Spencer D. Bakich
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780226107684
- eISBN:
- 9780226107851
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226107851.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
In the Persian Gulf War, America sought to carefully construct a favorable strategic environment so that the war to oust Iraq from Kuwait would not expand to include Israel and the Arab states. To ...
More
In the Persian Gulf War, America sought to carefully construct a favorable strategic environment so that the war to oust Iraq from Kuwait would not expand to include Israel and the Arab states. To achieve this, a broad coalition was constructed through the United Nations, political objectives were efficiently translated into military strategy, and pressures to expand American war aims were kept in check. This war is remarkable to the extent that American military objectives were achieved and escalation was avoided; the Persian Gulf War was a military and diplomatic success for the U.S. This chapter argues that America's strategic success resulted from the widespread sharing of information and intelligence among all actors and organizations within the American government, including George H. W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Council, the CIA, and generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf. Operation Desert Storm's success resulted from this robust American information institution.Less
In the Persian Gulf War, America sought to carefully construct a favorable strategic environment so that the war to oust Iraq from Kuwait would not expand to include Israel and the Arab states. To achieve this, a broad coalition was constructed through the United Nations, political objectives were efficiently translated into military strategy, and pressures to expand American war aims were kept in check. This war is remarkable to the extent that American military objectives were achieved and escalation was avoided; the Persian Gulf War was a military and diplomatic success for the U.S. This chapter argues that America's strategic success resulted from the widespread sharing of information and intelligence among all actors and organizations within the American government, including George H. W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Council, the CIA, and generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf. Operation Desert Storm's success resulted from this robust American information institution.
Steven Hurst
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748627677
- eISBN:
- 9780748672103
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748627677.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This book examines American policy toward Iraq between 1979 and 2009. In that period American policy evolved through a series of stages: Initially, the Iranian Revolution and fear of an Iranian ...
More
This book examines American policy toward Iraq between 1979 and 2009. In that period American policy evolved through a series of stages: Initially, the Iranian Revolution and fear of an Iranian threat to America's regional allies and interests led to a ‘tilt’ toward Saddam Hussein's Iraq that then became a full-blown effort to co-opt Iraq as an American regional proxy. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 then precipitated a policy reversal and propelled Iraq to the status of regional enemy number one. The Bush administration sought to destroy the Iraqi threat in the 1991 Gulf War but left Saddam in power. The Clinton administration then sought to contain Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction programmes through the application of sanctions and weapons inspections. Finally, believing containment to have failed, and motivated and empowered by fears generated by the attacks of September 11th 2001, the administration of George W. Bush sought to eliminate the Iraqi threat in the Iraq War of 2003, only to find no weapons of mass destruction and to become mired in a failing effort to transform Iraq into a beacon of democracy in the Middle East. The book explains this policy trajectory in terms of the American effort to restore a regional hegemonic position lost in 1979 and uses a theoretical framework that emphasises the American role in managing the global economy, the centrality of Persian Gulf oil to that role and long-term change in the American political system.Less
This book examines American policy toward Iraq between 1979 and 2009. In that period American policy evolved through a series of stages: Initially, the Iranian Revolution and fear of an Iranian threat to America's regional allies and interests led to a ‘tilt’ toward Saddam Hussein's Iraq that then became a full-blown effort to co-opt Iraq as an American regional proxy. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 then precipitated a policy reversal and propelled Iraq to the status of regional enemy number one. The Bush administration sought to destroy the Iraqi threat in the 1991 Gulf War but left Saddam in power. The Clinton administration then sought to contain Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction programmes through the application of sanctions and weapons inspections. Finally, believing containment to have failed, and motivated and empowered by fears generated by the attacks of September 11th 2001, the administration of George W. Bush sought to eliminate the Iraqi threat in the Iraq War of 2003, only to find no weapons of mass destruction and to become mired in a failing effort to transform Iraq into a beacon of democracy in the Middle East. The book explains this policy trajectory in terms of the American effort to restore a regional hegemonic position lost in 1979 and uses a theoretical framework that emphasises the American role in managing the global economy, the centrality of Persian Gulf oil to that role and long-term change in the American political system.
Steven Hurst
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748627677
- eISBN:
- 9780748672103
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748627677.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
1989–1990 saw American efforts to co-opt Iraq reach a peak during the administration of George H.W. Bush. That strategy was abandoned, however, after Saddam Hussein, in a desperate bid to solve ...
