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This chapter argues that the legacy in question is that the force of the open question argument, together with the rejection of the Moorean idea that there are non-natural properties, motivate two related claims: the no normative truth value thesis, according to which no normative sentences have truth value; and the expressivist thesis, that in uttering or thinking a normative sentence, what one does is express a favourable or unfavourable attitude toward the object of evaluation. The chapter explores two main sources of reason for rejecting the first thesis: appeals to minimalism about truth, and the so-called Frege–Geach problem. It argues that appeals to minimalism about truth are ultimately circular. However, the Frege–Geach problem represents a more serious challenge to those who embrace the no normative truth value thesis. Attempts — particularly by expressivists — to rebut this challenge falter, but rather than embrace the Moorean position (or any metaethical position that would countenance the property goodness, or rightness), the chapter denies the claim that ‘is good’ is a logical predicate. Rather, sentences of the form, ‘A is good’ are semantically incomplete and thus ‘is good’ is not (in the requisite sense) a logical predicate. Normative claims that predicate goodness or rightness in a way, as when someone claims that so and so is a good baseball player or that a certain move in chess was the right move to make, are predicating genuine properties that are arguably natural. If this is correct, then Moore's open question argument has misled philosophers to fix upon the pseudo-property of goodness.

This chapter examines how Virginia Woolf viewed the complex negotiation between personal relationships and socio-political community in relation to G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica. The importance of personal relationships is a recurrent idea in critical discussions of Bloomsbury, and Moore's Principia Ethica is often cited as a manifesto for its emphasis on love and friendship. The chapter considers Woolf's disagreements with Moore, as well as her experimentation with metaphor and syntax, and how they helped her “to imagine functional forms of community” which are explored in The Years (1937) and Three Guineas (1938). It also discusses the logical and linguistic aporias that surround the idea of meaningful interpersonal connection as they relate to Woolf's later attempts to imagine functional forms of community.

This chapter discusses the principle of organic unities as held in G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica: “The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts.” Moore's favored approach is a holistic interpretation grounded on a “thesis of universality”—that a part of the whole will retain the same intrinsic value while it is and is not a part of the whole. An opposing view—the conditionality interpretation—negates the universality thesis by claiming that a component will change its value when entering the whole in relation to the other parts. Neither approach is superior to the other, as there will certainly be cases wherein one view will be more applicable compared to the other. Ultimately, what matters is that both interpretations agree on the intrinsic value of the whole.

In this concluding chapter the book elucidates the tension in Leonard’s life between Hebraism and Hellenism, which provided the dynamic for his moral and spiritual evolution. His Jewish background helped shape his identity, imposing on him an obligation to duty and strictness of moral conscience, while the Hellenism, imparted by his education, his membership of the Apostles, and his Bloomsbury friends, opened him to ideals of beauty, rationality, and human progress. Abandoning religious belief at an early age, Leonard retained a “Semitic vision” of justice and mercy as the foundation of civilized life. His ethical values drew partly from parental influence, but even more from that of the philosopher G. E. Moore. In maturity he came to believe that “nothing matters” and developed a fatalistic view of death, his own and those who pre-deceased him, especially his father and his wife. In the final volume of his autobiography, he concludes that the thousands of hours he devoted to political activity and writing were ultimately futile, but that for him it was right that he should have done it. This book contends that his significant accomplishments were multifaceted—personal, political, literary, and commercial. As a publicist for the League of Nations and as a Labour activist, he strove to achieve international peace and to undermine faith in the merits of British imperialism. He also provided the security and support in which Virginia could flourish as a writer.