Christopher J. G. Meacham
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199673421
- eISBN:
- 9780191782534
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
In recent work, Callender and Cohen (2009) and Hoefer (2007) have proposed variants of the account of chance proposed by Lewis (1994). One of the ways in which these accounts diverge from Lewis’s is ...
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In recent work, Callender and Cohen (2009) and Hoefer (2007) have proposed variants of the account of chance proposed by Lewis (1994). One of the ways in which these accounts diverge from Lewis’s is that they allow special sciences and the macroscopic realm to have chances that are autonomous from those of physics and the microscopic realm. A worry for these proposals is that autonomous chances may place incompatible constraints on rational belief. This chapter examines this worry, and attempts to determine (i) what kinds of conflicts would be problematic, and (ii) whether these proposals lead to problematic conflicts. By working through a pair of cases, it is argued that these proposals do give rise to problematic conflicts. Some morals are considered.Less
In recent work, Callender and Cohen (2009) and Hoefer (2007) have proposed variants of the account of chance proposed by Lewis (1994). One of the ways in which these accounts diverge from Lewis’s is that they allow special sciences and the macroscopic realm to have chances that are autonomous from those of physics and the microscopic realm. A worry for these proposals is that autonomous chances may place incompatible constraints on rational belief. This chapter examines this worry, and attempts to determine (i) what kinds of conflicts would be problematic, and (ii) whether these proposals lead to problematic conflicts. By working through a pair of cases, it is argued that these proposals do give rise to problematic conflicts. Some morals are considered.
Richard Pettigrew
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198732716
- eISBN:
- 9780191797019
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This book explores a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that the book justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian ...
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This book explores a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that the book justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are met along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, credences should be distributed equally over all possibilities that are entertained; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how responses are planned when new evidence is received. Ultimately, then, the book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism. To justify these principles, the book looks to decision theory. An agent’s credences are treated as if they were a choice she makes. The book appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility given is the veritist’s: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, this is an investigation of the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology.Less
This book explores a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that the book justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are met along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, credences should be distributed equally over all possibilities that are entertained; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how responses are planned when new evidence is received. Ultimately, then, the book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism. To justify these principles, the book looks to decision theory. An agent’s credences are treated as if they were a choice she makes. The book appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility given is the veritist’s: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, this is an investigation of the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology.
Wolfgang Schwarz
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199673421
- eISBN:
- 9780191782534
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
Any credible interpretation of objective chance should make sense of the connection between objective chance and rational degree of belief. Ideally, an account that identifies chance with some ...
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Any credible interpretation of objective chance should make sense of the connection between objective chance and rational degree of belief. Ideally, an account that identifies chance with some objective quantity X should be accompanied by a story that explains, from independently plausible assumptions, why X guides rational credence in the way captured by the Principal Principle. In this chapter, this story is provided for various Humean accounts of chance, including frequentist and Best Systems accounts. Along the way, a generalization of the Principal Principle that allows for dyadic and ‘indefinite’ chances is suggested.Less
Any credible interpretation of objective chance should make sense of the connection between objective chance and rational degree of belief. Ideally, an account that identifies chance with some objective quantity X should be accompanied by a story that explains, from independently plausible assumptions, why X guides rational credence in the way captured by the Principal Principle. In this chapter, this story is provided for various Humean accounts of chance, including frequentist and Best Systems accounts. Along the way, a generalization of the Principal Principle that allows for dyadic and ‘indefinite’ chances is suggested.
Alastair Wilson (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199673421
- eISBN:
- 9780191782534
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This volume is a collection of cutting-edge research papers in scientifically informed metaphysics, tackling a range of philosophical puzzles which have emerged from recent work on chance and ...
