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Military and Diplomatic Success in the Persian Gulf War

Spencer D. Bakich

in Success and Failure in Limited War: Information and Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars

In the Persian Gulf War, America sought to carefully construct a favorable strategic environment so that the war to oust Iraq from Kuwait would not expand to include Israel and the Arab states. To ... More

In the Persian Gulf War, America sought to carefully construct a favorable strategic environment so that the war to oust Iraq from Kuwait would not expand to include Israel and the Arab states. To achieve this, a broad coalition was constructed through the United Nations, political objectives were efficiently translated into military strategy, and pressures to expand American war aims were kept in check. This war is remarkable to the extent that American military objectives were achieved and escalation was avoided; the Persian Gulf War was a military and diplomatic success for the U.S. This chapter argues that America's strategic success resulted from the widespread sharing of information and intelligence among all actors and organizations within the American government, including George H. W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Council, the CIA, and generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf. Operation Desert Storm's success resulted from this robust American information institution.Less

The Persian Gulf War, 1990–1991

Steven Hurst

in The United States and Iraq since 1979: Hegemony, Oil and War

1989–1990 saw American efforts to co-opt Iraq reach a peak during the administration of George H.W. Bush. That strategy was abandoned, however, after Saddam Hussein, in a desperate bid to solve ... More

1989–1990 saw American efforts to co-opt Iraq reach a peak during the administration of George H.W. Bush. That strategy was abandoned, however, after Saddam Hussein, in a desperate bid to solve economic problems resulting from his eight year war with Iran, invaded and attempted to annex Kuwait in August 1990. Perceiving a direct threat to American control over the flow of oil from the Gulf, the Bush administration soon decided that Iraqi forces must be expelled from Kuwait by whatever means necessary. Having built careful support for this position, Bush launched the Persian Gulf War of 1991, which saw Iraqi forces routed and Kuwaiti sovereignty restored. The Bush administration did not invade Iraq or seek to eliminate Saddam Hussein, however, out of fear that such actions would serve only to empower Iran. They therefore fell back on a policy of sanctions and weapons inspections designed to permanently neutralise the Iraqi threat and, hopefully, to cause Saddam's fall.Less

George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War: “Beyond Containment” in the Middle East

Douglas Little

in Us versus Them: "The United States, Radical Islam, and the Rise of the Green Threat"

Like his predecessors, George H. W. Bush regarded communism as a grave existential danger and worried that Gorbachev’s reforms would not endure. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 ... More

Like his predecessors, George H. W. Bush regarded communism as a grave existential danger and worried that Gorbachev’s reforms would not endure. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 confirmed the demise of the “red threat,” however, the Bush administration moved “beyond containment” and sought to establish a New World Order. Although the triumph of containment did not alter U.S. assumptions about the Middle East, where oil and Israel remained top priorities, Bush #41 hoped to broker peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Prospects for a new Middle East took a grim turn in August 1990, when Saddam Hussein seized Kuwait, prompting Bush #41 to send half a million U.S. troops to reverse the Iraqi invasion. While Bush savored his victory in the Persian Gulf, critics warned that he had paid too little attention to a rising tide of Muslim extremism from Afghanistan to Algieria.Less

International Peacekeeping

Bhubhindar Singh

in Reconstructing Japan’s Security Policy: The Role of Military Crises

This chapter shows the importance of the 1990–1 Persian Gulf Crisis to explain the Japanese security policy development. Here, it shows how the security policymaking elite utilised this crisis as a ... More

This chapter shows the importance of the 1990–1 Persian Gulf Crisis to explain the Japanese security policy development. Here, it shows how the security policymaking elite utilised this crisis as a policy window to achieve their objective of expanding the SDF’s mandate to include international peacekeeping missions.Less

Short Wars of Optimism: Persian Gulf and Anglo-Iranian

Alex Weisiger

in Logics of War: Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts

This chapter examines a set of wars that were more limited in severity and duration. These include case studies of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1856–57 Anglo-Persian War, both of which match the ... More

This chapter examines a set of wars that were more limited in severity and duration. These include case studies of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1856–57 Anglo-Persian War, both of which match the expectations of the informational mechanism. In both cases, war occurred because the participants disagreed about relative strength or resolve, and in both cases the recognition of its errors forced the loser to make rapid political concessions that allowed for a quick negotiated settlement. The chapter argues that either the informational or the principal-agent mechanism turns out to have been most significant in bringing about the war, while significant commitment problem concerns were absent.Less

Hollywood's Post-Cold War History: The ‘Righteousness’ of American Interventionism

Trevor B. McCrisken and Andrew Pepper

in American History and Contemporary Hollywood Film

In the giddy optimism that accompanied the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the attendant disintegration of the Cold War, commentators, particularly from the American right, looked to a ... More

