Matthew Clayton
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199268948
- eISBN:
- 9780191603693
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199268940.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This book defends a particular liberal conception of justice and legitimacy, and applies it to certain issues concerning the upbringing of children. It begins by offering an account of liberal ...
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This book defends a particular liberal conception of justice and legitimacy, and applies it to certain issues concerning the upbringing of children. It begins by offering an account of liberal political morality that draws on the work of Rawls and Dworkin. It then defends the claim that the distribution of childrearing rights should be sensitive to the interests of both children and parents. With respect to the issue of whether it is permissible to impart controversial values to children, a distinction is drawn between shaping children’s political motivations and enrolling them into disputed conceptions of the good. Whereas there is a requirement of liberal legitimacy to foster liberal virtues of civility and reciprocity, the widely held view that the enrolment of children into particular ethical or religious practices is rejected as illegitimate. Finally, the practice of age-based discrimination in the case of the allocation of certain rights, such as the right to vote, is defended and criteria for determining the appropriate age of majority are discussed.Less
This book defends a particular liberal conception of justice and legitimacy, and applies it to certain issues concerning the upbringing of children. It begins by offering an account of liberal political morality that draws on the work of Rawls and Dworkin. It then defends the claim that the distribution of childrearing rights should be sensitive to the interests of both children and parents. With respect to the issue of whether it is permissible to impart controversial values to children, a distinction is drawn between shaping children’s political motivations and enrolling them into disputed conceptions of the good. Whereas there is a requirement of liberal legitimacy to foster liberal virtues of civility and reciprocity, the widely held view that the enrolment of children into particular ethical or religious practices is rejected as illegitimate. Finally, the practice of age-based discrimination in the case of the allocation of certain rights, such as the right to vote, is defended and criteria for determining the appropriate age of majority are discussed.
Matthew Clayton
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199268948
- eISBN:
- 9780191603693
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199268940.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter introduces the central questions addressed in the book and states the main positions to be defended. The focus of the book is briefly discussed, which includes the choices of parents as ...
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This chapter introduces the central questions addressed in the book and states the main positions to be defended. The focus of the book is briefly discussed, which includes the choices of parents as well as the policies of governments.Less
This chapter introduces the central questions addressed in the book and states the main positions to be defended. The focus of the book is briefly discussed, which includes the choices of parents as well as the policies of governments.
George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Provides a full defence of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness (or fair play). The book responds to the most important objections and extends a theory-based on ...
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Provides a full defence of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness (or fair play). The book responds to the most important objections and extends a theory-based on fairness into a developed ‘multiple principle’ theory of obligation. The ‘self-image of the state’ in regard to political obligations is explored through examination of judicial decisions in three different democratic countries, while the book also breaks new ground by studying attitudes towards political obligations, through the use of small focus groups.Less
Provides a full defence of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness (or fair play). The book responds to the most important objections and extends a theory-based on fairness into a developed ‘multiple principle’ theory of obligation. The ‘self-image of the state’ in regard to political obligations is explored through examination of judicial decisions in three different democratic countries, while the book also breaks new ground by studying attitudes towards political obligations, through the use of small focus groups.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book seeks to further the debate between ‘cognitivists’ and ‘non-cognitivists’ about the possibility and the nature of moral knowledge. The book is divided into four parts. Part I presents the ...
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This book seeks to further the debate between ‘cognitivists’ and ‘non-cognitivists’ about the possibility and the nature of moral knowledge. The book is divided into four parts. Part I presents the theoretical framework for the revision of cognitivism. Part II examines the challenge to the revised form of cognitivism developed from two sophisticated forms of non-cognitivist strategy: expressive/projective strategy and non-objectivism. Part III develops proposals for the solution of the problems described in Parts I and II. Part IV focuses on the work of John Rawls.Less
This book seeks to further the debate between ‘cognitivists’ and ‘non-cognitivists’ about the possibility and the nature of moral knowledge. The book is divided into four parts. Part I presents the theoretical framework for the revision of cognitivism. Part II examines the challenge to the revised form of cognitivism developed from two sophisticated forms of non-cognitivist strategy: expressive/projective strategy and non-objectivism. Part III develops proposals for the solution of the problems described in Parts I and II. Part IV focuses on the work of John Rawls.
