David Bostock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286867
- eISBN:
- 9780191603532
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286868.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The book features a collection of ten essays on themes from Aristotle’s Physics. Six of these have been previously published, and four are newly written for this volume. The first five essays are ...
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The book features a collection of ten essays on themes from Aristotle’s Physics. Six of these have been previously published, and four are newly written for this volume. The first five essays are based on single theme, namely Aristotle’s conception of substance as it appears in his physical works. The basic texts here are Physics I-II, but the essays also range quite widely over Aristotle’s other physical works, where these are relevant to his understanding of the notions of substance, matter, and form. The general view of these five essays is that Aristotle’s idea of matter was a winner, but his idea of form certainly was not. The remaining five essays are on various topics from Physics III-VI, with each confined to the text of the Physics itself. The topics covered fall broadly under the headings: space, time, and infinity.Less
The book features a collection of ten essays on themes from Aristotle’s Physics. Six of these have been previously published, and four are newly written for this volume. The first five essays are based on single theme, namely Aristotle’s conception of substance as it appears in his physical works. The basic texts here are Physics I-II, but the essays also range quite widely over Aristotle’s other physical works, where these are relevant to his understanding of the notions of substance, matter, and form. The general view of these five essays is that Aristotle’s idea of matter was a winner, but his idea of form certainly was not. The remaining five essays are on various topics from Physics III-VI, with each confined to the text of the Physics itself. The topics covered fall broadly under the headings: space, time, and infinity.
Elias Burstein
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199238873
- eISBN:
- 9780191716652
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199238873.003.0001
- Subject:
- Physics, Condensed Matter Physics / Materials
This chapter includes recollections by Elias Burstein about his meetings with L. V. Keldysh in 1960s. It describes research links between US and USSR condensed matter physicists over four decades ...
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This chapter includes recollections by Elias Burstein about his meetings with L. V. Keldysh in 1960s. It describes research links between US and USSR condensed matter physicists over four decades ago, and the difficulty of organizing joint research meetings at that time.Less
This chapter includes recollections by Elias Burstein about his meetings with L. V. Keldysh in 1960s. It describes research links between US and USSR condensed matter physicists over four decades ago, and the difficulty of organizing joint research meetings at that time.
Laurent Lellouch, Rainer Sommer, Benjamin Svetitsky, Anastassios Vladikas, and Leticia F. Cugliandolo (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199691609
- eISBN:
- 9780191731792
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691609.001.0001
- Subject:
- Physics, Theoretical, Computational, and Statistical Physics
The book is based on the lectures delivered at the XCIII Session of the ´Ecole de Physique des Houches, held in August, 2009. The aim of the event was to familiarize the new generation of Ph.D. ...
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The book is based on the lectures delivered at the XCIII Session of the ´Ecole de Physique des Houches, held in August, 2009. The aim of the event was to familiarize the new generation of Ph.D. students and postdoctoral Fellows with the principles and methods of modern lattice field theory, which Is set to resolve fundamental, non-perturbative questions about QCD without uncontrolled approximations. The emphasis of the book is on the theoretical developments that have shaped the field in the last two decades and that have turned lattice gauge theory into a robust approach to the determination of low energy hadronic quantities and of fundamental parameters of the Standard Model. By way of introduction, the courses of the school began by covering lattice theory basics (P. Hernández), lattice renormalization and improvement (P. Weisz and A. Vladikas) and the many faces of chirality (D.B. Kaplan). A later course introduced QCD at finite temperature and density (O. Philipsen). A broad view of lattice computation from the basics to recent developments was offered in the corresponding course (M. Lüscher). The students learned the basics of lattice computation in a hands-on tutorial (S. Schaefer)---a first at Les Houches, Extrapolations to physical quark masses and a framework for the parameterization of the low-energy physics by means of effective coupling constants has been covered in the course on chiral perturbation theory (M. Golterman). A course in heavy-quark effective theories (R. Sommer), an essential tool for performing the relevant lattice calculations, covered HQET from its basics to recent advances. A number of shorter courses rounded out the school and broadened its purview. These included recent applications to flavour physics (L. Lellouch) the nucleon--nucleon interation (S. Aoki) and a course on physics beyond the Standard Model (T. Appelquist and E.T. Neil).Less
