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This chapter discusses the use of animals in research. It provides a brief history of animal research and examines the ethical arguments for and against animal experimentation. The chapter discusses the animal rights views of Peter Singer and Tom Regan and considers some morally significant differences between animals and humans. It also discusses some principles for the ethical treatment of animal in research, such as the “three Rs”—reduction, replacement, and refinement—as well as animal research regulations.

This chapter addresses the questions: what responsibilities do we have towards the global poor? What must we do for them as a matter of justice? It considers the arguments of Peter Singer and Thomas Pogge that responsibility for global poverty falls straightforwardly on the citizens of rich, developed societies. Against Peter Singer, it is argued that it makes no sense to assign remedial responsibility for poverty to citizens of rich states without first considering the question of outcome responsibility — how and why poverty has arisen. Against Thomas Pogge, it is argued that his attempt to assign outcome responsibility for poverty to the international order, and through that to citizens of rich states and their governments, is implausible. It is shown that remedial responsibilities to the world's poor are not straightforward, but must take into account a variety of factors, primarily having to do with attributions of outcome responsibility for the poverty we witness.

This chapter analyses the animal rights issue from legal, philosophical, and pragmatic perspectives. It argues that the best approach to the issue is a human-centric one that appeals to our developing knowledge and sentiments about animals, and which eschews on the one hand philosophical argument and a legal-formalist approach on the other. The chapter explains that on pragmatic grounds, people are not likely to want to give rights to animals and that some rights would be damaging to animals themselves. It also comments on the views of Steven Wise and Peter Singer.

This chapter examines the views of consequentialists as well as of nonconsequentialists whose perspectives differ from those of this book. It considers both the kind of consequentialism to which Peter Singer subscribes and his conception of the role of moral reasons. Based on what he claims in various places in published works, this chapter first reconstructs and critically analyzes his general normative theory. It contrast Singer's views with alternative possible conceptions. It then gives particular attention to his arguments for the claim that the distinction between killing and letting die has no moral relevance. The chapter also examines Singer's ethical theory in order to evaluate his views on such practical issues as famine relief, treatment of the disabled, and animal liberation, with some surprising results.

This chapter begins with the question of an individual donor: How will each dollar I can give to aid, or each hour I can devote to campaigning for aid, affect the long‐term well‐being of people in other countries? To answer this question, the chapter investigates the complex causal nexus between affluent individuals and people living in extreme poverty. This analysis shows that answering the donor's question will not be easy. It is difficult to get reliable information about the effects of giving, and some giving may harm as well as help. The chapter concludes that this analysis forces us to go beyond Peter Singer's well‐known principle that directs individuals to help when they know they can. Individuals who understand the urgency of severe poverty abroad must reason differently about how they will respond.

This chapter takes a close look at Peter Singer's argument that we have individual obligations to help those suffering from chronic severe poverty. The chapter compares Singer's drowning child analogy with the case of chronic severe poverty and argues that, although there are important differences in the two cases, the analogy holds, and where it differs, the case for aiding those who suffer from chronic severe poverty is more compelling than the rescue of an individual in an emergency, such as a child drowning in a pond. It is argued that, insofar as the threat to human interests caused by extreme poverty arise from a systematic injustice—and not a random emergency—duties to give aid are greater in the former than the latter.

This chapter confronts Peter Singer's enormously influential argument for giving up all luxuries and frills to aid the global poor, an argument based on the appealing principle that one ought to be willing to prevent something very bad from happening whenever one can do so without sacrificing anything morally significant. In opposition to this principle of beneficence, the chapter defends a moderate principle that only requires underlying concern for neediness as such that is sufficiently great that more would impose a significant risk of worsening one's life, if one lived up to one's other responsibilities. After grounding this principle on a morality of equal respect, and criticizing moralities of impartial concern, this chapter offers an alternative assessment of the cases of obligatory nearby rescue to which Singer appeals. These rescues are mandates of policies for implementing the moderate principle that everyone committed to it has reason to adopt, policies attending to nearby perils, which do not support Singer's radical global demands.

This chapter presents commentaries on Peter Singer's approach to animal rights. It contends that Singer's attack on ‘speciesism’ mischaracterises the moral issues at stake and contends that if people are to be on the side of animals, it must be for reasons different from those used by Singer and others who object to the current human use and mistreatment of animals. The chapter argues against the call to stop the killing of animals for food and the use of animals in scientific research.

This chapter surveys what Peter Singer has said about the “replaceability” of non-persons, emphasizing that there are problems with each of several different accounts he has offered and how these problems can be addressed in the context of a Harean, two level utilitarianism. It also takes up the questions of what the optimal populations of humans and animals would be, and the related problem of Parfit’s “repugnant conclusion.” The chapter ends with a more detailed consideration of the problem of marginal cases, which was initially treated at the end of chapter seven.

This brief concluding chapter compares and contrasts the Harean perspective on animal ethics developed in this book with the views of Peter Singer, who wrote his dissertation with Hare. Singer’s defense of utilitarianism is similar to Hare’s and Singer has appealed to Hare’s distinction between “intuitive level” thinking and explicitly utilitarian “critical thinking” in response to various objections. Yet Singer’s practical conclusions diverge in several ways from the Harean analysis presented in this book.

