Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029346
- eISBN:
- 9780262330213
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029346.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
In Disturbed Consciousness, philosophers and other scholars examine various psychopathologies in light of specific philosophical theories of consciousness. The contributing authors—some of them ...
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In Disturbed Consciousness, philosophers and other scholars examine various psychopathologies in light of specific philosophical theories of consciousness. The contributing authors—some of them discussing or defending their own theoretical work—consider not only how a theory of consciousness can account for a specific psychopathological condition but also how the characteristics of a psychopathology might challenge such a theory. Thus one essay defends the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness against the charge that it cannot account for somatoparaphrenia (a delusion in which one denies ownership of a limb). Another essay argues that various attempts to explain away such anomalies within subjective theories of consciousness fail. Other essays consider such topics as the application of a model of unified consciousness to cases of brain bisection and dissociative identity disorder; prefrontal and parietal underconnectivity in autism and other psychopathologies; self-deception and the self-model theory of subjectivity; schizophrenia and the vehicle theory of consciousness; and a shift in emphasis away from an internal (or brainbound) approach to psychopathology to an interactive one. Each essay offers a distinctive perspective from the intersection of philosophy, consciousness research, and psychiatry.Less
In Disturbed Consciousness, philosophers and other scholars examine various psychopathologies in light of specific philosophical theories of consciousness. The contributing authors—some of them discussing or defending their own theoretical work—consider not only how a theory of consciousness can account for a specific psychopathological condition but also how the characteristics of a psychopathology might challenge such a theory. Thus one essay defends the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness against the charge that it cannot account for somatoparaphrenia (a delusion in which one denies ownership of a limb). Another essay argues that various attempts to explain away such anomalies within subjective theories of consciousness fail. Other essays consider such topics as the application of a model of unified consciousness to cases of brain bisection and dissociative identity disorder; prefrontal and parietal underconnectivity in autism and other psychopathologies; self-deception and the self-model theory of subjectivity; schizophrenia and the vehicle theory of consciousness; and a shift in emphasis away from an internal (or brainbound) approach to psychopathology to an interactive one. Each essay offers a distinctive perspective from the intersection of philosophy, consciousness research, and psychiatry.
Stanley B. Klein
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199349968
- eISBN:
- 9780199369454
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199349968.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology
In this book, I take the position that the self is not a “thing” easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a ...
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In this book, I take the position that the self is not a “thing” easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construed as first-person subjectivity, lacking material instantiation. As a consequence of their potential immateriality, the subjective aspect of self cannot be taken as an object and therefore is not easily amenable to treatment by current scientific methods. I argue that to fully appreciate the self, its two aspects must be acknowledged, since it is only in virtue of their interaction that the self of everyday experience becomes a phenomenological reality. However, given their different metaphysical commitments (i.e., material and immaterial aspects of reality), a number of issues must be addressed. These include, but are not limited to, the possibility of interaction between metaphysically distinct aspects of reality, questions of causal closure under the physical, the principle of energy conservation, and more. After addressing these concerns, I present evidence based on self-reports from case studies of individuals who suffer from a chronic or temporary loss of their sense of personal ownership of their mental states. Drawing on this evidence, I argue that personal ownership may be the factor that closes the metaphysical gap between the material and immaterial selves, linking these two disparate aspects of reality, thereby enabling us to experience a unified sense of self despite its underlying multiplicity.Less
In this book, I take the position that the self is not a “thing” easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construed as first-person subjectivity, lacking material instantiation. As a consequence of their potential immateriality, the subjective aspect of self cannot be taken as an object and therefore is not easily amenable to treatment by current scientific methods. I argue that to fully appreciate the self, its two aspects must be acknowledged, since it is only in virtue of their interaction that the self of everyday experience becomes a phenomenological reality. However, given their different metaphysical commitments (i.e., material and immaterial aspects of reality), a number of issues must be addressed. These include, but are not limited to, the possibility of interaction between metaphysically distinct aspects of reality, questions of causal closure under the physical, the principle of energy conservation, and more. After addressing these concerns, I present evidence based on self-reports from case studies of individuals who suffer from a chronic or temporary loss of their sense of personal ownership of their mental states. Drawing on this evidence, I argue that personal ownership may be the factor that closes the metaphysical gap between the material and immaterial selves, linking these two disparate aspects of reality, thereby enabling us to experience a unified sense of self despite its underlying multiplicity.
