Gary E. Varner
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199758784
- eISBN:
- 9780199949465
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199758784.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
This introductory chapter discusses the concept of personhood, and provides a general overview of Hare’s theory. In day-to-day speech, “person” is often used synonymously with “human being,” but in ...
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This introductory chapter discusses the concept of personhood, and provides a general overview of Hare’s theory. In day-to-day speech, “person” is often used synonymously with “human being,” but in philosophical discussions of personhood, persons are defined as individuals who deserve special treatment or respect in virtue of having certain cognitive capacities. The burden of proof is on the proponent of a particular definition to show why having those cognitive capacities qualifies one for special moral respect. Hare distinguishes between what he calls “critical level” moral thinking, which is explicitly utilitarian, and what he calls “intuitive level” moral thinking, which follows sets of rules that may be very non-utilitarian in flavor. The overview of Hare’s theory in this chapter emphasizes the place of animals and how, in particular, Hare’s two level utilitarianism can incorporate aspects of both animal welfare and animal rights views.Less
This introductory chapter discusses the concept of personhood, and provides a general overview of Hare’s theory. In day-to-day speech, “person” is often used synonymously with “human being,” but in philosophical discussions of personhood, persons are defined as individuals who deserve special treatment or respect in virtue of having certain cognitive capacities. The burden of proof is on the proponent of a particular definition to show why having those cognitive capacities qualifies one for special moral respect. Hare distinguishes between what he calls “critical level” moral thinking, which is explicitly utilitarian, and what he calls “intuitive level” moral thinking, which follows sets of rules that may be very non-utilitarian in flavor. The overview of Hare’s theory in this chapter emphasizes the place of animals and how, in particular, Hare’s two level utilitarianism can incorporate aspects of both animal welfare and animal rights views.
Gary E. Varner
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199758784
- eISBN:
- 9780199949465
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199758784.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
This chapter provides a summary assessment of Hare’s theory, both as an empirical account of actual human moral thinking and as a normative theory of how we ought to think and act. The chapter argues ...
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This chapter provides a summary assessment of Hare’s theory, both as an empirical account of actual human moral thinking and as a normative theory of how we ought to think and act. The chapter argues that the empirical adequacy of Hare’s theory is bolstered by its ability to explain the diversity of moral views and by the ubiquity of the golden rule, and the chapter defends its normative adequacy by responding in detail to a range of objections. One objection concerns the inability of people to simultaneously employ both explicitly utilitarian thinking and a system of nonutilitarian intuitive level rules, but the chapter points to recent empirical research suggesting that they do exactly that. The other objections are variations on the claim that the theory leads to counter intuitive conclusions on a range of cases, but the chapter shows how Hare can give plausible responses to the full range of these cases.Less
This chapter provides a summary assessment of Hare’s theory, both as an empirical account of actual human moral thinking and as a normative theory of how we ought to think and act. The chapter argues that the empirical adequacy of Hare’s theory is bolstered by its ability to explain the diversity of moral views and by the ubiquity of the golden rule, and the chapter defends its normative adequacy by responding in detail to a range of objections. One objection concerns the inability of people to simultaneously employ both explicitly utilitarian thinking and a system of nonutilitarian intuitive level rules, but the chapter points to recent empirical research suggesting that they do exactly that. The other objections are variations on the claim that the theory leads to counter intuitive conclusions on a range of cases, but the chapter shows how Hare can give plausible responses to the full range of these cases.
Gary E. Varner
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199758784
- eISBN:
- 9780199949465
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199758784.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
R.M. Hare was one of the most important ethical theorists in the second half of the 20th century, and one of his graduate students, Peter Singer, became famous for his writings on animals and ...
