Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1978
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198244141
- eISBN:
- 9780191598241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198244142.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter 9 is the first of two chapters that apply the findings of the previous eight chapters of The Nature of Necessity to some traditional problems in natural theology. The Problem of Evil is the ...
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Chapter 9 is the first of two chapters that apply the findings of the previous eight chapters of The Nature of Necessity to some traditional problems in natural theology. The Problem of Evil is the objection to theism that holds that the conjunction of the propositions, God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good and There is evil in the world, is necessarily false. The Free Will Defense is an effort to show the two propositions are compatible, and in the process of the defence, I use the concept of transworld depravity. I then prove that the possibility that every essence suffers from such depravity entails that it is possible both that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good and that there is evil in the world. I conclude by addressing special problems caused by natural evil and by arguing that the Probabilistic Problem of Evil is unsuccessful.Less
Chapter 9 is the first of two chapters that apply the findings of the previous eight chapters of The Nature of Necessity to some traditional problems in natural theology. The Problem of Evil is the objection to theism that holds that the conjunction of the propositions, God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good and There is evil in the world, is necessarily false. The Free Will Defense is an effort to show the two propositions are compatible, and in the process of the defence, I use the concept of transworld depravity. I then prove that the possibility that every essence suffers from such depravity entails that it is possible both that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good and that there is evil in the world. I conclude by addressing special problems caused by natural evil and by arguing that the Probabilistic Problem of Evil is unsuccessful.
Peter Forrest
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199214587
- eISBN:
- 9780191706523
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214587.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter presents a case for the existence of the neoclassical Primordial God. First, we should either reject reductive materialism or at least not have confidence in it. Hence, we should attach ...
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This chapter presents a case for the existence of the neoclassical Primordial God. First, we should either reject reductive materialism or at least not have confidence in it. Hence, we should attach a non-negligible probability to theism of some sort, even before looking at the evidence. Various familiar kinds of evidence increase that probability, and especially likely is the simplest version of theism: the belief that the Primordial God existed. The Problem of Evil is no serious threat to this belief because the Primordial God behaved like a good consequentialist. As part of this case, fine-tuning is replaced by coarse tuning, which is less spectacular but more robust, in two ways. First, it would survive the shift to a theory that had no tunable constants. Second, it resists the many worlds reply to fine-tuning. There is an appendix on the classification dependence of simplicity.Less
This chapter presents a case for the existence of the neoclassical Primordial God. First, we should either reject reductive materialism or at least not have confidence in it. Hence, we should attach a non-negligible probability to theism of some sort, even before looking at the evidence. Various familiar kinds of evidence increase that probability, and especially likely is the simplest version of theism: the belief that the Primordial God existed. The Problem of Evil is no serious threat to this belief because the Primordial God behaved like a good consequentialist. As part of this case, fine-tuning is replaced by coarse tuning, which is less spectacular but more robust, in two ways. First, it would survive the shift to a theory that had no tunable constants. Second, it resists the many worlds reply to fine-tuning. There is an appendix on the classification dependence of simplicity.
Brian P. Boeninger and Robert K. Garcia
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198794301
- eISBN:
- 9780191835810
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198794301.003.0015
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter analyzes an apparent incompatibility between a traditional theistic view of heaven and theodicies that centrally appeal to libertarian free will in responding to the problem of evil. ...