The book is based on the lectures delivered at the XCIII Session of the ´Ecole de Physique des Houches, held in August, 2009. The aim of the event was to familiarize the new generation of Ph.D. students and postdoctoral Fellows with the principles and methods of modern lattice field theory, which Is set to resolve fundamental, non-perturbative questions about QCD without uncontrolled approximations. The emphasis of the book is on the theoretical developments that have shaped the field in the last two decades and that have turned lattice gauge theory into a robust approach to the determination of low energy hadronic quantities and of fundamental parameters of the Standard Model. By way of introduction, the courses of the school began by covering lattice theory basics (P. Hernández), lattice renormalization and improvement (P. Weisz and A. Vladikas) and the many faces of chirality (D.B. Kaplan). A later course introduced QCD at finite temperature and density (O. Philipsen). A broad view of lattice computation from the basics to recent developments was offered in the corresponding course (M. Lüscher). The students learned the basics of lattice computation in a hands-on tutorial (S. Schaefer)---a first at Les Houches, Extrapolations to physical quark masses and a framework for the parameterization of the low-energy physics by means of effective coupling constants has been covered in the course on chiral perturbation theory (M. Golterman). A course in heavy-quark effective theories (R. Sommer), an essential tool for performing the relevant lattice calculations, covered HQET from its basics to recent advances. A number of shorter courses rounded out the school and broadened its purview. These included recent applications to flavour physics (L. Lellouch) the nucleon--nucleon interation (S. Aoki) and a course on physics beyond the Standard Model (T. Appelquist and E.T. Neil).
David Bostock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286867
- eISBN:
- 9780191603532
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286868.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This essay discusses almost all of Aristotle’s claims in Physics VI, highlighting some virtues in his discussion as well as inadequacies or plain mistakes. In some cases, Aristotle’s mistakes may be ...
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This essay discusses almost all of Aristotle’s claims in Physics VI, highlighting some virtues in his discussion as well as inadequacies or plain mistakes. In some cases, Aristotle’s mistakes may be put down to his imperfect grasp of the notion of infinity. But in most cases, they are due to the fact that in this book of the Physics, he is trying to argue against all forms of atomism, i.e., against atoms of space, time, movement, and atoms of matter. However, his arguments on this head are never conclusive.Less
This essay discusses almost all of Aristotle’s claims in Physics VI, highlighting some virtues in his discussion as well as inadequacies or plain mistakes. In some cases, Aristotle’s mistakes may be put down to his imperfect grasp of the notion of infinity. But in most cases, they are due to the fact that in this book of the Physics, he is trying to argue against all forms of atomism, i.e., against atoms of space, time, movement, and atoms of matter. However, his arguments on this head are never conclusive.
David Bostock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286867
- eISBN:
- 9780191603532
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286868.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This essay is a commentary on Physics I, with special reference to the account of change in chapter 7. It is argued: (i) that Aristotle is mistaken when he attempts in the earlier chapters to present ...
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This essay is a commentary on Physics I, with special reference to the account of change in chapter 7. It is argued: (i) that Aristotle is mistaken when he attempts in the earlier chapters to present his account as the natural development of various Pre-Socratic views ‘on nature’; (ii) that as a result the main theme of his chapter 5 is a clear error; and (iii) that this raises an important question over how we should understand the apparent claims of chapter 6. All of this leads to the problem: How should we explain his remark at the end of chapter 7 that it is not yet clear whether the underlying thing, the thing that persists through change, is substance?Less
This essay is a commentary on Physics I, with special reference to the account of change in chapter 7. It is argued: (i) that Aristotle is mistaken when he attempts in the earlier chapters to present his account as the natural development of various Pre-Socratic views ‘on nature’; (ii) that as a result the main theme of his chapter 5 is a clear error; and (iii) that this raises an important question over how we should understand the apparent claims of chapter 6. All of this leads to the problem: How should we explain his remark at the end of chapter 7 that it is not yet clear whether the underlying thing, the thing that persists through change, is substance?
