Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195169720
- eISBN:
- 9780199786343
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169727.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Skepticism poses a central challenge in epistemology, but its opponents focus on Cartesian or Academic skepticism, whereas almost all actual defenders of skepticism are Pyrrhonians who suspend belief ...
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Skepticism poses a central challenge in epistemology, but its opponents focus on Cartesian or Academic skepticism, whereas almost all actual defenders of skepticism are Pyrrhonians who suspend belief about Cartesian skepticism and its denial. To remedy this imbalance, this volume explores the history of Pyrrhonian skepticism and then looks at objections to Pyrrhonian skepticism and its relation to other alternatives in contemporary epistemology.Less
Skepticism poses a central challenge in epistemology, but its opponents focus on Cartesian or Academic skepticism, whereas almost all actual defenders of skepticism are Pyrrhonians who suspend belief about Cartesian skepticism and its denial. To remedy this imbalance, this volume explores the history of Pyrrhonian skepticism and then looks at objections to Pyrrhonian skepticism and its relation to other alternatives in contemporary epistemology.
Katja Maria Vogt
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199916818
- eISBN:
- 9780199980291
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199916818.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This book explores a Socratic intuition about the difference between belief and knowledge. Beliefs—doxai—are deficient cognitive attitudes. In believing something, one accepts some content as true ...
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This book explores a Socratic intuition about the difference between belief and knowledge. Beliefs—doxai—are deficient cognitive attitudes. In believing something, one accepts some content as true without knowing that it is true; one holds something to be true that could turn out to be false. Since our actions reflect what we hold to be true, holding beliefs is potentially harmful for oneself and others. Accordingly, beliefs are ethically worrisome and even, in the words of Plato's Socrates, “shameful.” As the book argues, this is a serious philosophical proposal and it speaks to intuitions that we are likely to share. But it involves a notion of belief that is rather different from contemporary notions. Today, it is a widespread assumption that true beliefs are better than false beliefs, and that some true beliefs (perhaps those that come with justifications) qualify as knowledge. Socratic epistemology offers a genuinely different picture. In aiming for knowledge, one must aim to get rid of beliefs. Knowledge does not entail belief—belief and knowledge differ in such important ways that they cannot both count as kinds of belief. As long as one does not have knowledge, one should reserve judgment and investigate. It is argued that the ancient skeptics and Stoics draw many of these ideas from Plato's dialogues, revising Socratic-Platonic arguments as they see fit. The book retraces their steps through interpretations of the Apology, Ion, Republic, Theaetetus, and Philebus, reconstructs Pyrrhonian investigation and thought, and illuminates the connections between ancient skepticism and relativism, as well as the Stoic view that beliefs do not even merit the evaluations “true” and “false.”Less
This book explores a Socratic intuition about the difference between belief and knowledge. Beliefs—doxai—are deficient cognitive attitudes. In believing something, one accepts some content as true without knowing that it is true; one holds something to be true that could turn out to be false. Since our actions reflect what we hold to be true, holding beliefs is potentially harmful for oneself and others. Accordingly, beliefs are ethically worrisome and even, in the words of Plato's Socrates, “shameful.” As the book argues, this is a serious philosophical proposal and it speaks to intuitions that we are likely to share. But it involves a notion of belief that is rather different from contemporary notions. Today, it is a widespread assumption that true beliefs are better than false beliefs, and that some true beliefs (perhaps those that come with justifications) qualify as knowledge. Socratic epistemology offers a genuinely different picture. In aiming for knowledge, one must aim to get rid of beliefs. Knowledge does not entail belief—belief and knowledge differ in such important ways that they cannot both count as kinds of belief. As long as one does not have knowledge, one should reserve judgment and investigate. It is argued that the ancient skeptics and Stoics draw many of these ideas from Plato's dialogues, revising Socratic-Platonic arguments as they see fit. The book retraces their steps through interpretations of the Apology, Ion, Republic, Theaetetus, and Philebus, reconstructs Pyrrhonian investigation and thought, and illuminates the connections between ancient skepticism and relativism, as well as the Stoic view that beliefs do not even merit the evaluations “true” and “false.”