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This chapter analyzes an apparent incompatibility between a traditional theistic view of heaven and theodicies that centrally appeal to libertarian free will in responding to the problem of evil. Toward resolving this incompatibility, leading strategies (i) deploy a tracing (historical or externalist) account of freedom and moral responsibility along with the related distinction between occurrent (or direct) freedom and derivative (or indirect) freedom, (ii) hold that freedom makes possible the realization of “freedom goods,” goods uniquely actualized by freedom and of such outweighing value that they (at least partly) justify God’s permission of evil, and (iii) hold that heavenly acts manifest freedom goods by being derivatively free. It argues that these strategies for reconciling the alleged incompatibility founder on ambiguities in how they employ the notion of derivative freedom, and that available disambiguations both fail to show the requisite compatibility, and face significant and unnoticed objections to their possible success.Less
This chapter analyzes an apparent incompatibility between a traditional theistic view of heaven and theodicies that centrally appeal to libertarian free will in responding to the problem of evil. Toward resolving this incompatibility, leading strategies (i) deploy a tracing (historical or externalist) account of freedom and moral responsibility along with the related distinction between occurrent (or direct) freedom and derivative (or indirect) freedom, (ii) hold that freedom makes possible the realization of “freedom goods,” goods uniquely actualized by freedom and of such outweighing value that they (at least partly) justify God’s permission of evil, and (iii) hold that heavenly acts manifest freedom goods by being derivatively free. It argues that these strategies for reconciling the alleged incompatibility founder on ambiguities in how they employ the notion of derivative freedom, and that available disambiguations both fail to show the requisite compatibility, and face significant and unnoticed objections to their possible success.
Hud Hudson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198712695
- eISBN:
- 9780191781025
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712695.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Frequently, alleged irreconcilable conflicts between science and religion are instead misdescribed battles concerning negotiable philosophical assumptions—conflicts between metaphysics and ...
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Frequently, alleged irreconcilable conflicts between science and religion are instead misdescribed battles concerning negotiable philosophical assumptions—conflicts between metaphysics and metaphysics. This book provides a two-stage illustration of this claim with respect to the putative inconsistency between the doctrines of The Fall and Original Sin and the deliverances of contemporary science. The tension in question emerges through a study of the many forms the religious doctrines have assumed over the centuries and through a review of some well-established scientific lessons on the origin and history of the universe and of human persons. The first stage: after surveying various paths of retreat that involve reinterpreting and impoverishing Original Sin and minimizing and dehistoricizing The Fall, one version of moderate realism about the doctrines is articulated, critically evaluated, and found both consistent with contemporary science and suitable to play a crucial role in the theist’s confrontation with the Problem of Evil. The second stage: recent work in the philosophy of time and in the philosophy of religion provides intriguing support for a Hypertime Hypothesis (a species of multiverse hypothesis), distinctive for positing a series of successive hypertimes, each of which hosts a spacetime block. After arguing that the Hypertime Hypothesis is a genuine epistemic possibility and critically discussing its impact on a number of debates in metaphysics and philosophy of religion, Hudson reveals a strategy for unabashed, extreme literalism concerning The Fall and Original Sin is revealed that nevertheless has the extraordinary and delightful feature of being thoroughly consistent with the reigning scientific orthodoxy.Less
Frequently, alleged irreconcilable conflicts between science and religion are instead misdescribed battles concerning negotiable philosophical assumptions—conflicts between metaphysics and metaphysics. This book provides a two-stage illustration of this claim with respect to the putative inconsistency between the doctrines of The Fall and Original Sin and the deliverances of contemporary science. The tension in question emerges through a study of the many forms the religious doctrines have assumed over the centuries and through a review of some well-established scientific lessons on the origin and history of the universe and of human persons. The first stage: after surveying various paths of retreat that involve reinterpreting and impoverishing Original Sin and minimizing and dehistoricizing The Fall, one version of moderate realism about the doctrines is articulated, critically evaluated, and found both consistent with contemporary science and suitable to play a crucial role in the theist’s confrontation with the Problem of Evil. The second stage: recent work in the philosophy of time and in the philosophy of religion provides intriguing support for a Hypertime Hypothesis (a species of multiverse hypothesis), distinctive for positing a series of successive hypertimes, each of which hosts a spacetime block. After arguing that the Hypertime Hypothesis is a genuine epistemic possibility and critically discussing its impact on a number of debates in metaphysics and philosophy of religion, Hudson reveals a strategy for unabashed, extreme literalism concerning The Fall and Original Sin is revealed that nevertheless has the extraordinary and delightful feature of being thoroughly consistent with the reigning scientific orthodoxy.
