Vipin Narang
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159829
- eISBN:
- 9781400850402
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159829.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter identifies three main types of regional power nuclear postures, arrayed across a spectrum of capabilities and deployment procedures. This theory, the Posture Optimization Theory, ...
More
This chapter identifies three main types of regional power nuclear postures, arrayed across a spectrum of capabilities and deployment procedures. This theory, the Posture Optimization Theory, explains why the existing regional nuclear powers have adopted the nuclear postures and strategies they have, and generates testable predictions about what type of nuclear posture future regional nuclear powers might adopt based on a set of readily observable variables. Because of the dearth of regional states that have acquired nuclear weapons, this exercise has inherent limitations. However, by testing the framework against the existing empirical record, we can determine whether it provides a plausible framework with which to explain the choices of existing regional powers and to predict the choices that future nuclear powers might make.Less
This chapter identifies three main types of regional power nuclear postures, arrayed across a spectrum of capabilities and deployment procedures. This theory, the Posture Optimization Theory, explains why the existing regional nuclear powers have adopted the nuclear postures and strategies they have, and generates testable predictions about what type of nuclear posture future regional nuclear powers might adopt based on a set of readily observable variables. Because of the dearth of regional states that have acquired nuclear weapons, this exercise has inherent limitations. However, by testing the framework against the existing empirical record, we can determine whether it provides a plausible framework with which to explain the choices of existing regional powers and to predict the choices that future nuclear powers might make.
Vipin Narang
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159829
- eISBN:
- 9781400850402
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159829.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter reiterates the findings explored in this book and discusses their implications. In doing so, the chapter stresses the significance of the posited optimization theory. This theory is the ...
More
This chapter reiterates the findings explored in this book and discusses their implications. In doing so, the chapter stresses the significance of the posited optimization theory. This theory is the first comparative theory of regional power nuclear postures. Against the full universe of empirical cases involving selection of nuclear posture—a decision that unfolds deliberately over many years and often over many leaders—optimization theory is the most valid theory available. It is also the first broadly comparative theory for why states select the nuclear postures they do, suggesting that states may be rational to sacrifice deterrent power in certain security environments and under particular organizational and relative endowment circumstances. In addition, the chapter closes the volume by detailing some avenues for further research, as well as some concluding insights.Less
This chapter reiterates the findings explored in this book and discusses their implications. In doing so, the chapter stresses the significance of the posited optimization theory. This theory is the first comparative theory of regional power nuclear postures. Against the full universe of empirical cases involving selection of nuclear posture—a decision that unfolds deliberately over many years and often over many leaders—optimization theory is the most valid theory available. It is also the first broadly comparative theory for why states select the nuclear postures they do, suggesting that states may be rational to sacrifice deterrent power in certain security environments and under particular organizational and relative endowment circumstances. In addition, the chapter closes the volume by detailing some avenues for further research, as well as some concluding insights.