Jessica N. Berry
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195368420
- eISBN:
- 9780199867479
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195368420.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The impact of Nietzsche's engagement with the Greek skeptics has never been systematically explored in a book-length work—an inattention that belies the interpretive weight Nietzsche scholars ...
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The impact of Nietzsche's engagement with the Greek skeptics has never been systematically explored in a book-length work—an inattention that belies the interpretive weight Nietzsche scholars otherwise attribute to his early career as a professor of classical philology and to the fascination with Greek literature and culture that persisted throughout his productive academic life. This book brings together and expands on previously published work on Nietzsche and the Greek skeptics to fill this gap in the literature on Nietzsche by demonstrating how an understanding of ancient skepticism—the Pyrrhonian tradition in particular—promises to illuminate Nietzsche's own reflections on truth, knowledge, and ultimately, the nature and value of philosophic inquiry. It also presents an entirely new reading of Nietzsche's epistemological and ethical views, one that promises to make sense out of some of his most perplexing remarks on these topics. The reading of Nietzsche's work developed here helps to make clear and render coherent his provocative but often opaque remarks on the topics of truth and knowledge and to grant us further insight into his ethics, since the Greek skeptics, like Nietzsche, take up the position they do as a means of promoting well-being and psychological health. In addition, it allows us to recover a portrait of Nietzsche as a philologist and philosophical psychologist that has been too often obscured by commentaries on his thought.Less
The impact of Nietzsche's engagement with the Greek skeptics has never been systematically explored in a book-length work—an inattention that belies the interpretive weight Nietzsche scholars otherwise attribute to his early career as a professor of classical philology and to the fascination with Greek literature and culture that persisted throughout his productive academic life. This book brings together and expands on previously published work on Nietzsche and the Greek skeptics to fill this gap in the literature on Nietzsche by demonstrating how an understanding of ancient skepticism—the Pyrrhonian tradition in particular—promises to illuminate Nietzsche's own reflections on truth, knowledge, and ultimately, the nature and value of philosophic inquiry. It also presents an entirely new reading of Nietzsche's epistemological and ethical views, one that promises to make sense out of some of his most perplexing remarks on these topics. The reading of Nietzsche's work developed here helps to make clear and render coherent his provocative but often opaque remarks on the topics of truth and knowledge and to grant us further insight into his ethics, since the Greek skeptics, like Nietzsche, take up the position they do as a means of promoting well-being and psychological health. In addition, it allows us to recover a portrait of Nietzsche as a philologist and philosophical psychologist that has been too often obscured by commentaries on his thought.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199280384
- eISBN:
- 9780191602290
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019928038X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can ...
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One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for; it is an achievement of sorts, and yet luck undermines genuine achievements. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises that tempts us to think that either scepticism is true, and we don’t know very much after all, or else knowledge is compatible with knowledge after all. My claim is that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer inspection of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren’t. We can thus do justice to the intuition that knowledge is compatible with (some forms of) luck without acceding to the sceptical claim that we do not know as much as we think we do. Nevertheless, I also claim that there is a sceptical problem lurking in the background that is related to the problem of epistemic luck, though it is not best thought of in terms of the possession of knowledge.Less
One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for; it is an achievement of sorts, and yet luck undermines genuine achievements. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises that tempts us to think that either scepticism is true, and we don’t know very much after all, or else knowledge is compatible with knowledge after all. My claim is that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer inspection of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren’t. We can thus do justice to the intuition that knowledge is compatible with (some forms of) luck without acceding to the sceptical claim that we do not know as much as we think we do. Nevertheless, I also claim that there is a sceptical problem lurking in the background that is related to the problem of epistemic luck, though it is not best thought of in terms of the possession of knowledge.