David Bostock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286867
- eISBN:
- 9780191603532
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286868.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This essay opens with a summary of Aristotle’s general position on matter and change, which leads to the question: What is the criterion of identity that we apparently need to make sense of the idea ...
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This essay opens with a summary of Aristotle’s general position on matter and change, which leads to the question: What is the criterion of identity that we apparently need to make sense of the idea that the same matter persists through some change? The essay then explores this question on its own account, with almost no further reference to Aristotle’s own views. It is argued that although some progress can be made with this question, a fully satisfying answer is not available on Aristotelian terms. It is then questioned whether this is at all a serious defect in his conception. Some final remarks briefly indicate how his conception of matter has fared over the centuries between him and us.Less
This essay opens with a summary of Aristotle’s general position on matter and change, which leads to the question: What is the criterion of identity that we apparently need to make sense of the idea that the same matter persists through some change? The essay then explores this question on its own account, with almost no further reference to Aristotle’s own views. It is argued that although some progress can be made with this question, a fully satisfying answer is not available on Aristotelian terms. It is then questioned whether this is at all a serious defect in his conception. Some final remarks briefly indicate how his conception of matter has fared over the centuries between him and us.
David Bostock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286867
- eISBN:
- 9780191603532
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286868.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This essay begins by approving Aristotle’s general argument for teleology in Physics II.8. It then explores his use of teleological explanations in the biological works, distinguishing his practice ...
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This essay begins by approving Aristotle’s general argument for teleology in Physics II.8. It then explores his use of teleological explanations in the biological works, distinguishing his practice when actually giving explanations from his theory of how these explanations work. It is argued that while the practical instances usually make good sense, the theoretical explanation which identifies telos with form is wholly misleading. This brings the discussion back to the very puzzling chapter 9 of Physics II, and thence to a consideration of the idea that absolutely everything in nature is for some purpose. There are places where Aristotle seems to endorse this, although a more sober view would also assign a role to what may be called ‘laws of matter’, independent of teleology. The essay ends with some general reflections on Aristotle’s view of explanation in the natural sciences.Less
This essay begins by approving Aristotle’s general argument for teleology in Physics II.8. It then explores his use of teleological explanations in the biological works, distinguishing his practice when actually giving explanations from his theory of how these explanations work. It is argued that while the practical instances usually make good sense, the theoretical explanation which identifies telos with form is wholly misleading. This brings the discussion back to the very puzzling chapter 9 of Physics II, and thence to a consideration of the idea that absolutely everything in nature is for some purpose. There are places where Aristotle seems to endorse this, although a more sober view would also assign a role to what may be called ‘laws of matter’, independent of teleology. The essay ends with some general reflections on Aristotle’s view of explanation in the natural sciences.
David Bostock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286867
- eISBN:
- 9780191603532
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286868.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This essay argues that despite initial appearances, one can make good sense of Aristotle’s objections to Melissus (186a10-22), and one can find a comprehensible line of argument in the objections to ...
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This essay argues that despite initial appearances, one can make good sense of Aristotle’s objections to Melissus (186a10-22), and one can find a comprehensible line of argument in the objections to Parmenides that follow (186a22-b12). However, the final section of chapter 3, i.e. 186b12-187a11, remains obscure. It evidently refers to an argument of Zeno’s, but it is unclear how the discussion is supposed to be relevant to that argument. A conjecture is offered, but without much confidence.Less
This essay argues that despite initial appearances, one can make good sense of Aristotle’s objections to Melissus (186a10-22), and one can find a comprehensible line of argument in the objections to Parmenides that follow (186a22-b12). However, the final section of chapter 3, i.e. 186b12-187a11, remains obscure. It evidently refers to an argument of Zeno’s, but it is unclear how the discussion is supposed to be relevant to that argument. A conjecture is offered, but without much confidence.
David Bostock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286867
- eISBN:
- 9780191603532
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286868.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This essay argues that Aristotle misdescribes his own position when he sums it up as the claim that infinity can only be potential and never actual. He readily accepts that there are processes which ...