Thomas Schramme (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780262027915
- eISBN:
- 9780262320382
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262027915.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Psychopathy has been the subject of investigations in both philosophy and psychiatry and yet the conceptual issues remain largely unresolved. This volume approaches psychopathy by considering the ...
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Psychopathy has been the subject of investigations in both philosophy and psychiatry and yet the conceptual issues remain largely unresolved. This volume approaches psychopathy by considering the question of what psychopaths lack. The contributors investigate specific moral dysfunctions or deficits, shedding light on the capacities people need to be moral by examining cases of real people who seem to lack those capacities. The volume proceeds from the basic assumption that psychopathy is not characterized by a single deficit–for example, the lack of empathy, as some philosophers have proposed – but by a range of them. Thus contributors address specific deficits that include impairments in rationality, language, fellow-feeling, volition, evaluation, and sympathy. They also consider such issues in moral psychology as moral motivation, moral emotions, and moral character; and they examine social aspects of psychopathic behavior, including ascriptions of moral responsibility, justification of moral blame, and social and legal responses to people perceived to be dangerous.Less
Psychopathy has been the subject of investigations in both philosophy and psychiatry and yet the conceptual issues remain largely unresolved. This volume approaches psychopathy by considering the question of what psychopaths lack. The contributors investigate specific moral dysfunctions or deficits, shedding light on the capacities people need to be moral by examining cases of real people who seem to lack those capacities. The volume proceeds from the basic assumption that psychopathy is not characterized by a single deficit–for example, the lack of empathy, as some philosophers have proposed – but by a range of them. Thus contributors address specific deficits that include impairments in rationality, language, fellow-feeling, volition, evaluation, and sympathy. They also consider such issues in moral psychology as moral motivation, moral emotions, and moral character; and they examine social aspects of psychopathic behavior, including ascriptions of moral responsibility, justification of moral blame, and social and legal responses to people perceived to be dangerous.
Aaron Schuster
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780262528597
- eISBN:
- 9780262334150
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262528597.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Is pleasure a rotten idea, mired in negativity and lack, which should be abandoned in favor of a new concept of desire? Or is desire itself fundamentally a matter of lack, absence, and loss? This is ...
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Is pleasure a rotten idea, mired in negativity and lack, which should be abandoned in favor of a new concept of desire? Or is desire itself fundamentally a matter of lack, absence, and loss? This is one of the crucial issues dividing the work of Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Lacan, two formidable figures of post-war French thought. Though the encounter with psychoanalysis deeply marked Deleuze’s work, we are yet to have a critical account of the very different postures he adopted toward psychoanalysis, and especially Lacanian theory, throughout his career. In this book Schuster tackles this tangled relationship head on. The result is neither a Lacanian reading of Deleuze nor a Deleuzian reading of Lacan but rather a systematic and comparative analysis that identifies concerns common to both thinkers and their ultimately incompatible ways of addressing them. Schuster focuses on drive and desire—the strange, convoluted relationship of human beings to the forces that move them from within—“the trouble with pleasure.” Along the way, Schuster offers his own conceptual analyses and examples. In the “Critique of Pure Complaint” he provides a philosophy of complaining, ranging from Freud’s theory of neurosis to Spinoza’s intellectual complaint of God and the Deleuzian great complaint. Schuster goes on to elaborate a theory of love as “mutually compatible symptoms”; an original philosophical history of pleasure, including a hypothetical Heideggerian treatise and a Platonic theory of true pleasure; and an exploration of the 1920s “literature of the death drive,” including Thomas Mann, Italo Svevo, and Blaise Cendrars.Less
Is pleasure a rotten idea, mired in negativity and lack, which should be abandoned in favor of a new concept of desire? Or is desire itself fundamentally a matter of lack, absence, and loss? This is one of the crucial issues dividing the work of Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Lacan, two formidable figures of post-war French thought. Though the encounter with psychoanalysis deeply marked Deleuze’s work, we are yet to have a critical account of the very different postures he adopted toward psychoanalysis, and especially Lacanian theory, throughout his career. In this book Schuster tackles this tangled relationship head on. The result is neither a Lacanian reading of Deleuze nor a Deleuzian reading of Lacan but rather a systematic and comparative analysis that identifies concerns common to both thinkers and their ultimately incompatible ways of addressing them. Schuster focuses on drive and desire—the strange, convoluted relationship of human beings to the forces that move them from within—“the trouble with pleasure.” Along the way, Schuster offers his own conceptual analyses and examples. In the “Critique of Pure Complaint” he provides a philosophy of complaining, ranging from Freud’s theory of neurosis to Spinoza’s intellectual complaint of God and the Deleuzian great complaint. Schuster goes on to elaborate a theory of love as “mutually compatible symptoms”; an original philosophical history of pleasure, including a hypothetical Heideggerian treatise and a Platonic theory of true pleasure; and an exploration of the 1920s “literature of the death drive,” including Thomas Mann, Italo Svevo, and Blaise Cendrars.
