Vince R. Vitale
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198864226
- eISBN:
- 9780191896392
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198864226.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Using an ethical framework constructed out of the two variables of whether an agent causes, permits, or risks horrendous evils, and whether she does so in order to bestow pure benefit or in order to ...
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Using an ethical framework constructed out of the two variables of whether an agent causes, permits, or risks horrendous evils, and whether she does so in order to bestow pure benefit or in order to avert greater harm, some of the major theodicies in contemporary philosophy of religion are categorized. This chapter identifies three theodicies that depict God as causing horrendous evils for pure benefit. This structural approach to theodicy is evaluated and a conclusion is drawn that pure benefits are incapable of justifying the causation of horrendous evils. It is argued that this approach is insensitive to relevant asymmetries in the justificatory demands made by horrendous and non-horrendous evil and in the justificatory work done by averting harm and bestowing pure benefit. When moral constraints on the causing of horrors are considered and the justificatory asymmetry of harm-averting and non-harm-averting benefits brought to bear, pure benefit will not do the justificatory work (on its own) of securing God the status of an ethically perfect being.Less
Using an ethical framework constructed out of the two variables of whether an agent causes, permits, or risks horrendous evils, and whether she does so in order to bestow pure benefit or in order to avert greater harm, some of the major theodicies in contemporary philosophy of religion are categorized. This chapter identifies three theodicies that depict God as causing horrendous evils for pure benefit. This structural approach to theodicy is evaluated and a conclusion is drawn that pure benefits are incapable of justifying the causation of horrendous evils. It is argued that this approach is insensitive to relevant asymmetries in the justificatory demands made by horrendous and non-horrendous evil and in the justificatory work done by averting harm and bestowing pure benefit. When moral constraints on the causing of horrors are considered and the justificatory asymmetry of harm-averting and non-harm-averting benefits brought to bear, pure benefit will not do the justificatory work (on its own) of securing God the status of an ethically perfect being.
Vince R. Vitale
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198864226
- eISBN:
- 9780191896392
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198864226.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Using an ethical framework constructed out of the two variables of whether an agent causes, permits, or risks horrendous evils, and whether she does so in order to bestow pure benefit or in order to ...
More
Using an ethical framework constructed out of the two variables of whether an agent causes, permits, or risks horrendous evils, and whether she does so in order to bestow pure benefit or in order to avert greater harm, some of the major theodicies in contemporary philosophy of religion are categorized. This chapter identifies theodicies that depict God as permitting horrendous evil for pure benefit, risking horrendous evil for pure benefit, and permitting horrendous evil for the aversion of greater harm. Each theodicy is summarized and an evaluation is made as to whether it is structurally promising with respect to horrendous evils, where structural promise denotes that God is ethically in the clear on the assumption that the explanatory story told by the theodicy is true. The conclusion drawn is that the theodicies depicting God as permitting horrendous evils for pure benefit are structurally deficient; they do not depict God as ethically perfect even if they are true. Structural promise is identified in theodicies that depict God as risking horrendous evil for pure benefit and permitting horrendous evil for the aversion of harm. In the next chapter the plausibility of these structurally promising approaches is considered.Less
Using an ethical framework constructed out of the two variables of whether an agent causes, permits, or risks horrendous evils, and whether she does so in order to bestow pure benefit or in order to avert greater harm, some of the major theodicies in contemporary philosophy of religion are categorized. This chapter identifies theodicies that depict God as permitting horrendous evil for pure benefit, risking horrendous evil for pure benefit, and permitting horrendous evil for the aversion of greater harm. Each theodicy is summarized and an evaluation is made as to whether it is structurally promising with respect to horrendous evils, where structural promise denotes that God is ethically in the clear on the assumption that the explanatory story told by the theodicy is true. The conclusion drawn is that the theodicies depicting God as permitting horrendous evils for pure benefit are structurally deficient; they do not depict God as ethically perfect even if they are true. Structural promise is identified in theodicies that depict God as risking horrendous evil for pure benefit and permitting horrendous evil for the aversion of harm. In the next chapter the plausibility of these structurally promising approaches is considered.
Vince R. Vitale
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198864226
- eISBN:
- 9780191896392
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198864226.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter develops Non-Identity Theodicy—that is, theodicy primarily claiming that our existence as the individuals we are depends on God’s policy of evil and suffering allowance. Non-Identity ...