In the giddy optimism that accompanied the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the attendant disintegration of the Cold War, commentators, particularly from the American right, looked to a rose-tinted future in which the United States bestrode the world as its only superpower. In recent years, Hollywood has produced a steady stream of films that focused upon the role of America in various unilateral and multilateral military interventions. The question is how these films work to produce or unsettle particular established or consensual views about the inherent ‘righteousness’ of U.S. military actions and, as a result, how they undermine or reinforce traditional understandings of the benign meta-narrative of American history. This chapter focuses on two films: Three Kings (1999), which immediately disturbs the conventional view of the Persian Gulf War, and Black Hawk Down (2001), which shows the devastating impact that modern weaponry and warfare can have on the human body.Less

Modern POW Treatment in the United States: The Vietnam War, the Geneva Conventions, and the Pre-9/11 Era

Elizabeth Grimm Arsenault

in How the Gloves Came Off: Lawyers, Policy Makers, and Norms in the Debate on Torture

This chapter details the history of U.S. compliance with the Geneva Conventions, and later the UN Convention Against Torture, from Vietnam through September 10, 2001. The norm of humane POW treatment ... More

This chapter details the history of U.S. compliance with the Geneva Conventions, and later the UN Convention Against Torture, from Vietnam through September 10, 2001. The norm of humane POW treatment was solidified by U.S. experience in Vietnam as well as U.S. POW activities during the 1980s and 1990s. Military practice and doctrine from Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf War indicate a strong commitment to upholding the Geneva Conventions and the CAT. By integrating Army lawyers into operational planning and crafting a policy of widely extending POW status, the improvement in detainee treatment that occurred during these conflicts strongly reflects the redress for U.S. lapses in Vietnam.Less

Iraq: Fighting for Market Power

Stephen E. Gent and Mark J. C. Crescenzi

in Market Power Politics: War, Institutions, and Strategic Delay in World Politics

This chapter examines how the motivation to establish market power in the oil export market influenced Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade Kuwait in 1990. In the wake of the costly Iran-Iraq war, ... More

This chapter examines how the motivation to establish market power in the oil export market influenced Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade Kuwait in 1990. In the wake of the costly Iran-Iraq war, Hussein desperately needed access to new resources. By controlling Kuwait’s oil production, Iraq could both augment its own oil resources and prevent Kuwait from overproducing and putting downward pressure on the price of oil. Relatively unconstrained by low levels of economic dependence and a lack of acceptable institutional solutions, Hussein turned to violence to pursue his market power goals. A subsequent invasion of Saudi Arabia would have given Iraq a sufficient market share to be able to control the global output and price of oil. To prevent such a shift in market power, a coalition of forces led by the United States intervened militarily and drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait.Less

The imbalance of power in 1991: collapse of the Soviet Union and allied victory in the Persian Gulf War

James W. Peterson

in Russian-American Relations in the Post-Cold War World

The two unrelated events of the break-up of the Soviet Union and the allied victory in the Persian Gulf War made the year 1991 a significant turning point for both Moscow and Washington. A full ... More

The two unrelated events of the break-up of the Soviet Union and the allied victory in the Persian Gulf War made the year 1991 a significant turning point for both Moscow and Washington. A full fifteen nations emerged from the shell of the former Soviet Union, while revolutions in the formerly communist managed states of East Europe led to the emergence of democratic forms in all of them. The resulting Russian state was much smaller and weaker than the Soviet state that it supplanted. In contrast, American power surged forth with the coordinated victory in the Persian Gulf War over Iraq, after its invasion of Kuwait, that restored U.S. military credibility after the quagmire of the War in Southeast Asia. New doctrinal formulations emerged on both sides with the new Russian Constitution of 1993 that paralled the rise of the Yeltsin government, and with the New World Order as articulated for a time by the George H.W. Bush administration. The resulting imbalance of power was a major change from the dynamics of the Cold War but also a prod to the ambitions of Russian leaders like Vladimir Putin. However, balance remained with the mutual negotiations that characterized START diplomacy.Less

Public Opinion and War: A Historical Perspective

in In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World War II to Iraq

The era of public opinion polling began in the 1930s and has spanned wars great and small. Focusing on the period from 1950 to the present, this chapter provides an overview of the different wars the ... More

The era of public opinion polling began in the 1930s and has spanned wars great and small. Focusing on the period from 1950 to the present, this chapter provides an overview of the different wars the United States has fought since the beginning of the Cold War and a picture of the broad outlines of public support for those wars. In particular, it examines public opinion regarding the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, and the wars waged in Afghanistan and Iraq in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. By expanding our historical reach to include the most important war of the twentieth century, it is possible to draw broad conclusions about the roots of public attitudes toward foreign policy more generally.Less