Robert J. Fogelin
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195089875
- eISBN:
- 9780199833238
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195089871.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This work addresses the following question: What would be the consequence of allowing a representative of ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism to become a party to contemporary debates in theory of ...
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This work addresses the following question: What would be the consequence of allowing a representative of ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism to become a party to contemporary debates in theory of knowledge? The conclusion of this work is that most of our contemporary epistemologists would fare badly in this encounter.Part 1 concerns the analysis of knowledge claims. It defends the almost universally rejected view that knowledge is simply justified true belief. This analysis is generally thought to be untenable because it yields skepticism or Gettier problems (or both). In response, it is argued that everyday knowledge claims are protected from both difficulties by placing limits on the level of scrutiny, that is, limits are placed on the range of possible defeators that are taken seriously. Conversely, when these constraints are set aside, as epistemologists often do, skepticism and Gettier problems understandably arise. Three chapters are dedicated to examining and criticizing alternative analyses of knowledge claims: various fourth‐clause analyses, externalist analyses, and subjunctive (possible‐world) analyses.Part 2 concerns theories of justification. It presents a confrontation between Agrippa's Five Modes Leading to the Suspension of Belief (as found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism) and three contemporary theories of justification: Chisholm's foundationalist theory, BonJour's internal coherentism, and Davidson's external coherentism. The conclusion of this examination is that none of these accounts of justification makes serious headway in responding to Agrippa's Five Modes.Less
This work addresses the following question: What would be the consequence of allowing a representative of ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism to become a party to contemporary debates in theory of knowledge? The conclusion of this work is that most of our contemporary epistemologists would fare badly in this encounter.
Part 1 concerns the analysis of knowledge claims. It defends the almost universally rejected view that knowledge is simply justified true belief. This analysis is generally thought to be untenable because it yields skepticism or Gettier problems (or both). In response, it is argued that everyday knowledge claims are protected from both difficulties by placing limits on the level of scrutiny, that is, limits are placed on the range of possible defeators that are taken seriously. Conversely, when these constraints are set aside, as epistemologists often do, skepticism and Gettier problems understandably arise. Three chapters are dedicated to examining and criticizing alternative analyses of knowledge claims: various fourth‐clause analyses, externalist analyses, and subjunctive (possible‐world) analyses.
Part 2 concerns theories of justification. It presents a confrontation between Agrippa's Five Modes Leading to the Suspension of Belief (as found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism) and three contemporary theories of justification: Chisholm's foundationalist theory, BonJour's internal coherentism, and Davidson's external coherentism. The conclusion of this examination is that none of these accounts of justification makes serious headway in responding to Agrippa's Five Modes.
A. A. Long
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199279128
- eISBN:
- 9780191706769
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199279128.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Timon of Phlius has yet to receive his full due within the broad context of Greek intellectual history and literary study. Those who may have little or no interest in early Pyrrhonism are missing a ...
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Timon of Phlius has yet to receive his full due within the broad context of Greek intellectual history and literary study. Those who may have little or no interest in early Pyrrhonism are missing a lot if they are unfamiliar with Timon's extremely artful parodies of Homer and his Aristophanic versatility in coining new words. The neglect of Timon was the more surprising because his subject matter, the philosophy of Pyrrho, has never been short of attention. The study of Pyrrho must begin with the study of Timon; he stands even closer to Pyrrho than does Plato to Socrates.Less
Timon of Phlius has yet to receive his full due within the broad context of Greek intellectual history and literary study. Those who may have little or no interest in early Pyrrhonism are missing a lot if they are unfamiliar with Timon's extremely artful parodies of Homer and his Aristophanic versatility in coining new words. The neglect of Timon was the more surprising because his subject matter, the philosophy of Pyrrho, has never been short of attention. The study of Pyrrho must begin with the study of Timon; he stands even closer to Pyrrho than does Plato to Socrates.
Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195169720
- eISBN:
- 9780199786343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169727.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This essay invokes a technical framework of contrast classes within which Pyrrhonians can accept (or deny) knowledge claims that are relativized to specific contrast classes, but avoid all ...
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This essay invokes a technical framework of contrast classes within which Pyrrhonians can accept (or deny) knowledge claims that are relativized to specific contrast classes, but avoid all unrelativized knowledge claims and all presuppositions about which contrast classes are really relevant. Pyrrhonians can then assert part of the content of everyday knowledge claims without privileging the everyday perspective or any other perspective. This framework provides a precise way to understand the central claims of neo-Pyrrhonism while avoiding most, if not all, of the problems and objections raised by its critics.Less
This essay invokes a technical framework of contrast classes within which Pyrrhonians can accept (or deny) knowledge claims that are relativized to specific contrast classes, but avoid all unrelativized knowledge claims and all presuppositions about which contrast classes are really relevant. Pyrrhonians can then assert part of the content of everyday knowledge claims without privileging the everyday perspective or any other perspective. This framework provides a precise way to understand the central claims of neo-Pyrrhonism while avoiding most, if not all, of the problems and objections raised by its critics.
Gisela Striker
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195169720
- eISBN:
- 9780199786343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169727.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This essay argues that ancient Pyrrhonists did not decide to suspend judgment, but rather claimed to have found themselves unable to arrive at any judgment. By giving up the attempt, they also ...
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This essay argues that ancient Pyrrhonists did not decide to suspend judgment, but rather claimed to have found themselves unable to arrive at any judgment. By giving up the attempt, they also claimed to have unexpectedly reached tranquility, then followed the customs of ordinary life without ever claiming to have found the truth. This anti-rational attitude is not likely to be typical of ordinary people, nor would it seem desirable to modern defenders of ordinary practices like Fogelin.Less
This essay argues that ancient Pyrrhonists did not decide to suspend judgment, but rather claimed to have found themselves unable to arrive at any judgment. By giving up the attempt, they also claimed to have unexpectedly reached tranquility, then followed the customs of ordinary life without ever claiming to have found the truth. This anti-rational attitude is not likely to be typical of ordinary people, nor would it seem desirable to modern defenders of ordinary practices like Fogelin.
Janet Broughton
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195169720
- eISBN:
- 9780199786343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169727.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This essay contrasts Descartes with three skeptical figures: the Doubting Pyrrhonist, the Agrippan Pyrrhonist, and the Cartesian Skeptic. It argues that the meditator in Descartes’s Meditations is ...
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This essay contrasts Descartes with three skeptical figures: the Doubting Pyrrhonist, the Agrippan Pyrrhonist, and the Cartesian Skeptic. It argues that the meditator in Descartes’s Meditations is different from all three of these skeptics. Seeing the distinctive character of the meditator helps us understand how Descartes could have hoped to meet the challenge of skepticism.Less
This essay contrasts Descartes with three skeptical figures: the Doubting Pyrrhonist, the Agrippan Pyrrhonist, and the Cartesian Skeptic. It argues that the meditator in Descartes’s Meditations is different from all three of these skeptics. Seeing the distinctive character of the meditator helps us understand how Descartes could have hoped to meet the challenge of skepticism.
Hans Sluga
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195169720
- eISBN:
- 9780199786343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169727.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This essay traces the roots of Wittgenstein’s Pyrrhonism to Mauthner, and argues that Wittgenstein’s later views moved even closer to those of Mauthner, although Wittgenstein never became as ...