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This chapter develops Non-Identity Theodicy—that is, theodicy primarily claiming that our existence as the individuals we are depends on God’s policy of evil and suffering allowance. Non-Identity Theodicy suggests that God allows evil in order to create and love the specific individuals who come to exist. This theodicy is unique because the justifying good recommended is neither harm-aversion nor pure benefit. It is not a good that betters the lives of individual human persons (for they would not exist otherwise), but it is the individual human persons themselves. In order to aim successfully at the creation of particular individuals, however, God would need a control of history so complete that it might be argued to be inconsistent with beliefs about human free will that are important to some theologies. In order to avoid this problem, a second version of Non-Identity Theodicy is constructed. This version considers whether God’s justifying motivation could be a desire for beings of our type, even if it could not be a desire for particular individuals. It is suggested that God would be interested in loving those he creates under various descriptions (e.g., biological, psychological, and narrative descriptions) and that a horror-prone environment is necessary for us to be the type of being we are under these descriptions. This second version of Non-Identity Theodicy allows some version of Non-Identity Theodicy to be available to the theist regardless of her views about the existence and nature of human free will.Less
This chapter develops Non-Identity Theodicy—that is, theodicy primarily claiming that our existence as the individuals we are depends on God’s policy of evil and suffering allowance. Non-Identity Theodicy suggests that God allows evil in order to create and love the specific individuals who come to exist. This theodicy is unique because the justifying good recommended is neither harm-aversion nor pure benefit. It is not a good that betters the lives of individual human persons (for they would not exist otherwise), but it is the individual human persons themselves. In order to aim successfully at the creation of particular individuals, however, God would need a control of history so complete that it might be argued to be inconsistent with beliefs about human free will that are important to some theologies. In order to avoid this problem, a second version of Non-Identity Theodicy is constructed. This version considers whether God’s justifying motivation could be a desire for beings of our type, even if it could not be a desire for particular individuals. It is suggested that God would be interested in loving those he creates under various descriptions (e.g., biological, psychological, and narrative descriptions) and that a horror-prone environment is necessary for us to be the type of being we are under these descriptions. This second version of Non-Identity Theodicy allows some version of Non-Identity Theodicy to be available to the theist regardless of her views about the existence and nature of human free will.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1978
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198244141
- eISBN:
- 9780191598241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198244142.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter 9 is the first of two chapters that apply the findings of the previous eight chapters of The Nature of Necessity to some traditional problems in natural theology. The Problem of Evil is the ...
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Chapter 9 is the first of two chapters that apply the findings of the previous eight chapters of The Nature of Necessity to some traditional problems in natural theology. The Problem of Evil is the objection to theism that holds that the conjunction of the propositions, God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good and There is evil in the world, is necessarily false. The Free Will Defense is an effort to show the two propositions are compatible, and in the process of the defence, I use the concept of transworld depravity. I then prove that the possibility that every essence suffers from such depravity entails that it is possible both that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good and that there is evil in the world. I conclude by addressing special problems caused by natural evil and by arguing that the Probabilistic Problem of Evil is unsuccessful.Less
Chapter 9 is the first of two chapters that apply the findings of the previous eight chapters of The Nature of Necessity to some traditional problems in natural theology. The Problem of Evil is the objection to theism that holds that the conjunction of the propositions, God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good and There is evil in the world, is necessarily false. The Free Will Defense is an effort to show the two propositions are compatible, and in the process of the defence, I use the concept of transworld depravity. I then prove that the possibility that every essence suffers from such depravity entails that it is possible both that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good and that there is evil in the world. I conclude by addressing special problems caused by natural evil and by arguing that the Probabilistic Problem of Evil is unsuccessful.
Vince R. Vitale
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198864226
- eISBN:
- 9780191896392
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198864226.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter assesses the theodicies identified in the previous chapter as structurally promising (i.e. as depicting God as ethically in the clear on the assumption that the explanatory story told by ...