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R.M. Hare was one of the most important ethical theorists in the second half of the 20th century, and one of his graduate students, Peter Singer, became famous for his writings on animals and personhood. Singer now says that he endorses Hare’s “two-level utilitarianism,” and he has invoked the theory’s distinction between “critical thinking” and thinking in terms of “intuitive level rules” in response to certain objections to his conclusions on several issues. For his part, however, Hare never published a systematic treatment of how his theory applies to issues in animal ethics, and he avoided talking about the concept of “personhood.” This book defends the moral legitimacy of distinguishing among “persons,” “nearpersons,” and “the merely sentient” within Harean two-level utilitarianism, illustrates the implications of this distinction by applying the resulting ethical system to some issues regarding our treatment of animals, and emphasizes how the results contrast with the more abolitionist conclusions reached by Singer on these same issues. In the process, the book presents a new philosophical defense of two-level utilitarianism and its metaethical foundation (universal prescriptivism), and it significantly expands Hare’s account of how “intuitive level rules” function in moral thinking, based on recent empirical research. The book also draws heavily on empirical research on consciousness and cognition in non-human animals as a way of approaching the question of which animals, if any, are “persons,” or at least “near-persons.”Less
R.M. Hare was one of the most important ethical theorists in the second half of the 20th century, and one of his graduate students, Peter Singer, became famous for his writings on animals and personhood. Singer now says that he endorses Hare’s “two-level utilitarianism,” and he has invoked the theory’s distinction between “critical thinking” and thinking in terms of “intuitive level rules” in response to certain objections to his conclusions on several issues. For his part, however, Hare never published a systematic treatment of how his theory applies to issues in animal ethics, and he avoided talking about the concept of “personhood.” This book defends the moral legitimacy of distinguishing among “persons,” “nearpersons,” and “the merely sentient” within Harean two-level utilitarianism, illustrates the implications of this distinction by applying the resulting ethical system to some issues regarding our treatment of animals, and emphasizes how the results contrast with the more abolitionist conclusions reached by Singer on these same issues. In the process, the book presents a new philosophical defense of two-level utilitarianism and its metaethical foundation (universal prescriptivism), and it significantly expands Hare’s account of how “intuitive level rules” function in moral thinking, based on recent empirical research. The book also draws heavily on empirical research on consciousness and cognition in non-human animals as a way of approaching the question of which animals, if any, are “persons,” or at least “near-persons.”
Gary E. Varner
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199758784
- eISBN:
- 9780199949465
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199758784.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
Hare argues that all moral thinking is ultimately utilitarian, because moral judgements have three logical properties that, taken together, force us to think like utilitarians. At the same time, he ...
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Hare argues that all moral thinking is ultimately utilitarian, because moral judgements have three logical properties that, taken together, force us to think like utilitarians. At the same time, he argues that good utilitarian reasons for not using explicitly utilitarian thinking in most normal, day-to-day situations. For these reasons, Hare’s is a two level version of utilitarianism: it embraces, in addition to explicitly utilitarian thinking at what Hare calls “the critical level,” what he calls “intuitive level” thinking for normal, day-to-day decision making. This chapter focuses on the logical properties of critical level thinking: universalizability, overridingness, and (in Hare’s special sense) prescriptivity, and Hare’s argument that these three properties together force us to think like utilitarians. I give both an informal proof this, based on the familiar golden rule and a formal proof based on a Harean analysis of the three properties, and I respond to two key objections.Less
Hare argues that all moral thinking is ultimately utilitarian, because moral judgements have three logical properties that, taken together, force us to think like utilitarians. At the same time, he argues that good utilitarian reasons for not using explicitly utilitarian thinking in most normal, day-to-day situations. For these reasons, Hare’s is a two level version of utilitarianism: it embraces, in addition to explicitly utilitarian thinking at what Hare calls “the critical level,” what he calls “intuitive level” thinking for normal, day-to-day decision making. This chapter focuses on the logical properties of critical level thinking: universalizability, overridingness, and (in Hare’s special sense) prescriptivity, and Hare’s argument that these three properties together force us to think like utilitarians. I give both an informal proof this, based on the familiar golden rule and a formal proof based on a Harean analysis of the three properties, and I respond to two key objections.
Simon Glendinning
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748624706
- eISBN:
- 9780748671885
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748624706.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
A key claim of the book is that the idea of Continental philosophy has its roots in analytic philosophy. This chapter engages with this theme by exploring texts that belong centrally to the ...