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This volume is a collection of cutting-edge research papers in scientifically informed metaphysics, tackling a range of philosophical puzzles which have emerged from recent work on chance and temporal asymmetry. How do the probabilities found in fundamental physics and the probabilities of the special sciences relate to one another? How can we account for the normative significance of chance? Can constraints on the initial conditions of the universe underwrite the second law of thermodynamics, and potentially also all other lawlike regularities? How does contemporary quantum theory bear on debates over the nature of chance and the arrow of time? What grounds do we have for believing in a fundamental temporal direction, or flow? And how do all these questions connect up with one another? The aim of the volume is both to survey and summarize recent debates about chance and temporal asymmetry and to push them forward. The authors bring perspectives from metaphysics, from philosophy of physics and from philosophy of probability. Mainstream approaches are subjected to searching new critiques, and bold new proposals are made concerning (inter alia) the semantics of chance-attributions, the justification of the Principal Principle connecting chance and degree of belief, the limits on inter-theoretic reduction and the source of the temporal asymmetry of human experience..Less
This volume is a collection of cutting-edge research papers in scientifically informed metaphysics, tackling a range of philosophical puzzles which have emerged from recent work on chance and temporal asymmetry. How do the probabilities found in fundamental physics and the probabilities of the special sciences relate to one another? How can we account for the normative significance of chance? Can constraints on the initial conditions of the universe underwrite the second law of thermodynamics, and potentially also all other lawlike regularities? How does contemporary quantum theory bear on debates over the nature of chance and the arrow of time? What grounds do we have for believing in a fundamental temporal direction, or flow? And how do all these questions connect up with one another? The aim of the volume is both to survey and summarize recent debates about chance and temporal asymmetry and to push them forward. The authors bring perspectives from metaphysics, from philosophy of physics and from philosophy of probability. Mainstream approaches are subjected to searching new critiques, and bold new proposals are made concerning (inter alia) the semantics of chance-attributions, the justification of the Principal Principle connecting chance and degree of belief, the limits on inter-theoretic reduction and the source of the temporal asymmetry of human experience..
Richard Pettigrew
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198732716
- eISBN:
- 9780191797019
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter begins Part II of the book, which treats the accuracy argument for various chance-credence principles. This chapter considers David Lewis’ Principal Principle. It introduces the ...
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This chapter begins Part II of the book, which treats the accuracy argument for various chance-credence principles. This chapter considers David Lewis’ Principal Principle. It introduces the framework in which that principle is stated and discusses some of its features.Less
This chapter begins Part II of the book, which treats the accuracy argument for various chance-credence principles. This chapter considers David Lewis’ Principal Principle. It introduces the framework in which that principle is stated and discusses some of its features.
Moritz Schulz
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- March 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198785958
- eISBN:
- 9780191831713
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198785958.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter introduces a key notion for the book’s project: counterfactual chance.The desired evaluation constraint is then developed in close analogy to D. Lewis’s Principal Principle. The concept ...
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This chapter introduces a key notion for the book’s project: counterfactual chance.The desired evaluation constraint is then developed in close analogy to D. Lewis’s Principal Principle. The concept of admissibility is critically discussed and the resulting principle is compared to the operation of imaging.Less
This chapter introduces a key notion for the book’s project: counterfactual chance.The desired evaluation constraint is then developed in close analogy to D. Lewis’s Principal Principle. The concept of admissibility is critically discussed and the resulting principle is compared to the operation of imaging.
Toby Handfield and Alastair Wilson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199673421
- eISBN:
- 9780191782534
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
The most familiar philosophical conception of objective chance renders determinism incompatible with non-trivial chances. This conception—associated in particular with the work of David Lewis—is not ...
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The most familiar philosophical conception of objective chance renders determinism incompatible with non-trivial chances. This conception—associated in particular with the work of David Lewis—is not a good fit with use of the word ‘chance’ and cognates in ordinary discourse. A generalized framework for chance reconciles determinism with non-trivial chances, and provides for a more charitable interpretation of ordinary chance-talk. Variation in an admissible ‘evidence base’ generates a spectrum of different chance functions: coarse-grainings of the evidence base generate a partial ordering of chance functions, with finer trumping coarser if known. A contextual mechanism is proposed, according to which users of chance-talk refer to different chance functions in different contexts. Admissible evidence is identified with available evidence: evidence which could be obtained. Consequently, attributions of objective chances inherit the relatively familiar context-sensitivity associated with the modal ‘could’. This context-dependency undermines certain arguments for the incompatibility of chance with determinism.Less
The most familiar philosophical conception of objective chance renders determinism incompatible with non-trivial chances. This conception—associated in particular with the work of David Lewis—is not a good fit with use of the word ‘chance’ and cognates in ordinary discourse. A generalized framework for chance reconciles determinism with non-trivial chances, and provides for a more charitable interpretation of ordinary chance-talk. Variation in an admissible ‘evidence base’ generates a spectrum of different chance functions: coarse-grainings of the evidence base generate a partial ordering of chance functions, with finer trumping coarser if known. A contextual mechanism is proposed, according to which users of chance-talk refer to different chance functions in different contexts. Admissible evidence is identified with available evidence: evidence which could be obtained. Consequently, attributions of objective chances inherit the relatively familiar context-sensitivity associated with the modal ‘could’. This context-dependency undermines certain arguments for the incompatibility of chance with determinism.