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This essay argues that Aristotle misdescribes his own position when he sums it up as the claim that infinity can only be potential and never actual. He readily accepts that there are processes which are actually infinite, that is, never-ending. But he denies that there can ever be a time when an infinite process has been completed. This means that he has to find some fault with Zeno’s well-known argument of Achilles and the tortoise, which he does by introducing the idea that points do not exist until they are ‘actualized’. It is argued that this idea, though ingenious and certainly appropriate to the problem, does not work out in the end.Less
This essay argues that Aristotle misdescribes his own position when he sums it up as the claim that infinity can only be potential and never actual. He readily accepts that there are processes which are actually infinite, that is, never-ending. But he denies that there can ever be a time when an infinite process has been completed. This means that he has to find some fault with Zeno’s well-known argument of Achilles and the tortoise, which he does by introducing the idea that points do not exist until they are ‘actualized’. It is argued that this idea, though ingenious and certainly appropriate to the problem, does not work out in the end.
David Bostock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286867
- eISBN:
- 9780191603532
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286868.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This brief note discusses a thesis due to Ben Morison: that Aristotle’s account of place can be rescued from the usual objections by accepting his claim that the universe as a whole is at rest, and ...
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This brief note discusses a thesis due to Ben Morison: that Aristotle’s account of place can be rescued from the usual objections by accepting his claim that the universe as a whole is at rest, and taking the relevant ‘surrounding body’ always to be the universe as a whole. It is argued that this defence does not work because the relevant body that Aristotle believes to be at rest is the earth, which is not (usually) a ‘surrounding’ body, but which should have played a crucial role in his account of place.Less
This brief note discusses a thesis due to Ben Morison: that Aristotle’s account of place can be rescued from the usual objections by accepting his claim that the universe as a whole is at rest, and taking the relevant ‘surrounding body’ always to be the universe as a whole. It is argued that this defence does not work because the relevant body that Aristotle believes to be at rest is the earth, which is not (usually) a ‘surrounding’ body, but which should have played a crucial role in his account of place.
David Bostock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286867
- eISBN:
- 9780191603532
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286868.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This essay says something about nearly every aspect of Aristotle’s discussion of time. The most difficult question of interpretation is what Aristotle might have meant by describing time as ‘a ...
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This essay says something about nearly every aspect of Aristotle’s discussion of time. The most difficult question of interpretation is what Aristotle might have meant by describing time as ‘a number’. The main question of evaluation is whether there really is any connection between time and motion. Both of these issues and many minor issues are addressed.Less
This essay says something about nearly every aspect of Aristotle’s discussion of time. The most difficult question of interpretation is what Aristotle might have meant by describing time as ‘a number’. The main question of evaluation is whether there really is any connection between time and motion. Both of these issues and many minor issues are addressed.
Alan M. Turing
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780198565932
- eISBN:
- 9780191714016
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198565932.003.0021
- Subject:
- Mathematics, History of Mathematics
This chapter presents Alan M. Turing's report, ‘Proposed Electronic Calculator’. The report was submitted to the Executive Committee of the National Physical Laboratory in February 1946, under the ...
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This chapter presents Alan M. Turing's report, ‘Proposed Electronic Calculator’. The report was submitted to the Executive Committee of the National Physical Laboratory in February 1946, under the description ‘Report by Dr. A. M. Turing on Proposals for the Development of an Automatic Computing Engine (ACE)’. The design set out in ‘Proposed Electronic Calculator’ was the basis for all the ACE computers.Less
This chapter presents Alan M. Turing's report, ‘Proposed Electronic Calculator’. The report was submitted to the Executive Committee of the National Physical Laboratory in February 1946, under the description ‘Report by Dr. A. M. Turing on Proposals for the Development of an Automatic Computing Engine (ACE)’. The design set out in ‘Proposed Electronic Calculator’ was the basis for all the ACE computers.
Thomas Johansen
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199289974
- eISBN:
- 9780191711008
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289974.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter examines Aristotle's claim that the soul is an inner principle of change, against the background of his account in the Physics of nature as an inner principle of change. That for ...
