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This chapter provides a general introduction to the concept of rules of engagement (ROE) and similar rules on the use of force. It discusses the basic principles and purposes of ROE in military operations and presents a classical model of ROE. In that model, the influences of operational, political, and legal aspects of the use of force are combined to produce the basis for ROE. The chapter also discusses derivative instructions, such as ‘soldier’s cards’, and special forms of ROE. Finally, the chapter discusses the operational planning process to explain the placement of ROE in the overall military operational planning procedures and concepts.

This chapter provides an introduction to and summary of the first attempt at measuring European business performance over the entire twentieth century on a common basis of data. In doing so, it adopts a new approach to European business history. Based on a single sample of 1,225 companies, from eight European economies (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Sweden, and Finland), it describes the basic questions dealt with by the various authors of this book in their chapters. Performance has been measured in terms of return on equity (ROE) and holding return (HR), thus providing a complementary measure of profitability, the former from the firm’s perspective, the latter from the investor’s perspective. The findings are summarized and compared. The results are sometimes surprising, at once confirming and challenging widely held assumptions regarding business performance—regarding strategy and structure, ownership and control, old and new industries, and emerging and advanced economies.

Belgian capitalism during the twentieth century was characterized by important changes in composition and ownership. Belgian capitalists around 1900 were dominating the home country and were heavily investing abroad, while around 2000 they were pushed into a minority position, with foreign multinationals having become dominant players. The independence of the Belgian Congo (1960) and the takeover of the Société Générale by the French Suez company (1988) were important steps in this direction. Activities were changing too. Whereas around 1900 ‘old industries’ such as steel, coal, and textiles dominated the Belgian economy, their position declined. Around 2000, it was rather telecommunication, gas and electricity, retail distribution, and petrochemical industries that played a major role. Remarkably, although return on equity (ROE) performance throughout the century had its ups and downs, it remained by and large remarkably stable, with ROE (median) around 10–12%.

This chapter provides a comprehensive explanation of the role of rules of engagement (ROE) in contemporary military operations. It includes a discussion of how ROE evolved over time, an explanation of the central ROE doctrine in U.S. military practice—the Standing Rules of Engagement, and an explanation of how ROE are adapted to synchronize legal authority with mission dictates. It also explains the relationship between the right of self-defense and ROE, an explanation that is essential to truly understand use-of-force paradigms in contemporary military operations. The chapter then explains how ROE are tailored to different operational contexts, and how commanders and their operational staffs “negotiate” the actual mission-specific ROE in a variety of contexts.

This chapter provides a theoretical bridge between the development of ROE for various missions and the operational and tactical implementation of these vital use-of- force control measures. Because this implementation process will often occur in the context of a multinational mission, the chapter addresses some of the unique challenges associated with implementation, specifically focusing on the NATO ROE model. The chapter explains how the same influences that drive ROE development in U.S. practice also influence NATO and multinational ROE, but then explains the added complexity of deconfliction among the various troop-contributing nations. The chapter then shifts to explaining how ROE are implemented through training and the mission planning and execution process. Ultimately, the chapter provides insight into how national differences are mitigated through a comprehensive and forward- thinking process that maximizes common ground and tailors missions to individual national capacities.

The U.S. military Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) restrict the use of force in armed conflict to either self-defense or “mission-specific” rules of engagement, which refer to the use of force against members of enemy armed forces or organized armed groups that have been “declared hostile.” This bifurcation of authority works well in an international armed conflict, where the enemy force is uniformed and easily distinguished. In these circumstances, the overwhelming number of engagements are against identified hostile forces. In many non-international armed conflicts, however, combatants actively attempt to camouflage their status, and U.S. forces find themselves engaging enemy forces under a self-defense framework. This creates problems. Consider, for example, a situation where three individuals of unknown affiliation launch an attack against a U.S. military convoy in Afghanistan. After a short engagement, the attackers get in a van and speed away from the attack site. The U.S. convoy is disabled, but an unmanned aerial vehicle tracks the van as it retreats into the desert. Thirty minutes later an AH-64 Apache attack helicopter arrives on scene above the still-retreating van. Can the Apache attack the vehicle? The van is retreating and poses no threat, thus self-defense principles would not allow for the use of force, despite the fact that the occupants are clearly directly participating in hostilities. This chapter addresses three questions: Why are the SROE drafted in this manner? What is the basis in the law for the SROE’s approach to self-defense? What are the problems presented by this approach?

This chapter argues that the US-led war in Vietnam (1955–1975) paved the way for institutional changes in the US military, including the establishment of the US Law of War Program, which later precipitated the emergence of a new doctrinal approach to the laws of war called ‘operational law’. Military lawyers emerged from the Vietnam War better equipped and with a formal mandate to advise military commanders on the legality of targeting operations. Military lawyers performed a wide range of duties in Vietnam, especially around Prisoner of War (POW) issues, and were deployed in unprecedented numbers. Military lawyers were not involved in targeting, neither during ‘Operation Rolling Thunder’ nor ‘Operation Linebacker’, but the Vietnam War in general and the My Lai massacre of 1968 in particular helped to create the conditions for their involvement in subsequent wars.