Wallace Matson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199812691
- eISBN:
- 9780199919420
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812691.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The intensely human culture of newly literate Ionia spread into every field of intellectual endeavor. Though it was obviously anti-religious, serious opposition to it took nearly a century to ...
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The intensely human culture of newly literate Ionia spread into every field of intellectual endeavor. Though it was obviously anti-religious, serious opposition to it took nearly a century to develop. Ionian thought came to Athens later than to Italy. It was introduced by Anaxagoras of Clazomenae and by members of a new “profession,” the Sophists –itinerant lecturers and tutors. The most famous of these was Protagoras, the first Relativist and explicit agnostic. Socrates, a native Athenian, started out as a friend of the scientific side of Pythagoreanism. As such he was caricatured by the comic poet Aristophanes; and as such he was condemned and put to death for “impiety.” But by that time he had undergone a conversion from science to the moral and religious interests also associated with the Brotherhood.Less
The intensely human culture of newly literate Ionia spread into every field of intellectual endeavor. Though it was obviously anti-religious, serious opposition to it took nearly a century to develop. Ionian thought came to Athens later than to Italy. It was introduced by Anaxagoras of Clazomenae and by members of a new “profession,” the Sophists –itinerant lecturers and tutors. The most famous of these was Protagoras, the first Relativist and explicit agnostic. Socrates, a native Athenian, started out as a friend of the scientific side of Pythagoreanism. As such he was caricatured by the comic poet Aristophanes; and as such he was condemned and put to death for “impiety.” But by that time he had undergone a conversion from science to the moral and religious interests also associated with the Brotherhood.
Terence Irwin
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195086454
- eISBN:
- 9780199833306
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195086457.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This book is an evolution of Plato’s Moral Theory where Irwin presented for the first time his personal interpretation of Plato’s ethics. The aim of this book is to demonstrate that Plato’s rejection ...
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This book is an evolution of Plato’s Moral Theory where Irwin presented for the first time his personal interpretation of Plato’s ethics. The aim of this book is to demonstrate that Plato’s rejection of Socrates’ instrumentalism is one of the key elements in the development of Plato’s philosophical perspective. The book, which is structured in 20 chapters, is a dialogue by dialogue commentary, which discusses Plato’s ethics in context of his metaphysics and epistemology. The first chapters study how in his early dialogues (Laches, Charmides, and Euthydemus) Plato interprets Socrates’ method and doctrines. Then, from chapter 6 to 9, it is illustrated how in later dialogues (Gorgias, Meno, Protagoras) Plato tries to defend and support Socrates’ theories against some possible critics. The core of the book (chapters 10 through 18) is devoted to a careful analysis of how Plato in the Republic develops his own views, moving away from the positions of his master. Lastly, in the two final chapters how the mature views of the Republic are advanced in the late dialogues (the Philebus, the Statesman, and the Laws) is examined.Less
This book is an evolution of Plato’s Moral Theory where Irwin presented for the first time his personal interpretation of Plato’s ethics. The aim of this book is to demonstrate that Plato’s rejection of Socrates’ instrumentalism is one of the key elements in the development of Plato’s philosophical perspective. The book, which is structured in 20 chapters, is a dialogue by dialogue commentary, which discusses Plato’s ethics in context of his metaphysics and epistemology. The first chapters study how in his early dialogues (Laches, Charmides, and Euthydemus) Plato interprets Socrates’ method and doctrines. Then, from chapter 6 to 9, it is illustrated how in later dialogues (Gorgias, Meno, Protagoras) Plato tries to defend and support Socrates’ theories against some possible critics. The core of the book (chapters 10 through 18) is devoted to a careful analysis of how Plato in the Republic develops his own views, moving away from the positions of his master. Lastly, in the two final chapters how the mature views of the Republic are advanced in the late dialogues (the Philebus, the Statesman, and the Laws) is examined.
Kenneth P. Winkler
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195169720
- eISBN:
- 9780199786343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169727.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This essay reinterprets Berkeley’s idealism as partially motivated by a need to overcome the Agrippan mode of relativity pressed by Pyrrhonists. It compares Berkeley’s solution to that of Protagoras ...