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This essay traces the roots of Wittgenstein’s Pyrrhonism to Mauthner, and argues that Wittgenstein’s later views moved even closer to those of Mauthner, although Wittgenstein never became as thoroughgoing a Pyrrhonian as Mauthner had been. It is argued that Mauthner’s neo-Pyrrhonian view of language was “responsible for the linguistic turn in Wittgenstein’s thinking and thereby indirectly also for the whole linguistic turn in 20th-century analytic philosophy”.Less
This essay traces the roots of Wittgenstein’s Pyrrhonism to Mauthner, and argues that Wittgenstein’s later views moved even closer to those of Mauthner, although Wittgenstein never became as thoroughgoing a Pyrrhonian as Mauthner had been. It is argued that Mauthner’s neo-Pyrrhonian view of language was “responsible for the linguistic turn in Wittgenstein’s thinking and thereby indirectly also for the whole linguistic turn in 20th-century analytic philosophy”.
Georges Dreyfus
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199751426
- eISBN:
- 9780199827190
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199751426.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
This chapter compares the twelfth-century Tibetan thinker Patsab’s interpretation of Madhyamaka with certain readings of ancient skepticism, focusing on the central question that skeptical accounts ...
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This chapter compares the twelfth-century Tibetan thinker Patsab’s interpretation of Madhyamaka with certain readings of ancient skepticism, focusing on the central question that skeptical accounts face: Can the skeptic advance a thesis, or is it merely therapeutic? This chapter argues that Patsab’s approach is similar to that of Sextus in that it offers a radical answer to this question, and the chapter then asks whether his approach is compatible with constructive philosophy.Less
This chapter compares the twelfth-century Tibetan thinker Patsab’s interpretation of Madhyamaka with certain readings of ancient skepticism, focusing on the central question that skeptical accounts face: Can the skeptic advance a thesis, or is it merely therapeutic? This chapter argues that Patsab’s approach is similar to that of Sextus in that it offers a radical answer to this question, and the chapter then asks whether his approach is compatible with constructive philosophy.
Georges Dreyfus and Jay L. Garfield
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199751426
- eISBN:
- 9780199827190
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199751426.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
This chapter explores the relation between two doxographic distinctions—between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika Madhyamaka in India and Tibet on the one hand and Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism in ...
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This chapter explores the relation between two doxographic distinctions—between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika Madhyamaka in India and Tibet on the one hand and Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism in ancient Greece on the other. It points out that each of these distinctions is contested and that sorting out the doxographic questions yields important insights into philosophical method and its role in both traditions.Less
This chapter explores the relation between two doxographic distinctions—between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika Madhyamaka in India and Tibet on the one hand and Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism in ancient Greece on the other. It points out that each of these distinctions is contested and that sorting out the doxographic questions yields important insights into philosophical method and its role in both traditions.
Paul Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195110333
- eISBN:
- 9780199872084
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195110333.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter begins with a review of the classical (Reid‐Beattie) skeptical interpretation of Hume's Treatise followed by an account of Norman Kemp Smith's influential naturalistic interpretation of ...
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This chapter begins with a review of the classical (Reid‐Beattie) skeptical interpretation of Hume's Treatise followed by an account of Norman Kemp Smith's influential naturalistic interpretation of Hume's fundamental intentions. Other more recent interpretations, falling on either side of the skeptical/naturalist divide, are also described, including several interpretations that have paid more careful attention to the historical context in which the Treatise was composed and published. This account of the various alternative interpretations provides a framework for explaining the fundamental “riddle” of the Treatise: namely, that Hume's (radical) skeptical commitments appear to undermine and discredit his effort to make a contribution to “the science of man.”Less
This chapter begins with a review of the classical (Reid‐Beattie) skeptical interpretation of Hume's Treatise followed by an account of Norman Kemp Smith's influential naturalistic interpretation of Hume's fundamental intentions. Other more recent interpretations, falling on either side of the skeptical/naturalist divide, are also described, including several interpretations that have paid more careful attention to the historical context in which the Treatise was composed and published. This account of the various alternative interpretations provides a framework for explaining the fundamental “riddle” of the Treatise: namely, that Hume's (radical) skeptical commitments appear to undermine and discredit his effort to make a contribution to “the science of man.”
