Search Results

Introduction

Gary E. Varner

in Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two Level Utilitarianism

This introductory chapter discusses the concept of personhood, and provides a general overview of Hare’s theory. In day-to-day speech, “person” is often used synonymously with “human being,” but in ... More

This introductory chapter discusses the concept of personhood, and provides a general overview of Hare’s theory. In day-to-day speech, “person” is often used synonymously with “human being,” but in philosophical discussions of personhood, persons are defined as individuals who deserve special treatment or respect in virtue of having certain cognitive capacities. The burden of proof is on the proponent of a particular definition to show why having those cognitive capacities qualifies one for special moral respect. Hare distinguishes between what he calls “critical level” moral thinking, which is explicitly utilitarian, and what he calls “intuitive level” moral thinking, which follows sets of rules that may be very non-utilitarian in flavor. The overview of Hare’s theory in this chapter emphasizes the place of animals and how, in particular, Hare’s two level utilitarianism can incorporate aspects of both animal welfare and animal rights views.Less

Assessing Hare’s Theory

Gary E. Varner

in Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two Level Utilitarianism

This chapter provides a summary assessment of Hare’s theory, both as an empirical account of actual human moral thinking and as a normative theory of how we ought to think and act. The chapter argues ... More

This chapter provides a summary assessment of Hare’s theory, both as an empirical account of actual human moral thinking and as a normative theory of how we ought to think and act. The chapter argues that the empirical adequacy of Hare’s theory is bolstered by its ability to explain the diversity of moral views and by the ubiquity of the golden rule, and the chapter defends its normative adequacy by responding in detail to a range of objections. One objection concerns the inability of people to simultaneously employ both explicitly utilitarian thinking and a system of nonutilitarian intuitive level rules, but the chapter points to recent empirical research suggesting that they do exactly that. The other objections are variations on the claim that the theory leads to counter intuitive conclusions on a range of cases, but the chapter shows how Hare can give plausible responses to the full range of these cases.Less

Hare on the Logic of Moral Discourse

Gary E. Varner

in Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two Level Utilitarianism

Hare argues that all moral thinking is ultimately utilitarian, because moral judgements have three logical properties that, taken together, force us to think like utilitarians. At the same time, he ... More

Hare argues that all moral thinking is ultimately utilitarian, because moral judgements have three logical properties that, taken together, force us to think like utilitarians. At the same time, he argues that good utilitarian reasons for not using explicitly utilitarian thinking in most normal, day-to-day situations. For these reasons, Hare’s is a two level version of utilitarianism: it embraces, in addition to explicitly utilitarian thinking at what Hare calls “the critical level,” what he calls “intuitive level” thinking for normal, day-to-day decision making. This chapter focuses on the logical properties of critical level thinking: universalizability, overridingness, and (in Hare’s special sense) prescriptivity, and Hare’s argument that these three properties together force us to think like utilitarians. I give both an informal proof this, based on the familiar golden rule and a formal proof based on a Harean analysis of the three properties, and I respond to two key objections.Less

The Analytic Perspective on the Idea

Simon Glendinning

in The Idea of Continental Philosophy

A key claim of the book is that the idea of Continental philosophy has its roots in analytic philosophy. This chapter engages with this theme by exploring texts that belong centrally to the ... More

A key claim of the book is that the idea of Continental philosophy has its roots in analytic philosophy. This chapter engages with this theme by exploring texts that belong centrally to the development of this analytic idea: texts which have strongly affirmed the idea of, and so cultivated the reality of, a gulf-stricken philosophical culture. The aim is to make clear why it came about that Continental philosophy became the analytic tag for what must be excluded from a ‘healthy’ philosophical culture. The main texts explored in this chapter are by Gilbert Ryle, R.M. Hare, and Geoffrey Warnock. These texts make it clear that Continental philosophy is not a style or method of philosophy, nor even a set of such styles or methods, but, first of all, the Other of analytic philosophy: a free-floating construction which gives analytic philosophy the illusory assurance that it has methodologically secured itself from ‘sophistry and illusion’.Less

The Golden Rule and a Theory of Moral Reasoning

Thomas L. Carson

in Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice

This chapter develops a theory of moral reasoning in the form of rationality conditions for moral judgments. The chapter argues that moral judges must be: 1) consistent, 2) adequately informed by ... More

This chapter develops a theory of moral reasoning in the form of rationality conditions for moral judgments. The chapter argues that moral judges must be: 1) consistent, 2) adequately informed by knowledge of relevant facts (this requires vividly understanding relevant considerations, including the feelings of others), and 3) able to reason properly and have properly functioning cognitive abilities. The chapter argues that requirements of consistency commit us to the following version of the golden rule: “If I think it would be morally permissible for someone to do a certain act to another person, then I must not object to someone doing the same act to me (or someone I love) in relevantly similar circumstances.” The chapter answers several well-known objections to the golden rule and illustrate how it can be applied to cases.Less