Gerard O’Brien and Jon Opie
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029346
- eISBN:
- 9780262330213
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029346.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Gerard O’Brien and Jon Opie first present their “vehicle theory of consciousness” which identifies phenomenal consciousness with the brain’s vehicles of explicit representation. Given the distributed ...
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Gerard O’Brien and Jon Opie first present their “vehicle theory of consciousness” which identifies phenomenal consciousness with the brain’s vehicles of explicit representation. Given the distributed nature of neural representation, a vehicle theory is committed to the conjecture that phenomenal consciousness at each instant is a multiplicity: an aggregate of discrete phenomenal elements, each of which is the product of a distinct consciousness-making neural mechanism. This in turn implies that the single, unified, conscious subject (or “self”) is a hard-won computational achievement, in which myriad co-conscious parts are stitched together by the brain to form an integrated and coherent whole. From the perspective of a vehicle theory of consciousness, therefore, it is not surprising that the brain sometimes fails to pull off this remarkable feat. In this chapter, they explore what light a vehicle theory sheds on familiar psychopathologies of the self, especially schizophrenia.Less
Gerard O’Brien and Jon Opie first present their “vehicle theory of consciousness” which identifies phenomenal consciousness with the brain’s vehicles of explicit representation. Given the distributed nature of neural representation, a vehicle theory is committed to the conjecture that phenomenal consciousness at each instant is a multiplicity: an aggregate of discrete phenomenal elements, each of which is the product of a distinct consciousness-making neural mechanism. This in turn implies that the single, unified, conscious subject (or “self”) is a hard-won computational achievement, in which myriad co-conscious parts are stitched together by the brain to form an integrated and coherent whole. From the perspective of a vehicle theory of consciousness, therefore, it is not surprising that the brain sometimes fails to pull off this remarkable feat. In this chapter, they explore what light a vehicle theory sheds on familiar psychopathologies of the self, especially schizophrenia.
Jakob Hohwy
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029346
- eISBN:
- 9780262330213
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029346.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Jakob Hohwy seeks to recover an approach to consciousness from a general theory of brain function, namely the prediction error minimization theory. The way this theory applies to mental and ...
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Jakob Hohwy seeks to recover an approach to consciousness from a general theory of brain function, namely the prediction error minimization theory. The way this theory applies to mental and developmental disorder demonstrates its relevance to consciousness. The resulting view is discussed in relation to a contemporary theory of consciousness, namely, the idea that conscious perception depends on Bayesian metacognition which is also supported by considerations of psychopathology. This Bayesian theory is first disconnected from the higher-order thought theory, and then, via a prediction error conception of action, connected instead to the global workspace theory. Considerations of mental and developmental disorder therefore show that a very general theory of brain function is relevant to explaining the structure of conscious perception. Furthermore, Hohwy argues that this theory can unify two contemporary approaches to consciousness in a move that seeks to elucidate the fundamental mechanism for the selection of representational content into consciousness.Less
Jakob Hohwy seeks to recover an approach to consciousness from a general theory of brain function, namely the prediction error minimization theory. The way this theory applies to mental and developmental disorder demonstrates its relevance to consciousness. The resulting view is discussed in relation to a contemporary theory of consciousness, namely, the idea that conscious perception depends on Bayesian metacognition which is also supported by considerations of psychopathology. This Bayesian theory is first disconnected from the higher-order thought theory, and then, via a prediction error conception of action, connected instead to the global workspace theory. Considerations of mental and developmental disorder therefore show that a very general theory of brain function is relevant to explaining the structure of conscious perception. Furthermore, Hohwy argues that this theory can unify two contemporary approaches to consciousness in a move that seeks to elucidate the fundamental mechanism for the selection of representational content into consciousness.