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This essay reinterprets Berkeley’s idealism as partially motivated by a need to overcome the Agrippan mode of relativity pressed by Pyrrhonists. It compares Berkeley’s solution to that of Protagoras as presented in Plato’s Theaetetus, and argues that Berkeley needed to depend on reason — intuition or demonstration — to avoid skepticism. In this interpretation, Berkeley is closer to the rationalist tradition than usually recognized.Less
This essay reinterprets Berkeley’s idealism as partially motivated by a need to overcome the Agrippan mode of relativity pressed by Pyrrhonists. It compares Berkeley’s solution to that of Protagoras as presented in Plato’s Theaetetus, and argues that Berkeley needed to depend on reason — intuition or demonstration — to avoid skepticism. In this interpretation, Berkeley is closer to the rationalist tradition than usually recognized.
Matthew Evans
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199644384
- eISBN:
- 9780191743344
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644384.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
One of Plato's favorite targets, from dialogue to dialogue, is the broadly Protagorean view that the facts about how we should live are grounded in our best beliefs about how we should live. The aim ...
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One of Plato's favorite targets, from dialogue to dialogue, is the broadly Protagorean view that the facts about how we should live are grounded in our best beliefs about how we should live. The aim of this chapter is to show that (and how) the famous argument of Euthyphro 10A–11B can be seen to play an important role in Plato's larger anti‐Protagorean project. According to the interpretation defended here, this argument is best understood as an attack on the very idea that beliefs could ground facts in the way the Protagorean thinks they could.Less
One of Plato's favorite targets, from dialogue to dialogue, is the broadly Protagorean view that the facts about how we should live are grounded in our best beliefs about how we should live. The aim of this chapter is to show that (and how) the famous argument of Euthyphro 10A–11B can be seen to play an important role in Plato's larger anti‐Protagorean project. According to the interpretation defended here, this argument is best understood as an attack on the very idea that beliefs could ground facts in the way the Protagorean thinks they could.
Catherine Osborne
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199282067
- eISBN:
- 9780191712944
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282067.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter discusses extracts from the Apocryphal book of Jubilees, Herodotus' Histories, and Plato's Protagoras. It explores the idea that myths and stories serve to construct one's understanding ...
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This chapter discusses extracts from the Apocryphal book of Jubilees, Herodotus' Histories, and Plato's Protagoras. It explores the idea that myths and stories serve to construct one's understanding of nature, appealing to what appear to be value-free facts, but telling a story that attaches significance to those facts as morally relevant or irrelevant considerations. Nature appears as provident and wise, or as improvident and hostile. The portrayal generates in the reader either a sense of fellow-feeling and care for the environment, or a sense of justified aggression. Narrative can be used to manipulate the reader's perception of his/her place in the world, and of the value and purpose of moral precepts.Less
This chapter discusses extracts from the Apocryphal book of Jubilees, Herodotus' Histories, and Plato's Protagoras. It explores the idea that myths and stories serve to construct one's understanding of nature, appealing to what appear to be value-free facts, but telling a story that attaches significance to those facts as morally relevant or irrelevant considerations. Nature appears as provident and wise, or as improvident and hostile. The portrayal generates in the reader either a sense of fellow-feeling and care for the environment, or a sense of justified aggression. Narrative can be used to manipulate the reader's perception of his/her place in the world, and of the value and purpose of moral precepts.
William J. Richardson
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823222551
- eISBN:
- 9780823235247
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823222551.003.0018
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter explains the non-subjective character of thought, describing in new terms what it means for thought to let beings be. It means to yield to Being in its ...
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This chapter explains the non-subjective character of thought, describing in new terms what it means for thought to let beings be. It means to yield to Being in its negativity. In the essay “The Time of World-as-Picture”, there are passages where the author contrasts the Cartesian version of presentative thought with what he understands to be Greek νοε̃ιν. Heidegger argues that when beings emerge into presence in any given instance, the domain of non-concealment is limited, for the emergence is finite. Thus the domain of disclosure has measure. It is what separates what comes to presence from what does not. For Protagoras, the fundamental attitude is one of acceptance, of opening himself unto the self-revelation of beings in their Being.Less
This chapter explains the non-subjective character of thought, describing in new terms what it means for thought to let beings be. It means to yield to Being in its negativity. In the essay “The Time of World-as-Picture”, there are passages where the author contrasts the Cartesian version of presentative thought with what he understands to be Greek νοε̃ιν. Heidegger argues that when beings emerge into presence in any given instance, the domain of non-concealment is limited, for the emergence is finite. Thus the domain of disclosure has measure. It is what separates what comes to presence from what does not. For Protagoras, the fundamental attitude is one of acceptance, of opening himself unto the self-revelation of beings in their Being.