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This chapter assesses the theodicies identified in the previous chapter as structurally promising (i.e. as depicting God as ethically in the clear on the assumption that the explanatory story told by the theodicy is true). Because these fall-based theodicies conceive of humanity as having fallen at some point in history from a much more advanced state, they face a number of plausibility challenges rooted in modern science and theological tradition. Moreover and more decisively, these theodicies are implausible due to their overestimation of the extent to which finite human agents can bear primary responsibility for evils that are horrendous. The conclusion drawn is that the most influential contemporary theodicies fail either ethically or otherwise.Less
This chapter assesses the theodicies identified in the previous chapter as structurally promising (i.e. as depicting God as ethically in the clear on the assumption that the explanatory story told by the theodicy is true). Because these fall-based theodicies conceive of humanity as having fallen at some point in history from a much more advanced state, they face a number of plausibility challenges rooted in modern science and theological tradition. Moreover and more decisively, these theodicies are implausible due to their overestimation of the extent to which finite human agents can bear primary responsibility for evils that are horrendous. The conclusion drawn is that the most influential contemporary theodicies fail either ethically or otherwise.
Peter Forrest
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199214587
- eISBN:
- 9780191706523
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214587.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter presents a case for the existence of the neoclassical Primordial God. First, we should either reject reductive materialism or at least not have confidence in it. Hence, we should attach ...
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This chapter presents a case for the existence of the neoclassical Primordial God. First, we should either reject reductive materialism or at least not have confidence in it. Hence, we should attach a non-negligible probability to theism of some sort, even before looking at the evidence. Various familiar kinds of evidence increase that probability, and especially likely is the simplest version of theism: the belief that the Primordial God existed. The Problem of Evil is no serious threat to this belief because the Primordial God behaved like a good consequentialist. As part of this case, fine-tuning is replaced by coarse tuning, which is less spectacular but more robust, in two ways. First, it would survive the shift to a theory that had no tunable constants. Second, it resists the many worlds reply to fine-tuning. There is an appendix on the classification dependence of simplicity.Less
This chapter presents a case for the existence of the neoclassical Primordial God. First, we should either reject reductive materialism or at least not have confidence in it. Hence, we should attach a non-negligible probability to theism of some sort, even before looking at the evidence. Various familiar kinds of evidence increase that probability, and especially likely is the simplest version of theism: the belief that the Primordial God existed. The Problem of Evil is no serious threat to this belief because the Primordial God behaved like a good consequentialist. As part of this case, fine-tuning is replaced by coarse tuning, which is less spectacular but more robust, in two ways. First, it would survive the shift to a theory that had no tunable constants. Second, it resists the many worlds reply to fine-tuning. There is an appendix on the classification dependence of simplicity.
Vince R. Vitale
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198864226
- eISBN:
- 9780191896392
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198864226.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter introduces the problem of evil and then the more specific problem of horrendous evil (that is, the argument that the existence of horrendous evils makes the existence of God impossible ...
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This chapter introduces the problem of evil and then the more specific problem of horrendous evil (that is, the argument that the existence of horrendous evils makes the existence of God impossible or unlikely). First horrendous evil is defined as a technical term. Then, after proposing conditions for successful theodicy, prima facie reasons are given for why two of the most popular approaches to theodicy—a greater goods approach and a blame-shifting approach—are not successful where horrendous evils are concerned. The chapter ends by outlining the rest of the book.Less
This chapter introduces the problem of evil and then the more specific problem of horrendous evil (that is, the argument that the existence of horrendous evils makes the existence of God impossible or unlikely). First horrendous evil is defined as a technical term. Then, after proposing conditions for successful theodicy, prima facie reasons are given for why two of the most popular approaches to theodicy—a greater goods approach and a blame-shifting approach—are not successful where horrendous evils are concerned. The chapter ends by outlining the rest of the book.
Vince R. Vitale
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198864226
- eISBN:
- 9780191896392
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198864226.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This book develops Non-Identity Theodicy as an original response to the problem of evil. It begins by recognizing that horrendous evils pose distinctive challenges for belief in God. To home in on ...