Erik Myin, J. Kevin O’Regan, and Inez Myin-Germeys
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029346
- eISBN:
- 9780262330213
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029346.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Erik Myin, Inez Myin-Germeys, and Kevin O’Regan explain that according to the sensorimotor approach to perception, perceptual experience should be seen as a way of interacting with the environment. ...
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Erik Myin, Inez Myin-Germeys, and Kevin O’Regan explain that according to the sensorimotor approach to perception, perceptual experience should be seen as a way of interacting with the environment. What distinguishes different perceptual experiences is the different ways in which a perceiver perceptually engages with the environment. What differentiates hearing from seeing are the differences between the patterns of auditory versus visual engaging with the world. Similarly, within a single sub-modality such as color vision, what sets apart an experience of red from an experience of green are also the differences in the modes of interaction with the environment. It has been argued by sensorimotor theorists that this relocation of emphasis from the brain to the interaction with the environment dissolves many problems regarding understanding the nature of phenomenal consciousness. They argue that a similar shift of emphasis away from a brainbound approach to an interactive one is possible in psychopathology. Indeed, such a shift is implemented in approaches to psychopathology which focus on the role of person-environment interactions in the study of the positive and negative phenomena of psychosis. On a theoretical level, this has led to the view of schizophrenia as a “salience dysregulation syndrome.”Less
Erik Myin, Inez Myin-Germeys, and Kevin O’Regan explain that according to the sensorimotor approach to perception, perceptual experience should be seen as a way of interacting with the environment. What distinguishes different perceptual experiences is the different ways in which a perceiver perceptually engages with the environment. What differentiates hearing from seeing are the differences between the patterns of auditory versus visual engaging with the world. Similarly, within a single sub-modality such as color vision, what sets apart an experience of red from an experience of green are also the differences in the modes of interaction with the environment. It has been argued by sensorimotor theorists that this relocation of emphasis from the brain to the interaction with the environment dissolves many problems regarding understanding the nature of phenomenal consciousness. They argue that a similar shift of emphasis away from a brainbound approach to an interactive one is possible in psychopathology. Indeed, such a shift is implemented in approaches to psychopathology which focus on the role of person-environment interactions in the study of the positive and negative phenomena of psychosis. On a theoretical level, this has led to the view of schizophrenia as a “salience dysregulation syndrome.”
Oshin Vartanian, Adam S. Bristol, and James C. Kaufman (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262019583
- eISBN:
- 9780262314695
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019583.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
This volume offers a comprehensive overview of the latest neuroscientific approaches to the scientific study of creativity. In chapters that progress logically from neurobiological fundamentals to ...
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This volume offers a comprehensive overview of the latest neuroscientific approaches to the scientific study of creativity. In chapters that progress logically from neurobiological fundamentals to systems neuroscience and neuroimaging, leading scholars describe the latest theoretical, genetic, structural, clinical, functional, and applied research on the neural bases of creativity. The treatment is both broad and in depth, offering a range of neuroscientific perspectives with detailed coverage by experts in each area. Following opening chapters that offer theoretical context, the contributors discuss such issues as the heritability of creativity; creativity in patients with brain damage, neurodegenerative conditions, and mental illness; clinical interventions and the relationship between psychopathology and creativity; neuroimaging studies of intelligence and creativity; neuroscientific basis of creativity-enhancing methodologies; and the information-processing challenges of viewing visual art.Less
This volume offers a comprehensive overview of the latest neuroscientific approaches to the scientific study of creativity. In chapters that progress logically from neurobiological fundamentals to systems neuroscience and neuroimaging, leading scholars describe the latest theoretical, genetic, structural, clinical, functional, and applied research on the neural bases of creativity. The treatment is both broad and in depth, offering a range of neuroscientific perspectives with detailed coverage by experts in each area. Following opening chapters that offer theoretical context, the contributors discuss such issues as the heritability of creativity; creativity in patients with brain damage, neurodegenerative conditions, and mental illness; clinical interventions and the relationship between psychopathology and creativity; neuroimaging studies of intelligence and creativity; neuroscientific basis of creativity-enhancing methodologies; and the information-processing challenges of viewing visual art.