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A key claim of the book is that the idea of Continental philosophy has its roots in analytic philosophy. This chapter engages with this theme by exploring texts that belong centrally to the development of this analytic idea: texts which have strongly affirmed the idea of, and so cultivated the reality of, a gulf-stricken philosophical culture. The aim is to make clear why it came about that Continental philosophy became the analytic tag for what must be excluded from a ‘healthy’ philosophical culture. The main texts explored in this chapter are by Gilbert Ryle, R.M. Hare, and Geoffrey Warnock. These texts make it clear that Continental philosophy is not a style or method of philosophy, nor even a set of such styles or methods, but, first of all, the Other of analytic philosophy: a free-floating construction which gives analytic philosophy the illusory assurance that it has methodologically secured itself from ‘sophistry and illusion’.Less
A key claim of the book is that the idea of Continental philosophy has its roots in analytic philosophy. This chapter engages with this theme by exploring texts that belong centrally to the development of this analytic idea: texts which have strongly affirmed the idea of, and so cultivated the reality of, a gulf-stricken philosophical culture. The aim is to make clear why it came about that Continental philosophy became the analytic tag for what must be excluded from a ‘healthy’ philosophical culture. The main texts explored in this chapter are by Gilbert Ryle, R.M. Hare, and Geoffrey Warnock. These texts make it clear that Continental philosophy is not a style or method of philosophy, nor even a set of such styles or methods, but, first of all, the Other of analytic philosophy: a free-floating construction which gives analytic philosophy the illusory assurance that it has methodologically secured itself from ‘sophistry and illusion’.
Thomas L. Carson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577415
- eISBN:
- 9780191722813
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577415.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter develops a theory of moral reasoning in the form of rationality conditions for moral judgments. The chapter argues that moral judges must be: 1) consistent, 2) adequately informed by ...
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This chapter develops a theory of moral reasoning in the form of rationality conditions for moral judgments. The chapter argues that moral judges must be: 1) consistent, 2) adequately informed by knowledge of relevant facts (this requires vividly understanding relevant considerations, including the feelings of others), and 3) able to reason properly and have properly functioning cognitive abilities. The chapter argues that requirements of consistency commit us to the following version of the golden rule: “If I think it would be morally permissible for someone to do a certain act to another person, then I must not object to someone doing the same act to me (or someone I love) in relevantly similar circumstances.” The chapter answers several well-known objections to the golden rule and illustrate how it can be applied to cases.Less
This chapter develops a theory of moral reasoning in the form of rationality conditions for moral judgments. The chapter argues that moral judges must be: 1) consistent, 2) adequately informed by knowledge of relevant facts (this requires vividly understanding relevant considerations, including the feelings of others), and 3) able to reason properly and have properly functioning cognitive abilities. The chapter argues that requirements of consistency commit us to the following version of the golden rule: “If I think it would be morally permissible for someone to do a certain act to another person, then I must not object to someone doing the same act to me (or someone I love) in relevantly similar circumstances.” The chapter answers several well-known objections to the golden rule and illustrate how it can be applied to cases.
Gary E. Varner
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199758784
- eISBN:
- 9780199949465
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199758784.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
This chapter surveys what Peter Singer has said about the “replaceability” of non-persons, emphasizing that there are problems with each of several different accounts he has offered and how these ...
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This chapter surveys what Peter Singer has said about the “replaceability” of non-persons, emphasizing that there are problems with each of several different accounts he has offered and how these problems can be addressed in the context of a Harean, two level utilitarianism. It also takes up the questions of what the optimal populations of humans and animals would be, and the related problem of Parfit’s “repugnant conclusion.” The chapter ends with a more detailed consideration of the problem of marginal cases, which was initially treated at the end of chapter seven.Less
This chapter surveys what Peter Singer has said about the “replaceability” of non-persons, emphasizing that there are problems with each of several different accounts he has offered and how these problems can be addressed in the context of a Harean, two level utilitarianism. It also takes up the questions of what the optimal populations of humans and animals would be, and the related problem of Parfit’s “repugnant conclusion.” The chapter ends with a more detailed consideration of the problem of marginal cases, which was initially treated at the end of chapter seven.
Gary E. Varner
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199758784
- eISBN:
- 9780199949465
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199758784.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
This brief concluding chapter compares and contrasts the Harean perspective on animal ethics developed in this book with the views of Peter Singer, who wrote his dissertation with Hare. Singer’s ...
