Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195151886
- eISBN:
- 9780199867189
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195151887.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Explores the metaphysical question of the relation between reality and human perceptions, thoughts and beliefs with reference to colours. Posits an absolute independent reality of which knowledge is ...
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Explores the metaphysical question of the relation between reality and human perceptions, thoughts and beliefs with reference to colours. Posits an absolute independent reality of which knowledge is sought through the testing of beliefs about it, and analyses physicalism and scientific explanation in an attempt to argue that, though colour's reality may be rejected, colour cannot be properly referred to or explained through exclusive reference to scientific facts and physicalism or through the language of science since colour is understood as belonging to the realm of psychological facts. Utilises the concepts of perception, thoughts and beliefs in investigating psychological facts, and rejects the possibility of both a direct and an indirect connection between objects of perception and thoughts on the colour of these objects. Presents the argument that the metaphysical question cannot be fully answered in a subjectivist or objectivist manner or through metaphysical error theory, as abstraction from all beliefs about colour is neither possible nor desirable, and outlines the failure of the project of unmasking perceptions of colour. Concludes that disengagement from the world is needed for an answer to the metaphysical question of whether colours are objectively real, but the answer is unattainable.Less
Explores the metaphysical question of the relation between reality and human perceptions, thoughts and beliefs with reference to colours. Posits an absolute independent reality of which knowledge is sought through the testing of beliefs about it, and analyses physicalism and scientific explanation in an attempt to argue that, though colour's reality may be rejected, colour cannot be properly referred to or explained through exclusive reference to scientific facts and physicalism or through the language of science since colour is understood as belonging to the realm of psychological facts. Utilises the concepts of perception, thoughts and beliefs in investigating psychological facts, and rejects the possibility of both a direct and an indirect connection between objects of perception and thoughts on the colour of these objects. Presents the argument that the metaphysical question cannot be fully answered in a subjectivist or objectivist manner or through metaphysical error theory, as abstraction from all beliefs about colour is neither possible nor desirable, and outlines the failure of the project of unmasking perceptions of colour. Concludes that disengagement from the world is needed for an answer to the metaphysical question of whether colours are objectively real, but the answer is unattainable.
Phillip Wiebe
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195140125
- eISBN:
- 9780199835492
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195140125.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter examines several challenges coming from naturalistic perspectives to the thesis of this book, including: (a) the view of J. J. C. Smart, who claims that naturalism (or physicalism) is ...
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This chapter examines several challenges coming from naturalistic perspectives to the thesis of this book, including: (a) the view of J. J. C. Smart, who claims that naturalism (or physicalism) is capable of providing explanations for all significant events to date, and that whatever is not now successfully explained, in a short time will be; (b) the view of Donald Wiebe and others who claim that the language of religion is mythopoeic and consequently not suitable for description and explanation in ways that resemble the language of cognitive discourse, including science; and (c) the claim of Kai Nielsen and others that the claims of Judaeo-Christian faith are inconsistent with one another and consequently are not capable of rational assessment. The reconstructed theory of religion advanced in earlier chapters is shown to be capable of overcoming these difficulties.Less
This chapter examines several challenges coming from naturalistic perspectives to the thesis of this book, including: (a) the view of J. J. C. Smart, who claims that naturalism (or physicalism) is capable of providing explanations for all significant events to date, and that whatever is not now successfully explained, in a short time will be; (b) the view of Donald Wiebe and others who claim that the language of religion is mythopoeic and consequently not suitable for description and explanation in ways that resemble the language of cognitive discourse, including science; and (c) the claim of Kai Nielsen and others that the claims of Judaeo-Christian faith are inconsistent with one another and consequently are not capable of rational assessment. The reconstructed theory of religion advanced in earlier chapters is shown to be capable of overcoming these difficulties.
Brian Davies
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198267539
- eISBN:
- 9780191600500
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198267533.003.0011
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Thomas Aquinas maintains that we share in the life of the Trinity as human beings, and in order to grasp the implications of that notion, this chapter examines what he thinks human beings are. First, ...
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Thomas Aquinas maintains that we share in the life of the Trinity as human beings, and in order to grasp the implications of that notion, this chapter examines what he thinks human beings are. First, it looks at the concepts of Dualism (Descartes’ view that people are composed of a separate mind and body) and Physicalism (which says that people are made up of one kind of matter – or body – and that this includes the mind, or mental processes), and concludes that Aquinas occupied a viewpoint between these two extremes. Next, it looks at the position that he held on people as having both soul and body, which he does not treat as distinct things, but nevertheless feels obliged to distinguish. Following on from this, Aquinas’ thinking on death and the soul is examined. The last part of the chapter looks at desire and action; here, Aquinas is shown to treat human action both as voluntary (free) and as occurring on the basis of dispositions, which are determined by past events and by choice.Less
Thomas Aquinas maintains that we share in the life of the Trinity as human beings, and in order to grasp the implications of that notion, this chapter examines what he thinks human beings are. First, it looks at the concepts of Dualism (Descartes’ view that people are composed of a separate mind and body) and Physicalism (which says that people are made up of one kind of matter – or body – and that this includes the mind, or mental processes), and concludes that Aquinas occupied a viewpoint between these two extremes. Next, it looks at the position that he held on people as having both soul and body, which he does not treat as distinct things, but nevertheless feels obliged to distinguish. Following on from this, Aquinas’ thinking on death and the soul is examined. The last part of the chapter looks at desire and action; here, Aquinas is shown to treat human action both as voluntary (free) and as occurring on the basis of dispositions, which are determined by past events and by choice.