Andrew Dobson (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294894
- eISBN:
- 9780191599064
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294891.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
Contributors to this edited book consider the normative issues at stake in the relationship between environmental sustainability and social justice. If future generations are owed justice, what ...
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Contributors to this edited book consider the normative issues at stake in the relationship between environmental sustainability and social justice. If future generations are owed justice, what should we bequeath them? Is ‘sustainability’ an appropriate medium for environmentalists to express their demands? Is environmental protection compatible with justice within generations? Is environmental sustainability a luxury when social peace has broken down? The contested nature of sustainable development is considered––is it a useful concept at all any longer? Is it reconcilable with capital accumulation? Liberal––particularly Rawlsian––and socialist notions of justice are tested against the demands of sustainability, and policy instruments for sustainability––such as environmental taxation––are examined for their distributive effects.Less
Contributors to this edited book consider the normative issues at stake in the relationship between environmental sustainability and social justice. If future generations are owed justice, what should we bequeath them? Is ‘sustainability’ an appropriate medium for environmentalists to express their demands? Is environmental protection compatible with justice within generations? Is environmental sustainability a luxury when social peace has broken down? The contested nature of sustainable development is considered––is it a useful concept at all any longer? Is it reconcilable with capital accumulation? Liberal––particularly Rawlsian––and socialist notions of justice are tested against the demands of sustainability, and policy instruments for sustainability––such as environmental taxation––are examined for their distributive effects.
Eamonn Callan
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292586
- eISBN:
- 9780191598913
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292589.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The problem of education in liberal democracies is to ensure the intergenerational continuity of their constitutive political ideals while remaining open to a diversity of conduct and belief that ...
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The problem of education in liberal democracies is to ensure the intergenerational continuity of their constitutive political ideals while remaining open to a diversity of conduct and belief that sometimes threatens those ideals. Creating Citizens addresses this problem. The book identifies both the principal aims of political education—liberal patriotism and the sense of justice—and the rights that limit their public pursuit. The public pursuit of these educational aims is properly constrained by deference to the rights of parents, and these are shown to have some independent moral weight underived from the rights of children. The liberal state's possible role in the sponsorship and the control of denominational school is discussed, as are the benefits and hazards of moral dialogue in morally diverse educational environments. The book draws heavily on John Rawls's theory of justice.Less
The problem of education in liberal democracies is to ensure the intergenerational continuity of their constitutive political ideals while remaining open to a diversity of conduct and belief that sometimes threatens those ideals. Creating Citizens addresses this problem. The book identifies both the principal aims of political education—liberal patriotism and the sense of justice—and the rights that limit their public pursuit. The public pursuit of these educational aims is properly constrained by deference to the rights of parents, and these are shown to have some independent moral weight underived from the rights of children. The liberal state's possible role in the sponsorship and the control of denominational school is discussed, as are the benefits and hazards of moral dialogue in morally diverse educational environments. The book draws heavily on John Rawls's theory of justice.
Matt Matravers
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198295730
- eISBN:
- 9780191599828
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295731.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This book attempts to answer the challenge of showing that morality is not a confidence trick or a fetish. It does so by arguing that moral norms are those that rational, self‐interested people could ...