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This brief concluding chapter compares and contrasts the Harean perspective on animal ethics developed in this book with the views of Peter Singer, who wrote his dissertation with Hare. Singer’s defense of utilitarianism is similar to Hare’s and Singer has appealed to Hare’s distinction between “intuitive level” thinking and explicitly utilitarian “critical thinking” in response to various objections. Yet Singer’s practical conclusions diverge in several ways from the Harean analysis presented in this book.Less
This brief concluding chapter compares and contrasts the Harean perspective on animal ethics developed in this book with the views of Peter Singer, who wrote his dissertation with Hare. Singer’s defense of utilitarianism is similar to Hare’s and Singer has appealed to Hare’s distinction between “intuitive level” thinking and explicitly utilitarian “critical thinking” in response to various objections. Yet Singer’s practical conclusions diverge in several ways from the Harean analysis presented in this book.
Gary E. Varner
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199758784
- eISBN:
- 9780199949465
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199758784.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
Hare argues that good utilitarian reasons can be given for not thinking like utilitarians in most normal situations, where several different kinds of rules should be adhered to. This chapter focuses ...
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Hare argues that good utilitarian reasons can be given for not thinking like utilitarians in most normal situations, where several different kinds of rules should be adhered to. This chapter focuses on this “intuitive level thinking,” emphasizing the complications that it introduces into a utilitarian analysis of a situation, and how the resulting subtleties bring a utilitarian analysis closer to common sense. There are four categories of such rules: the common morality of a society, which are not formally stated but which are widely embraced and understood as binding on all members; codes of professional ethics, which are explicitly stated but understood to be binding only on members of particular professions; laws, which are both explicitly stated and binding on all; and personal morality, which is binding only on the individual and may or may not be formally stated.Less
Hare argues that good utilitarian reasons can be given for not thinking like utilitarians in most normal situations, where several different kinds of rules should be adhered to. This chapter focuses on this “intuitive level thinking,” emphasizing the complications that it introduces into a utilitarian analysis of a situation, and how the resulting subtleties bring a utilitarian analysis closer to common sense. There are four categories of such rules: the common morality of a society, which are not formally stated but which are widely embraced and understood as binding on all members; codes of professional ethics, which are explicitly stated but understood to be binding only on members of particular professions; laws, which are both explicitly stated and binding on all; and personal morality, which is binding only on the individual and may or may not be formally stated.
Rosalind Hursthouse
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199247998
- eISBN:
- 9780191597756
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247994.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Some familiar objections to the very idea that the virtues benefit their possessor can be quickly cleared away. When we consider the claim in the context of bringing up our own children or reflexion ...
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Some familiar objections to the very idea that the virtues benefit their possessor can be quickly cleared away. When we consider the claim in the context of bringing up our own children or reflexion on our own lives, rather than in the context of trying to convince the wicked or the moral sceptic, we believe it. According to Phillips and McDowell, we believe it in so far as we are virtuous, because we have special conceptions of eudaimonia, benefit, harm, and loss, which guarantees its truth. But we also believe it on the basis of the sort of ethical, but non‐evaluative beliefs about human nature cited by Hare and Foot.Less
Some familiar objections to the very idea that the virtues benefit their possessor can be quickly cleared away. When we consider the claim in the context of bringing up our own children or reflexion on our own lives, rather than in the context of trying to convince the wicked or the moral sceptic, we believe it. According to Phillips and McDowell, we believe it in so far as we are virtuous, because we have special conceptions of eudaimonia, benefit, harm, and loss, which guarantees its truth. But we also believe it on the basis of the sort of ethical, but non‐evaluative beliefs about human nature cited by Hare and Foot.
Ingmar Persson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199276905
- eISBN:
- 9780191603198
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199276900.003.0027
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter argues that in the realm of prudence, we are not rationally required to maximize the desire-fulfilment of our lives. It is not irrational to adopt ideals, such as the rationalist ideal ...
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This chapter argues that in the realm of prudence, we are not rationally required to maximize the desire-fulfilment of our lives. It is not irrational to adopt ideals, such as the rationalist ideal of leading a life in the light of reason, though this is in opposition to the maximization of fulfilment of one’s life. Arguments to the contrary by R. M. Hare, Thomas Nagel and John Rawls are examined and rejected.Less
This chapter argues that in the realm of prudence, we are not rationally required to maximize the desire-fulfilment of our lives. It is not irrational to adopt ideals, such as the rationalist ideal of leading a life in the light of reason, though this is in opposition to the maximization of fulfilment of one’s life. Arguments to the contrary by R. M. Hare, Thomas Nagel and John Rawls are examined and rejected.
