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Ordinary Language and the Unordinary Philosophy of Peter Achinstein

Steven Gimbel and Jeffrey Maynes

in Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein

In 1959, Peter Achinstein left Harvard and his Logical Positivist-influenced teachers and spent a year working at Oxford during the heyday of ordinary language philosophy. In his writings on evidence ... More

In 1959, Peter Achinstein left Harvard and his Logical Positivist-influenced teachers and spent a year working at Oxford during the heyday of ordinary language philosophy. In his writings on evidence and explanation, we find competing influences from both. His explicative methodology and his rigorous approach show the deep influence of Rudolf Carnap and C. G. Hempel, while his historical contextualization and use of pragmatic machinery show his debt to J. L. Austin and Peter Strawson. Achinstein's work in the philosophy of science can be seen as the result of taking the competing views in a debate in the philosophy of language from the generation that preceded him and synthesizing them into something more fruitful.Less

Achinstein's Newtonian Empiricism

Victor Di Fate

in Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein

By examining Peter Achinstein's longstanding views on evidence and recent work on induction, this chapter attempts to characterize and critically evaluate Achinstein's meta-methodology. It is argued ... More

By examining Peter Achinstein's longstanding views on evidence and recent work on induction, this chapter attempts to characterize and critically evaluate Achinstein's meta-methodology. It is argued that Achinstein is a distinctive kind of empiricist about scientific method. Unlike some methodological empiricists, Achinstein does not expect the philosopher of science to engage in empirical investigation to evaluate methodological principles. Rather, the empirical information bearing on such principles is generated during the normal work of the scientist. This sort of empiricism is branded “Newtonian” because it is argued that there is good reason to think that Newton held a very similar view. In particular, both Newton and Achinstein think we normally require empirical information to determine whether some fact is evidence for a hypothesis, and thus whether it is reasonable to infer from one to the other. Achinstein's mistake, it is argued, is that he tries to retain some justificatory force for inductive principles, rather than letting such empirical information do all the justificatory work.Less

A Defense of Achinstein's Pragmatism about Explanation

Adam M. Goldstein

in Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein

Carl Hempel and many others influenced by him claim that explanations in science require showing why the event to be explained occurred, by showing that it is necessary, given the laws of nature and ... More

Carl Hempel and many others influenced by him claim that explanations in science require showing why the event to be explained occurred, by showing that it is necessary, given the laws of nature and the particular conditions prior to the event's occurrence. Hempel also sometimes uses an alternative formulation of this condition for explanation: the explanation must show that the event ought to have been expected. This rules out explaining chance events, which do not occur necessarily, and whose occurrence is not to be expected. Hempel's view also rules out historical explanations that, some claim, are of explanatory value because they describe, in narrative form, how the event to be explained occurred. Against Hempel's view, this chapter argues for a pluralistic, pragmatic view about explanation. According to this view of explanation, there is clear warrant for regarding narratives as having explanatory value, even in cases in which the event to be explained occurs by chance. The most forceful and well-developed statement of this view is advanced by Peter Achinstein in works such as The Nature of Explanation. Though he presents the view clearly and precisely, Achinstein does not mount a strong defense of it against Hempelians, nor do others who adopt the view.Less

Evidence, External Validity, and Explanatory Relevance

Nancy Cartwright

in Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein

Evidence-based policy commends randomized controlled trials (RCTs) as gold-standard evidence for predictions about whether policies will “work” (so-called “effectiveness predictions”), and largely ... More

Evidence-based policy commends randomized controlled trials (RCTs) as gold-standard evidence for predictions about whether policies will “work” (so-called “effectiveness predictions”), and largely because RCTs establish causal conclusions without need for theory. But what makes RCTs evidence for effectiveness at all? A usual label for this problem, “external validity,” conceals a host of problems and a productive answer. This chapter employs Achinstein's formula, “evidential relevance = explanatory relevance,” to argue that the evidential relevance of an RCT to an effectiveness prediction is conditional. If the effect in question is governed by the same causal laws in the RCT and in the target, these laws could explain the effect in both, thus securing the explanatory relevance of the RCT result to the effectiveness prediction. But the explanation, and in consequence the evidential relevance, is conditional on (a) sharing these causal laws and (b) the target possessing the requisite auxiliary factors that call the shared laws into play. Finding the requisite auxiliaries involves what this chapter calls “horizontal search”; finding shared laws, if they exist at all, involves “vertical search”: locating or creating the right kind and level of abstraction. Both generally require a great deal of theory, which RCT advocates had hoped to avoid.Less

The Place of Artificial Selection in Charles Darwin's Theory of Evolution through Natural Selection

Michael Ruse

in Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein

How important are metaphors and analogies in science and what form do they take? Peter Achinstein's Concepts of Science is the definitive modern lynchpin of this discussion in modern philosophy of ... More

How important are metaphors and analogies in science and what form do they take? Peter Achinstein's Concepts of Science is the definitive modern lynchpin of this discussion in modern philosophy of science. Inspired by this work, this chapter look at the use of artificial selection in Charles Darwin's Origin of Species. This chapter argue that it has a three-fold role: heuristic, pedagogical, and justificatory. This chapter locate Darwin's use of artificial selection in the context of the nineteenth-century discussion about causation, and, in particular, what constitutes a true cause, or vera causa. This chapter argue that this all shows what a skilled methodologist Darwin was and how crucial metaphors and models are in science.Less

Achinstein's Replies

Gregory J. Morgan

in Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein

This chapter gives Peter Achinstein's replies to the previous chapters which are about his views on the philosophy of science. The chapter responds to all of the previous chapters individually.