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This chapter examines Aristotle's claim that the soul is an inner principle of change, against the background of his account in the Physics of nature as an inner principle of change. That for Aristotle, the study of the soul is part of the study of nature is clear already from the opening lines of the De anima, where he announces that ‘knowledge of the soul seems to contribute greatly to all truth but most of all the truth in relation to nature: for the soul is such a thing as a principle of animals’. The study of the soul is valued, then, for its contribution to our knowledge of nature. The reason for that claim is in turn that the soul is such a thing as ‘a principle of animals’. Aristotle thinks that the soul really is a principle of animals. The ‘such as’ here serves rather to put epistemic distance to the claim: we do not yet know what it means for the soul to be a principle, so the vagueness is appropriate. The chapter seeks to overcome some of that vagueness.Less
This chapter examines Aristotle's claim that the soul is an inner principle of change, against the background of his account in the Physics of nature as an inner principle of change. That for Aristotle, the study of the soul is part of the study of nature is clear already from the opening lines of the De anima, where he announces that ‘knowledge of the soul seems to contribute greatly to all truth but most of all the truth in relation to nature: for the soul is such a thing as a principle of animals’. The study of the soul is valued, then, for its contribution to our knowledge of nature. The reason for that claim is in turn that the soul is such a thing as ‘a principle of animals’. Aristotle thinks that the soul really is a principle of animals. The ‘such as’ here serves rather to put epistemic distance to the claim: we do not yet know what it means for the soul to be a principle, so the vagueness is appropriate. The chapter seeks to overcome some of that vagueness.
Don S. Lemons
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262035903
- eISBN:
- 9780262338745
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262035903.001.0001
- Subject:
- Physics, History of Physics
Drawing Physics is a collection of 51 essays each one organized around a simple, informative, line drawing that conveys a key idea in the history of physics. The essays, each approximately 1000 words ...
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Drawing Physics is a collection of 51 essays each one organized around a simple, informative, line drawing that conveys a key idea in the history of physics. The essays, each approximately 1000 words long, are chronologically ordered from Thales, who around 600 BCE explained and used the principles of triangulation, to Peter Higgs, who received the Nobel Prize in 2012 for his prediction of the Higgs boson. The essays expand on the science conveyed in each drawing and place that science in a broader cultural context. The essays are grouped into five sections: Antiquity, Middle Ages, Early Modern Period, Nineteenth Century, and Twentieth Century and Beyond. Each essay stands alone and requires no background in physics or mathematics.Less
Drawing Physics is a collection of 51 essays each one organized around a simple, informative, line drawing that conveys a key idea in the history of physics. The essays, each approximately 1000 words long, are chronologically ordered from Thales, who around 600 BCE explained and used the principles of triangulation, to Peter Higgs, who received the Nobel Prize in 2012 for his prediction of the Higgs boson. The essays expand on the science conveyed in each drawing and place that science in a broader cultural context. The essays are grouped into five sections: Antiquity, Middle Ages, Early Modern Period, Nineteenth Century, and Twentieth Century and Beyond. Each essay stands alone and requires no background in physics or mathematics.
Gordon Fraser
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199208463
- eISBN:
- 9780191708954
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208463.001.0001
- Subject:
- Physics, History of Physics
This book presents a biography of Abdus Salam, the first Muslim to win a Nobel Prize for Science (Physics 1979), who was nevertheless excommunicated and branded as a heretic in his own country. His ...
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This book presents a biography of Abdus Salam, the first Muslim to win a Nobel Prize for Science (Physics 1979), who was nevertheless excommunicated and branded as a heretic in his own country. His achievements are often overlooked, even besmirched. Realizing that the whole world had to be his stage, he pioneered the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, a vital focus of Third World science which remains as his monument. A staunch Muslim, he was ashamed of the decline of science in the heritage of Islam, and struggled doggedly to restore it to its former glory. Undermined by his excommunication, these valiant efforts were doomed.Less
This book presents a biography of Abdus Salam, the first Muslim to win a Nobel Prize for Science (Physics 1979), who was nevertheless excommunicated and branded as a heretic in his own country. His achievements are often overlooked, even besmirched. Realizing that the whole world had to be his stage, he pioneered the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, a vital focus of Third World science which remains as his monument. A staunch Muslim, he was ashamed of the decline of science in the heritage of Islam, and struggled doggedly to restore it to its former glory. Undermined by his excommunication, these valiant efforts were doomed.