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This book attempts to answer the challenge of showing that morality is not a confidence trick or a fetish. It does so by arguing that moral norms are those that rational, self‐interested people could accept. The problem is approached by asking by what right some people punish others, and by comparing recent developments in theories of distributive and retributive justice. The first part of the book considers retributive, utilitarian, and mixed theories of punishment. In the second part, recent theories of distributive justice, especially those of Rawls and Gauthier, are examined. It is argued that these theories cannot give an adequate account of punishment. In the final part, an argument is offered for a genuinely constructivist account of morality—constructivist in that it rejects any idea of objective, mind‐independent moral values and seeks instead to construct morality from non‐moral human concerns; genuinely constructivist in that, in contrast to Rawls, it does not take as a premise the equal moral worth of persons. The conclusion is that a genuine constructivism will show the need for, and justification of, punishment as intrinsic to morality itself.Less
This book attempts to answer the challenge of showing that morality is not a confidence trick or a fetish. It does so by arguing that moral norms are those that rational, self‐interested people could accept. The problem is approached by asking by what right some people punish others, and by comparing recent developments in theories of distributive and retributive justice. The first part of the book considers retributive, utilitarian, and mixed theories of punishment. In the second part, recent theories of distributive justice, especially those of Rawls and Gauthier, are examined. It is argued that these theories cannot give an adequate account of punishment. In the final part, an argument is offered for a genuinely constructivist account of morality—constructivist in that it rejects any idea of objective, mind‐independent moral values and seeks instead to construct morality from non‐moral human concerns; genuinely constructivist in that, in contrast to Rawls, it does not take as a premise the equal moral worth of persons. The conclusion is that a genuine constructivism will show the need for, and justification of, punishment as intrinsic to morality itself.
Margaret P. Battin, Leslie P. Francis, Jay A. Jacobson, and Charles B. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195335842
- eISBN:
- 9780199868926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335842.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter presents the full exposition of the PVV view: that ethical problems in infectious disease should be analyzed, and clinical practices, research agendas, and public policies developed, ...
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This chapter presents the full exposition of the PVV view: that ethical problems in infectious disease should be analyzed, and clinical practices, research agendas, and public policies developed, which always take into account the possibility that a person with communicable infectious disease is both victim and vector. The PVV view works on three levels. First is ordinary life in which people are more or less aware of their actual circumstances of illness, health, and risk. Second is the population-wide view, in which patterns of disease, special risks for sub-populations, and progress or failure with respect to the overall burden of infectious disease can be observed. Third is the view of the “way-station self,” who is always in some sense at unknown and unknowable risk of disease. This third perspective is a naturalized version of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance: a thought-experiment that asks what choices and practices people would want with respect to infectious disease in light of the reality that they are always at unknown and unknowable risk of disease. These perspectives are difficult to hold in view at the same time, but each is essential to analysis of the ethical issues raised by infectious disease.Less
This chapter presents the full exposition of the PVV view: that ethical problems in infectious disease should be analyzed, and clinical practices, research agendas, and public policies developed, which always take into account the possibility that a person with communicable infectious disease is both victim and vector. The PVV view works on three levels. First is ordinary life in which people are more or less aware of their actual circumstances of illness, health, and risk. Second is the population-wide view, in which patterns of disease, special risks for sub-populations, and progress or failure with respect to the overall burden of infectious disease can be observed. Third is the view of the “way-station self,” who is always in some sense at unknown and unknowable risk of disease. This third perspective is a naturalized version of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance: a thought-experiment that asks what choices and practices people would want with respect to infectious disease in light of the reality that they are always at unknown and unknowable risk of disease. These perspectives are difficult to hold in view at the same time, but each is essential to analysis of the ethical issues raised by infectious disease.
Jonathan Quong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199594870
- eISBN:
- 9780191723513
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199594870.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
A growing number of political philosophers favour a view called liberal perfectionism. According to this view, liberal political morality is characterized by a commitment to helping individuals lead ...
