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Lieutenant-General Petr Lashchenko, the ranking member of Zakharov’s delegation, remained in Egypt as the chief Soviet military adviser and “commander of the Soviet Forces Group.” While constructing the Egyptian defense line along the Suez Canal and overseeing rehabilitation of Egyptian units to Soviet standards, he negotiated the upgrade of Soviet “experts” to “advisers” with quasi-command authority. Resistance within the Egyptian military ended with the arrest and reported suicide of Abdel Hakim Amer, the commander-in-chief in the June war. On the day the agreement was signed, with hundreds of Soviet advisers arriving in Egypt, the Soviets were involved in the sinking off Port Said of the Israeli destroyer Eilat – the first sinking of a warship by missile. Soviet air advisers established a de facto air base at Cairo-West and began flying sorties opposite Israeli planes, for now undetected.

The artillery exchanges in September-October 1968 settled the controversy with the Israeli command in favor of “static” defense, that is a system of hardened fortifications along the Suez Canal that would become known as the Bar-Lev Line after Chief of Staff Chaim Bar-Lev. It was constructed over the following months with little disruption by the Egyptians and Soviets. One reason for this failure was the reorganization process of the Egyptian array along the canal into two army corps instead of one. Another was the replacement of the chief Soviet adviser Petr Lashchenko by his much inferior deputy, Ivan Katyshkin. However, Soviet airmen took an increasing role in Egyptian operations. This accelerated US agreement to sell Israel F-4 Phantom jets, which in turn motivated the Soviets to prepare for direct intervention against this superior weapon.

As early as the autumn of 1967, in response to Egyptian desires as well as Moscow’s own objectives, the Soviet advisers began to elaborate a plan for a military offensive across the Suez Canal to recapture the Sinai Peninsula, which had been lost to Israel in the June war. Preparations included a training program to upgrade Egyptian fighting capability under Soviet supervision and induction of weaponry. As an interim measure until the ultimate offensive was readied, an attrition strategy was shaped. Simultaneously, the heightened presence of Soviet naval and aviation units in Egyptian bases was activated to confront the US Sixth Fleet. Yet-inconclusive evidence connects the Soviet navy with the sinking of the Israel submarine Dakar in January 1968.

In early November 1972, the US presidential election and the announcement of a breakthrough in peace negotiations for Vietnam had mixed effects on the Middle astern situation. An upsurge in US bombings in Vietnam before the (deceptive) peace was concluded was mirrored by a brief war scare on the Egyptian-Israeli front. The numerous shootdowns of US bombers by Soviet SAMs over Vietnam was held up as an example to the Soviet advisers in Egypt. Once reelected, Nixon declared intent replace Kissinger in handling Arab-Israeli relations and to press Israel for concessions, but Nixon’s increasing embroilment in Watergate prevented any weakening of Kissinger’s position or policy. A Soviet military delegation to Egypt, headed by General Petr Lashchenko, who had originated the plan for a cross-canal offensive, was presented as discussing peace plans but in effect coordinated weapons supplies, including offensive systems that had supposedly been withheld, such as long-range bombers and Scud missiles. Further secret talks between Soviet and Israeli officials yielded no progress toward normalization.