Martin Shubik and Eric Smith
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780262034630
- eISBN:
- 9780262337540
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262034630.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Econometrics
This book is devoted to the study of the guidance, control and coordination problems of an enterprise economy. Our basic approach requires an understanding of the roles of money and financial ...
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This book is devoted to the study of the guidance, control and coordination problems of an enterprise economy. Our basic approach requires an understanding of the roles of money and financial institutions. Our viewpoint differs from most current approaches in stressing together specifically game theory, methods of physics and experimental gaming; together with and more generally a broader evolutionary approach from the biological and other behavioural sciences. Our intended audiences are economists, physicists, experimental gamers, accounting theorists , legal scholars and other behavioural scientists willing to explore beyond their own specialist disciplines. Our biases run primarily to an exposition most congenial to economists, experimental gamers and physicists, but we aim to have all basic concepts understandable regardless of technical background. A mathematically precise unification of Walrasian general equilibrium with macroeconomic dynamics and Schumpeterian innovation is provided utilizing strategic market games.Less
This book is devoted to the study of the guidance, control and coordination problems of an enterprise economy. Our basic approach requires an understanding of the roles of money and financial institutions. Our viewpoint differs from most current approaches in stressing together specifically game theory, methods of physics and experimental gaming; together with and more generally a broader evolutionary approach from the biological and other behavioural sciences. Our intended audiences are economists, physicists, experimental gamers, accounting theorists , legal scholars and other behavioural scientists willing to explore beyond their own specialist disciplines. Our biases run primarily to an exposition most congenial to economists, experimental gamers and physicists, but we aim to have all basic concepts understandable regardless of technical background. A mathematically precise unification of Walrasian general equilibrium with macroeconomic dynamics and Schumpeterian innovation is provided utilizing strategic market games.
Richard Cross
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198269748
- eISBN:
- 9780191683787
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269748.003.0011
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Theology
This chapter discusses different conceptions of time and place. It starts by labeling Aristotle's conceptions of place in Physics and Categories. ...
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This chapter discusses different conceptions of time and place. It starts by labeling Aristotle's conceptions of place in Physics and Categories. It names the Physics conception as ‘place’ and the Categories conception as ‘space’. The first section of the chapter investigates Scotu's account of place using Physics. He uses the terms ubiteas and locus for place. The second section looks at the nearly identical terminology found in the Categories. Despite not finding a three-dimensional conception of space in the Categories, Scotus was able to develop such an account. In the third section, his account of the void is examined. The fourth section examines his attempts to develop an account of three-dimensional space, from an exegesis of Aristotle's claim in Physics that place is immobile.Less
This chapter discusses different conceptions of time and place. It starts by labeling Aristotle's conceptions of place in Physics and Categories. It names the Physics conception as ‘place’ and the Categories conception as ‘space’. The first section of the chapter investigates Scotu's account of place using Physics. He uses the terms ubiteas and locus for place. The second section looks at the nearly identical terminology found in the Categories. Despite not finding a three-dimensional conception of space in the Categories, Scotus was able to develop such an account. In the third section, his account of the void is examined. The fourth section examines his attempts to develop an account of three-dimensional space, from an exegesis of Aristotle's claim in Physics that place is immobile.
Daniel W. Graham
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198243151
- eISBN:
- 9780191680649
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243151.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter presented how the problematic of Physics i and Aristotle's prior philosophic positions and certain ‘facts’ generate a conception of form and matter. Aristotle sets himself the task of ...
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This chapter presented how the problematic of Physics i and Aristotle's prior philosophic positions and certain ‘facts’ generate a conception of form and matter. Aristotle sets himself the task of giving a general account of change, one which will be proof against the Eleatic challenge. He appeals to his One Under Many principle, which perhaps embodied the most basic insight on his S1 ontology. The development of hylomorphism can be traced from the S1 conception of substance. This chapter argues that there may be no development at all. Aristotle always had a theory of matter and only formally introduces it in Physics i. His predecessors also already had the concept of matter. Hence, it is arbitrary to suppose that he did not inherit the notion.Less
This chapter presented how the problematic of Physics i and Aristotle's prior philosophic positions and certain ‘facts’ generate a conception of form and matter. Aristotle sets himself the task of giving a general account of change, one which will be proof against the Eleatic challenge. He appeals to his One Under Many principle, which perhaps embodied the most basic insight on his S1 ontology. The development of hylomorphism can be traced from the S1 conception of substance. This chapter argues that there may be no development at all. Aristotle always had a theory of matter and only formally introduces it in Physics i. His predecessors also already had the concept of matter. Hence, it is arbitrary to suppose that he did not inherit the notion.