Stephen V. Tracy
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520256033
- eISBN:
- 9780520943629
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520256033.003.0013
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Archaeology: Classical
Except for Plutarch, the authors discussed in this book all lived at the same time as Pericles, or within a generation of his death. Many were his coevals and in a position either to have been ...
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Except for Plutarch, the authors discussed in this book all lived at the same time as Pericles, or within a generation of his death. Many were his coevals and in a position either to have been personally acquainted with him or to have known people who were. Some, such as Anaxagoras, Protagoras, and Sophocles, were probably his good friends. The historian Thucydides also doubtless knew him personally and saw him on the street and in the assembly, but, inasmuch as he was at least thirty years younger than Pericles, it is doubtful that Pericles had any close association with him. Herodotus might have composed much of his work prior to Pericles' death and might have expected that Pericles would be aware of what he wrote. Within a century of his death, Pericles has become the exemplar of the greatness of Athens in its heyday and remains so to the present day. The golden age of Athens is referred to as “Periclean Athens” or “Athens in the age of Pericles.”Less
Except for Plutarch, the authors discussed in this book all lived at the same time as Pericles, or within a generation of his death. Many were his coevals and in a position either to have been personally acquainted with him or to have known people who were. Some, such as Anaxagoras, Protagoras, and Sophocles, were probably his good friends. The historian Thucydides also doubtless knew him personally and saw him on the street and in the assembly, but, inasmuch as he was at least thirty years younger than Pericles, it is doubtful that Pericles had any close association with him. Herodotus might have composed much of his work prior to Pericles' death and might have expected that Pericles would be aware of what he wrote. Within a century of his death, Pericles has become the exemplar of the greatness of Athens in its heyday and remains so to the present day. The golden age of Athens is referred to as “Periclean Athens” or “Athens in the age of Pericles.”
Hugo Koning
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199236343
- eISBN:
- 9780191717130
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199236343.003.0006
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Literary Studies: Classical, Early, and Medieval
This chapter shows that Plato's view of Hesiod is shaped not only by a critical tradition that pairs him with Homer, but also by sophistic appropriations of a more specific kind. Prodicus in ...
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This chapter shows that Plato's view of Hesiod is shaped not only by a critical tradition that pairs him with Homer, but also by sophistic appropriations of a more specific kind. Prodicus in particular, with his concern for the ‘correctness of names’, recognized Hesiod as an intellectual ancestor. More generally, Hesiod could be appropriated to represent particular philosophical interests, including etymology and epistemological atomism. As such, he became a convenient target for Plato's attacks on those approaches.Less
This chapter shows that Plato's view of Hesiod is shaped not only by a critical tradition that pairs him with Homer, but also by sophistic appropriations of a more specific kind. Prodicus in particular, with his concern for the ‘correctness of names’, recognized Hesiod as an intellectual ancestor. More generally, Hesiod could be appropriated to represent particular philosophical interests, including etymology and epistemological atomism. As such, he became a convenient target for Plato's attacks on those approaches.
Matthew Evans
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195382440
- eISBN:
- 9780199870158
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195382440.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
In a celebrated passage of Plato’s Protagoras (351b–58e) Socrates argues that it is impossible for us to do things that we know are better left undone. His claim, roughly put, is that we are capable ...
