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Recent Skepticism about Absolute Goodness

Richard Kraut

in Against Absolute Goodness

This chapter focuses on how others have also arrived at a skeptical conclusion about absolute goodness, although the route by which this book comes to that conclusion is different from those that ... More

This chapter focuses on how others have also arrived at a skeptical conclusion about absolute goodness, although the route by which this book comes to that conclusion is different from those that others have taken. This chapter states that doubts may not have occurred to the author had he not read some other authors. The chapter acknowledges a debt to them and calls attention to the ways in which this book's approach to this subject differs from theirs. These authors include P. T. Geach, Philippa Foot, Judith Jarvis Thomson, and T. M. Scanlon.Less

The Trolley Problem

F. M. Kamm

in Morality, Mortality Volume II: Rights, Duties, and Status

Part I considered how to determine whether there is a moral difference between killing and letting die per se, but in the two chapters of Part II, the consideration is when it is and when it is not ... More

Part I considered how to determine whether there is a moral difference between killing and letting die per se, but in the two chapters of Part II, the consideration is when it is and when it is not permissible to kill some to save others. Ch. 6 first examines in some detail the arguments John Harris has made for a survival lottery (where we may select from among healthy people the one who will die to save another or who will share a fair risk of death with another), and considers a very limited context in which a curtailed survival lottery might be installed. The rest of the chapter is devoted to consideration of the many attempts to solve the problem of why we may not ordinarily kill one to save more (as in the Transplant Case, where a non‐consequentialist would believe that we may not chop up one innocent non‐threatening person, who would not otherwise die, to transplant his organs into a greater number of people in order to save their lives) but may kill via redirection of threats (as in the Trolley Case, where there is a choice between killing one or killing a greater number by turning/redirecting, or failing to turn/redirect, a runaway trolley). These attempts include the views of Philippa Foot, proponents of the Doctrine of Double Effect (e.g. Michael Costa), Warren Quinn, James Montmarquet, Judith Thomson, and Bruce Russell. A detailed examination is also made of whether the notion of ‘being already involved’ is a moral notion or can be given a non‐moral description.Less

Reason, Authority, and Friendship

John Finnis

in Reason in Action: Collected Essays Volume I

The first section of this chapter engages with Hart and Kelsen on the method of legal theory, in a close dialectic with Aristotle's method in his Politics, especially his identification of central ... More

The first section of this chapter engages with Hart and Kelsen on the method of legal theory, in a close dialectic with Aristotle's method in his Politics, especially his identification of central and secondary cases of social realities, and his grounds for attributing centrality or non-centrality. Exploration of Aristotle's appeal to the standards of the morally sound person leads to the second section, examining the course of 20th-century English moral philosophy through the eyes of Geoffrey Warnock, and with special reference to Philippa Foot (whose comment on the chapter is the subject of a long endnote). Friendship, it is argued, carries us beyond the contrast between egoistic flourishing and justice, though Aristotle's account of friendship has its difficulties, too. Recognition of legal obligation is, centrally, appreciation of one's moral obligation.Less

Biology and Ethics

Philip Kitcher

David Copp (ed.)

in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

This chapter outlines three programs that aim to use biological insights in support of philosophical positions in ethics: Aristotelian approaches found, for example, in Thomas Hurka and Philippa ... More

This chapter outlines three programs that aim to use biological insights in support of philosophical positions in ethics: Aristotelian approaches found, for example, in Thomas Hurka and Philippa Foot; Humean approaches found in Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard; and biologically grounded approaches found in of Elliott Sober and Brian Skyrms. The first two approaches begin with a philosophical view, and seek support for it in biology. The third approach begins with biology, and uses it to illuminate the status of morality. This chapter pursues a version of the third program. A major accomplishment of evolutionary biology has been the explanation of biological altruism, which opens the door to a similar explanation of psychological altruism, or “fellow-feeling.” The chapter conjectures that humans have evolved a capacity for normative governance by socially shared rules. A process of cultural evolution led to the social rules with which we are familiar. This genealogical story poses a challenge, for the idea of moral truth plays no role in it. The story therefore lends support to non-cognitivism or anti-realist expressivism. The chapter concludes by exploring the implications of the genealogical story for moral knowledge, moral objectivity, and the idea of moral authority.Less