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This book develops Non-Identity Theodicy as an original response to the problem of evil. It begins by recognizing that horrendous evils pose distinctive challenges for belief in God. To home in on these challenges, this book constructs an ethical framework for theodicy by sketching four cases of human action where horrendous evils are either caused, permitted, or risked, either for pure benefit (i.e. a benefit that does not avert a still greater harm) or for harm avoidance. This framework is then brought to bear on the project of theodicy. The initial conclusions drawn impugn the dominant structural approach of depicting God as causing or permitting horrors in individual lives for the sake of some merely pure benefit. This approach is insensitive to relevant asymmetries in the justificatory demands made by horrendous and non-horrendous evil and in the justificatory work done by averting harm and bestowing pure benefit. Next this book critiques Fall-based theodicies that depict God as permitting or risking horrors in order to avert greater harm. The second half of this book develops a theodicy that falls outside of the proposed taxonomy. Non-Identity Theodicy suggests that God allows evil because it is a necessary condition of creating individual people whom he desires to love. This approach to theodicy is unique because the justifying good recommended is neither harm-aversion nor pure benefit. It is not a good that betters the lives of individual human persons (for they would not exist otherwise), but it is the individual human persons themselves.Less
This book develops Non-Identity Theodicy as an original response to the problem of evil. It begins by recognizing that horrendous evils pose distinctive challenges for belief in God. To home in on these challenges, this book constructs an ethical framework for theodicy by sketching four cases of human action where horrendous evils are either caused, permitted, or risked, either for pure benefit (i.e. a benefit that does not avert a still greater harm) or for harm avoidance. This framework is then brought to bear on the project of theodicy. The initial conclusions drawn impugn the dominant structural approach of depicting God as causing or permitting horrors in individual lives for the sake of some merely pure benefit. This approach is insensitive to relevant asymmetries in the justificatory demands made by horrendous and non-horrendous evil and in the justificatory work done by averting harm and bestowing pure benefit. Next this book critiques Fall-based theodicies that depict God as permitting or risking horrors in order to avert greater harm. The second half of this book develops a theodicy that falls outside of the proposed taxonomy. Non-Identity Theodicy suggests that God allows evil because it is a necessary condition of creating individual people whom he desires to love. This approach to theodicy is unique because the justifying good recommended is neither harm-aversion nor pure benefit. It is not a good that betters the lives of individual human persons (for they would not exist otherwise), but it is the individual human persons themselves.
Vince R. Vitale
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198864226
- eISBN:
- 9780191896392
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198864226.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter analyzes the concepts of harm and benefit. There is a tendency in the literature on the metaphysics of harm to assume symmetric accounts of harm and benefit. But there are deep ...
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This chapter analyzes the concepts of harm and benefit. There is a tendency in the literature on the metaphysics of harm to assume symmetric accounts of harm and benefit. But there are deep asymmetries between harm and benefit, recommending asymmetric metaphysical accounts. For harm and benefit, in turn, this chapter considers whether counterfactual comparative, temporal comparative, and non-comparative conditions are necessary or sufficient. For harm, the judgement reached is that a non-comparative condition—whereby harm is a matter of being in a bad state even if not in a worse state—is necessary and sufficient. It is further discussed why “non-comparative” is a misleading term for this account, and a more precise terminology of trans-comparative account is recommended. For benefit, the judgement reached is that temporal comparative and counterfactual comparative conditions are individually sufficient and disjunctively necessary; being benefited is a matter of being made temporally or counterfactually better-off. It is shown that this asymmetric metaphysical accounts allow for an important ethical distinction between harm-averting and non-harm-averting benefits. Next this distinction and an analogy between the ethics of human horror-inducement and the ethics of divine creation and sustenance is used to develop an ethical framework for theodicy. A taxonomy is constructed by sketching four cases of human action where horrors are either caused, permitted, or risked, either for pure benefit (i.e. a benefit that does not avert a still greater harm) or for harm avoidance.Less
This chapter analyzes the concepts of harm and benefit. There is a tendency in the literature on the metaphysics of harm to assume symmetric accounts of harm and benefit. But there are deep asymmetries between harm and benefit, recommending asymmetric metaphysical accounts. For harm and benefit, in turn, this chapter considers whether counterfactual comparative, temporal comparative, and non-comparative conditions are necessary or sufficient. For harm, the judgement reached is that a non-comparative condition—whereby harm is a matter of being in a bad state even if not in a worse state—is necessary and sufficient. It is further discussed why “non-comparative” is a misleading term for this account, and a more precise terminology of trans-comparative account is recommended. For benefit, the judgement reached is that temporal comparative and counterfactual comparative conditions are individually sufficient and disjunctively necessary; being benefited is a matter of being made temporally or counterfactually better-off. It is shown that this asymmetric metaphysical accounts allow for an important ethical distinction between harm-averting and non-harm-averting benefits. Next this distinction and an analogy between the ethics of human horror-inducement and the ethics of divine creation and sustenance is used to develop an ethical framework for theodicy. A taxonomy is constructed by sketching four cases of human action where horrors are either caused, permitted, or risked, either for pure benefit (i.e. a benefit that does not avert a still greater harm) or for harm avoidance.