Replaceability, Population, and Marginal Cases

Gary E. Varner

in Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two Level Utilitarianism

This chapter surveys what Peter Singer has said about the “replaceability” of non-persons, emphasizing that there are problems with each of several different accounts he has offered and how these ... More

This chapter surveys what Peter Singer has said about the “replaceability” of non-persons, emphasizing that there are problems with each of several different accounts he has offered and how these problems can be addressed in the context of a Harean, two level utilitarianism. It also takes up the questions of what the optimal populations of humans and animals would be, and the related problem of Parfit’s “repugnant conclusion.” The chapter ends with a more detailed consideration of the problem of marginal cases, which was initially treated at the end of chapter seven.Less

Harey Animals

Gary E. Varner

in Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two Level Utilitarianism

This brief concluding chapter compares and contrasts the Harean perspective on animal ethics developed in this book with the views of Peter Singer, who wrote his dissertation with Hare. Singer’s ... More

This brief concluding chapter compares and contrasts the Harean perspective on animal ethics developed in this book with the views of Peter Singer, who wrote his dissertation with Hare. Singer’s defense of utilitarianism is similar to Hare’s and Singer has appealed to Hare’s distinction between “intuitive level” thinking and explicitly utilitarian “critical thinking” in response to various objections. Yet Singer’s practical conclusions diverge in several ways from the Harean analysis presented in this book.Less

The Nature of Intuitive-Level System (ILS) Rules

Gary E. Varner

in Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two Level Utilitarianism

Hare argues that good utilitarian reasons can be given for not thinking like utilitarians in most normal situations, where several different kinds of rules should be adhered to. This chapter focuses ... More

Hare argues that good utilitarian reasons can be given for not thinking like utilitarians in most normal situations, where several different kinds of rules should be adhered to. This chapter focuses on this “intuitive level thinking,” emphasizing the complications that it introduces into a utilitarian analysis of a situation, and how the resulting subtleties bring a utilitarian analysis closer to common sense. There are four categories of such rules: the common morality of a society, which are not formally stated but which are widely embraced and understood as binding on all members; codes of professional ethics, which are explicitly stated but understood to be binding only on members of particular professions; laws, which are both explicitly stated and binding on all; and personal morality, which is binding only on the individual and may or may not be formally stated.Less

The Virtues Benefit Their Possessor

Rosalind Hursthouse

in On Virtue Ethics

Some familiar objections to the very idea that the virtues benefit their possessor can be quickly cleared away. When we consider the claim in the context of bringing up our own children or reflexion ... More

Some familiar objections to the very idea that the virtues benefit their possessor can be quickly cleared away. When we consider the claim in the context of bringing up our own children or reflexion on our own lives, rather than in the context of trying to convince the wicked or the moral sceptic, we believe it. According to Phillips and McDowell, we believe it in so far as we are virtuous, because we have special conceptions of eudaimonia, benefit, harm, and loss, which guarantees its truth. But we also believe it on the basis of the sort of ethical, but non‐evaluative beliefs about human nature cited by Hare and Foot.Less

PRUDENCE: MAXIMIZATION OR IDEALISM?

Ingmar Persson

in The Retreat of Reason: A dilemma in the philosophy of life

This chapter argues that in the realm of prudence, we are not rationally required to maximize the desire-fulfilment of our lives. It is not irrational to adopt ideals, such as the rationalist ideal ... More

This chapter argues that in the realm of prudence, we are not rationally required to maximize the desire-fulfilment of our lives. It is not irrational to adopt ideals, such as the rationalist ideal of leading a life in the light of reason, though this is in opposition to the maximization of fulfilment of one’s life. Arguments to the contrary by R. M. Hare, Thomas Nagel and John Rawls are examined and rejected.Less

Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake ?

Philippa Foot

in Moral Dilemmas: and Other Topics in Moral Philosophy

Foot examines the moral theory known as ‘non‐cognitivism’ (a form of subjectivism). Her central thesis is that all non‐cognitivist moral theories are based on the same serious mistake. This mistake ... More

Foot examines the moral theory known as ‘non‐cognitivism’ (a form of subjectivism). Her central thesis is that all non‐cognitivist moral theories are based on the same serious mistake. This mistake is traced to a distinction taken for granted by non‐cognitivist moral philosophers such as A. J. Ayer (an emotivist) and R. M. Hare (a prescriptivist). Such philosophers wrongly believed that there is a logical gap between ‘descriptive language’ (which states facts) and ‘evaluative language’ (which expresses evaluations). Foot argues that this supposed gap between facts and values, which crucially gives a logical gap between a moral judgement and its grounds, is a chimera.Less

Relativistic Ethics: Morality as Politics

Gilbert Harman

in Explaining Value: and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy

A ‘naive view’ of morality says it is based on certain moral demands that everyone accepts, or at least has reasons to accept as demands on everyone, and on which all moral reasons depend. The naive ... More