Paul Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195110333
- eISBN:
- 9780199872084
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195110333.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The early responses to the Treatise show that the issue of “atheism” was neither peripheral nor irrelevant to the way that Hume's own contemporaries understood his aims and objectives. Most ...
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The early responses to the Treatise show that the issue of “atheism” was neither peripheral nor irrelevant to the way that Hume's own contemporaries understood his aims and objectives. Most contemporary Hume scholars maintain, however, that this label, not only misrepresents Hume's intentions in the Treatise but that it also misrepresents his position on the subject of religion as presented in his later writings (which are understood to be more “directly” or “explicitly” concerned with religion). The immediate aim of this chapter is to develop a clearer understanding of the way that Hume and his contemporaries interpreted “atheism” and the specific doctrines that were associated with it. Once this standard is (back) in place, we will be in a position to determine the extent to which the charge of “atheism” fits the actual content of the Treatise.Less
The early responses to the Treatise show that the issue of “atheism” was neither peripheral nor irrelevant to the way that Hume's own contemporaries understood his aims and objectives. Most contemporary Hume scholars maintain, however, that this label, not only misrepresents Hume's intentions in the Treatise but that it also misrepresents his position on the subject of religion as presented in his later writings (which are understood to be more “directly” or “explicitly” concerned with religion). The immediate aim of this chapter is to develop a clearer understanding of the way that Hume and his contemporaries interpreted “atheism” and the specific doctrines that were associated with it. Once this standard is (back) in place, we will be in a position to determine the extent to which the charge of “atheism” fits the actual content of the Treatise.
Paul Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195110333
- eISBN:
- 9780199872084
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195110333.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter provides a general interpretation of the irreligious character of Hume's sceptical intentions in the Treatise. Although the Treatise remains the primary concern, the discussion also ...
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This chapter provides a general interpretation of the irreligious character of Hume's sceptical intentions in the Treatise. Although the Treatise remains the primary concern, the discussion also covers Hume's later philosophical works. Hume's basic aim is to reveal the “weakness and uncertainty of mere human reason" so that he can show that all speculations that reach beyond “the common affairs of life"—specifically, those that are encouraged by “superstition"—should be abandoned. This is the principal lesson of the Conclusion of Book I (T, 1.4.7). This general account of Hume's skeptical commitments serves as the foundation for a solution to the problem of the “riddle” of the Treatise. Less
This chapter provides a general interpretation of the irreligious character of Hume's sceptical intentions in the Treatise. Although the Treatise remains the primary concern, the discussion also covers Hume's later philosophical works. Hume's basic aim is to reveal the “weakness and uncertainty of mere human reason" so that he can show that all speculations that reach beyond “the common affairs of life"—specifically, those that are encouraged by “superstition"—should be abandoned. This is the principal lesson of the Conclusion of Book I (T, 1.4.7). This general account of Hume's skeptical commitments serves as the foundation for a solution to the problem of the “riddle” of the Treatise.
Katja Maria Vogt
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199916818
- eISBN:
- 9780199980291
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199916818.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Pyrrhonian skepticism has roots in metaphysical discussions relevant to relativism. The chapter reconstructs these discussions in Plato's Theaetetus, and explores how different versions of Pyrrhonian ...