Vince R. Vitale
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198864226
- eISBN:
- 9780191896392
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198864226.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This concluding chapter takes a step back to consider the place of Non-Identity Theodicy in the contemporary theodicy literature. It recaps the key areas of overemphasis and underemphasis in ...
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This concluding chapter takes a step back to consider the place of Non-Identity Theodicy in the contemporary theodicy literature. It recaps the key areas of overemphasis and underemphasis in contemporary theodicies. These misemphases include a failure to adequately appreciate the distinctive challenges that horrendous evils pose for the moral justification of harm; an overemphasis on the moral distinction between causing and permitting (especially where God is the agent in question); an overestimation of the moral significance of caretaker rights to cause or permit harm; an overemphasis on the role of free will in theodicy (resulting in a tendency towards anthropocentrism); and a questionable focus on general goods which manifests itself in a prioritizing of worlds over human persons, generic human persons over individual human persons, and all-things-considered benefit over more specific interests such as the aversion of serious harm. It is argued that Non-Identity Theodicy corrects for these various misemphases by conceiving of God first and foremost not as a creator of goods but as a lover of persons. This chapter ends by discussing how Non-Identity Theodicy can be combined with other theodicies in the formulation of a cumulative case theodicy.Less
This concluding chapter takes a step back to consider the place of Non-Identity Theodicy in the contemporary theodicy literature. It recaps the key areas of overemphasis and underemphasis in contemporary theodicies. These misemphases include a failure to adequately appreciate the distinctive challenges that horrendous evils pose for the moral justification of harm; an overemphasis on the moral distinction between causing and permitting (especially where God is the agent in question); an overestimation of the moral significance of caretaker rights to cause or permit harm; an overemphasis on the role of free will in theodicy (resulting in a tendency towards anthropocentrism); and a questionable focus on general goods which manifests itself in a prioritizing of worlds over human persons, generic human persons over individual human persons, and all-things-considered benefit over more specific interests such as the aversion of serious harm. It is argued that Non-Identity Theodicy corrects for these various misemphases by conceiving of God first and foremost not as a creator of goods but as a lover of persons. This chapter ends by discussing how Non-Identity Theodicy can be combined with other theodicies in the formulation of a cumulative case theodicy.
Hud Hudson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198712695
- eISBN:
- 9780191781025
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712695.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Frequently, alleged irreconcilable conflicts between science and religion are instead misdescribed battles concerning negotiable philosophical assumptions—conflicts between metaphysics and ...
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Frequently, alleged irreconcilable conflicts between science and religion are instead misdescribed battles concerning negotiable philosophical assumptions—conflicts between metaphysics and metaphysics. This book provides a two-stage illustration of this claim with respect to the putative inconsistency between the doctrines of The Fall and Original Sin and the deliverances of contemporary science. The tension in question emerges through a study of the many forms the religious doctrines have assumed over the centuries and through a review of some well-established scientific lessons on the origin and history of the universe and of human persons. The first stage: after surveying various paths of retreat that involve reinterpreting and impoverishing Original Sin and minimizing and dehistoricizing The Fall, one version of moderate realism about the doctrines is articulated, critically evaluated, and found both consistent with contemporary science and suitable to play a crucial role in the theist’s confrontation with the Problem of Evil. The second stage: recent work in the philosophy of time and in the philosophy of religion provides intriguing support for a Hypertime Hypothesis (a species of multiverse hypothesis), distinctive for positing a series of successive hypertimes, each of which hosts a spacetime block. After arguing that the Hypertime Hypothesis is a genuine epistemic possibility and critically discussing its impact on a number of debates in metaphysics and philosophy of religion, Hudson reveals a strategy for unabashed, extreme literalism concerning The Fall and Original Sin is revealed that nevertheless has the extraordinary and delightful feature of being thoroughly consistent with the reigning scientific orthodoxy.Less
Frequently, alleged irreconcilable conflicts between science and religion are instead misdescribed battles concerning negotiable philosophical assumptions—conflicts between metaphysics and metaphysics. This book provides a two-stage illustration of this claim with respect to the putative inconsistency between the doctrines of The Fall and Original Sin and the deliverances of contemporary science. The tension in question emerges through a study of the many forms the religious doctrines have assumed over the centuries and through a review of some well-established scientific lessons on the origin and history of the universe and of human persons. The first stage: after surveying various paths of retreat that involve reinterpreting and impoverishing Original Sin and minimizing and dehistoricizing The Fall, one version of moderate realism about the doctrines is articulated, critically evaluated, and found both consistent with contemporary science and suitable to play a crucial role in the theist’s confrontation with the Problem of Evil. The second stage: recent work in the philosophy of time and in the philosophy of religion provides intriguing support for a Hypertime Hypothesis (a species of multiverse hypothesis), distinctive for positing a series of successive hypertimes, each of which hosts a spacetime block. After arguing that the Hypertime Hypothesis is a genuine epistemic possibility and critically discussing its impact on a number of debates in metaphysics and philosophy of religion, Hudson reveals a strategy for unabashed, extreme literalism concerning The Fall and Original Sin is revealed that nevertheless has the extraordinary and delightful feature of being thoroughly consistent with the reigning scientific orthodoxy.