William T. Carpenter
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262019620
- eISBN:
- 9780262314602
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019620.003.0003
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
Schizophrenia is best viewed as a clinical syndrome, without compelling evidence of a homogeneous disease. Most investigations over the past century, however, have been designed without addressing ...
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Schizophrenia is best viewed as a clinical syndrome, without compelling evidence of a homogeneous disease. Most investigations over the past century, however, have been designed without addressing heterogeneity, thus impeding knowledge acquisition. Recent paradigm shifts in the schizophrenia construct are intended to provide more valid and more robust approaches to discovery. These include: 1) Identifying patient subgroups to enrich study cohort homogeneity on causal pathway and pathophysiology; 2) Identifying key domains of psychopathology and using each domain as the pathology of interest; 3) Investigating molecules, genes, and pathways related to known neural circuits and behavioral constructs which, in turn, are related to psychopathology domains; and 4) Using stages of vulnerability development as study targets, to conceptualize causal pathways to early vulnerability that are not specific to schizophrenia, as well as later stages associated with pathological variables which have greater disorder-outcome specificity. The first paradigm shift can be informative for a form of schizophrenia that may not generalize to all forms of the disorder. The last three provide for more specific study targets but address pathologies that will cut across current disorder boundaries. The fourth paradigm, in particular, calls attention to preventive and resiliency factors as well as causal factors. Published in the Strungmann Forum Reports Series.Less
Schizophrenia is best viewed as a clinical syndrome, without compelling evidence of a homogeneous disease. Most investigations over the past century, however, have been designed without addressing heterogeneity, thus impeding knowledge acquisition. Recent paradigm shifts in the schizophrenia construct are intended to provide more valid and more robust approaches to discovery. These include: 1) Identifying patient subgroups to enrich study cohort homogeneity on causal pathway and pathophysiology; 2) Identifying key domains of psychopathology and using each domain as the pathology of interest; 3) Investigating molecules, genes, and pathways related to known neural circuits and behavioral constructs which, in turn, are related to psychopathology domains; and 4) Using stages of vulnerability development as study targets, to conceptualize causal pathways to early vulnerability that are not specific to schizophrenia, as well as later stages associated with pathological variables which have greater disorder-outcome specificity. The first paradigm shift can be informative for a form of schizophrenia that may not generalize to all forms of the disorder. The last three provide for more specific study targets but address pathologies that will cut across current disorder boundaries. The fourth paradigm, in particular, calls attention to preventive and resiliency factors as well as causal factors. Published in the Strungmann Forum Reports Series.
Michael Silberstein
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262027236
- eISBN:
- 9780262322461
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262027236.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Psychopathology might be one domain where we can get some empirical perch on the Systematicity debate. In patients with schizophrenia transformational systematicity and other types of systematicity ...
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Psychopathology might be one domain where we can get some empirical perch on the Systematicity debate. In patients with schizophrenia transformational systematicity and other types of systematicity often break down. Systems neuroscience has provided some reason to believe that the best explanation for this break down is in terms of the degradation of key brain subsymbolic network properties such as small-world graphical structures. It is argued that if such systems neuroscience explanations for failures of systematicity in schizophrenia are robust then this is a victory for network approaches over symbol-and-rule approaches that themselves provide little insight into said failures. Finally, there is speculation that the relevant dynamical and graphical relations in such cases extend beyond the brain to include body and environment.Less
Psychopathology might be one domain where we can get some empirical perch on the Systematicity debate. In patients with schizophrenia transformational systematicity and other types of systematicity often break down. Systems neuroscience has provided some reason to believe that the best explanation for this break down is in terms of the degradation of key brain subsymbolic network properties such as small-world graphical structures. It is argued that if such systems neuroscience explanations for failures of systematicity in schizophrenia are robust then this is a victory for network approaches over symbol-and-rule approaches that themselves provide little insight into said failures. Finally, there is speculation that the relevant dynamical and graphical relations in such cases extend beyond the brain to include body and environment.