Philippa Foot
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252848
- eISBN:
- 9780191597411
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925284X.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Foot examines the moral theory known as ‘non‐cognitivism’ (a form of subjectivism). Her central thesis is that all non‐cognitivist moral theories are based on the same serious mistake. This mistake ...
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Foot examines the moral theory known as ‘non‐cognitivism’ (a form of subjectivism). Her central thesis is that all non‐cognitivist moral theories are based on the same serious mistake. This mistake is traced to a distinction taken for granted by non‐cognitivist moral philosophers such as A. J. Ayer (an emotivist) and R. M. Hare (a prescriptivist). Such philosophers wrongly believed that there is a logical gap between ‘descriptive language’ (which states facts) and ‘evaluative language’ (which expresses evaluations). Foot argues that this supposed gap between facts and values, which crucially gives a logical gap between a moral judgement and its grounds, is a chimera.Less
Foot examines the moral theory known as ‘non‐cognitivism’ (a form of subjectivism). Her central thesis is that all non‐cognitivist moral theories are based on the same serious mistake. This mistake is traced to a distinction taken for granted by non‐cognitivist moral philosophers such as A. J. Ayer (an emotivist) and R. M. Hare (a prescriptivist). Such philosophers wrongly believed that there is a logical gap between ‘descriptive language’ (which states facts) and ‘evaluative language’ (which expresses evaluations). Foot argues that this supposed gap between facts and values, which crucially gives a logical gap between a moral judgement and its grounds, is a chimera.
Gilbert Harman
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238041
- eISBN:
- 9780191597626
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238045.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
A ‘naive view’ of morality says it is based on certain moral demands that everyone accepts, or at least has reasons to accept as demands on everyone, and on which all moral reasons depend. The naive ...
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A ‘naive view’ of morality says it is based on certain moral demands that everyone accepts, or at least has reasons to accept as demands on everyone, and on which all moral reasons depend. The naive view must be rejected because there are no substantive moral demands satisfying those conditions. Moral conventionalism or ‘morality as politics’ is the best replacement for the naive view. Other conceptions of morality retain less of the content of the naive view and tend toward unrealistic accounts of what morality requires. Extremely agent‐centred theories, as in certain forms of existentialism, practically abandon morality as a social enterprise, as do extremely critic‐centred theories, like certain forms of emotivism and Hare's theory, which are best seen as rejecting the moral ought in favour of the ought of evaluation.Less
A ‘naive view’ of morality says it is based on certain moral demands that everyone accepts, or at least has reasons to accept as demands on everyone, and on which all moral reasons depend. The naive view must be rejected because there are no substantive moral demands satisfying those conditions. Moral conventionalism or ‘morality as politics’ is the best replacement for the naive view. Other conceptions of morality retain less of the content of the naive view and tend toward unrealistic accounts of what morality requires. Extremely agent‐centred theories, as in certain forms of existentialism, practically abandon morality as a social enterprise, as do extremely critic‐centred theories, like certain forms of emotivism and Hare's theory, which are best seen as rejecting the moral ought in favour of the ought of evaluation.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195150438
- eISBN:
- 9780199869091
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195150430.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Defends a position on the nature and function of agents’ judgments that it would be best to do something and on the connection between such judgments and intentions. Competing theories advanced by ...
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Defends a position on the nature and function of agents’ judgments that it would be best to do something and on the connection between such judgments and intentions. Competing theories advanced by Aristotle, Donald Davidson, and R. M. Hare are criticized. One conclusion is that no nonartificial species of evaluative judgment renders agents immune to weakness of will. Agents’ judgments about what is best to do are not only subject to defeat by opposing motivation but are also supportable by exercises of self‐control. An account of practical reasoning or deliberation and of what motivates it is offered.Less
Defends a position on the nature and function of agents’ judgments that it would be best to do something and on the connection between such judgments and intentions. Competing theories advanced by Aristotle, Donald Davidson, and R. M. Hare are criticized. One conclusion is that no nonartificial species of evaluative judgment renders agents immune to weakness of will. Agents’ judgments about what is best to do are not only subject to defeat by opposing motivation but are also supportable by exercises of self‐control. An account of practical reasoning or deliberation and of what motivates it is offered.