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A growing number of political philosophers favour a view called liberal perfectionism. According to this view, liberal political morality is characterized by a commitment to helping individuals lead autonomous lives and making other valuable choices. This book rejects this widely held view and offers an alternative account of liberal political morality. It argues that the liberal state should not be engaged in determining what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile life nor try to make sure that individuals live up to this ideal. Instead, it should remain neutral on the issue of the good life, and restrict itself to establishing the fair terms within which individuals can pursue their own beliefs about what gives value to their lives. The book thus defends a position known as political liberalism. The first part of the book subjects the liberal perfectionist position to critical scrutiny, advancing three major objections which raise serious doubts about the liberal perfectionist position with regard to autonomy, paternalism, and political legitimacy. The second part of the book presents and defends a distinctive version of political liberalism. In particular, it clarifies and develops political liberalism's central thesis: that political principles, in order to be legitimate, must be publicly justifiable to reasonable people. Drawing on the work of John Rawls, the author offers his own interpretation of this idea, and rebuts some of the main objections that have been pressed against it. In doing so, he provides novel arguments regarding the nature of an overlapping consensus, the structure of political justification, the idea of public reason, and the status of unreasonable persons.Less
A growing number of political philosophers favour a view called liberal perfectionism. According to this view, liberal political morality is characterized by a commitment to helping individuals lead autonomous lives and making other valuable choices. This book rejects this widely held view and offers an alternative account of liberal political morality. It argues that the liberal state should not be engaged in determining what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile life nor try to make sure that individuals live up to this ideal. Instead, it should remain neutral on the issue of the good life, and restrict itself to establishing the fair terms within which individuals can pursue their own beliefs about what gives value to their lives. The book thus defends a position known as political liberalism. The first part of the book subjects the liberal perfectionist position to critical scrutiny, advancing three major objections which raise serious doubts about the liberal perfectionist position with regard to autonomy, paternalism, and political legitimacy. The second part of the book presents and defends a distinctive version of political liberalism. In particular, it clarifies and develops political liberalism's central thesis: that political principles, in order to be legitimate, must be publicly justifiable to reasonable people. Drawing on the work of John Rawls, the author offers his own interpretation of this idea, and rebuts some of the main objections that have been pressed against it. In doing so, he provides novel arguments regarding the nature of an overlapping consensus, the structure of political justification, the idea of public reason, and the status of unreasonable persons.
John E. Roemer
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281688
- eISBN:
- 9780191603747
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281688.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This essay considers the role of impartiality in theories of distributive justice. Impartiality is modelled by Rawls in his famous thought experiment of a veil of ignorance, where individuals reason ...
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This essay considers the role of impartiality in theories of distributive justice. Impartiality is modelled by Rawls in his famous thought experiment of a veil of ignorance, where individuals reason about principles of justice without knowing fundamental aspects of themselves — such as talent or family background. It is argued that the veil of ignorance delivers recommendations that are inconsistent with prioritarianism, that is, the view that priority should be given to ameliorating the disadvantage of the worst off. Hence, prioritarianism, which is after all far weaker than strict egalitarianism, cannot be justified by appeal to a veil of ignorance. The veil of ignorance achieves impartiality, but impartiality needs to be conjoined with a principle of solidarity in order to justify the redistribution of wealth. The resource allocation rules that jointly satisfy impartiality, priority, and solidarity are described.Less
This essay considers the role of impartiality in theories of distributive justice. Impartiality is modelled by Rawls in his famous thought experiment of a veil of ignorance, where individuals reason about principles of justice without knowing fundamental aspects of themselves — such as talent or family background. It is argued that the veil of ignorance delivers recommendations that are inconsistent with prioritarianism, that is, the view that priority should be given to ameliorating the disadvantage of the worst off. Hence, prioritarianism, which is after all far weaker than strict egalitarianism, cannot be justified by appeal to a veil of ignorance. The veil of ignorance achieves impartiality, but impartiality needs to be conjoined with a principle of solidarity in order to justify the redistribution of wealth. The resource allocation rules that jointly satisfy impartiality, priority, and solidarity are described.
T. M. Scanlon
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281688
- eISBN:
- 9780191603747
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281688.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This essay considers the disagreement between Cohen and Rawls on the question of whether individuals should be held responsible for their tastes and preferences. It notes the difference in principle, ...
