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Autonomous Chances and the Conflicts Problem

Christopher J. G. Meacham

in Chance and Temporal Asymmetry

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
November 2014
ISBN:
9780199673421
eISBN:
9780191782534
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

In recent work, Callender and Cohen (2009) and Hoefer (2007) have proposed variants of the account of chance proposed by Lewis (1994). One of the ways in which these accounts diverge from Lewis’s is ... More


Accuracy and the Laws of Credence

Richard Pettigrew

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
May 2016
ISBN:
9780198732716
eISBN:
9780191797019
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This book explores a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that the book justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian ... More


Emergent Chance

Alastair Wilson

in The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
March 2020
ISBN:
9780198846215
eISBN:
9780191881374
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198846215.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

This chapter offers a theory of objective chance in the Everettian context, often seen as the main challenge facing EQM. By supplementing diverging EQM with quantum modal realist bridge principles ... More


Proving the Principal Principle

Wolfgang Schwarz

in Chance and Temporal Asymmetry

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
November 2014
ISBN:
9780199673421
eISBN:
9780191782534
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

Any credible interpretation of objective chance should make sense of the connection between objective chance and rational degree of belief. Ideally, an account that identifies chance with some ... More


Chance and Temporal Asymmetry

Alastair Wilson (ed.)

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
November 2014
ISBN:
9780199673421
eISBN:
9780191782534
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This volume is a collection of cutting-edge research papers in scientifically informed metaphysics, tackling a range of philosophical puzzles which have emerged from recent work on chance and ... More


The Principal Principle

Richard Pettigrew

in Accuracy and the Laws of Credence

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
May 2016
ISBN:
9780198732716
eISBN:
9780191797019
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This chapter begins Part II of the book, which treats the accuracy argument for various chance-credence principles. This chapter considers David Lewis’ Principal Principle. It introduces the ... More


Counterfactual Chance

Moritz Schulz

in Counterfactuals and Probability

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
March 2017
ISBN:
9780198785958
eISBN:
9780191831713
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198785958.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter introduces a key notion for the book’s project: counterfactual chance.The desired evaluation constraint is then developed in close analogy to D. Lewis’s Principal Principle. The concept ... More


Chance and Context

Toby Handfield and Alastair Wilson

in Chance and Temporal Asymmetry

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
November 2014
ISBN:
9780199673421
eISBN:
9780191782534
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

The most familiar philosophical conception of objective chance renders determinism incompatible with non-trivial chances. This conception—associated in particular with the work of David Lewis—is not ... More


Vindication and chance

Richard Pettigrew

in Accuracy and the Laws of Credence

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
May 2016
ISBN:
9780198732716
eISBN:
9780191797019
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This chapter introduces a first attempt at an accuracy-based argument for chance-credence principles. It adapts the accuracy-based argument for Probabilism by changing the notion of vindication from ... More


Deducing the Principal Principle

Carl Hoefer

in Chance in the World: A Humean Guide to Objective Chance

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
October 2019
ISBN:
9780190907419
eISBN:
9780190907440
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190907419.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This chapter gives two distinct justifications of the Principal Principle (PP) for Humean objective chances (HOCs). The first justification is “consequentialist” in nature: it shows that in practical ... More


Models, Idealizations and Objective Chance

Jan Sprenger and Stephan Hartmann

in Bayesian Philosophy of Science

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
October 2019
ISBN:
9780199672110
eISBN:
9780191881671
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199672110.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

How does Bayesian inference handle the highly idealized nature of many (statistical) models in science? The standard interpretation of probability as degree of belief in the truth of a model does not ... More


Introduction: Chance and Temporal Asymmetry

Alastair Wilson (ed.)

in Chance and Temporal Asymmetry

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
November 2014
ISBN:
9780199673421
eISBN:
9780191782534
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

The main purpose of this introduction is to provide background on debates about chance (mostly from the philosophy of probability literature) and about the direction of time (mostly from the ... More


Chance in the World: A Humean Guide to Objective Chance

Carl Hoefer

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
October 2019
ISBN:
9780190907419
eISBN:
9780190907440
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190907419.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This book argues that objective chance, or probability, should not be understood as a metaphysical primitive, nor as a dispositional property of certain systems (“propensity”). Given that traditional ... More


Undermining

Carl Hoefer

in Chance in the World: A Humean Guide to Objective Chance

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
October 2019
ISBN:
9780190907419
eISBN:
9780190907440
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190907419.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

The problem of undermining is an apparent contradiction that arises when Humean chances and the Principal Principle come together. This chapter gives a full discussion of, and resolution of, the ... More


Consistency and Admissibility: Reply to Meacham

Carl Hoefer

in Chance and Temporal Asymmetry

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
November 2014
ISBN:
9780199673421
eISBN:
9780191782534
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

In his contribution to this volume, Christopher Meacham identifies a possibly serious defect of the pragmatic Humean approach to laws and chance, compared to the more fundamentalist/reductionist ... More


Dominance and chance

Richard Pettigrew

in Accuracy and the Laws of Credence

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
May 2016
ISBN:
9780198732716
eISBN:
9780191797019
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This chapter introduces a second attempt at an accuracy-based argument for chance-credence principles. In this attempt, the veritist account of vindication, on which the accuracy-based argument for ... More


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