Joseph Corabi
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198806967
- eISBN:
- 9780191844461
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198806967.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Social evil—pain and suffering caused by game-theoretic interactions among agents—has recently received attention as a newly recognized and potentially problematic kind of evidence against theism. ...
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Social evil—pain and suffering caused by game-theoretic interactions among agents—has recently received attention as a newly recognized and potentially problematic kind of evidence against theism. After an initial introduction to social evil and discussion of why it might be thought to constitute evidence against theism, I argue that social evil is in fact much rarer than it might initially appear to be, at least when we adopt a Christian ethical framework. In addition, I argue that the genuine social evils that remain after scrutiny do not provide significant new evidence against the existence of God.Less
Social evil—pain and suffering caused by game-theoretic interactions among agents—has recently received attention as a newly recognized and potentially problematic kind of evidence against theism. After an initial introduction to social evil and discussion of why it might be thought to constitute evidence against theism, I argue that social evil is in fact much rarer than it might initially appear to be, at least when we adopt a Christian ethical framework. In addition, I argue that the genuine social evils that remain after scrutiny do not provide significant new evidence against the existence of God.
Matthew Mutter
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780300221732
- eISBN:
- 9780300227963
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300221732.003.0006
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
This chapter contends that modernists find themselves entangled in a distinctly secular version of the “problem of evil.” As secularists they want to affirm the abundance of the immanent, material ...
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This chapter contends that modernists find themselves entangled in a distinctly secular version of the “problem of evil.” As secularists they want to affirm the abundance of the immanent, material world, but this very world seems to resist the desires and needs specific to human personhood. This leads, in different writers, to a critique of “secular humanism” or to a valorization of the world as a scene of conflict. The chapter suggests, however, that Auden’s Christian understanding of secularity is able to elude this problem of evil by relinquishing the expectation that the material world satisfy the desires proper to embodied persons.Less
This chapter contends that modernists find themselves entangled in a distinctly secular version of the “problem of evil.” As secularists they want to affirm the abundance of the immanent, material world, but this very world seems to resist the desires and needs specific to human personhood. This leads, in different writers, to a critique of “secular humanism” or to a valorization of the world as a scene of conflict. The chapter suggests, however, that Auden’s Christian understanding of secularity is able to elude this problem of evil by relinquishing the expectation that the material world satisfy the desires proper to embodied persons.
Hud Hudson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198704768
- eISBN:
- 9780191774300
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198704768.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
A severe and underappreciated problem confronts anyone who holds a certain popular combination of theses – namely, that there is such a thing as knowledge by revelation alone and that a defensive ...
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A severe and underappreciated problem confronts anyone who holds a certain popular combination of theses – namely, that there is such a thing as knowledge by revelation alone and that a defensive maneuver known as skeptical theism is sufficient to undermine a variety of popular arguments from the magnitude, intensity, duration, and distribution of evil to the nonexistence of God. After briefly characterizing and commenting on these two positions, this chapter identifies and explores the puzzle generated by their combination, and critically examines a variety of proposals for responding to that puzzle.Less
A severe and underappreciated problem confronts anyone who holds a certain popular combination of theses – namely, that there is such a thing as knowledge by revelation alone and that a defensive maneuver known as skeptical theism is sufficient to undermine a variety of popular arguments from the magnitude, intensity, duration, and distribution of evil to the nonexistence of God. After briefly characterizing and commenting on these two positions, this chapter identifies and explores the puzzle generated by their combination, and critically examines a variety of proposals for responding to that puzzle.
Hud Hudson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198712695
- eISBN:
- 9780191781025
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712695.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
One popular response to any alleged conflict between religion and science has been that of retreat by those in a position to speak for religion. This chapter describes numerous ...