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This essay considers the disagreement between Cohen and Rawls on the question of whether individuals should be held responsible for their tastes and preferences. It notes the difference in principle, since the primary goods measure of Rawls holds individuals responsible for their choices as to how to deploy these goods, whereas Cohen’s aim is to equalize access to advantage, and thereby the satisfaction of persons, however costly. It is argued that since Cohen concedes that practical matters of application might compromise egalitarian principle, the two thinkers might be, in practice, not that dissimilar.Less
This essay considers the disagreement between Cohen and Rawls on the question of whether individuals should be held responsible for their tastes and preferences. It notes the difference in principle, since the primary goods measure of Rawls holds individuals responsible for their choices as to how to deploy these goods, whereas Cohen’s aim is to equalize access to advantage, and thereby the satisfaction of persons, however costly. It is argued that since Cohen concedes that practical matters of application might compromise egalitarian principle, the two thinkers might be, in practice, not that dissimilar.
Samuel Scheffler
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281688
- eISBN:
- 9780191603747
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281688.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This essay focuses on Cohen’s recent arguments for extending the scope of justice beyond Rawls’s formulation. It argues for the merits of Rawls’s argument that the primary subject of justice should ...
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This essay focuses on Cohen’s recent arguments for extending the scope of justice beyond Rawls’s formulation. It argues for the merits of Rawls’s argument that the primary subject of justice should be restricted to social institutions. It contends that whether or not one agrees with Rawls’s view of what should count as the subject of justice, Cohen is wrong to understand the upshot of this to be either a paltry measure of redistribution or the accommodation of the untrammelled pursuit of selfish interests.Less
This essay focuses on Cohen’s recent arguments for extending the scope of justice beyond Rawls’s formulation. It argues for the merits of Rawls’s argument that the primary subject of justice should be restricted to social institutions. It contends that whether or not one agrees with Rawls’s view of what should count as the subject of justice, Cohen is wrong to understand the upshot of this to be either a paltry measure of redistribution or the accommodation of the untrammelled pursuit of selfish interests.
Jonathan Quong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199594870
- eISBN:
- 9780191723513
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199594870.003.0012
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
The Conclusion briefly returns to the main questions posed at the outset of the book, and offers two broad considerations in favour of a liberalism that is political and neither perfectionist nor ...
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The Conclusion briefly returns to the main questions posed at the outset of the book, and offers two broad considerations in favour of a liberalism that is political and neither perfectionist nor comprehensive.Less
The Conclusion briefly returns to the main questions posed at the outset of the book, and offers two broad considerations in favour of a liberalism that is political and neither perfectionist nor comprehensive.
Matthew Clayton
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199268948
- eISBN:
- 9780191603693
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199268940.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter sets out the liberal ideals of justice and legitimacy that form the basis of the conception of upbringing defended in later chapters. It begins with a summary of Rawls’s conception of ...
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This chapter sets out the liberal ideals of justice and legitimacy that form the basis of the conception of upbringing defended in later chapters. It begins with a summary of Rawls’s conception of political morality, then discusses the different dimensions of liberal autonomy and summarizes Rawls’s case for anti-perfectionist justice. Section 3 considers certain objections to Rawls’s political liberalism and against Rawls, asserting the view that autonomy should be treated as valuable in non-political lives. Section 4 sets out a conception of advantage with which to judge the demands of justice, drawing on Rawls’s account of the interests of citizens and Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance scheme. Finally, the questions addressed in later chapters are clarified by reference to recent discussions of the issue of the site of political morality offered by G.A. Cohen and Andrew Williams.Less
This chapter sets out the liberal ideals of justice and legitimacy that form the basis of the conception of upbringing defended in later chapters. It begins with a summary of Rawls’s conception of political morality, then discusses the different dimensions of liberal autonomy and summarizes Rawls’s case for anti-perfectionist justice. Section 3 considers certain objections to Rawls’s political liberalism and against Rawls, asserting the view that autonomy should be treated as valuable in non-political lives. Section 4 sets out a conception of advantage with which to judge the demands of justice, drawing on Rawls’s account of the interests of citizens and Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance scheme. Finally, the questions addressed in later chapters are clarified by reference to recent discussions of the issue of the site of political morality offered by G.A. Cohen and Andrew Williams.