The Virtues Benefit Their Possessor

Rosalind Hursthouse

in On Virtue Ethics

Some familiar objections to the very idea that the virtues benefit their possessor can be quickly cleared away. When we consider the claim in the context of bringing up our own children or reflexion ... More

Some familiar objections to the very idea that the virtues benefit their possessor can be quickly cleared away. When we consider the claim in the context of bringing up our own children or reflexion on our own lives, rather than in the context of trying to convince the wicked or the moral sceptic, we believe it. According to Phillips and McDowell, we believe it in so far as we are virtuous, because we have special conceptions of eudaimonia, benefit, harm, and loss, which guarantees its truth. But we also believe it on the basis of the sort of ethical, but non‐evaluative beliefs about human nature cited by Hare and Foot.Less

Moral Rationalism

Russ Shafer-Landau

in Moral Realism: A Defence

Defends the idea that moral facts constitute excellent reasons for action, regardless of one's antecedent commitments. Provides some presumptive support for this claim, and then proceeds to criticize ... More

Defends the idea that moral facts constitute excellent reasons for action, regardless of one's antecedent commitments. Provides some presumptive support for this claim, and then proceeds to criticize the best arguments against moral rationalism (the idea that moral duties entail powerful reasons for action), including a prominent argument by Philippa Foot. Ends by arguing that the idea of intrinsic normativity is not as implausible as many have thought.Less

The Carus Lectures on the Conception of Value

Paul Grice

in The Conception of Value

This chapter discusses Grice's three Carus lectures on value and objectivity, relative and absolute value, and metaphysics and value. The lecture on value and objectivity investigates the conception ... More

This chapter discusses Grice's three Carus lectures on value and objectivity, relative and absolute value, and metaphysics and value. The lecture on value and objectivity investigates the conception of value by addressing questions about objectivity in this region and the relation of such questions to questions about scepticism. It considers the ideas of two anti-objectivists: J. L. Mackie and Philippa Foot. The lecture on relative and absolute value considers the assertion that Mackie's denial of objective values that is tantamount to a denial that there are any absolutely action-directing values, despite what may be claimed in ordinary moral judgements. The lecture on metaphysics and value explores the possibility of providing some kind of metaphysical account of, and positive backing for, the notion of value.Less

Naturalism

Rosalind Hursthouse

in On Virtue Ethics

Virtues are those character traits that make a human being a good human being— those traits that human beings need to live well as human beings, to live a characteristically human life. Ethical ... More

Virtues are those character traits that make a human being a good human being— those traits that human beings need to live well as human beings, to live a characteristically human life. Ethical evaluations of human beings as good or bad are taken to be analogous to evaluations of other living things as good or bad specimens of their kind, as Foot has argued. This naturalism reveals that several features of ethical evaluation thought to be peculiar to it, and inimical to its objectivity, are present in the quasi‐scientific evaluation, even of plants.Less

Moral dilemmas

Allyn Fives

in Evaluating Parental Power: An Exercise in Pluralist Political Theory

The argument of this chapter is that we can be faced with genuine, real moral dilemmas, that is, moral conflicts for which there is no general rule for their resolution and conflicts that leave us ... More

The argument of this chapter is that we can be faced with genuine, real moral dilemmas, that is, moral conflicts for which there is no general rule for their resolution and conflicts that leave us with moral regret at the item not acted upon. For example, there is a moral conflict involved in every act of parental paternalism. When I, as a parent, act paternalistically, in attempting to do what is best for my child I violate a moral rule in regard to my child. In making this argument, I reject Philippa Foot’s counter arguments claiming to show the moral dilemmas are a logical contradiction. If we cannot identify a general rule for their resolution, how can we resolve moral conflicts? In this chapter I try to show that we can do so through practical reasoning and practical judgement. In doing so, I will borrow from John Rawls and his account of reasonableness and Thomas Nagel’s account of public justification in a context of actual disagreement. However, we must be cognisant of a number of possible dangers here. In particular, we must ensure that we do not impose a ‘liberal’ political solution on moral conflicts and in that way ourselves become guilty of the moral simplification we have been critical of in others.Less