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In a celebrated passage of Plato’s Protagoras (351b–58e) Socrates argues that it is impossible for us to do things that we know are better left undone. His claim, roughly put, is that we are capable of acting incorrectly only if and only when we fail to recognize that we are acting incorrectly. Of all the counterintuitive arguments in the so-called Socratic dialogues, this one is probably the most famous. Historians have extensively examined its structure, its motivation, and its place within the broader sweep of Socratic and Platonic moral psychology. As a result of this, perhaps, many contemporary philosophers of action now feel compelled to mention it, if not to scrutinize it, when addressing themselves to the general topic of practical irrationality. But in recent years the historians and the philosophers have begun to diverge in their assessments of the argument’s intrinsic merit. While most of the philosophers have come to agree that it is implausible, either in whole or in part, many of the historians have defended it against this very charge, and have implied that the argument’s detractors are, as a rule, either exegetically misguided or philosophically shallow. Sadly, these two camps seem to have little if any sustained interaction with each other. So it is hardly surprising to find, in the recent literature on the subject, an unresolved and (largely) unengaged dispute between the majority of contemporary philosophers, on the one hand, and a cadre of devoted historians on the other. The purpose of this chapter is to get the dispute back on track, by providing both parties with a reliable guide to the issues that continue to divide them.Less
In a celebrated passage of Plato’s Protagoras (351b–58e) Socrates argues that it is impossible for us to do things that we know are better left undone. His claim, roughly put, is that we are capable of acting incorrectly only if and only when we fail to recognize that we are acting incorrectly. Of all the counterintuitive arguments in the so-called Socratic dialogues, this one is probably the most famous. Historians have extensively examined its structure, its motivation, and its place within the broader sweep of Socratic and Platonic moral psychology. As a result of this, perhaps, many contemporary philosophers of action now feel compelled to mention it, if not to scrutinize it, when addressing themselves to the general topic of practical irrationality. But in recent years the historians and the philosophers have begun to diverge in their assessments of the argument’s intrinsic merit. While most of the philosophers have come to agree that it is implausible, either in whole or in part, many of the historians have defended it against this very charge, and have implied that the argument’s detractors are, as a rule, either exegetically misguided or philosophically shallow. Sadly, these two camps seem to have little if any sustained interaction with each other. So it is hardly surprising to find, in the recent literature on the subject, an unresolved and (largely) unengaged dispute between the majority of contemporary philosophers, on the one hand, and a cadre of devoted historians on the other. The purpose of this chapter is to get the dispute back on track, by providing both parties with a reliable guide to the issues that continue to divide them.
Stephen V. Tracy
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520256033
- eISBN:
- 9780520943629
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520256033.003.0009
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Archaeology: Classical
Protagoras of Abdera, the most famous sophist of the age, visited Athens on several occasions, probably for extended periods of time. He came once about 443 B.C. in preparation for creating a law ...
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Protagoras of Abdera, the most famous sophist of the age, visited Athens on several occasions, probably for extended periods of time. He came once about 443 B.C. in preparation for creating a law code for the settlement at Thurii. Pericles almost certainly picked him for the task. Plato in his Protagoras records another visit about 432. In that dialogue he depicts Pericles' sons, Xanthippus and Paralus, as present at his discourse, which takes place at the home of Callias, their half brother on their mother's side. Protagoras, who was born about 490 and died about 420, was just slightly younger than Pericles and probably knew him very well. Despite Protagoras's importance, almost nothing of his writings has survived. It is intriguing, then, for understanding the relationship between Pericles and Protagoras, that the one substantial fragment that remains of his writings expresses his admiration for Pericles' behavior in the face of the deaths of his sons from the onslaught of the plague in the summer of 430.Less
Protagoras of Abdera, the most famous sophist of the age, visited Athens on several occasions, probably for extended periods of time. He came once about 443 B.C. in preparation for creating a law code for the settlement at Thurii. Pericles almost certainly picked him for the task. Plato in his Protagoras records another visit about 432. In that dialogue he depicts Pericles' sons, Xanthippus and Paralus, as present at his discourse, which takes place at the home of Callias, their half brother on their mother's side. Protagoras, who was born about 490 and died about 420, was just slightly younger than Pericles and probably knew him very well. Despite Protagoras's importance, almost nothing of his writings has survived. It is intriguing, then, for understanding the relationship between Pericles and Protagoras, that the one substantial fragment that remains of his writings expresses his admiration for Pericles' behavior in the face of the deaths of his sons from the onslaught of the plague in the summer of 430.
Lauren J. Apfel
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199600625
- eISBN:
- 9780191724985
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199600625.003.0003
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Ancient Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Philosophy
This chapter examines Protagoras in the context of Plato's dialogue the Protagoras, and also in the larger context of the sophistic age. More specifically, it argues that Protagoras held that values, ...
