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Klein on Closure and Skepticism

Anthony Brueckner

in Essays on Skepticism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
January 2011
ISBN:
9780199585861
eISBN:
9780191595332
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0031
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter examines Peter Klein's ingenious defense of closure and raises a number of problems for it.


Infallibilism or Pragmatic Encroachment?

Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath

in Knowledge in an Uncertain World

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199550623
eISBN:
9780191722684
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550623.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language

If the arguments of previous chapters are sound, then fallibilist purism about knowledge is false. This raises the question of which to retain, fallibilism or purism? The first part of the chapter ... More


Misleading Defeaters

Richard Foley

in When Is True Belief Knowledge?

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691154725
eISBN:
9781400842308
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691154725.003.0019
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter proposes a game in a similar vein to the Gettier game: when a subject has a true belief but seems not to have knowledge, it looks for some key aspect of the situation about which the ... More


Skepticism

Peter Klein

in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195130058
eISBN:
9780199833481
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195130057.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

In ”Skepticism,” Peter Klein distinguishes between the “Academic Skeptic” who proposes that we cannot have knowledge of a certain set of propositions and the “Pyrrhonian Skeptic” who refrains from ... More


Making the Question Precise

Erik J. Olsson

in Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199279999
eISBN:
9780191602665
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199279993.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The comparative question is raised as to whether more coherence implies a higher likelihood of truth. The chapter is devoted to making the question precise. Coherence measures are defined and ... More


Chained to the Gettier Problem— a Useful Falsehood?

Robert K. Shope

in Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
December 2017
ISBN:
9780198724551
eISBN:
9780191840142
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198724551.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 5 refines a solution previously proposed to the Gettier Problem focusing on proscribing certain roles for falsehoods in a ‘justification-explaining chain.’ The refinement is partly explained ... More


Knowledge, Benign Falsehoods, and the Gettier Problem

Claudio de Almeida

in Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
December 2017
ISBN:
9780198724551
eISBN:
9780191840142
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198724551.003.0018
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Contrary to millennial thought, inferential knowledge does seem to arise in certain cases of reasoning to which false premises are evidentially essential. The phenomenon refutes all of the well-known ... More


The Kantian Account of Knowledge

Mark Schroeder

in Reasons First

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
July 2021
ISBN:
9780198868224
eISBN:
9780191904745
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198868224.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 11 elaborates on and defends the account of knowledge—the Kantian Account—that follows from a right reasons account of the nature of well properties. Knowledge, it is argued, is a special ... More


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