Vince R. Vitale
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- January 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198864226
- eISBN:
- 9780191896392
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198864226.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter considers the implications of Non-Identity Theodicy for divine morality. This requires assessing the extent to which the moral status of a harm inducing action can be affected by the ...
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This chapter considers the implications of Non-Identity Theodicy for divine morality. This requires assessing the extent to which the moral status of a harm inducing action can be affected by the fact that the persons harmed by the action in question would not have existed had that action not been performed. It is argued (against some influential assumptions in the ethics of procreation literature) that the good of a worthwhile human life (lived by someone who otherwise would not have existed) has unique justificatory power, and further that the good of a God-given human life (lived by someone who otherwise would not have existed) has justificatory power great enough to depict God as not violating moral obligations to human persons by his policy of evil allowance. These arguments are aided by an analogy between divine creation and human procreation. Reflection on the morality of human procreation implies, it is suggested, that it is not always wrong to create people in an environment in which you know they will suffer seriously. Further, it is argued that if you think voluntary human procreation is in general morally permissible, you have even more reason to think that divine creation and sustenance is morally permissible; conversely, if you think it would be immoral for God to create and sustain our universe, then you have even more reason to think voluntary human procreation is in general immoral. It is concluded that Non-Identity Theodicy reasonably can be taken to be successful.Less
This chapter considers the implications of Non-Identity Theodicy for divine morality. This requires assessing the extent to which the moral status of a harm inducing action can be affected by the fact that the persons harmed by the action in question would not have existed had that action not been performed. It is argued (against some influential assumptions in the ethics of procreation literature) that the good of a worthwhile human life (lived by someone who otherwise would not have existed) has unique justificatory power, and further that the good of a God-given human life (lived by someone who otherwise would not have existed) has justificatory power great enough to depict God as not violating moral obligations to human persons by his policy of evil allowance. These arguments are aided by an analogy between divine creation and human procreation. Reflection on the morality of human procreation implies, it is suggested, that it is not always wrong to create people in an environment in which you know they will suffer seriously. Further, it is argued that if you think voluntary human procreation is in general morally permissible, you have even more reason to think that divine creation and sustenance is morally permissible; conversely, if you think it would be immoral for God to create and sustain our universe, then you have even more reason to think voluntary human procreation is in general immoral. It is concluded that Non-Identity Theodicy reasonably can be taken to be successful.
Joseph Corabi
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198806967
- eISBN:
- 9780191844461
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198806967.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Social evil—pain and suffering caused by game-theoretic interactions among agents—has recently received attention as a newly recognized and potentially problematic kind of evidence against theism. ...
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Social evil—pain and suffering caused by game-theoretic interactions among agents—has recently received attention as a newly recognized and potentially problematic kind of evidence against theism. After an initial introduction to social evil and discussion of why it might be thought to constitute evidence against theism, I argue that social evil is in fact much rarer than it might initially appear to be, at least when we adopt a Christian ethical framework. In addition, I argue that the genuine social evils that remain after scrutiny do not provide significant new evidence against the existence of God.Less
Social evil—pain and suffering caused by game-theoretic interactions among agents—has recently received attention as a newly recognized and potentially problematic kind of evidence against theism. After an initial introduction to social evil and discussion of why it might be thought to constitute evidence against theism, I argue that social evil is in fact much rarer than it might initially appear to be, at least when we adopt a Christian ethical framework. In addition, I argue that the genuine social evils that remain after scrutiny do not provide significant new evidence against the existence of God.
