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Since the retirement of President Kekkonen in 1981, a process of piecemeal constitutional reform has strengthened the core concept of parliamentary government at the expense of the old quasi‐monarchical elements in the Finnish political system; this modernization process has been propelled by a concern to avoid the possibility of a recurrence of the ‘enlightened despotism’ of the Kekkonen era, and has been aided by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Recent constitutional changes have also enhanced the involvement of the prime minister and government in the performance of the federative (foreign policy) function; above all, the institutional adaptation required by membership of the EU has emphasized the bicephalous character of the Finnish political executive in a way reminiscent of interwar practice. Political factors, notably the ability of the party system to deliver stable majority coalitions, have worked in the same direction, and indeed arguments have been made in favour of the abolition of the whole institution of the presidency. With parliament having recently accepted the main findings of the Nikula Committee's report and restricted the president's involvement in the process of coalition‐building, as well as vesting the government with powers jointly to manage foreign policy, it is clear that Finland is en route to becoming an orthodox parliamentary democracy: the head of state has lost his exclusive charge of the federative function; his involvement in the legislative process is limited and exceptional; and even his executive powers—particularly his powers of appointment—have been restricted in recent years. The different sections of the chapter are: Constitution‐Making 1917–1919: A Monarchical Republic?; The Shift to a President‐Dominant System, 1940–1987; From President‐Dominant to Pluralist Foreign Policy‐Making, 1987–1998; and Towards a Ceremonial Presidency?

Some question the possibility of consensus, others doubt its desirability. Pluralist skeptics argue that consensus is impossible because of social complexity and hyper-pluralism, and cognitive skeptics find consensus to be impossible as a consequence of the limits of rationality. Pluralist critics condemn consensus because it threatens the repression of diversity, and cognitive critics think consensus undesirable because of the risks it poses of poor decision making. The juristic approach to democracy offers responses to each of these clusters of doubt and criticism, providing a normative framework for a path of evolving practical solutions to otherwise intractable problems faced by an emergent system of earth system governance. Consensus is both possible and desirable. Similar pragmatic responses to environmental challenges recur across cultures and populations precisely because they work. Activity in the international public sphere—marked as it is by an unavoidable search for consensus—can lead the way toward more just resolutions of disputes. It does not have to labor under a democratic deficit. With respect to matters environmental, the fruit of the natural and social sciences can be brought to bear on processes of solving concrete problems in ways that increasingly square with identifiable consensual norms about right and wrong.

This chapter argues that the Empiricist account provides a direct link between laws and determinism, and that the causal account does not. The popularity of the Empiricist account of laws in the twentieth century may explain the prevalence of the assumption that a law-governed world must also be deterministic. However, the argument from Empiricist laws to determinism is no better than its premises, and it has already been seen that there are compelling objections to the Empiricist account of laws. These objections also weaken any support that account might give to determinism. To the extent that we ought to favor a causal account of laws, whether those posed by Cartwright and Hacking or the one developed in the Cognitive Pluralist formulation, a commitment to such laws is perfectly compatible with a commitment to free will.

This chapter presents three replies to the argument that being committed to scientific laws does not entail a commitment to determinism and hence is compatible with free will. First, there are appeals to other scientific principles. These concede that acknowledging the aptness of some law, or even some set of laws, does not entail determinism. Second, there are appeals to the future which acknowledge that the sciences as we currently understand them do not entail determinism or prohibit free will. Third, there are appeals to mystery. These admit that our present scientific understanding of the world does not commit us to determinism or prohibit free will, and that we might not be able to produce an “ideally completed science” which would do so, perhaps on Cognitive Pluralist grounds.

The pluralist approach to these perennial philosophical problems is an alternative both to the absolutist search for a solution of each that reason requires everyone to accept and to the relativist claim that their solutions are ultimately arbitrary. In each case, there is a reasonable strategy for coping with the problems, but it is practical, context-dependent, particular, and varies as physical, historical, social, and individual conditions vary. This strategy is carried out for each of these problems in a particular context.

The pluralist approach to these perennial philosophical problems is an alternative both to the absolutist search for a solution of each that reason requires everyone to accept and to the relativist claim that their solutions are ultimately arbitrary. In each case, there is a reasonable strategy for coping with the problems, but it is practical, context-dependent, particular, and varies as physical, historical, social, and individual conditions vary. This strategy is carried out for each of these problems in a particular context.