Species Concepts and Natural Goodness

Judith K. Crane and Ronald Sandler

in Carving Nature at Its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science

This chapter defends a pluralist understanding of species on which a normative species concept is viable and can support natural goodness evaluations. The central question here is thus: Since ... More

This chapter defends a pluralist understanding of species on which a normative species concept is viable and can support natural goodness evaluations. The central question here is thus: Since organisms are to be evaluated as members of their species, how does a proper understanding of species affect the feasibility of natural goodness evaluations? Philippa Foot has argued for a form of natural goodness evaluation in which living things are evaluated by how well fitted they are for flourishing as members of their species, in ways characteristic of their species. She has further argued that assessments of moral goodness in humans are of the same evaluative form. However, natural goodness evaluations and, by extension, the natural goodness approach, do not garner justification in virtue of employing a scientifically privileged conception of species. The natural goodness approach is only justified given particular metaethical and normative commitments that are independent of naturalism, since the approach does not depend upon naturalism alone.Less

The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion

John Finnis

in Human Rights and Common Good: Collected Essays Volume III

This chapter, written in 1973, offers a response to Judith Thomson's famous proto-feminist attempt to vindicate abortion by a thought-experiment which accepts the humanity of the unborn child. It ... More

This chapter, written in 1973, offers a response to Judith Thomson's famous proto-feminist attempt to vindicate abortion by a thought-experiment which accepts the humanity of the unborn child. It begins by showing that casting the issue in terms of rights (to life verses to decide what happens in one's body) obscures the underlying question, which (as she belatedly concedes) is about what is morally required. But abortion, at least in most cases, cannot reasonably be assimilated to the range of Good Samaritan problems. The traditional moral discussion of killing is traced, and the traditional casuistry distinguishing justifiable terminations of pregnancy from ‘direct’ abortions is critically analysed (with a partly defective concept of intention). Arguments of Jonathan Bennett and Philippa Foot are considered along the way, as well as Thomson's incidental comparison of the embryo to an acorn. An endnote points the way to rectifying the account of intention.Less

Moral Value

David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls

in God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning

This chapter’s focus is on the locus of human value most particularly. It examines several secular efforts to undergird convictions about intrinsic human value and moral standing, showing why, in ... More

This chapter’s focus is on the locus of human value most particularly. It examines several secular efforts to undergird convictions about intrinsic human value and moral standing, showing why, in each case, the account in question leaves much to be desired. Among the secular ethical treatments canvassed are egoism, utilitarianism, and, more comprehensively, Philippa Foot’s natural law approach, against which five objections are raised: smart free riders, a deflationary analysis, a transition problem, a normativity challenge, and an epistemic problem. Finally, we consider Erik Wielenberg’s “robust realism” account of intrinsic human value, raising several concerns about the adequacy of his account, including the huge qualitative gap between naturalistic properties and moral properties.Less

Who Turned the Trolley?

F. M. Kamm

in The Trolley Problem Mysteries

Lecture I begins with a brief history of changing views on what the Trolley Problem is and attempts to solve it. The lecture then critically examines Judith Thomson’s recent view that a moral ... More

Lecture I begins with a brief history of changing views on what the Trolley Problem is and attempts to solve it. The lecture then critically examines Judith Thomson’s recent view that a moral distinction between killing and letting die, and between what a conductor of the trolley or a mere bystander may do to save people from the trolley, eliminates what she now thinks of as the Trolley Problem. The last part considers a different argument for the conclusion that Thomson now favors, but ultimately attempts to resurrect the Trolley Problem, suggesting that it is not who turns the trolley that makes the turning permissible.Less

Psychopathy and Moral Rationality

Eric Matthews

in Being Amoral: Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity

The chapter puts into doubt the close link that is often established between lack of empathy and psychopathic amorality. This critique is then developed into the claim that feeling alone cannot be ... More