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Pyrrhonian skepticism has roots in metaphysical discussions relevant to relativism. The chapter reconstructs these discussions in Plato's Theaetetus, and explores how different versions of Pyrrhonian skepticism—the skepticism of Pyrrho, of Aenesidemus, and of Sextus Empiricus—compare to Protagorean relativism. The chapter begins with a sketch of why Plato interprets Protagoras' Measure Doctrine as global relativism rather than relativism about a particular domain. Pyrrhonian skepticism, it is argued, inherits this global scope. But Pyrrhonian responses to disagreement differ importantly from the responses Protagorean relativism envisages. Skepticism suggests that, when encountering disagreement, it is rational to step back from one's view and investigate, rather than simply hold on to one's view, as presumably the relativist does. The chapter defends skepticism's response to disagreement as construed by Sextus Empiricus as superior to earlier proposals.Less
Pyrrhonian skepticism has roots in metaphysical discussions relevant to relativism. The chapter reconstructs these discussions in Plato's Theaetetus, and explores how different versions of Pyrrhonian skepticism—the skepticism of Pyrrho, of Aenesidemus, and of Sextus Empiricus—compare to Protagorean relativism. The chapter begins with a sketch of why Plato interprets Protagoras' Measure Doctrine as global relativism rather than relativism about a particular domain. Pyrrhonian skepticism, it is argued, inherits this global scope. But Pyrrhonian responses to disagreement differ importantly from the responses Protagorean relativism envisages. Skepticism suggests that, when encountering disagreement, it is rational to step back from one's view and investigate, rather than simply hold on to one's view, as presumably the relativist does. The chapter defends skepticism's response to disagreement as construed by Sextus Empiricus as superior to earlier proposals.
Katja Maria Vogt
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199916818
- eISBN:
- 9780199980291
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199916818.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The Concluding Remarks offer an overview of ingredients relevant to Pyrrhonian skepticism and its history—and thus, ingredients relevant to a perspective that is defended as plausible throughout the ...
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The Concluding Remarks offer an overview of ingredients relevant to Pyrrhonian skepticism and its history—and thus, ingredients relevant to a perspective that is defended as plausible throughout the book: a commitment to Socratic investigation and epistemic caution, engagement with metaphysical questions about a world that might be indeterminate, and the question of how one can think and investigate without forming beliefs.Less
The Concluding Remarks offer an overview of ingredients relevant to Pyrrhonian skepticism and its history—and thus, ingredients relevant to a perspective that is defended as plausible throughout the book: a commitment to Socratic investigation and epistemic caution, engagement with metaphysical questions about a world that might be indeterminate, and the question of how one can think and investigate without forming beliefs.
Mauro Bonazzi
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199666164
- eISBN:
- 9780191751936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199666164.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
A clarification of Plutarch's attitude towards scepticism will help us to assess his Platonist stance. But his attitude is not clear and scholars diverge, ranging from the view that Plutarch was not ...
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A clarification of Plutarch's attitude towards scepticism will help us to assess his Platonist stance. But his attitude is not clear and scholars diverge, ranging from the view that Plutarch was not interested at all in scepticism to the hypothesis that he might have had a sceptical phase or even that his entire philosophy was sceptical. A solution can be found if Plutarch's interpretation of the Hellenistic Academy is correctly reconstructed and if its difference from Pyrrhonism is considered. Plutarch claims that Pyrrhonism is nothing but the result of an empiricist ontology and epistemology, whereas what distinguishes Academic scepticism is an anti-empiricist stance. More precisely, an analysis of the treatise Against Colotes shows that Academic polemics against Epicurean empiricism involve the acknowledgment of the dualism between the sensible and the intelligible which is distinctive of all Platonist philosophy. If one considers only the senses and the sensible dimension life would be impossible; but the very fact that we live shows, according to Plutarch's interpretation of Arcesilaus, that something else, the intelligible, exists. By exploiting the so-called apraxia argument and by interpreting Arcesilaus' philosophy against the background of dualism, Plutarch can therefore claim that also the Hellenistic Academics can be regarded as loyal heirs of Plato.Less
A clarification of Plutarch's attitude towards scepticism will help us to assess his Platonist stance. But his attitude is not clear and scholars diverge, ranging from the view that Plutarch was not interested at all in scepticism to the hypothesis that he might have had a sceptical phase or even that his entire philosophy was sceptical. A solution can be found if Plutarch's interpretation of the Hellenistic Academy is correctly reconstructed and if its difference from Pyrrhonism is considered. Plutarch claims that Pyrrhonism is nothing but the result of an empiricist ontology and epistemology, whereas what distinguishes Academic scepticism is an anti-empiricist stance. More precisely, an analysis of the treatise Against Colotes shows that Academic polemics against Epicurean empiricism involve the acknowledgment of the dualism between the sensible and the intelligible which is distinctive of all Platonist philosophy. If one considers only the senses and the sensible dimension life would be impossible; but the very fact that we live shows, according to Plutarch's interpretation of Arcesilaus, that something else, the intelligible, exists. By exploiting the so-called apraxia argument and by interpreting Arcesilaus' philosophy against the background of dualism, Plutarch can therefore claim that also the Hellenistic Academics can be regarded as loyal heirs of Plato.