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This chapter examines Protagoras in the context of Plato's dialogue the Protagoras, and also in the larger context of the sophistic age. More specifically, it argues that Protagoras held that values, like truths, can be diverse and conflicting. The chapter explores each section of the dialogue in turn by illustrating the ways in which Protagoras' views, as expounded by Plato, can further be considered pluralist. So too, it highlights the sophistic issues which are brought to light and how Protagorean pluralism is representative of broader fifth‐century trends of thinking. The analysis of the Great Speech, the unity of virtues, and the metrikē technē (measuring craft) are particularly important in drawing attention to the parallels between modern pluralism and Protagoras' position.Less
This chapter examines Protagoras in the context of Plato's dialogue the Protagoras, and also in the larger context of the sophistic age. More specifically, it argues that Protagoras held that values, like truths, can be diverse and conflicting. The chapter explores each section of the dialogue in turn by illustrating the ways in which Protagoras' views, as expounded by Plato, can further be considered pluralist. So too, it highlights the sophistic issues which are brought to light and how Protagorean pluralism is representative of broader fifth‐century trends of thinking. The analysis of the Great Speech, the unity of virtues, and the metrikē technē (measuring craft) are particularly important in drawing attention to the parallels between modern pluralism and Protagoras' position.
David Bostock
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198239307
- eISBN:
- 9780191679889
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239307.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter analyzes the theory that perception is knowledge. begins by introducing Protagoras and his thesis that all perceptual judgements are true, and it is apparently indicated that this thesis ...
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This chapter analyzes the theory that perception is knowledge. begins by introducing Protagoras and his thesis that all perceptual judgements are true, and it is apparently indicated that this thesis will be defended by stressing the relativity of perception: the wind may perhaps feel hot to you and cold to me, in which case we shall say that it is hot to you and cold to me, and we shall not allow that it is either hot or cold ‘in itself’. Then at once we get the first statement of the ‘secret doctrine’, stated as the doctrine that nothing ever is, but is always coming to be, and that the things that we ordinarily say are in fact come to be from motion, change, and mixture: they are the offspring of flux and change (152d–e). Taking this together with the later statement that only changes exist (156a), and using what we know of the further development of the theory, we can see that the doctrine intended must be this: the only things that exist in their own right are changes — that is, comings-to-be, happenings, or events — and what we ordinarily regard as persisting things are in fact just series or collections of these changes.Less
This chapter analyzes the theory that perception is knowledge. begins by introducing Protagoras and his thesis that all perceptual judgements are true, and it is apparently indicated that this thesis will be defended by stressing the relativity of perception: the wind may perhaps feel hot to you and cold to me, in which case we shall say that it is hot to you and cold to me, and we shall not allow that it is either hot or cold ‘in itself’. Then at once we get the first statement of the ‘secret doctrine’, stated as the doctrine that nothing ever is, but is always coming to be, and that the things that we ordinarily say are in fact come to be from motion, change, and mixture: they are the offspring of flux and change (152d–e). Taking this together with the later statement that only changes exist (156a), and using what we know of the further development of the theory, we can see that the doctrine intended must be this: the only things that exist in their own right are changes — that is, comings-to-be, happenings, or events — and what we ordinarily regard as persisting things are in fact just series or collections of these changes.
David Bostock
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198239307
- eISBN:
- 9780191679889
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239307.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Having brought Theaetetus' first child to birth, Socrates now sets about testing it, and in fact he brings three separate objections. In the first he refutes Protagoras' general claim that ‘man is ...