Richard Pettigrew
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198732716
- eISBN:
- 9780191797019
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter introduces a first attempt at an accuracy-based argument for chance-credence principles. It adapts the accuracy-based argument for Probabilism by changing the notion of vindication from ...
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This chapter introduces a first attempt at an accuracy-based argument for chance-credence principles. It adapts the accuracy-based argument for Probabilism by changing the notion of vindication from that proposed by the veritist to an alternative that has been endorsed by Alan Hájek. The chapter argues that, ultimately, it fails.Less
This chapter introduces a first attempt at an accuracy-based argument for chance-credence principles. It adapts the accuracy-based argument for Probabilism by changing the notion of vindication from that proposed by the veritist to an alternative that has been endorsed by Alan Hájek. The chapter argues that, ultimately, it fails.
Alastair Wilson (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199673421
- eISBN:
- 9780191782534
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
The main purpose of this introduction is to provide background on debates about chance (mostly from the philosophy of probability literature) and about the direction of time (mostly from the ...
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The main purpose of this introduction is to provide background on debates about chance (mostly from the philosophy of probability literature) and about the direction of time (mostly from the philosophy of physics literature). It is designed to get those with a general background in metaphysics up to speed in these more specialized areas. The contributions to the volume are also summarized, and some connections between them are drawn out.Less
The main purpose of this introduction is to provide background on debates about chance (mostly from the philosophy of probability literature) and about the direction of time (mostly from the philosophy of physics literature). It is designed to get those with a general background in metaphysics up to speed in these more specialized areas. The contributions to the volume are also summarized, and some connections between them are drawn out.
Carl Hoefer
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199673421
- eISBN:
- 9780191782534
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
In his contribution to this volume, Christopher Meacham identifies a possibly serious defect of the pragmatic Humean approach to laws and chance, compared to the more fundamentalist/reductionist ...
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In his contribution to this volume, Christopher Meacham identifies a possibly serious defect of the pragmatic Humean approach to laws and chance, compared to the more fundamentalist/reductionist approaches of Lewis and Loewer: a potential inconsistency in the credences that rational agents are advised to have, when two or more different objective chances are ascribed to the same event by distinct parts of the pragmatist’s chance theory. This chapter discusses Meacham’s objections, some of which apply to Hoefer’s approach to objective chance, and some of which apply to Callender and Cohen’s Better Best System account of laws. In the course of defending Hoefer’s account of chance from the inconsistency objection, the chapter also discusses some contentious issues regarding how we should understand the Principal Principle, and in particular whether it should include an ‘admissibility clause’.Less
In his contribution to this volume, Christopher Meacham identifies a possibly serious defect of the pragmatic Humean approach to laws and chance, compared to the more fundamentalist/reductionist approaches of Lewis and Loewer: a potential inconsistency in the credences that rational agents are advised to have, when two or more different objective chances are ascribed to the same event by distinct parts of the pragmatist’s chance theory. This chapter discusses Meacham’s objections, some of which apply to Hoefer’s approach to objective chance, and some of which apply to Callender and Cohen’s Better Best System account of laws. In the course of defending Hoefer’s account of chance from the inconsistency objection, the chapter also discusses some contentious issues regarding how we should understand the Principal Principle, and in particular whether it should include an ‘admissibility clause’.
Richard Pettigrew
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198732716
- eISBN:
- 9780191797019
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter introduces a second attempt at an accuracy-based argument for chance-credence principles. In this attempt, the veritist account of vindication, on which the accuracy-based argument for ...
More
This chapter introduces a second attempt at an accuracy-based argument for chance-credence principles. In this attempt, the veritist account of vindication, on which the accuracy-based argument for Probabilism depends, is retained. What is changed instead is the decision-theoretic principle: it is changed from a pure dominance principle to what is called a chance dominance principle. The chapter shows how the argument thus adapted can be used to establish various chance-credence principles and answers an objection that the justification it provides is circular.Less
This chapter introduces a second attempt at an accuracy-based argument for chance-credence principles. In this attempt, the veritist account of vindication, on which the accuracy-based argument for Probabilism depends, is retained. What is changed instead is the decision-theoretic principle: it is changed from a pure dominance principle to what is called a chance dominance principle. The chapter shows how the argument thus adapted can be used to establish various chance-credence principles and answers an objection that the justification it provides is circular.