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One popular response to any alleged conflict between religion and science has been that of retreat by those in a position to speak for religion. This chapter describes numerous strategies—increasingly concessive—that attempt to preserve as much of the doctrines of The Fall, Original Sin, and Original Guilt as possible without infringing on the authority of the reigning scientific orthodoxy. More specifically, it exhibits prevailing strategies for diminishing the role of these doctrines—concessions ranging from abandoning and apologizing for the thesis of Original Guilt to reinterpreting and impoverishing the account of Original Sin to minimizing and dehistoricizing The Fall. Finally, it presents and critically evaluates one significant alternative to excessive concession—namely, Peter van Inwagen’s modest articulation of The Fall and Original Sin in a way that is consistent with contemporary science and that also reveals the role such doctrines can play in confronting the Problem of Evil.Less
One popular response to any alleged conflict between religion and science has been that of retreat by those in a position to speak for religion. This chapter describes numerous strategies—increasingly concessive—that attempt to preserve as much of the doctrines of The Fall, Original Sin, and Original Guilt as possible without infringing on the authority of the reigning scientific orthodoxy. More specifically, it exhibits prevailing strategies for diminishing the role of these doctrines—concessions ranging from abandoning and apologizing for the thesis of Original Guilt to reinterpreting and impoverishing the account of Original Sin to minimizing and dehistoricizing The Fall. Finally, it presents and critically evaluates one significant alternative to excessive concession—namely, Peter van Inwagen’s modest articulation of The Fall and Original Sin in a way that is consistent with contemporary science and that also reveals the role such doctrines can play in confronting the Problem of Evil.
Hud Hudson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198712695
- eISBN:
- 9780191781025
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712695.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
The widely discussed arguments for atheism known as the Problem of Evil, the Problem of the Best, and the Problem of No Best World are grounded on the alleged lack of morally justifying reasons for ...
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The widely discussed arguments for atheism known as the Problem of Evil, the Problem of the Best, and the Problem of No Best World are grounded on the alleged lack of morally justifying reasons for God to permit particular moral and natural evils and on the thesis that God would have to create the best possible world. The Hypertime Hypothesis promises a further significant advantage to the philosophy of religion by way of providing a new twist on an underexplored strategy for refuting these popular atheistic arguments. With the assistance of the view known as Skeptical Theism, this chapter examines the prospects for responding to these three arguments by constructing a case for our world’s being the best of all possible worlds, a case made surprisingly palatable by appeal to the concept of a multiverse, especially to the species of multiverse at issue in the Hypertime Hypothesis.Less
The widely discussed arguments for atheism known as the Problem of Evil, the Problem of the Best, and the Problem of No Best World are grounded on the alleged lack of morally justifying reasons for God to permit particular moral and natural evils and on the thesis that God would have to create the best possible world. The Hypertime Hypothesis promises a further significant advantage to the philosophy of religion by way of providing a new twist on an underexplored strategy for refuting these popular atheistic arguments. With the assistance of the view known as Skeptical Theism, this chapter examines the prospects for responding to these three arguments by constructing a case for our world’s being the best of all possible worlds, a case made surprisingly palatable by appeal to the concept of a multiverse, especially to the species of multiverse at issue in the Hypertime Hypothesis.
D. H. Dilbeck
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781469636184
- eISBN:
- 9781469636191
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469636184.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, African-American History
This chapter describes Douglass’s life from his birth until his move to Baltimore as a young child. It describes his exposure both to the religion of local slaves and the proslavery Christianity of ...
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This chapter describes Douglass’s life from his birth until his move to Baltimore as a young child. It describes his exposure both to the religion of local slaves and the proslavery Christianity of local masters. The chapter also details Douglass’s earliest encounters with evil and suffering, and how those encounters shaped the foundation of his religious outlookLess
This chapter describes Douglass’s life from his birth until his move to Baltimore as a young child. It describes his exposure both to the religion of local slaves and the proslavery Christianity of local masters. The chapter also details Douglass’s earliest encounters with evil and suffering, and how those encounters shaped the foundation of his religious outlook