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Having brought Theaetetus' first child to birth, Socrates now sets about testing it, and in fact he brings three separate objections. In the first he refutes Protagoras' general claim that ‘man is the measure of all things’, but — as he himself makes clear — this refutation leaves the heart of our theory untouched. In the second he refutes the Heraclitean claim that everything is perpetually changing, but it is not altogether obvious what effect upon our theory this refutation is intended to have, and this question should be considered. In the third he turns directly to Theaetetus' claim that perception is knowledge and offers a refutation of it which hardly depends at all upon the details of the theory that has been worked out to support it. This chapter argues that Plato's claim is that perception never reaches truth, and therefore cannot be said to be knowledge of any kind. His ground for this claim is that perception cannot provide the concepts that are required to formulate any judgement at all.Less
Having brought Theaetetus' first child to birth, Socrates now sets about testing it, and in fact he brings three separate objections. In the first he refutes Protagoras' general claim that ‘man is the measure of all things’, but — as he himself makes clear — this refutation leaves the heart of our theory untouched. In the second he refutes the Heraclitean claim that everything is perpetually changing, but it is not altogether obvious what effect upon our theory this refutation is intended to have, and this question should be considered. In the third he turns directly to Theaetetus' claim that perception is knowledge and offers a refutation of it which hardly depends at all upon the details of the theory that has been worked out to support it. This chapter argues that Plato's claim is that perception never reaches truth, and therefore cannot be said to be knowledge of any kind. His ground for this claim is that perception cannot provide the concepts that are required to formulate any judgement at all.
J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor
- Published in print:
- 1982
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198246664
- eISBN:
- 9780191681035
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246664.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter analyzes the Gorgias, both because it is — of the dialogues where pleasure is discussed — most probably the nearest in date to the Protagoras, and because it appears to contain an ...
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This chapter analyzes the Gorgias, both because it is — of the dialogues where pleasure is discussed — most probably the nearest in date to the Protagoras, and because it appears to contain an explicit rejection of the identification of pleasure with the good, which is maintained by Socrates in the latter dialogue. It argues that the position which Callicles defends is very far from the enlightened hedonism of the Protagoras, and the arguments by which Socrates attacks that position have no force against the thesis of that dialogue. So if the Protagoras is a target in the Gorgias, Plato is wide of the mark. It is further argued that Gorgias shows the development towards a specifically Platonic view of pleasure from his original Socratic position.Less
This chapter analyzes the Gorgias, both because it is — of the dialogues where pleasure is discussed — most probably the nearest in date to the Protagoras, and because it appears to contain an explicit rejection of the identification of pleasure with the good, which is maintained by Socrates in the latter dialogue. It argues that the position which Callicles defends is very far from the enlightened hedonism of the Protagoras, and the arguments by which Socrates attacks that position have no force against the thesis of that dialogue. So if the Protagoras is a target in the Gorgias, Plato is wide of the mark. It is further argued that Gorgias shows the development towards a specifically Platonic view of pleasure from his original Socratic position.
J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor
- Published in print:
- 1982
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198246664
- eISBN:
- 9780191681035
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246664.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter analyzes the development of Plato's thought on pleasure in the Republic. It argues that the Republic contains an ingenious attempt to salvage the table-turning elements in the Protagoras ...
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This chapter analyzes the development of Plato's thought on pleasure in the Republic. It argues that the Republic contains an ingenious attempt to salvage the table-turning elements in the Protagoras view while giving grounds for not giving value to ‘lower’ pleasures simply in virtue of their pleasantness. The method is to extend the lack/replenishment model to other than physiologically based examples and then argue that only the favoured cases deserve to be called replenishments. Since every pleasure is a replenishment, only ‘real’ replenishments are ‘real’ pleasures — and surely what is really pleasant is pleasanter than what is not? Quite apart from the initial plausibility, and the seductive ambiguity of ‘replenishment’, ‘fulfilment’, or ‘satisfaction’, the very neatness of the way in which the account yielded the results which Plato felt a correct account ought to yield must have made it not only attractive but convincing. Unsatisfactory points in the Republic account are also discussed.Less
This chapter analyzes the development of Plato's thought on pleasure in the Republic. It argues that the Republic contains an ingenious attempt to salvage the table-turning elements in the Protagoras view while giving grounds for not giving value to ‘lower’ pleasures simply in virtue of their pleasantness. The method is to extend the lack/replenishment model to other than physiologically based examples and then argue that only the favoured cases deserve to be called replenishments. Since every pleasure is a replenishment, only ‘real’ replenishments are ‘real’ pleasures — and surely what is really pleasant is pleasanter than what is not? Quite apart from the initial plausibility, and the seductive ambiguity of ‘replenishment’, ‘fulfilment’, or ‘satisfaction’, the very neatness of the way in which the account yielded the results which Plato felt a correct account ought to yield must have made it not only attractive but convincing. Unsatisfactory points in the Republic account are also discussed.