Focuses on the origin, history, and conceptual structure of “speciesism”. The central question asked is whether the notion of speciesism, under which inclusion of all humans within the purview of moral protections is paired with exclusion of all nonhumans from similar fundamental protections, is a valuable interpretive tool in discerning features of general views about nonhuman animals. Included is an overview of many uses of the term “speciesism,” including the seminal use by Peter Singer. The prevalence of ideology, in the sense of bias or prejudgment, in discussions regarding nonhuman animals is also identified. A working definition of “speciesism” is proposed: “Speciesism is the inclusion of all human animals within, and the exclusion of all other animals from, the moral circle.”

Drawing on some of Bernard Williams's work, especially his essays ‘The Idea of Equality’ and ‘The Human Prejudice’, this chapter argues that ‘speciesism’ is very unlike racism or sexism, and that much of the philosophical apparatus which has been mobilized on behalf of anti-speciesism, such as moral individualism and the argument from marginal cases, is unsound. Moral individualists hold that the standards of appropriate ethical treatment of a creature must display fundamental sensitivity to only the intrinsic non-relational properties exemplified by that creature. But this doctrine cannot tell us, all by itself, when a creature has been unfortunate, and hence deserving of protection or compensation. Those questions can only be settled by locating the creature in a community of fellow creatures, which define the relevant standards of flourishing and misfortune. It is further contended that there is nothing unintelligible or morally obnoxious about defining these communities in species-sensitive ways, and that our understanding of the wrongness of racism and sexism is actually dependent on the background thought that those individuals who are victimized by racist or sexist treatment belong to a particular community: the human community.

This chapter explores the limitations that a few philosophers would place on the human use of animals, and how these restrictions have formed the foundation of the modern animal rights and liberation movement. It also reports a description of the origins of this movement. It concentrates on Peter Singer and Tom Regan, the two largely uncontested philosophical leaders of the animal rights movement, with examples from writings by a few of the others brought in at appropriate points. Animal rightists usually think they have an obligation to avoid sport hunters from killing nonhuman animals. Humans are not invaders in the world but a part of it, and humans have as much right to make their way in it as any other species.

Given the facility with which wealthy Western nations can reduce child mortality rates in developing countries, we should reject the view that it is not wrong to do nothing to lessen distant suffering as this view strongly conflicts with the truth about morality. This is the minority position known as Liberationism, first espoused by Peter Singer, according to which moral intuitions derive from sources far removed from basic moral values. Thus, moral intuitions (of the sort that it is acceptable not to alleviate distant suffering) not only fail to reflect those values but also often point in the opposite direction. This position contrasts with the majority view known as Preservationism, according to which our moral intuitions about particular cases reflect our basic moral values, and thus ground the claim that it is permissible not to lessen distant suffering. This chapter concludes with a brief discussion of some ethical puzzles that make the Liberationist approach more intuitively appealing.

This book is about nonconsequentialist ethical theory and some alternatives to it, either substantive or methodological. It explores nonconsequentialism and the Trolley Problem as well as particular aspects of nonconsequentialist theory pertaining to harming persons. It includes a discussion on prerogatives, constraints, inviolability, and the significance of status, along with a nonconsequentialist theory of aggregation and the distribution of scarce goods. It contrasts two subcategories of a method known as pairwise comparison—confrontation and substitution—by which conflicts might be resolved in a nonconsequentialist theory, and argues that substitution is permissible. The book also examines Peter Unger's views on the permissibility of harming innocent bystanders and the duty to harm ourselves in order to aid others, responsibility and collaboration, and new ways in which physical distance might bear on our duty to aid. Moreover, there is a section devoted to the views of others within the consequentialist and nonconsequentialist camps, including Peter Singer's ethical theory.

This chapter discusses the contemporary basis for the moral respect for animals. It analyses philosophers Jeremy Bentham and Peter Singer's thoughts on the issue and suggests that the central point of their argument is that animal interests should be considered in the course of moral deliberations as animal interests in avoiding pain are very similar to those of humans. It argues that sentience can best be served as the basis of equal considerations in all matters.

Farrell’s model of a collaborative circle predicts that much of the creative work is conducted within pairings in which instrumental intimacy—the sharing of unpublished and often unwritten ideas—occurs. This chapter examines two key such pairings in the Oxford Group, between Peter Singer and Ros Godlovitch, and between Peter Singer and Richard Ryder. The chapter considers the impact on Singer’s intellectual development of his association with the Oxford Group in general and Ryder and Ros Godlovitch in particular. It demonstrates how the transformation in Singer’s thinking about animals was startling. He learned from Godlovitch and Ryder in particular but, at the same time, he impacted their thought too. It is plausible to suggest that Singer’s participation in the Oxford Group was a vital component of his emergence as the most important animal ethicist.

This chapter begins by reviewing previous claims that distinguish between the moral significance of intrapersonal and interpersonal aggregation of life years, need, and quality of life, for the purpose of making decisions about the allocation of scarce lifesaving resources among different people. It then considers some partially contrasting views of Peter Singer on these matters. Finally, it presents some recent views on the role of quality and quantity of life in nondiscriminatorily allocating lifesaving and nonlifesaving resources between disabled and nondisabled individuals. It also examines how ex-ante reasoning behind a veil of ignorance bears on these issues.