John Allan Knight
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199969388
- eISBN:
- 9780199301546
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199969388.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Religious Studies
This chapter describes liberal responses to the falsification challenge, which tended to be a version of one of two sorts. For noncognitivists, religious or theological utterances were never ...
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This chapter describes liberal responses to the falsification challenge, which tended to be a version of one of two sorts. For noncognitivists, religious or theological utterances were never straightforward assertions, but are to be understood symbolically, or as expressions of an intention to follow a certain way of life, or as expressions of an internalized spiritual principle. Cognitive responses, on the other hand, argued that some religious or theological utterances are indeed straightforward assertions. Some argued that theological assertions could in principle be falsified, but in fact have not been (at least not all of them). Others argued that such assertions are meaningful because some things count as evidence against them, despite their invulnerability to conclusive empirical falsification. Yet both sorts of responses agreed with Flew that if religious or theological language is to be meaningful, it must meet the descriptivist requirements described in chapter one. This chapter considers the noncognitive response of R.M. Hare and the cognitive responses of Basil Mitchell, I.M. Crombie and Schubert M. Ogden. Though different from each other, liberal responses all assumed a descriptivist view of religious and theological language.Less
This chapter describes liberal responses to the falsification challenge, which tended to be a version of one of two sorts. For noncognitivists, religious or theological utterances were never straightforward assertions, but are to be understood symbolically, or as expressions of an intention to follow a certain way of life, or as expressions of an internalized spiritual principle. Cognitive responses, on the other hand, argued that some religious or theological utterances are indeed straightforward assertions. Some argued that theological assertions could in principle be falsified, but in fact have not been (at least not all of them). Others argued that such assertions are meaningful because some things count as evidence against them, despite their invulnerability to conclusive empirical falsification. Yet both sorts of responses agreed with Flew that if religious or theological language is to be meaningful, it must meet the descriptivist requirements described in chapter one. This chapter considers the noncognitive response of R.M. Hare and the cognitive responses of Basil Mitchell, I.M. Crombie and Schubert M. Ogden. Though different from each other, liberal responses all assumed a descriptivist view of religious and theological language.
Nick Fotion
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- June 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199373529
- eISBN:
- 9780199373543
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199373529.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
In contrast to Scanlon, who is almost a grand theorist, Hare is a unapologetically a grand theorist. Hare makes the distinctions of critical and non-critical (for him intuitive) thinking; and the ...
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In contrast to Scanlon, who is almost a grand theorist, Hare is a unapologetically a grand theorist. Hare makes the distinctions of critical and non-critical (for him intuitive) thinking; and the ethics/meta-ethics distinction found in Chapter 2. His ethical theory is a combination of prescriptivism and universalizability. Hare insists that in applying the former concept it is necessary to engage in the process of role reversing.Less
In contrast to Scanlon, who is almost a grand theorist, Hare is a unapologetically a grand theorist. Hare makes the distinctions of critical and non-critical (for him intuitive) thinking; and the ethics/meta-ethics distinction found in Chapter 2. His ethical theory is a combination of prescriptivism and universalizability. Hare insists that in applying the former concept it is necessary to engage in the process of role reversing.
Gary E. Varner
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199758784
- eISBN:
- 9780199949465
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199758784.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
This chapter illustrates the application of Harean utilitarianism to the debate over what constitutes humane sustainable agriculture. My goal is to illustrate how nuanced and contextualized is a ...