Richard Bett
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199256617
- eISBN:
- 9780191698323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256617.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Pyrrho's philosophical affiliations and antecedents are far from clear and a bewildering variety of claims has been made on the topic, in both ancient and modern times. In the ancient period, these ...
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Pyrrho's philosophical affiliations and antecedents are far from clear and a bewildering variety of claims has been made on the topic, in both ancient and modern times. In the ancient period, these frequently take the form of locating Pyrrho in a certain ‘succession’ of philosophers — that is, a chronological sequence of philosophers, each member of which is alleged to have been the teacher of the next member. Such ‘succession’ stories deserve consideration. More clearly worthy of serious attention are the verdicts on other philosophers offered by Timon in his poem Silloi, ‘Lampoons’. This chapter casts doubt on a number of such claims of influence — claims that have received a large measure of acceptance in the literature on Pyrrho. It discusses the indeterminacy thesis, Pyrrho's predecessors such as Plato and Aristotle, Xenophanes, Protagoras, Democritus, Anaxarchus, and the megarians and the Indians.Less
Pyrrho's philosophical affiliations and antecedents are far from clear and a bewildering variety of claims has been made on the topic, in both ancient and modern times. In the ancient period, these frequently take the form of locating Pyrrho in a certain ‘succession’ of philosophers — that is, a chronological sequence of philosophers, each member of which is alleged to have been the teacher of the next member. Such ‘succession’ stories deserve consideration. More clearly worthy of serious attention are the verdicts on other philosophers offered by Timon in his poem Silloi, ‘Lampoons’. This chapter casts doubt on a number of such claims of influence — claims that have received a large measure of acceptance in the literature on Pyrrho. It discusses the indeterminacy thesis, Pyrrho's predecessors such as Plato and Aristotle, Xenophanes, Protagoras, Democritus, Anaxarchus, and the megarians and the Indians.
Jeanette Kennett
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199266302
- eISBN:
- 9780191699146
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266302.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter presents an outline of Socrates' view of moral psychology as presented in Plato's Protagoras. The chapter concerns with the critical examination of some classical and modern views of ...
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This chapter presents an outline of Socrates' view of moral psychology as presented in Plato's Protagoras. The chapter concerns with the critical examination of some classical and modern views of reasons for action and motivation for action which tend, sometimes themselves to assimilate weakness to recklessness or compulsion. It focuses on Socratic account of knowledge and pleasure in the production of action, and his explanation of weakness of will. It then examines John McDowell's analysis of moral knowledge and moral motivation. A close evaluation of the shortcomings of the Socratic accounts, which equate virtue with knowledge, tends to push towards Humean account of the explanation of action. The chapter concludes that a search for a looser connection at a lower cost to common sense.Less
This chapter presents an outline of Socrates' view of moral psychology as presented in Plato's Protagoras. The chapter concerns with the critical examination of some classical and modern views of reasons for action and motivation for action which tend, sometimes themselves to assimilate weakness to recklessness or compulsion. It focuses on Socratic account of knowledge and pleasure in the production of action, and his explanation of weakness of will. It then examines John McDowell's analysis of moral knowledge and moral motivation. A close evaluation of the shortcomings of the Socratic accounts, which equate virtue with knowledge, tends to push towards Humean account of the explanation of action. The chapter concludes that a search for a looser connection at a lower cost to common sense.
Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199254057
- eISBN:
- 9780191698194
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199254057.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses the contradiction in the limits of cognition, one of the four limits of thought. Cognition is about relationships that arise between agents and the world that they cognise, ...
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This chapter discusses the contradiction in the limits of cognition, one of the four limits of thought. Cognition is about relationships that arise between agents and the world that they cognise, such as knowledge, truth, and rational belief. It determines the contradictions at the limit of cognition with a thesis called the Cognition Scheme. It also analyses the issue of relativism and scepticism through the views and works of philosophers Protagoras and Sextus Empiricus.Less
This chapter discusses the contradiction in the limits of cognition, one of the four limits of thought. Cognition is about relationships that arise between agents and the world that they cognise, such as knowledge, truth, and rational belief. It determines the contradictions at the limit of cognition with a thesis called the Cognition Scheme. It also analyses the issue of relativism and scepticism through the views and works of philosophers Protagoras and Sextus Empiricus.