The chapter puts into doubt the close link that is often established between lack of empathy and psychopathic amorality. This critique is then developed into the claim that feeling alone cannot be the basis of moral action. The main aspect of psychopathic amorality according to the proposed analysis is the lack of intelligibility of psychopaths’ explanations for their behavior. These imply failures of reason-giving capacities, or, briefly, a defect in an aspect of practical rationality. Empathy, in the sense of a concern for others, is seen as a precondition for possessing moral rationality.Less

Rights and Harm

Kai Draper

in War and Individual Rights: The Foundations of Just War Theory

Chapter 3 explores in detail the issue of when causing harm infringes upon rights. This requires an investigation of the “doctrine of doing and allowing,” for it is commonly thought that doing harm ... More

Chapter 3 explores in detail the issue of when causing harm infringes upon rights. This requires an investigation of the “doctrine of doing and allowing,” for it is commonly thought that doing harm typically infringes upon rights, whereas merely allowing harm typically does not. Various formulations of the doctrine are evaluated, including those offered by Philippa Foot and Warren Quinn, respectively, but none of them withstand scrutiny. Ultimately, the doctrine is rejected in favor of a set of doctrines about rights. The most important of these is that, with certain exceptions, harming someone by acting on something to which that person has a right is an infringement upon that right.Less

The Distinction between Doing and Allowing

Fiona Woollard

in Doing and Allowing Harm

This chapter begin the analysis of the distinction between doing and allowing. Drawing on the work of Philippa Foot, it suggests that an agent counts as doing harm if and only if some fact about the ... More

This chapter begin the analysis of the distinction between doing and allowing. Drawing on the work of Philippa Foot, it suggests that an agent counts as doing harm if and only if some fact about the agent’s behaviour is part of the sequence leading to the harm. Substantial facts are suitable to be part of the sequence leading to an outcome, whereas non-substantial facts are, normally, merely background conditions. If an agent is only relevant to a sequence through a non-substantial fact, the fact about his or her behaviour will not count as part of the sequence.Less

Morality and Happiness

Steven M. Cahn and Christine Vitrano

in Happiness and Goodness: Philosophical Reflections on Living Well

This chapter examines the connection between morality and happiness. Some philosophers, echoing Plato, have argued that those who are moral are happy, and those who are happy are moral. Among the ... More

This chapter examines the connection between morality and happiness. Some philosophers, echoing Plato, have argued that those who are moral are happy, and those who are happy are moral. Among the many who believe that happiness depends on a commitment to morality is Philippa Foot, who finds happiness “a most intractable concept” but defends the claim that “great happiness, unlike euphoria or even great pleasure, must come from something related to what is deep in human nature, and fundamental in human life, such as affection for children and friends, the desire to work, and love of freedom and truth.” Thus she believes that immorality precludes happiness. One historical reason why some philosophers may suppose happiness requires moral behavior is that Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, claims that eudaimonia, a Greek word often translated as “happiness,” can be achieved only by virtuous activity, the fulfillment of the best aspect of human nature.Less

Aristotle in the Ethic Wars

Sylvia Berryman

in Aristotle on the Sources of the Ethical Life

Beginning from a short history of ethics offered in Korsgaard’s The Sources of Normativity, this chapter notes the practice—dating back to Anscombe’s ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’—of offering narratives ... More

Beginning from a short history of ethics offered in Korsgaard’s The Sources of Normativity, this chapter notes the practice—dating back to Anscombe’s ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’—of offering narratives about the history of modern ethics in order to unsettle the metaphysical picture underlying the rise of non-cognitivism or subjectivism in ethics. These narratives often feature Aristotelian virtue ethics as a potential alternative, and have shaped the reading of Aristotle’s ethics. The supposed ‘gap’ separating ancient and modern ethics is questioned, and with it the claim that Aristotle was unreflective about the grounding of his ethics; the supposition is also disputed that he regarded human nature as an ‘Archimedean Point’ to ground the demands of ethics, as the work of Williams and Foot might suggest. From a survey of modern appropriations of his ideas, two research questions are isolated: was Aristotle an Archimedean naturalist, and was he metaethically naive?Less