus it fosters. Paying unprecedented attention to Irish novels, this book argues that the movement between shared institutional time and anachronisms is more pronounced in realist novels from Ireland, where Britain relied on a dual logic of institutional assimilation and exclusion. But such movement does not mean Irish novels are anomalous: these novels make the tension between the shared time of institutions and the unruly politics of anachronism visible in English realist novels. The book concludes that we cannot escape institutions, but we can refuse the narrow political future that they work to secure.Less
Novel Institutions rethinks the politics of institutions by reinterpreting the most institutional of literary forms: nineteenth-century British realism. Although realist novels, like institutions, mediate social life through a set of formal conventions and informal expectations, they also offer strategies for more capacious political imagining through their prevalent anachronisms. These anachronisms—untimely chronologies, obsolete practices, and out-of-date characters—unsettle the shared time of institutions and the consensus it fosters. Paying unprecedented attention to Irish novels, this book argues that the movement between shared institutional time and anachronisms is more pronounced in realist novels from Ireland, where Britain relied on a dual logic of institutional assimilation and exclusion. But such movement does not mean Irish novels are anomalous: these novels make the tension between the shared time of institutions and the unruly politics of anachronism visible in English realist novels. The book concludes that we cannot escape institutions, but we can refuse the narrow political future that they work to secure.
Evan Tsen Lee
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195340341
- eISBN:
- 9780199867240
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195340341.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter argues that the clash between Protestant idealism and secular or scientific pragmatism that was evident during the American culture wars had a direct counterpart in American ...
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This chapter argues that the clash between Protestant idealism and secular or scientific pragmatism that was evident during the American culture wars had a direct counterpart in American jurisprudence. Protestant idealism corresponded closely to what has been variously labeled the “classical orthodoxy” or “Langdellian formalism.” Scientific pragmatism more or less corresponded to a movement that called itself “Sociological Jurisprudence” and a later movement known as “Legal Realism.” The struggle between classical legal orthodoxy on the one hand and Sociological Jurisprudence and Legal Realism on the other profoundly shaped the mores of judicial review and helped produce the modern standing doctrine.Less
This chapter argues that the clash between Protestant idealism and secular or scientific pragmatism that was evident during the American culture wars had a direct counterpart in American jurisprudence. Protestant idealism corresponded closely to what has been variously labeled the “classical orthodoxy” or “Langdellian formalism.” Scientific pragmatism more or less corresponded to a movement that called itself “Sociological Jurisprudence” and a later movement known as “Legal Realism.” The struggle between classical legal orthodoxy on the one hand and Sociological Jurisprudence and Legal Realism on the other profoundly shaped the mores of judicial review and helped produce the modern standing doctrine.
David Tompkins
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199759392
- eISBN:
- 9780199918911
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199759392.003.0007
- Subject:
- Music, History, Western
This chapter provides a fresh perspective on the musical world of Stalinist East Germany, and argues that the vibrant soundscape was marked by the hopes and desires of both composers and the audience ...
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This chapter provides a fresh perspective on the musical world of Stalinist East Germany, and argues that the vibrant soundscape was marked by the hopes and desires of both composers and the audience as well as by directives from cultural officials. Beginning with a brief discussion of expectations for musical compositions under Socialist Realism, it explores the rich array of music festivals in the post-war period, from prominent events in Berlin to those organized in smaller towns and the countryside. Concluding with an examination of Estradenkonzerte, or stage revues, the chapter asserts that the soundscape of the GDR was a negotiated project that helped to create a new socialist identity.Less
This chapter provides a fresh perspective on the musical world of Stalinist East Germany, and argues that the vibrant soundscape was marked by the hopes and desires of both composers and the audience as well as by directives from cultural officials. Beginning with a brief discussion of expectations for musical compositions under Socialist Realism, it explores the rich array of music festivals in the post-war period, from prominent events in Berlin to those organized in smaller towns and the countryside. Concluding with an examination of Estradenkonzerte, or stage revues, the chapter asserts that the soundscape of the GDR was a negotiated project that helped to create a new socialist identity.
Andrew J. Webber
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198159049
- eISBN:
- 9780191673467
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198159049.003.0005
- Subject:
- Literature, European Literature
This chapter discusses cases of doubling in the Novelle genre of 19th-century German literature. These are forms of narrative which treat the mysterious and the antisocial, giving account of those ...
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This chapter discusses cases of doubling in the Novelle genre of 19th-century German literature. These are forms of narrative which treat the mysterious and the antisocial, giving account of those stories which undermine or exceed the objective generality of a conventional history. Nineteenth-century Novellen provide a catalogue of such ‘strange cases’, supernatural, criminal, and pathological. The Doppelgäanger operates as both a paradigm and a test case, a phantasm which enters into and challenges the constructions of realism. As this chapter revisits texts which are broadly historicized as of the Age of Realism, so this apparently dis- and misplaced figure questions the sense of real and proper place and time which is so fundamental to the Realist project.Less
This chapter discusses cases of doubling in the Novelle genre of 19th-century German literature. These are forms of narrative which treat the mysterious and the antisocial, giving account of those stories which undermine or exceed the objective generality of a conventional history. Nineteenth-century Novellen provide a catalogue of such ‘strange cases’, supernatural, criminal, and pathological. The Doppelgäanger operates as both a paradigm and a test case, a phantasm which enters into and challenges the constructions of realism. As this chapter revisits texts which are broadly historicized as of the Age of Realism, so this apparently dis- and misplaced figure questions the sense of real and proper place and time which is so fundamental to the Realist project.
