Omar W. Nasim
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780226084374
- eISBN:
- 9780226084404
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226084404.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
With a detailed study of the procedures of the young American astronomer, E. P. Mason (in part 1) and the celebrated English scientist, Sir John F. W. Herschel (in part 2), chapter 3 is focused on ...
More
With a detailed study of the procedures of the young American astronomer, E. P. Mason (in part 1) and the celebrated English scientist, Sir John F. W. Herschel (in part 2), chapter 3 is focused on the relationship between conception and perception, particularly in the context of bringing to bear the numerical into the production of the pictorial representations of the nebulae. In the work of both Mason and Herschel, conceptions are used to prepare sheets of paper in order to receive and fix visual inscriptions. For both, these preparations derive from cartographical practices, but it is only in the work of Herschel that the motives and the structure of the observational records spring from an empiricist notion of the “constructive activity” of the mind (a philosophical notion formulated in contrast to William Whewell’s and Sir W. R. Hamilton’s apriorism).Less
With a detailed study of the procedures of the young American astronomer, E. P. Mason (in part 1) and the celebrated English scientist, Sir John F. W. Herschel (in part 2), chapter 3 is focused on the relationship between conception and perception, particularly in the context of bringing to bear the numerical into the production of the pictorial representations of the nebulae. In the work of both Mason and Herschel, conceptions are used to prepare sheets of paper in order to receive and fix visual inscriptions. For both, these preparations derive from cartographical practices, but it is only in the work of Herschel that the motives and the structure of the observational records spring from an empiricist notion of the “constructive activity” of the mind (a philosophical notion formulated in contrast to William Whewell’s and Sir W. R. Hamilton’s apriorism).
Zed Adams and Jacob Browning (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780262035248
- eISBN:
- 9780262335850
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262035248.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
In his work, the philosopher John Haugeland (1945–2010) proposed a radical expansion of philosophy’s conceptual toolkit, calling for a wider range of resources for understanding the mind, the world, ...
More
In his work, the philosopher John Haugeland (1945–2010) proposed a radical expansion of philosophy’s conceptual toolkit, calling for a wider range of resources for understanding the mind, the world, and how they relate. Haugeland argued that “giving a damn” is essential for having a mind, and suggested that traditional approaches to cognitive science mistakenly overlook the relevance of caring to the understanding of mindedness. Haugeland’s determination to expand philosophy’s array of concepts led him to write on a wide variety of subjects that may seem unrelated—from topics in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to examinations of such figures as Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger, and Thomas Kuhn. Haugeland’s two books with the MIT Press, Artificial Intelligence and Mind Design, show the range of his interests.
This book offers a collection of essays in conversation with Haugeland’s work. The essays, by prominent scholars, extend Haugeland’s work on a range of contemporary topics in philosophy of mind—from questions about intentionality to issues concerning objectivity and truth to the work of Heidegger. Giving a Damn also includes a previously unpublished paper by Haugeland, “Two Dogmas of Rationalism,” as well as critical responses to it. Finally, an appendix offers Haugeland’s outline of Kant’s "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.”Less
In his work, the philosopher John Haugeland (1945–2010) proposed a radical expansion of philosophy’s conceptual toolkit, calling for a wider range of resources for understanding the mind, the world, and how they relate. Haugeland argued that “giving a damn” is essential for having a mind, and suggested that traditional approaches to cognitive science mistakenly overlook the relevance of caring to the understanding of mindedness. Haugeland’s determination to expand philosophy’s array of concepts led him to write on a wide variety of subjects that may seem unrelated—from topics in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to examinations of such figures as Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger, and Thomas Kuhn. Haugeland’s two books with the MIT Press, Artificial Intelligence and Mind Design, show the range of his interests.
This book offers a collection of essays in conversation with Haugeland’s work. The essays, by prominent scholars, extend Haugeland’s work on a range of contemporary topics in philosophy of mind—from questions about intentionality to issues concerning objectivity and truth to the work of Heidegger. Giving a Damn also includes a previously unpublished paper by Haugeland, “Two Dogmas of Rationalism,” as well as critical responses to it. Finally, an appendix offers Haugeland’s outline of Kant’s "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.”
Jonathan Knowles and Thomas Raleigh (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- December 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198803461
- eISBN:
- 9780191841644
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198803461.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Bertrand Russell famously distinguished between ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance’ and ‘Knowledge by Description’. For much of the latter half of the Twentieth Century, many philosophers viewed the notion ...
More
Bertrand Russell famously distinguished between ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance’ and ‘Knowledge by Description’. For much of the latter half of the Twentieth Century, many philosophers viewed the notion of acquaintance with suspicion, associating it with Russellian ideas that they would wish to reject. However in the past decade or two the concept has undergone a striking revival in mainstream ‘analytic’ philosophy – acquaintance is, it seems, respectable again. This is the first collection of new essays devoted to the topic of acquaintance, featuring contributions from many of the world’s leading experts in this area. The volume showcases the great variety of topics in philosophy of mind, epistemology and philosophy of language for which philosophers are currently employing the notion of acquaintance. This book features an extensive introduction by one of the editors, which provides some historical background as well as summarising the main debates and issues in contemporary philosophy where appeals to acquaintance are currently being made. The remaining thirteen essays are grouped thematically into the following four sections: (1) Phenomenal Consciousness, (2) Perceptual Experience, (3) Reference, (4) Epistemology.Less
Bertrand Russell famously distinguished between ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance’ and ‘Knowledge by Description’. For much of the latter half of the Twentieth Century, many philosophers viewed the notion of acquaintance with suspicion, associating it with Russellian ideas that they would wish to reject. However in the past decade or two the concept has undergone a striking revival in mainstream ‘analytic’ philosophy – acquaintance is, it seems, respectable again. This is the first collection of new essays devoted to the topic of acquaintance, featuring contributions from many of the world’s leading experts in this area. The volume showcases the great variety of topics in philosophy of mind, epistemology and philosophy of language for which philosophers are currently employing the notion of acquaintance. This book features an extensive introduction by one of the editors, which provides some historical background as well as summarising the main debates and issues in contemporary philosophy where appeals to acquaintance are currently being made. The remaining thirteen essays are grouped thematically into the following four sections: (1) Phenomenal Consciousness, (2) Perceptual Experience, (3) Reference, (4) Epistemology.