Jerry L. Walls
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199732296
- eISBN:
- 9780199918492
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199732296.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
The doctrine of purgatory raises distinctive issues of personal identity since it assumes conscious survival between death and resurrection. This survival must be sufficient to make sense of the ...
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The doctrine of purgatory raises distinctive issues of personal identity since it assumes conscious survival between death and resurrection. This survival must be sufficient to make sense of the subject undergoing punishment, discipline, and/or moral and spiritual growth, depending on how one conceives of purgatory. This chapter examines materialist, Thomist, and substance dualist accounts of personal identity in light of the doctrine of purgatory. It also explores arguments that significant moral change, including change between death and resurrection, requires time if the personal identity of the one undergoing that change is to maintain identity.Less
The doctrine of purgatory raises distinctive issues of personal identity since it assumes conscious survival between death and resurrection. This survival must be sufficient to make sense of the subject undergoing punishment, discipline, and/or moral and spiritual growth, depending on how one conceives of purgatory. This chapter examines materialist, Thomist, and substance dualist accounts of personal identity in light of the doctrine of purgatory. It also explores arguments that significant moral change, including change between death and resurrection, requires time if the personal identity of the one undergoing that change is to maintain identity.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195151886
- eISBN:
- 9780199867189
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195151887.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Outlines the philosophical quest for reality, and how humans are related to the real world through perceptions, thoughts and beliefs. A discussion of what constitutes a metaphysical question is ...
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Outlines the philosophical quest for reality, and how humans are related to the real world through perceptions, thoughts and beliefs. A discussion of what constitutes a metaphysical question is followed by a brief outline of certain philosophers’ ideas on reality through history, focusing on causality, subjectivity and objectivity, physicalism (or materialism) and giving a critique of correspondence theory. Introduces the subject of whether certain ideas, such as colours and morality, are real both as human perceptions and in a correspondent reality.Less
Outlines the philosophical quest for reality, and how humans are related to the real world through perceptions, thoughts and beliefs. A discussion of what constitutes a metaphysical question is followed by a brief outline of certain philosophers’ ideas on reality through history, focusing on causality, subjectivity and objectivity, physicalism (or materialism) and giving a critique of correspondence theory. Introduces the subject of whether certain ideas, such as colours and morality, are real both as human perceptions and in a correspondent reality.
Henri-Jérôme Gagey
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780823257522
- eISBN:
- 9780823261567
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823257522.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Systematic theologian Henri-Jérôme Gagey argues that the postmodern awareness of cultural plurality and the radical historicity of our moral values render any appeal to nature suspicious. Based on ...
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Systematic theologian Henri-Jérôme Gagey argues that the postmodern awareness of cultural plurality and the radical historicity of our moral values render any appeal to nature suspicious. Based on “In Search of a Universal Ethic: A New Look at the Natural Law” (2009), a document of the International Theological Commission, he exams to what extent to which, and the conditions under which, this concept can prove relevant in the postmodern context. Although its authors are distancing themselves from the ‘modern rationalist approach’ and its essentialist belief in human nature, Gagey formulates a twofold challenge for the document: the move away from a physicalist conception of natural law as identical with biological laws on the one hand calls for more explicit attention for the essentially social and historical character of human nature and, on the other hand, demands an approach which presents natural law thinking less as a scientific enterprise than as an initiation into wisdom.Less
Systematic theologian Henri-Jérôme Gagey argues that the postmodern awareness of cultural plurality and the radical historicity of our moral values render any appeal to nature suspicious. Based on “In Search of a Universal Ethic: A New Look at the Natural Law” (2009), a document of the International Theological Commission, he exams to what extent to which, and the conditions under which, this concept can prove relevant in the postmodern context. Although its authors are distancing themselves from the ‘modern rationalist approach’ and its essentialist belief in human nature, Gagey formulates a twofold challenge for the document: the move away from a physicalist conception of natural law as identical with biological laws on the one hand calls for more explicit attention for the essentially social and historical character of human nature and, on the other hand, demands an approach which presents natural law thinking less as a scientific enterprise than as an initiation into wisdom.
Naomi Scheman
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780195395112
- eISBN:
- 9780190267483
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780195395112.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This chapter makes the argument against the theory that all causality is physical causality. Physicalism is set forth as the ontological basis of mental phenomena, disregarding the fact that while a ...
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This chapter makes the argument against the theory that all causality is physical causality. Physicalism is set forth as the ontological basis of mental phenomena, disregarding the fact that while a physical event may indeed cause a reaction that produces a mental event, the argument fails to note that not all mental responses arising from that event can be attributed to physics alone. Mental phenomena are caused by social constructs, which can account for attitudes, desires, beliefs, emotions, and so on.Less
This chapter makes the argument against the theory that all causality is physical causality. Physicalism is set forth as the ontological basis of mental phenomena, disregarding the fact that while a physical event may indeed cause a reaction that produces a mental event, the argument fails to note that not all mental responses arising from that event can be attributed to physics alone. Mental phenomena are caused by social constructs, which can account for attitudes, desires, beliefs, emotions, and so on.