Matthew Clayton
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199268948
- eISBN:
- 9780191603693
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199268940.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Can parents legitimately enrol their child into controversial religious practices or disputed conceptions of human well being? Many liberals assert that they can, provided that this enrolment does ...
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Can parents legitimately enrol their child into controversial religious practices or disputed conceptions of human well being? Many liberals assert that they can, provided that this enrolment does not jeopardize the child’s development of autonomy. This chapter defends the view that the ideal of individual autonomy supports a negative answer to the question. It draws a distinction between autonomy as an end-state to be achieved, and autonomy as a precondition for legitimate enrolment into controversial ethical practices. The argument begins with a defence of the view that parental conduct must conform to certain aspects of Rawls’s ideal of public reason, since it is relevantly like political activity. The intrinsic and instrumental merits of the precondition conception of autonomy are discussed. The chapter closes with a critique of certain arguments for enrolment, which emphasize intimacy or the child’s development of the capacity for autonomous judgement.Less
Can parents legitimately enrol their child into controversial religious practices or disputed conceptions of human well being? Many liberals assert that they can, provided that this enrolment does not jeopardize the child’s development of autonomy. This chapter defends the view that the ideal of individual autonomy supports a negative answer to the question. It draws a distinction between autonomy as an end-state to be achieved, and autonomy as a precondition for legitimate enrolment into controversial ethical practices. The argument begins with a defence of the view that parental conduct must conform to certain aspects of Rawls’s ideal of public reason, since it is relevantly like political activity. The intrinsic and instrumental merits of the precondition conception of autonomy are discussed. The chapter closes with a critique of certain arguments for enrolment, which emphasize intimacy or the child’s development of the capacity for autonomous judgement.
Andrew Mason
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199264414
- eISBN:
- 9780191718489
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264414.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter examines Rawls' account of fair equality of opportunity. Rawls argues that fair equality of opportunity requires not only ‘careers to be open to talents’, but also that those with the ...
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This chapter examines Rawls' account of fair equality of opportunity. Rawls argues that fair equality of opportunity requires not only ‘careers to be open to talents’, but also that those with the same talents and ability and willingness to use these talents should have equal chance of success. Whilst defending Rawls' account against some influential criticisms that have been levelled against it, it is argued that the idea that fair equality of opportunity is lexically prior to the difference principle cannot be justified.Less
This chapter examines Rawls' account of fair equality of opportunity. Rawls argues that fair equality of opportunity requires not only ‘careers to be open to talents’, but also that those with the same talents and ability and willingness to use these talents should have equal chance of success. Whilst defending Rawls' account against some influential criticisms that have been levelled against it, it is argued that the idea that fair equality of opportunity is lexically prior to the difference principle cannot be justified.
Kok-Chor Tan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199588855
- eISBN:
- 9780191738586
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588855.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book is a critical survey of the following three questions of egalitarian distributive justice. where does distributive equality matter? Why does it matter? And among whom does it matter? These ...
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This book is a critical survey of the following three questions of egalitarian distributive justice. where does distributive equality matter? Why does it matter? And among whom does it matter? These questions may be referred to, respectively, as the questions of the site, ground, and scope of distributive equality. The book defends an institutional site for egalitarian justice, a luck eglitarian ideal of why equality matters, and the idea that the scope of distributive justice is global. The account of equality proposed in this work may be described as “institutional luck egalitarianism” that is global in scope.Less
This book is a critical survey of the following three questions of egalitarian distributive justice. where does distributive equality matter? Why does it matter? And among whom does it matter? These questions may be referred to, respectively, as the questions of the site, ground, and scope of distributive equality. The book defends an institutional site for egalitarian justice, a luck eglitarian ideal of why equality matters, and the idea that the scope of distributive justice is global. The account of equality proposed in this work may be described as “institutional luck egalitarianism” that is global in scope.
William Talbott
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195173475
- eISBN:
- 9780199835331
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195173473.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
In this book, William Talbott builds on the work of J.S. Mill, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas to develop a new equilibrium model for moral reasoning, in which moral reasoning is primarily bottom-up, ...