JOSEPH RAZ
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199278466
- eISBN:
- 9780191699986
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278466.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Quoting from the philosophical idea of Protagoras that ‘Man is the measure of all things’, this chapter discusses how the philosopher’s maxim disagrees with the author’s views on social relativism. ...
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Quoting from the philosophical idea of Protagoras that ‘Man is the measure of all things’, this chapter discusses how the philosopher’s maxim disagrees with the author’s views on social relativism. Two formulations of social dependence of values are presented based on the special and general aspects. Sustaining practices are identified as well, apart from showing examples and explanations of dependence without reduction or conventionalism and other justifying considerations. Although applicable to cultural values, the scope and limitations of special dependence thesis are pointed out and it is also emphasised that the values giving a meaning and a purpose to life are socially dependent. Outlined in this chapter is the motivation to view social dependence of values as free from relativism.Less
Quoting from the philosophical idea of Protagoras that ‘Man is the measure of all things’, this chapter discusses how the philosopher’s maxim disagrees with the author’s views on social relativism. Two formulations of social dependence of values are presented based on the special and general aspects. Sustaining practices are identified as well, apart from showing examples and explanations of dependence without reduction or conventionalism and other justifying considerations. Although applicable to cultural values, the scope and limitations of special dependence thesis are pointed out and it is also emphasised that the values giving a meaning and a purpose to life are socially dependent. Outlined in this chapter is the motivation to view social dependence of values as free from relativism.
Zina Giannopoulou
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199695294
- eISBN:
- 9780191755873
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695294.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book argues that Theaetetus—Plato’s most systematic examination of knowledge—is a philosophically sophisticated elaboration of Apology that successfully differentiates Socrates from the ...
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This book argues that Theaetetus—Plato’s most systematic examination of knowledge—is a philosophically sophisticated elaboration of Apology that successfully differentiates Socrates from the sophists. In Apology Socrates defends his philosophical activity partly by distinguishing it from sophistic practices, and in Theaetetus he enacts this distinction: the self-proclaimed ignorant and pious Socrates of Apology poses as the barren practitioner of midwifery, an art that enjoys divine support, and helps his pregnant interlocutor to birth his ideas. Whereas sophistic expertise fills others’ souls with items of dubious epistemic quality, Socratic midwifery removes, tests, and discards falsities. In Theaetetus Plato drapes the Socrates of Apology with obstetric garb and stages a philosophical contest between him and the seemingly wise men with whose definitions Theaetetus’ soul teems, chief among whom is Protagoras. By proving the indefensibility of these definitions Socrates challenges their authors’ wisdom, since for him no one can justifiably be said to have knowledge, if he cannot give an account of knowledge. On the other hand, his own inability to procure the definition he seeks confirms his assertion that he lacks wisdom. In Apology Socrates claims that his wisdom consists in his awareness of his lack of wisdom, and in Theaetetus he validates this claimLess
This book argues that Theaetetus—Plato’s most systematic examination of knowledge—is a philosophically sophisticated elaboration of Apology that successfully differentiates Socrates from the sophists. In Apology Socrates defends his philosophical activity partly by distinguishing it from sophistic practices, and in Theaetetus he enacts this distinction: the self-proclaimed ignorant and pious Socrates of Apology poses as the barren practitioner of midwifery, an art that enjoys divine support, and helps his pregnant interlocutor to birth his ideas. Whereas sophistic expertise fills others’ souls with items of dubious epistemic quality, Socratic midwifery removes, tests, and discards falsities. In Theaetetus Plato drapes the Socrates of Apology with obstetric garb and stages a philosophical contest between him and the seemingly wise men with whose definitions Theaetetus’ soul teems, chief among whom is Protagoras. By proving the indefensibility of these definitions Socrates challenges their authors’ wisdom, since for him no one can justifiably be said to have knowledge, if he cannot give an account of knowledge. On the other hand, his own inability to procure the definition he seeks confirms his assertion that he lacks wisdom. In Apology Socrates claims that his wisdom consists in his awareness of his lack of wisdom, and in Theaetetus he validates this claim