Brian P. Boeninger and Robert K. Garcia
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198794301
- eISBN:
- 9780191835810
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198794301.003.0015
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter analyzes an apparent incompatibility between a traditional theistic view of heaven and theodicies that centrally appeal to libertarian free will in responding to the problem of evil. ...
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This chapter analyzes an apparent incompatibility between a traditional theistic view of heaven and theodicies that centrally appeal to libertarian free will in responding to the problem of evil. Toward resolving this incompatibility, leading strategies (i) deploy a tracing (historical or externalist) account of freedom and moral responsibility along with the related distinction between occurrent (or direct) freedom and derivative (or indirect) freedom, (ii) hold that freedom makes possible the realization of “freedom goods,” goods uniquely actualized by freedom and of such outweighing value that they (at least partly) justify God’s permission of evil, and (iii) hold that heavenly acts manifest freedom goods by being derivatively free. It argues that these strategies for reconciling the alleged incompatibility founder on ambiguities in how they employ the notion of derivative freedom, and that available disambiguations both fail to show the requisite compatibility, and face significant and unnoticed objections to their possible success.Less
This chapter analyzes an apparent incompatibility between a traditional theistic view of heaven and theodicies that centrally appeal to libertarian free will in responding to the problem of evil. Toward resolving this incompatibility, leading strategies (i) deploy a tracing (historical or externalist) account of freedom and moral responsibility along with the related distinction between occurrent (or direct) freedom and derivative (or indirect) freedom, (ii) hold that freedom makes possible the realization of “freedom goods,” goods uniquely actualized by freedom and of such outweighing value that they (at least partly) justify God’s permission of evil, and (iii) hold that heavenly acts manifest freedom goods by being derivatively free. It argues that these strategies for reconciling the alleged incompatibility founder on ambiguities in how they employ the notion of derivative freedom, and that available disambiguations both fail to show the requisite compatibility, and face significant and unnoticed objections to their possible success.
Matthew Mutter
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780300221732
- eISBN:
- 9780300227963
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300221732.003.0006
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
This chapter contends that modernists find themselves entangled in a distinctly secular version of the “problem of evil.” As secularists they want to affirm the abundance of the immanent, material ...
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This chapter contends that modernists find themselves entangled in a distinctly secular version of the “problem of evil.” As secularists they want to affirm the abundance of the immanent, material world, but this very world seems to resist the desires and needs specific to human personhood. This leads, in different writers, to a critique of “secular humanism” or to a valorization of the world as a scene of conflict. The chapter suggests, however, that Auden’s Christian understanding of secularity is able to elude this problem of evil by relinquishing the expectation that the material world satisfy the desires proper to embodied persons.Less
This chapter contends that modernists find themselves entangled in a distinctly secular version of the “problem of evil.” As secularists they want to affirm the abundance of the immanent, material world, but this very world seems to resist the desires and needs specific to human personhood. This leads, in different writers, to a critique of “secular humanism” or to a valorization of the world as a scene of conflict. The chapter suggests, however, that Auden’s Christian understanding of secularity is able to elude this problem of evil by relinquishing the expectation that the material world satisfy the desires proper to embodied persons.
Hud Hudson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198704768
- eISBN:
- 9780191774300
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198704768.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
A severe and underappreciated problem confronts anyone who holds a certain popular combination of theses – namely, that there is such a thing as knowledge by revelation alone and that a defensive ...
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A severe and underappreciated problem confronts anyone who holds a certain popular combination of theses – namely, that there is such a thing as knowledge by revelation alone and that a defensive maneuver known as skeptical theism is sufficient to undermine a variety of popular arguments from the magnitude, intensity, duration, and distribution of evil to the nonexistence of God. After briefly characterizing and commenting on these two positions, this chapter identifies and explores the puzzle generated by their combination, and critically examines a variety of proposals for responding to that puzzle.Less
A severe and underappreciated problem confronts anyone who holds a certain popular combination of theses – namely, that there is such a thing as knowledge by revelation alone and that a defensive maneuver known as skeptical theism is sufficient to undermine a variety of popular arguments from the magnitude, intensity, duration, and distribution of evil to the nonexistence of God. After briefly characterizing and commenting on these two positions, this chapter identifies and explores the puzzle generated by their combination, and critically examines a variety of proposals for responding to that puzzle.