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In this book, William Talbott builds on the work of J.S. Mill, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas to develop a new equilibrium model for moral reasoning, in which moral reasoning is primarily bottom-up, from judgments about particular actual and hypothetical cases to norms or principles that best explain the particular judgments. Employing the equilibrium model, Talbott builds on the work of John Rawls, Amartya Sen, and Henry Shue to explain how, over the course of history, human beings have learned to adopt a distinctively moral standpoint from which it is possible to make reliable, though not infallible, universal judgments of right and wrong. He explains how this distinctively moral standpoint has led to the discovery of the moral importance of nine basic human rights. The book is constructed around pivotal examples. Talbott uses the example of Bartolomé de Las Casas and his opposition to the Spanish colonists’ treatment of the American natives in the 16th century to illustrate the possibility of attaining a universal moral standpoint. He uses the example of the development of women's rights as a microcosm of the development of basic human rights. He argues that assertions of basic human rights are almost always a response to oppressive norms justified by self-reinforcing paternalism. Talbott uses examples from Marxist dictatorships to show the importance of basic human rights in solving what he refers to as the reliable feedback problem and the appropriate responsiveness problem for governments. He uses Sen’s research on famines and psychological research on the ultimatum game and other related games to explain how individual fairness judgments from the moral standpoint make rights-respecting democracies self-improving self-regulating systems that become more just over time. Undoubtedly, the most controversial issue raised by the claim of universal human rights is the issue of moral relativism. How can the advocate of universal rights avoid being a moral imperialist? In this book, Talbott shows how to defend basic individual rights from a universal moral point of view that is not imperialistic. Talbott avoids moral imperialism, first, by insisting that all of us, himself included, have moral blindspots and that we usually depend on others to help us to identify those blindspots; second, by emphasizing the importance of avoiding moral paternalism. In the book, Talbott develops a new consequentialist account of the importance of the basic human rights, which he employs to augment the more familiar nonconsequentialist accounts.Less
In this book, William Talbott builds on the work of J.S. Mill, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas to develop a new equilibrium model for moral reasoning, in which moral reasoning is primarily bottom-up, from judgments about particular actual and hypothetical cases to norms or principles that best explain the particular judgments. Employing the equilibrium model, Talbott builds on the work of John Rawls, Amartya Sen, and Henry Shue to explain how, over the course of history, human beings have learned to adopt a distinctively moral standpoint from which it is possible to make reliable, though not infallible, universal judgments of right and wrong. He explains how this distinctively moral standpoint has led to the discovery of the moral importance of nine basic human rights. The book is constructed around pivotal examples. Talbott uses the example of Bartolomé de Las Casas and his opposition to the Spanish colonists’ treatment of the American natives in the 16th century to illustrate the possibility of attaining a universal moral standpoint. He uses the example of the development of women's rights as a microcosm of the development of basic human rights. He argues that assertions of basic human rights are almost always a response to oppressive norms justified by self-reinforcing paternalism. Talbott uses examples from Marxist dictatorships to show the importance of basic human rights in solving what he refers to as the reliable feedback problem and the appropriate responsiveness problem for governments. He uses Sen’s research on famines and psychological research on the ultimatum game and other related games to explain how individual fairness judgments from the moral standpoint make rights-respecting democracies self-improving self-regulating systems that become more just over time. Undoubtedly, the most controversial issue raised by the claim of universal human rights is the issue of moral relativism. How can the advocate of universal rights avoid being a moral imperialist? In this book, Talbott shows how to defend basic individual rights from a universal moral point of view that is not imperialistic. Talbott avoids moral imperialism, first, by insisting that all of us, himself included, have moral blindspots and that we usually depend on others to help us to identify those blindspots; second, by emphasizing the importance of avoiding moral paternalism. In the book, Talbott develops a new consequentialist account of the importance of the basic human rights, which he employs to augment the more familiar nonconsequentialist accounts.
Nicholas Rescher
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198236016
- eISBN:
- 9780191679162
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236016.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, General
This book presents a critical reaction against two currently influential tendencies of thought. On the one hand, it rejects the facile relativism that pervades contemporary social and academic life. ...