Michael J. White
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198239529
- eISBN:
- 9780191679940
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239529.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter further explores various metaphysical features of Aristotle's discussion of time and local motion, as well as the relation between these metaphysical features and the formal, structural ...
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This chapter further explores various metaphysical features of Aristotle's discussion of time and local motion, as well as the relation between these metaphysical features and the formal, structural properties of continuous magnitudes. In Aristotle's view, a stretch of time is not formed by a dense and Dedekind-continuous linear array of instants. His ontology of time is that of ‘foundationless’ intervals. The first section pursues the Aristotelian metaphysics of time, distinguishing a topological and a metrical component of his account of time in the last part of Book 4 of the Physics. The second section turns to Aristotle's metaphysical analysis of local motion, looking at the formulaic metaphysical account of kinēseis, and the Aristotelian identity conditions for local motions.Less
This chapter further explores various metaphysical features of Aristotle's discussion of time and local motion, as well as the relation between these metaphysical features and the formal, structural properties of continuous magnitudes. In Aristotle's view, a stretch of time is not formed by a dense and Dedekind-continuous linear array of instants. His ontology of time is that of ‘foundationless’ intervals. The first section pursues the Aristotelian metaphysics of time, distinguishing a topological and a metrical component of his account of time in the last part of Book 4 of the Physics. The second section turns to Aristotle's metaphysical analysis of local motion, looking at the formulaic metaphysical account of kinēseis, and the Aristotelian identity conditions for local motions.
Sarah Waterlow
- Published in print:
- 1982
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198246534
- eISBN:
- 9780191680984
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246534.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Having examined the concept of nature as a principle of change, this chapter now turns to change itself. Aristotle’s use of ‘μεταβολή’ expresses his determination to let nothing that could be called ...
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Having examined the concept of nature as a principle of change, this chapter now turns to change itself. Aristotle’s use of ‘μεταβολή’ expresses his determination to let nothing that could be called change from one state to another fall outside the net of the definition he is about to propose; whereas ‘κίνησις’ is symptomatic of a restriction controlling his entire approach to the concept of change. He says that changes are to be exhaustively classified in terms of the categories: the categories and categories alone determine all the respects in which change is possible. What better evidence of Aristotle’s aim that his definition should be fully comprehensive? But there are more ways than one of dividing the class of changes: there can be division, for instance, in terms of cause as well as in terms of respect. Some changes are from the natures of substances, some from conscious purpose, some from neither. And just a proper concern for comprehensiveness leads him to take account of each categorically determinate type of change, so it should deter him from concentrating exclusively on changes caused in one of several possible ways. But it is argued that this is precisely what does not happen in Physics III. Here, Aristotle has come to consider change in general because of his interest in nature, since change is that of which nature is the inner principle.Less
Having examined the concept of nature as a principle of change, this chapter now turns to change itself. Aristotle’s use of ‘μεταβολή’ expresses his determination to let nothing that could be called change from one state to another fall outside the net of the definition he is about to propose; whereas ‘κίνησις’ is symptomatic of a restriction controlling his entire approach to the concept of change. He says that changes are to be exhaustively classified in terms of the categories: the categories and categories alone determine all the respects in which change is possible. What better evidence of Aristotle’s aim that his definition should be fully comprehensive? But there are more ways than one of dividing the class of changes: there can be division, for instance, in terms of cause as well as in terms of respect. Some changes are from the natures of substances, some from conscious purpose, some from neither. And just a proper concern for comprehensiveness leads him to take account of each categorically determinate type of change, so it should deter him from concentrating exclusively on changes caused in one of several possible ways. But it is argued that this is precisely what does not happen in Physics III. Here, Aristotle has come to consider change in general because of his interest in nature, since change is that of which nature is the inner principle.