Hud Hudson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198712695
- eISBN:
- 9780191781025
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712695.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
One popular response to any alleged conflict between religion and science has been that of retreat by those in a position to speak for religion. This chapter describes numerous ...
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One popular response to any alleged conflict between religion and science has been that of retreat by those in a position to speak for religion. This chapter describes numerous strategies—increasingly concessive—that attempt to preserve as much of the doctrines of The Fall, Original Sin, and Original Guilt as possible without infringing on the authority of the reigning scientific orthodoxy. More specifically, it exhibits prevailing strategies for diminishing the role of these doctrines—concessions ranging from abandoning and apologizing for the thesis of Original Guilt to reinterpreting and impoverishing the account of Original Sin to minimizing and dehistoricizing The Fall. Finally, it presents and critically evaluates one significant alternative to excessive concession—namely, Peter van Inwagen’s modest articulation of The Fall and Original Sin in a way that is consistent with contemporary science and that also reveals the role such doctrines can play in confronting the Problem of Evil.Less
One popular response to any alleged conflict between religion and science has been that of retreat by those in a position to speak for religion. This chapter describes numerous strategies—increasingly concessive—that attempt to preserve as much of the doctrines of The Fall, Original Sin, and Original Guilt as possible without infringing on the authority of the reigning scientific orthodoxy. More specifically, it exhibits prevailing strategies for diminishing the role of these doctrines—concessions ranging from abandoning and apologizing for the thesis of Original Guilt to reinterpreting and impoverishing the account of Original Sin to minimizing and dehistoricizing The Fall. Finally, it presents and critically evaluates one significant alternative to excessive concession—namely, Peter van Inwagen’s modest articulation of The Fall and Original Sin in a way that is consistent with contemporary science and that also reveals the role such doctrines can play in confronting the Problem of Evil.
Hud Hudson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198712695
- eISBN:
- 9780191781025
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712695.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
The widely discussed arguments for atheism known as the Problem of Evil, the Problem of the Best, and the Problem of No Best World are grounded on the alleged lack of morally justifying reasons for ...
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The widely discussed arguments for atheism known as the Problem of Evil, the Problem of the Best, and the Problem of No Best World are grounded on the alleged lack of morally justifying reasons for God to permit particular moral and natural evils and on the thesis that God would have to create the best possible world. The Hypertime Hypothesis promises a further significant advantage to the philosophy of religion by way of providing a new twist on an underexplored strategy for refuting these popular atheistic arguments. With the assistance of the view known as Skeptical Theism, this chapter examines the prospects for responding to these three arguments by constructing a case for our world’s being the best of all possible worlds, a case made surprisingly palatable by appeal to the concept of a multiverse, especially to the species of multiverse at issue in the Hypertime Hypothesis.Less
The widely discussed arguments for atheism known as the Problem of Evil, the Problem of the Best, and the Problem of No Best World are grounded on the alleged lack of morally justifying reasons for God to permit particular moral and natural evils and on the thesis that God would have to create the best possible world. The Hypertime Hypothesis promises a further significant advantage to the philosophy of religion by way of providing a new twist on an underexplored strategy for refuting these popular atheistic arguments. With the assistance of the view known as Skeptical Theism, this chapter examines the prospects for responding to these three arguments by constructing a case for our world’s being the best of all possible worlds, a case made surprisingly palatable by appeal to the concept of a multiverse, especially to the species of multiverse at issue in the Hypertime Hypothesis.
D. H. Dilbeck
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781469636184
- eISBN:
- 9781469636191
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469636184.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, African-American History
This chapter describes Douglass’s life from his birth until his move to Baltimore as a young child. It describes his exposure both to the religion of local slaves and the proslavery Christianity of ...
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This chapter describes Douglass’s life from his birth until his move to Baltimore as a young child. It describes his exposure both to the religion of local slaves and the proslavery Christianity of local masters. The chapter also details Douglass’s earliest encounters with evil and suffering, and how those encounters shaped the foundation of his religious outlookLess
This chapter describes Douglass’s life from his birth until his move to Baltimore as a young child. It describes his exposure both to the religion of local slaves and the proslavery Christianity of local masters. The chapter also details Douglass’s earliest encounters with evil and suffering, and how those encounters shaped the foundation of his religious outlook