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This book presents a critical reaction against two currently influential tendencies of thought. On the one hand, it rejects the facile relativism that pervades contemporary social and academic life. On the other hand, it opposes the rationalism inherent in new-contractarian theory — both in the idealized communicative-contract version promoted in continental European political philosophy by Jürgen Habermas, and in the idealized social-contract version of the theory promoted in the Anglo-American context by John Rawls. Against such tendencies, this pluralist approach takes a more realistic and pragmatic line, eschewing the convenient recourse of idealization in cognitive and practical matters. Instead of a utopianism that looks to a uniquely perfect order that would prevail under ideal conditions, it advocates incremental improvements within the framework or arrangements that none of us will deem perfect, but that all of us ‘can live with’. Such an approach replaces the yearning for an unattainable consensus with the institution of pragmatic arrangements in which the community will acquiesce — not through agreeing on their optimality, but through a shared recognition among the dissonant parties that the available options are even worse.Less
This book presents a critical reaction against two currently influential tendencies of thought. On the one hand, it rejects the facile relativism that pervades contemporary social and academic life. On the other hand, it opposes the rationalism inherent in new-contractarian theory — both in the idealized communicative-contract version promoted in continental European political philosophy by Jürgen Habermas, and in the idealized social-contract version of the theory promoted in the Anglo-American context by John Rawls. Against such tendencies, this pluralist approach takes a more realistic and pragmatic line, eschewing the convenient recourse of idealization in cognitive and practical matters. Instead of a utopianism that looks to a uniquely perfect order that would prevail under ideal conditions, it advocates incremental improvements within the framework or arrangements that none of us will deem perfect, but that all of us ‘can live with’. Such an approach replaces the yearning for an unattainable consensus with the institution of pragmatic arrangements in which the community will acquiesce — not through agreeing on their optimality, but through a shared recognition among the dissonant parties that the available options are even worse.
Pavlos Eleftheriadis
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199545285
- eISBN:
- 9780191719899
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545285.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
How can there be rights in law? We learn from moral philosophy that rights protect persons in a special way because they have peremptory force. But how can this aspect of practical reason be captured ...
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How can there be rights in law? We learn from moral philosophy that rights protect persons in a special way because they have peremptory force. But how can this aspect of practical reason be captured by the law? For many leading legal philosophers the legal order is constructed on the foundations of factual sources and with materials provided by technical argument. For this ‘legal positivist’ school of jurisprudence, the law endorses rights by some official act suitably communicated. But how can any such legal enactment recreate the proper force of rights? Rights take their meaning and importance from moral reflection, which only expresses itself in practical reasoning. This puzzle about rights invites a reconsideration of the nature and methods of legal doctrine and of jurisprudence itself. Legal Rights argues that the theory of law and legal concepts is a project of moral and political philosophy, the best account of which is to be found in the social contract tradition. It outlines an argument according to which legal rights can be justified before equal citizens under the constraints of public reason. The place of rights in law is explained by the unique position of law as an essential component of the civil condition and a necessary condition for freedom.Less
How can there be rights in law? We learn from moral philosophy that rights protect persons in a special way because they have peremptory force. But how can this aspect of practical reason be captured by the law? For many leading legal philosophers the legal order is constructed on the foundations of factual sources and with materials provided by technical argument. For this ‘legal positivist’ school of jurisprudence, the law endorses rights by some official act suitably communicated. But how can any such legal enactment recreate the proper force of rights? Rights take their meaning and importance from moral reflection, which only expresses itself in practical reasoning. This puzzle about rights invites a reconsideration of the nature and methods of legal doctrine and of jurisprudence itself. Legal Rights argues that the theory of law and legal concepts is a project of moral and political philosophy, the best account of which is to be found in the social contract tradition. It outlines an argument according to which legal rights can be justified before equal citizens under the constraints of public reason. The place of rights in law is explained by the unique position of law as an essential component of the civil condition and a necessary condition for freedom.