Ben Morgan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780823239924
- eISBN:
- 9780823239962
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823239924.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
The book takes as its starting point the declaration by a woman religious in a fourteenth-century text that she has “become God”. Part I sets out the methodological tools necessary for a critical ...
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The book takes as its starting point the declaration by a woman religious in a fourteenth-century text that she has “become God”. Part I sets out the methodological tools necessary for a critical understanding of this claim, arguing that practices of a gendered identity be seen as tools through which people together manage a sense of connectedness to the world and others, a sense of irrefragable involvement that in the fourteenth century is given the name “God”. Writing the history of identity then means writing the history of these changing practices. An example of what this entails is set out in Part II, which traces changes evident in mystical texts written in the Rhineland in the wake of the condemnation of Meister Eckhart's teaching for heresy in 1329. A new identification with the practices by which individuals monitor their spiritual longings introduces, in the texts of Heinrich Seuse, habits which prefigure those of modern identity. Identity appears as a set of practices by which men and women together regulate the distance from what in the medieval period was called “God”. Part III, in search of a vocabulary for acknowledging the sense of connectedness that was previously managed with religious habits, offers a critical reading of early psychoanalysis. The idea of the unconscious is shown to be a tool for keeping at bay the sense of connection. But Freud's early texts also show the possibility of attending to the shared project of coming to terms with togetherness and of “becoming God” as much as we can bear.Less
The book takes as its starting point the declaration by a woman religious in a fourteenth-century text that she has “become God”. Part I sets out the methodological tools necessary for a critical understanding of this claim, arguing that practices of a gendered identity be seen as tools through which people together manage a sense of connectedness to the world and others, a sense of irrefragable involvement that in the fourteenth century is given the name “God”. Writing the history of identity then means writing the history of these changing practices. An example of what this entails is set out in Part II, which traces changes evident in mystical texts written in the Rhineland in the wake of the condemnation of Meister Eckhart's teaching for heresy in 1329. A new identification with the practices by which individuals monitor their spiritual longings introduces, in the texts of Heinrich Seuse, habits which prefigure those of modern identity. Identity appears as a set of practices by which men and women together regulate the distance from what in the medieval period was called “God”. Part III, in search of a vocabulary for acknowledging the sense of connectedness that was previously managed with religious habits, offers a critical reading of early psychoanalysis. The idea of the unconscious is shown to be a tool for keeping at bay the sense of connection. But Freud's early texts also show the possibility of attending to the shared project of coming to terms with togetherness and of “becoming God” as much as we can bear.
Aaron Schuster
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780262528597
- eISBN:
- 9780262334150
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262528597.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The problem of the relationship between Deleuze and Lacan raises more generally that of the relationship between philosophy and psychoanalysis. I develop this around the question of psychopathology: ...
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The problem of the relationship between Deleuze and Lacan raises more generally that of the relationship between philosophy and psychoanalysis. I develop this around the question of psychopathology: what can the study of psychopathology teach us about the human condition? Freud strongly criticizes the idea of normality, and develops a patho-analytic view on human existence, where pathologies are essentially exaggerations of universally shared crises and problems. The strongest expression of this idea is found in the theory of the death drive, which makes of life itself a disease. I explore the meaning of the death drive, first in relation to literature (Thomas Mann, Italo Svevo, Blaise Cendrars), then through an extended reading of Sade’s seeming radicalization of the death drive into the imperative for universal extinction. The problem of the death drive, and the negativity it stands for, is the key point of contention between Deleuze and Lacan, both of whom are committed to the project of a clinical anthropology. Instead of Deleuze as the philosopher of affirmation, creativity, and becoming versus Lacan’s emphasis on lack, castration, and loss, I argue that the difference between the two ultimately concerns different ways of conceiving negativity and the violence of the negative.Less
The problem of the relationship between Deleuze and Lacan raises more generally that of the relationship between philosophy and psychoanalysis. I develop this around the question of psychopathology: what can the study of psychopathology teach us about the human condition? Freud strongly criticizes the idea of normality, and develops a patho-analytic view on human existence, where pathologies are essentially exaggerations of universally shared crises and problems. The strongest expression of this idea is found in the theory of the death drive, which makes of life itself a disease. I explore the meaning of the death drive, first in relation to literature (Thomas Mann, Italo Svevo, Blaise Cendrars), then through an extended reading of Sade’s seeming radicalization of the death drive into the imperative for universal extinction. The problem of the death drive, and the negativity it stands for, is the key point of contention between Deleuze and Lacan, both of whom are committed to the project of a clinical anthropology. Instead of Deleuze as the philosopher of affirmation, creativity, and becoming versus Lacan’s emphasis on lack, castration, and loss, I argue that the difference between the two ultimately concerns different ways of conceiving negativity and the violence of the negative.