Alexandre Matheron
Filippo Del Lucchese, David Maruzzella, and Gil Morejón (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- September 2021
- ISBN:
- 9781474440103
- eISBN:
- 9781474484961
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474440103.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Alexandre Matheron (1926–2020) worked and wrote substantially on the 17th century philosopher Benedict de Spinoza beginning with the publication of his influential 1969 masterpiece Individu et ...
More
Alexandre Matheron (1926–2020) worked and wrote substantially on the 17th century philosopher Benedict de Spinoza beginning with the publication of his influential 1969 masterpiece Individu et communauté chez Spinoza. Widely considered one of the most important and original interpreters of Spinoza’s philosophy in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, but whose work was rarely translated into English, the 20 essays gathered here span the entirety of Matheron’s prolific career and present to the Anglophone the first collection of its kind outside of France. From texts on Spinoza’s epistemology and metaphysics to his signature interpretation of Spinoza’s political philosophy, Matheron’s work touches on every imaginable theme in the Spinozist corpus from Spinoza’s views on sexuality to his relationship to his predecessors, contemporaries, and inheritors such as Aquinas, Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Rousseau to Spinoza’s latent communism and importance for the development of Spinozist Marxism in France. Complete with a substantial interview conducted by two of Matheron’s best known students, Laurent Bove and Pierre-François Moreau, and a comprehensive bibliography of Matheron’s publications, this is a crucial collection for anyone seeking to understand 20th-century continental Spinozism. Whether it be the established scholar looking for translations of difficult to find essays or the advanced undergraduate or graduate student in search of reliable secondary literature on Spinoza, this volume is the perfect introduction to Matheron’s rigorous, masterful, and original interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy.Less
Alexandre Matheron (1926–2020) worked and wrote substantially on the 17th century philosopher Benedict de Spinoza beginning with the publication of his influential 1969 masterpiece Individu et communauté chez Spinoza. Widely considered one of the most important and original interpreters of Spinoza’s philosophy in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, but whose work was rarely translated into English, the 20 essays gathered here span the entirety of Matheron’s prolific career and present to the Anglophone the first collection of its kind outside of France. From texts on Spinoza’s epistemology and metaphysics to his signature interpretation of Spinoza’s political philosophy, Matheron’s work touches on every imaginable theme in the Spinozist corpus from Spinoza’s views on sexuality to his relationship to his predecessors, contemporaries, and inheritors such as Aquinas, Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Rousseau to Spinoza’s latent communism and importance for the development of Spinozist Marxism in France. Complete with a substantial interview conducted by two of Matheron’s best known students, Laurent Bove and Pierre-François Moreau, and a comprehensive bibliography of Matheron’s publications, this is a crucial collection for anyone seeking to understand 20th-century continental Spinozism. Whether it be the established scholar looking for translations of difficult to find essays or the advanced undergraduate or graduate student in search of reliable secondary literature on Spinoza, this volume is the perfect introduction to Matheron’s rigorous, masterful, and original interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy.
Alexandre Matheron
Filippo Del Lucchese, David Maruzzella, and Gil Morejón (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- September 2021
- ISBN:
- 9781474440103
- eISBN:
- 9781474484961
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474440103.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Despite an apparent contradiction between Spinoza’s claims in the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione and the Ethics concerning the nature of knowledge and certainty, Matheron here argues for the ...
More
Despite an apparent contradiction between Spinoza’s claims in the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione and the Ethics concerning the nature of knowledge and certainty, Matheron here argues for the consistency of Spinoza’s epistemological position. To have a true idea is at the same time to be certain of the truth of the idea even if, from a psychological point of view, certainty appears to be a secondary acquisition that arises after the initial moment of knowing. Those who doubt the certainty necessarily associated with true ideas do not ultimately acquire any new knowledge upon eliminating their doubts for, as Matheron shows, Spinoza’s use of the term prius or first, in both texts, has a chronological and logical sense. Knowledge of knowledge is therefore present at the moment of knowing whether one knows it or not. Moreover, science can proceed without being grounded in epistemology, even if the latter can eventually come to serve and clarify the former.Less
Despite an apparent contradiction between Spinoza’s claims in the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione and the Ethics concerning the nature of knowledge and certainty, Matheron here argues for the consistency of Spinoza’s epistemological position. To have a true idea is at the same time to be certain of the truth of the idea even if, from a psychological point of view, certainty appears to be a secondary acquisition that arises after the initial moment of knowing. Those who doubt the certainty necessarily associated with true ideas do not ultimately acquire any new knowledge upon eliminating their doubts for, as Matheron shows, Spinoza’s use of the term prius or first, in both texts, has a chronological and logical sense. Knowledge of knowledge is therefore present at the moment of knowing whether one knows it or not. Moreover, science can proceed without being grounded in epistemology, even if the latter can eventually come to serve and clarify the former.
