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Public Benefit Corporations (“PBCs”) are a revolutionary new form of business organization that overturn the fundamental corporate principle of shareholder wealth maximization. Of the many questions that surround this new entity type, perhaps the most perplexing is why Delaware – the most influential and important state for corporate law by far – chose to adopt it. I explore this troubling question through qualitative empirical research. I find that Delaware primarily wanted to serve the needs of social entrepreneurs and financiers, but also hoped to harness the power of capitalism to remedy social ills that government has so far failed to fix. The PBC statute rather poorly implements either of these goals. The PBC statute is not a very good enforcement tool. On the other hand, the statute may prove an effective reinforcement tool, aiding sincere social entrepreneurs to pursue their various missions. Also, private ordering, such as certification by outside entities like B Lab, may fill many of the important gaps left by the law.

This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the multi-year design process leading to the implementation of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in 2008. It considers the question: How did RGGI’s policy designers succeed in auctioning virtually all of the program’s emissions allowances, wheresimilar efforts to promote auctions failed? After reviewing the limits of existing explanations of RGGI’s decision to auction allowances that are grounded in the interest group politics model, the chapter offers a detailed analysis of the RGGI design process to demonstrate the central role of the new public benefit model in making auctions politically viable. Public and private accounts confirm the prominence of this new normative framing for auctions from the very beginning of the process, and its influence over the political choice to make this policy change.

This chapter reviews the theory of normative reframing that is at the heart of the book’s explanation for sudden policy change, and the evidence of normative reframing’s role in the unprecedented policy shift toward auctioning emissions allowances from 2008-2015. It then offers some concluding thoughts on the wider implications of the expansion of auctions since RGGI, and the theory of normative reframing for climate and environmental policymaking, as well as for understanding sudden policy change in general. In particular, the chapter concludes that the choice of how to distribute benefits from future climate policies will be the most important factor determining the political success of those policies, and that policies such as cap and trade with auction using public benefit framing remain the most promising policy option going forward.

This chapter explains the concept of democratic deliberation and considers its implications for ethical review of human subjects research. Democratic deliberation is an ethical principle relatively new to research ethics. It involves a public exchange of ideas within and across groups of ordinary citizens, experts, and political representatives, and requires participants to engage actively with one another, to offer reasons that are acceptable and intelligible to their interlocutors, and to revise their decisions as new information and new perspectives come into view.Incorporating democratic deliberation into human subjects research would recommend greater inclusion of participants in the review process. This might be achieved by seating participants or their advocates on IRBs, and by otherwise involving them on advisory committees overseeing research. Such inclusion of research participants would follow the model of advisory committees elsewhere in the health care system, which include patients and other stakeholders. It would also counsel against exempting public benefits research, such as experimentation with Medicare and Medicaid benefits, from ethical review.

This chapter describes the “old” model of cap-and-trade policy design that largely controlled emissions trading policy from its origins in the 1970s through the 1990s, under which emissions trading programs were adopted reluctantly, and “grandfathered” emissions allowances to current emitters at no cost. It also describes some important events starting in the 1990s that helped lay the groundwork for the sudden switch to auctions in RGGI, including: greater attention to allocation rules by political actors, new precedents such as spectrum rights auctions and severance taxes on some nature resources, new political and economic pressures from electricity deregulation, and the emergence of “public benefit” charges and programs to improve energy efficiency for consumers. In addition, this period saw the emergence of new polluter pays and public ownership normative frames in the context of emissions allowances. At the same time, the chapter documents how these initial changes were insufficient to successfully promote allowance auctions in the development of two prominent cap and trade programs: the initial phase of the EU ETS from 1998-2005, and the NOx Budget emissions trading program from 1994-2005.