Thomas J. Csordas
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780520288423
- eISBN:
- 9780520963368
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520288423.003.0023
- Subject:
- Anthropology, Anthropology, Religion
The early 21st century has seen a resurgence in the performance of exorcism in the Catholic Church. Exorcism is a solemn rite that must be performed by a priest with the express consent of the ...
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The early 21st century has seen a resurgence in the performance of exorcism in the Catholic Church. Exorcism is a solemn rite that must be performed by a priest with the express consent of the bishop with jurisdiction in the area where the exorcism takes place. Both a form of healing for afflicted individuals and a discourse on evil at large in the contemporary world, exorcism lies at the intersection of therapy and cosmology in the world's largest religious institution. Its social and cultural significance is therefore worthy of analysis. This chapter takes a step in that direction through consideration of ethnographic material from exorcists, mental health professionals who assist and consult with them, and the afflicted people who seek their help.Less
The early 21st century has seen a resurgence in the performance of exorcism in the Catholic Church. Exorcism is a solemn rite that must be performed by a priest with the express consent of the bishop with jurisdiction in the area where the exorcism takes place. Both a form of healing for afflicted individuals and a discourse on evil at large in the contemporary world, exorcism lies at the intersection of therapy and cosmology in the world's largest religious institution. Its social and cultural significance is therefore worthy of analysis. This chapter takes a step in that direction through consideration of ethnographic material from exorcists, mental health professionals who assist and consult with them, and the afflicted people who seek their help.
John D. Caputo
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780823239924
- eISBN:
- 9780823239962
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823239924.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
The chapter begins with Lucian's second-century account of a slip of the tongue, which understood a mistake to be an occurrence through which individuals could discover something as yet unknown about ...
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The chapter begins with Lucian's second-century account of a slip of the tongue, which understood a mistake to be an occurrence through which individuals could discover something as yet unknown about the interaction they were involved in, and take responsibility for it by making it meaningful. Freud's approach to blunders is also to make them meaningful, but the comparison with Lucian highlights the degree to which he tends to make mistakes private rather than situate them in a wider cultural context. Nevertheless, the slips Freud collects can be placed in the context of conversations about culture by educated Viennese circa 1900. They can then be understood as ways of negotiating togetherness. Freud's Psychopathology is shown to contain, alongside the arguments which serve primarily to vindicate Freud's theory, a different model of the unconscious: namely that of a longing to be aligned with the situation we are involved in. Situated as it is in a context of everyday encounters, this model offers a fruitful starting place for the acknowledgement of, and alignment with, the shared unfolding process in which we are always already involved. In the fourteenth century, this striving for alignment went by the name of “becoming God”.Less
The chapter begins with Lucian's second-century account of a slip of the tongue, which understood a mistake to be an occurrence through which individuals could discover something as yet unknown about the interaction they were involved in, and take responsibility for it by making it meaningful. Freud's approach to blunders is also to make them meaningful, but the comparison with Lucian highlights the degree to which he tends to make mistakes private rather than situate them in a wider cultural context. Nevertheless, the slips Freud collects can be placed in the context of conversations about culture by educated Viennese circa 1900. They can then be understood as ways of negotiating togetherness. Freud's Psychopathology is shown to contain, alongside the arguments which serve primarily to vindicate Freud's theory, a different model of the unconscious: namely that of a longing to be aligned with the situation we are involved in. Situated as it is in a context of everyday encounters, this model offers a fruitful starting place for the acknowledgement of, and alignment with, the shared unfolding process in which we are always already involved. In the fourteenth century, this striving for alignment went by the name of “becoming God”.