Jessica N. Berry
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195368420
- eISBN:
- 9780199867479
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195368420.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The introductory chapter states the book's primary ambition—to settle the question of whether and in what sense Nietzsche is a skeptic by taking Pyrrhonism, a powerful form of skepticism that ...
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The introductory chapter states the book's primary ambition—to settle the question of whether and in what sense Nietzsche is a skeptic by taking Pyrrhonism, a powerful form of skepticism that originated in ancient Greece, as a model for understanding his philosophical project. The chapter locates this reading within the landscape of recent attempts to characterize Nietzsche's views of truth and knowledge, and previews some of the reasons in favor of constructing a skeptical reading of his work. It anticipates some resistance to reading him as a skeptic and contends that such resistance may turn on a confusion about ancient and modern varieties of skepticism and on a general neglect of the former variety by scholars of Nietzsche's thought. Finally, it indicates some of the power and potential of this skepticism for Nietzsche's project.Less
The introductory chapter states the book's primary ambition—to settle the question of whether and in what sense Nietzsche is a skeptic by taking Pyrrhonism, a powerful form of skepticism that originated in ancient Greece, as a model for understanding his philosophical project. The chapter locates this reading within the landscape of recent attempts to characterize Nietzsche's views of truth and knowledge, and previews some of the reasons in favor of constructing a skeptical reading of his work. It anticipates some resistance to reading him as a skeptic and contends that such resistance may turn on a confusion about ancient and modern varieties of skepticism and on a general neglect of the former variety by scholars of Nietzsche's thought. Finally, it indicates some of the power and potential of this skepticism for Nietzsche's project.
Jessica N. Berry
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195368420
- eISBN:
- 9780199867479
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195368420.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter opens with a discussion of “historical influence” that intends to clarify the sense in which Nietzsche can be said to have been influenced by Pyrrhonism. Then, it presents the ...
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This chapter opens with a discussion of “historical influence” that intends to clarify the sense in which Nietzsche can be said to have been influenced by Pyrrhonism. Then, it presents the biographical and historical evidence for Nietzsche's own familiarity with the Greek skeptics and their principal texts and arguments, and to familiarize non-specialists with the fundamental and distinctive features of Pyrrhonian skepticism, including its opposition to dogmatism, its suspension of judgment (epochē) and the equipollence of arguments, and its ultimate aim (ataraxia). Finally, a lengthy discussion of the scope of Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment is included, to clarify the interpretive possibilities and to argue for a restricted reading that does not compromise the radical nature of Nietzsche's critical philosophy.Less
This chapter opens with a discussion of “historical influence” that intends to clarify the sense in which Nietzsche can be said to have been influenced by Pyrrhonism. Then, it presents the biographical and historical evidence for Nietzsche's own familiarity with the Greek skeptics and their principal texts and arguments, and to familiarize non-specialists with the fundamental and distinctive features of Pyrrhonian skepticism, including its opposition to dogmatism, its suspension of judgment (epochē) and the equipollence of arguments, and its ultimate aim (ataraxia). Finally, a lengthy discussion of the scope of Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment is included, to clarify the interpretive possibilities and to argue for a restricted reading that does not compromise the radical nature of Nietzsche's critical philosophy.