Arianna Betti
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029216
- eISBN:
- 9780262329644
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029216.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this and the following chapter a fallback position is explored under the assumption that there is, per absurdum, reference to facts via that-clauses taken to be singular terms (against the ...
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In this and the following chapter a fallback position is explored under the assumption that there is, per absurdum, reference to facts via that-clauses taken to be singular terms (against the conclusion of chapter 4). The claim that factive that-clauses refer to facts while non-factive that-clauses refer to propositions is first put to test, to conclude that, even if that-clauses were singular terms, and factive that-clauses referred to facts, the facts in question could only be propositional facts. It turns out that there are no acceptable identity conditions for propositional facts such that we can avoid their collapsing into true propositions. On the basis of a working definition of propositional facts, the identity conditions for propositional facts are critically analysed, and no convincing case is found in favor of accepting propositional facts alongside (true) propositions. Five attempts at blocking the collapse of propositional facts into (true) propositions are shown to be ineffective.Less
In this and the following chapter a fallback position is explored under the assumption that there is, per absurdum, reference to facts via that-clauses taken to be singular terms (against the conclusion of chapter 4). The claim that factive that-clauses refer to facts while non-factive that-clauses refer to propositions is first put to test, to conclude that, even if that-clauses were singular terms, and factive that-clauses referred to facts, the facts in question could only be propositional facts. It turns out that there are no acceptable identity conditions for propositional facts such that we can avoid their collapsing into true propositions. On the basis of a working definition of propositional facts, the identity conditions for propositional facts are critically analysed, and no convincing case is found in favor of accepting propositional facts alongside (true) propositions. Five attempts at blocking the collapse of propositional facts into (true) propositions are shown to be ineffective.
Arianna Betti
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029216
- eISBN:
- 9780262329644
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029216.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Against facts argues that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at least as they are described by the two major metaphysical theories of facts. Neither of these theories ...
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Against facts argues that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at least as they are described by the two major metaphysical theories of facts. Neither of these theories is tenable—neither the theory according to which facts are special structured building blocks of reality nor the theory according to which facts are whatever is named by certain expressions of the form “the fact that such and such.” There is reality, and there are entities in reality that we are able to name, but among these entities there are no facts. Drawing on metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and linguistics, Against facts examines the main arguments in favor of and against facts of the two major sorts, distinguished as compositional and propositional, giving special attention to methodological presuppositions. Compositional facts (facts as special structured building blocks of reality) and the central argument for them, Armstrong’s truthmaker argument are criticized in part I. Propositional facts (facts as whatever is named in “the fact that” statements) and what Against facts calls the argument from nominal reference, which draws on a Quine-like criterion of ontological commitment, are criticized in part II. Against facts argues that metaphysicians should stop worrying about facts, and philosophers in general should stop arguing for or against entities on the basis of how we use language.Less
Against facts argues that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at least as they are described by the two major metaphysical theories of facts. Neither of these theories is tenable—neither the theory according to which facts are special structured building blocks of reality nor the theory according to which facts are whatever is named by certain expressions of the form “the fact that such and such.” There is reality, and there are entities in reality that we are able to name, but among these entities there are no facts. Drawing on metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and linguistics, Against facts examines the main arguments in favor of and against facts of the two major sorts, distinguished as compositional and propositional, giving special attention to methodological presuppositions. Compositional facts (facts as special structured building blocks of reality) and the central argument for them, Armstrong’s truthmaker argument are criticized in part I. Propositional facts (facts as whatever is named in “the fact that” statements) and what Against facts calls the argument from nominal reference, which draws on a Quine-like criterion of ontological commitment, are criticized in part II. Against facts argues that metaphysicians should stop worrying about facts, and philosophers in general should stop arguing for or against entities on the basis of how we use language.
Arianna Betti
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029216
- eISBN:
- 9780262329644
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029216.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter, like the previous one, assumes per absurdum that that-clauses are singular terms against the conclusion of chapter 4, and discusses a sixth and final attempt at blocking the collapse of ...
More
This chapter, like the previous one, assumes per absurdum that that-clauses are singular terms against the conclusion of chapter 4, and discusses a sixth and final attempt at blocking the collapse of propositional facts into (true) propositions. It is here investigated whether certain linguistic evidence, in particular certain uses involving anaphora, can be used to support an acknowledgment of propositional facts as a distinct category of entities alongside propositions. Counterexamples are found to the positive linguistic evidence in question, and, in the presence of a superior alternative explanation, it is concluded that language alone cannot establish a difference between (propositional) facts and (true) propositions. This sixth attempt is, like the other five, judged to be a failure: the claim that propositional facts must be acknowledged alongside propositions is left unsupported by arguments. Even if it were true that that-clauses are singular terms, it would be false to claim that some (kinds of) that-clauses refer to propositional facts while other (kinds of) that-clauses refer to propositions.Less
This chapter, like the previous one, assumes per absurdum that that-clauses are singular terms against the conclusion of chapter 4, and discusses a sixth and final attempt at blocking the collapse of propositional facts into (true) propositions. It is here investigated whether certain linguistic evidence, in particular certain uses involving anaphora, can be used to support an acknowledgment of propositional facts as a distinct category of entities alongside propositions. Counterexamples are found to the positive linguistic evidence in question, and, in the presence of a superior alternative explanation, it is concluded that language alone cannot establish a difference between (propositional) facts and (true) propositions. This sixth attempt is, like the other five, judged to be a failure: the claim that propositional facts must be acknowledged alongside propositions is left unsupported by arguments. Even if it were true that that-clauses are singular terms, it would be false to claim that some (kinds of) that-clauses refer to propositional facts while other (kinds of) that-clauses refer to propositions.