A ‘naive view’ of morality says it is based on certain moral demands that everyone accepts, or at least has reasons to accept as demands on everyone, and on which all moral reasons depend. The naive view must be rejected because there are no substantive moral demands satisfying those conditions. Moral conventionalism or ‘morality as politics’ is the best replacement for the naive view. Other conceptions of morality retain less of the content of the naive view and tend toward unrealistic accounts of what morality requires. Extremely agent‐centred theories, as in certain forms of existentialism, practically abandon morality as a social enterprise, as do extremely critic‐centred theories, like certain forms of emotivism and Hare's theory, which are best seen as rejecting the moral ought in favour of the ought of evaluation.Less

The Liberal Response

John Allan Knight

in Liberalism versus Postliberalism: The Great Divide in Twentieth-Century Theology

This chapter describes liberal responses to the falsification challenge, which tended to be a version of one of two sorts. For noncognitivists, religious or theological utterances were never ... More

This chapter describes liberal responses to the falsification challenge, which tended to be a version of one of two sorts. For noncognitivists, religious or theological utterances were never straightforward assertions, but are to be understood symbolically, or as expressions of an intention to follow a certain way of life, or as expressions of an internalized spiritual principle. Cognitive responses, on the other hand, argued that some religious or theological utterances are indeed straightforward assertions. Some argued that theological assertions could in principle be falsified, but in fact have not been (at least not all of them). Others argued that such assertions are meaningful because some things count as evidence against them, despite their invulnerability to conclusive empirical falsification. Yet both sorts of responses agreed with Flew that if religious or theological language is to be meaningful, it must meet the descriptivist requirements described in chapter one. This chapter considers the noncognitive response of R.M. Hare and the cognitive responses of Basil Mitchell, I.M. Crombie and Schubert M. Ogden. Though different from each other, liberal responses all assumed a descriptivist view of religious and theological language.Less

R.M. Hare

Nick Fotion

in Theory vs. Anti-Theory in Ethics: A Misconceived Conflict

In contrast to Scanlon, who is almost a grand theorist, Hare is a unapologetically a grand theorist. Hare makes the distinctions of critical and non-critical (for him intuitive) thinking; and the ... More

In contrast to Scanlon, who is almost a grand theorist, Hare is a unapologetically a grand theorist. Hare makes the distinctions of critical and non-critical (for him intuitive) thinking; and the ethics/meta-ethics distinction found in Chapter 2. His ethical theory is a combination of prescriptivism and universalizability. Hare insists that in applying the former concept it is necessary to engage in the process of role reversing.Less

A Harean Perspective on Humane Sustainable Agriculture

Gary E. Varner

in Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two Level Utilitarianism

This chapter illustrates the application of Harean utilitarianism to the debate over what constitutes humane sustainable agriculture. My goal is to illustrate how nuanced and contextualized is a ... More

This chapter illustrates the application of Harean utilitarianism to the debate over what constitutes humane sustainable agriculture. My goal is to illustrate how nuanced and contextualized is a Harean perspective on humans’ use of animals for food, and how subtle forces influence changes in law and common morality over time. To this end the chapter distinguishes among and provide examples of: prelapsarian, contemporary, and utopian visions of sustainability. Examples discussed include slaughter, handling, and housing practices, certification programs, demi-vegetarianism, and in vitro meat. As these examples illustrate, Harean utilitarianism does not produce simple, clear-cut, once-and-for-all answers, but in doing so it reveals rather than obscures the complexities of issues in animal ethics. Because the issues are so complex, diverse moral agents sincerely concerned about animal welfare do not automatically come to consensus on a vision for humane sustainability, and a number of contemporary and utopian visions will always be under discussion.Less

Antirealist Expressivism and Quasi-Realism

Simon Blackburn

David Copp (ed.)

in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

Expressivism is the view that the function of normative sentences is not to represent a kind of fact, but to avow attitudes, prescribe behavior, or the like. The idea can be found in David Hume. In ... More

Expressivism is the view that the function of normative sentences is not to represent a kind of fact, but to avow attitudes, prescribe behavior, or the like. The idea can be found in David Hume. In the 20th century, G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument provided important support for the view. Elizabeth Anscombe introduced the notion of “direction of fit,” which helped distinguish expressivism from a kind of naive subjectivism. The central advantage of expressivism is that it easily explains the motivational force of moral conviction. Its chief problem is it has difficulty explaining the “realist surface” of moralizing. Quasi-realism is a strategy for explaining the realist surface without abandoning the underlying ideas of expressivism. It aims to explain moral error as well as deal with the so-called Frege-Geach problem. This chapter explains quasi-realism, and evaluates it by comparison with its chief rivals: Aristotelian approaches, Kantian approaches, realist moral naturalism, and fictionalism.Less

Jonathan Glover

Alan Ryan

in Ethics and Humanity: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Glover

This brief chapter is a lively, anecdotal appreciation of Jonathan Glover written by a friend and former colleague.