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This chapter illustrates the application of Harean utilitarianism to the debate over what constitutes humane sustainable agriculture. My goal is to illustrate how nuanced and contextualized is a Harean perspective on humans’ use of animals for food, and how subtle forces influence changes in law and common morality over time. To this end the chapter distinguishes among and provide examples of: prelapsarian, contemporary, and utopian visions of sustainability. Examples discussed include slaughter, handling, and housing practices, certification programs, demi-vegetarianism, and in vitro meat. As these examples illustrate, Harean utilitarianism does not produce simple, clear-cut, once-and-for-all answers, but in doing so it reveals rather than obscures the complexities of issues in animal ethics. Because the issues are so complex, diverse moral agents sincerely concerned about animal welfare do not automatically come to consensus on a vision for humane sustainability, and a number of contemporary and utopian visions will always be under discussion.Less
This chapter illustrates the application of Harean utilitarianism to the debate over what constitutes humane sustainable agriculture. My goal is to illustrate how nuanced and contextualized is a Harean perspective on humans’ use of animals for food, and how subtle forces influence changes in law and common morality over time. To this end the chapter distinguishes among and provide examples of: prelapsarian, contemporary, and utopian visions of sustainability. Examples discussed include slaughter, handling, and housing practices, certification programs, demi-vegetarianism, and in vitro meat. As these examples illustrate, Harean utilitarianism does not produce simple, clear-cut, once-and-for-all answers, but in doing so it reveals rather than obscures the complexities of issues in animal ethics. Because the issues are so complex, diverse moral agents sincerely concerned about animal welfare do not automatically come to consensus on a vision for humane sustainability, and a number of contemporary and utopian visions will always be under discussion.
Simon Blackburn
David Copp (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195147797
- eISBN:
- 9780199785841
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195147790.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Expressivism is the view that the function of normative sentences is not to represent a kind of fact, but to avow attitudes, prescribe behavior, or the like. The idea can be found in David Hume. In ...
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Expressivism is the view that the function of normative sentences is not to represent a kind of fact, but to avow attitudes, prescribe behavior, or the like. The idea can be found in David Hume. In the 20th century, G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument provided important support for the view. Elizabeth Anscombe introduced the notion of “direction of fit,” which helped distinguish expressivism from a kind of naive subjectivism. The central advantage of expressivism is that it easily explains the motivational force of moral conviction. Its chief problem is it has difficulty explaining the “realist surface” of moralizing. Quasi-realism is a strategy for explaining the realist surface without abandoning the underlying ideas of expressivism. It aims to explain moral error as well as deal with the so-called Frege-Geach problem. This chapter explains quasi-realism, and evaluates it by comparison with its chief rivals: Aristotelian approaches, Kantian approaches, realist moral naturalism, and fictionalism.Less
Expressivism is the view that the function of normative sentences is not to represent a kind of fact, but to avow attitudes, prescribe behavior, or the like. The idea can be found in David Hume. In the 20th century, G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument provided important support for the view. Elizabeth Anscombe introduced the notion of “direction of fit,” which helped distinguish expressivism from a kind of naive subjectivism. The central advantage of expressivism is that it easily explains the motivational force of moral conviction. Its chief problem is it has difficulty explaining the “realist surface” of moralizing. Quasi-realism is a strategy for explaining the realist surface without abandoning the underlying ideas of expressivism. It aims to explain moral error as well as deal with the so-called Frege-Geach problem. This chapter explains quasi-realism, and evaluates it by comparison with its chief rivals: Aristotelian approaches, Kantian approaches, realist moral naturalism, and fictionalism.
Alan Ryan
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195325195
- eISBN:
- 9780199776412
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195325195.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This brief chapter is a lively, anecdotal appreciation of Jonathan Glover written by a friend and former colleague.
This brief chapter is a lively, anecdotal appreciation of Jonathan Glover written by a friend and former colleague.
James Griffin
- Published in print:
- 1988
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198248439
- eISBN:
- 9780191597558
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198248431.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Morality must be rooted in the natural sources of human action. What are they? For instance, how are morality and self‐interest related? How are morality and personal aims related (a question to ...
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Morality must be rooted in the natural sources of human action. What are they? For instance, how are morality and self‐interest related? How are morality and personal aims related (a question to which Bernard Williams has given a well‐known answer in terms of internal and external reasons)? How are morality and rationality related (a question to which Kant, R.M. Hare, Bentham, Mill, and decision theorists have given important answers)? The chapter ends with a sketch of the relation of prudence and morality.Less
Morality must be rooted in the natural sources of human action. What are they? For instance, how are morality and self‐interest related? How are morality and personal aims related (a question to which Bernard Williams has given a well‐known answer in terms of internal and external reasons)? How are morality and rationality related (a question to which Kant, R.M. Hare, Bentham, Mill, and decision theorists have given important answers)? The chapter ends with a sketch of the relation of prudence and morality.