Containing Iran

Wallace J. Thies

in Why Containment Works: Power, Proliferation, and Preventive War

This chapter details how, like Colonel Qaddafi's Libya and Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Iran under clerical rule was widely thought to be a difficult target for a strategy based on containment. With every ... More

This chapter details how, like Colonel Qaddafi's Libya and Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Iran under clerical rule was widely thought to be a difficult target for a strategy based on containment. With every year that passed, Iran seemed to draw closer to becoming a nuclear power and therefore harder to deter and to contain, or so the conventional wisdom proclaimed. The chapter considers the political–military rivalry between the United States and Iran between 1991 (the first Persian Gulf War) and 2016 (when Iran accepted strict limits on its use of the nuclear fuel cycle to produce fissionable materials). If containment pessimists are correct about Iran being undeterrable and uncontainable, then many of the events recounted in the chapter probably should not have occurred. But they did occur, which suggests that a closer look at the historical record will likely reveal some additional interesting twists and turns.Less

Social Structure, Ethnicity, and Military Effectiveness: Iraq, 1980–2004

Timothy D. Hoyt

in Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness

This chapter investigates the effect of government policies intended to control internal division on overall military effectiveness. It specifically addresses the case of Iraq from 1980 to 2004. This ... More

This chapter investigates the effect of government policies intended to control internal division on overall military effectiveness. It specifically addresses the case of Iraq from 1980 to 2004. This case indicates that there is a distinct trade-off between improving military effectiveness and preserving internal security. Iraq was involved in three major wars from 1980 to 2004: the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and the 2003 U.S. war. The Iraq case supports the hypothesis that discrimination in training and education does adversely influence military skill and quality. Discrimination also harmed the capacity of the military to respond quickly to developments on the battlefield. In general, the Iraq case shows that discrimination on ethnic grounds can significantly affect the ability to mobilize resources in war, and policies that are less discriminatory appear to mobilize resources more efficiently and to create higher levels of military effectiveness.Less

The Gradual Awakening

Andrew L. Oros

in Japan's Security Renaissance: New Policies and Politics for the Twenty-First Century

This chapter examines Japan's gradual security awakening with particular focus on the post-Cold War period to 2006.

Strategy in a Murky World

Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro

in In Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy after the Berlin Wall and 9/11

This book concludes with an analysis of what the United States did and how it fared during the momentous years that followed the end of the Cold War. It begins by discussing the evolution of strategy ... More

This book concludes with an analysis of what the United States did and how it fared during the momentous years that followed the end of the Cold War. It begins by discussing the evolution of strategy from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the onset of Barack Obama's presidency. It then considers the accomplishments and failures of U.S. strategic planning during uncertain times, suggesting that U.S. leaders struggled to address the challenges and opportunities created by the collapse of the Wall and the terrorist attacks of 9/11, yet cites the U.S. response to the events of 1989 as one of the most notable tactical success stories in the history of U.S. diplomacy. It also examines what the repercussions of the Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 say about U.S. architecture for global affairs. Finally, it outlines some instructive lessons from the record of U.S planning since the end of the Cold War.Less

The Strange Career of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance

Eric S. Edelman

in In Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy after the Berlin Wall and 9/11

This chapter examines the origins, evolution, and consequences of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), believed to be the first draft of the Bush administration's “Grand Strategy” articulated in ... More

This chapter examines the origins, evolution, and consequences of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), believed to be the first draft of the Bush administration's “Grand Strategy” articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS). It considers how well the DPG described the national security environment after the Cold War, how it compared with many of the academic assessments written from 1990 to 1992, and whether it influenced the development of the 2002 National Security Strategy. It also explains whether the thinking in the DPG deviated from the broad mainstream of American strategic thinking since 1945. The chapter argues that the DPG was an attempt to bring defense policy into line with George W. Bush's expressed wishes and in response to the lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War. It also suggests that the basic principles of the DPG were widely shared by both Democrats and Republicans.Less

After the cold war: a new world order?

Norrie Macqueen

in Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations

As the final decade of the twentieth century began, the United Nations contemplated a new role in world politics. The idea of a ‘new world order’, a term famously used by U.S. President George W. ... More

As the final decade of the twentieth century began, the United Nations contemplated a new role in world politics. The idea of a ‘new world order’, a term famously used by U.S. President George W. Bush, became pervasive. The end of bipolarity acted as a catalyst for a changed sense of the importance of humanitarianism in world politics. In particular there seemed to be a chance to revive — or perhaps, more correctly, belatedly inaugurate — the UN's founding ambition of collective security based on military enforcement. The Persian Gulf War, coming in the immediate wake of the end of the Cold War, did not deliver a new world order of genuine UN collective security and humanitarian intervention through military enforcement. In 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali produced a major report on the state of UN peacekeeping and military intervention: An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. This was followed by a Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, issued in 1995.Less