More
1989–1990 saw American efforts to co-opt Iraq reach a peak during the administration of George H.W. Bush. That strategy was abandoned, however, after Saddam Hussein, in a desperate bid to solve economic problems resulting from his eight year war with Iran, invaded and attempted to annex Kuwait in August 1990. Perceiving a direct threat to American control over the flow of oil from the Gulf, the Bush administration soon decided that Iraqi forces must be expelled from Kuwait by whatever means necessary. Having built careful support for this position, Bush launched the Persian Gulf War of 1991, which saw Iraqi forces routed and Kuwaiti sovereignty restored. The Bush administration did not invade Iraq or seek to eliminate Saddam Hussein, however, out of fear that such actions would serve only to empower Iran. They therefore fell back on a policy of sanctions and weapons inspections designed to permanently neutralise the Iraqi threat and, hopefully, to cause Saddam's fall.Less
1989–1990 saw American efforts to co-opt Iraq reach a peak during the administration of George H.W. Bush. That strategy was abandoned, however, after Saddam Hussein, in a desperate bid to solve economic problems resulting from his eight year war with Iran, invaded and attempted to annex Kuwait in August 1990. Perceiving a direct threat to American control over the flow of oil from the Gulf, the Bush administration soon decided that Iraqi forces must be expelled from Kuwait by whatever means necessary. Having built careful support for this position, Bush launched the Persian Gulf War of 1991, which saw Iraqi forces routed and Kuwaiti sovereignty restored. The Bush administration did not invade Iraq or seek to eliminate Saddam Hussein, however, out of fear that such actions would serve only to empower Iran. They therefore fell back on a policy of sanctions and weapons inspections designed to permanently neutralise the Iraqi threat and, hopefully, to cause Saddam's fall.
Michael F. Cairo
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780813136721
- eISBN:
- 9780813141275
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813136721.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
Despite the appearance of familiar faces in both Bush administrations, significant differences existed between the foreign policies of George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush. The Gulf refers to these ...
More
Despite the appearance of familiar faces in both Bush administrations, significant differences existed between the foreign policies of George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush. The Gulf refers to these differences and argues that they can be explained by the personal beliefs and styles of each George Bush. Describing George H.W. Bush as an “enlightened” realist and George W. Bush as a “cowboy” liberal, the book begins by exploring the life experiences that contributed to each president’s belief system. Comparing and contrasting each president throughout, it focuses on each administration’s policy in the Middle East, with specific attention given to the Persian Gulf War, Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Madrid Peace Conference, and the Road Map for peace. The book suggests that presidents rarely fit into a realist or liberal model and combines the two approaches to explain presidential worldviews. George H.W. Bush’s emphasis on defensive rather than offensive strategies, and international organizations rather than the power of democracy to foster peace and stability, combine to create an “enlightened” realist worldview. George W. Bush’s emphasis on offensive strategies and the power of democracy to foster peace and stability combine to create the “cowboy” liberal worldview. The book concludes by offering general and specific lessons illuminated by the cases. Suggesting that the study is more than an isolated comparison of the Bushes, the book offers examples of the importance of understanding presidential leadership styles and worldviews.Less
Despite the appearance of familiar faces in both Bush administrations, significant differences existed between the foreign policies of George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush. The Gulf refers to these differences and argues that they can be explained by the personal beliefs and styles of each George Bush. Describing George H.W. Bush as an “enlightened” realist and George W. Bush as a “cowboy” liberal, the book begins by exploring the life experiences that contributed to each president’s belief system. Comparing and contrasting each president throughout, it focuses on each administration’s policy in the Middle East, with specific attention given to the Persian Gulf War, Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Madrid Peace Conference, and the Road Map for peace. The book suggests that presidents rarely fit into a realist or liberal model and combines the two approaches to explain presidential worldviews. George H.W. Bush’s emphasis on defensive rather than offensive strategies, and international organizations rather than the power of democracy to foster peace and stability, combine to create an “enlightened” realist worldview. George W. Bush’s emphasis on offensive strategies and the power of democracy to foster peace and stability combine to create the “cowboy” liberal worldview. The book concludes by offering general and specific lessons illuminated by the cases. Suggesting that the study is more than an isolated comparison of the Bushes, the book offers examples of the importance of understanding presidential leadership styles and worldviews.
Douglas Little
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781469626802
- eISBN:
- 9781469628042
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469626802.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, Middle East History
Like his predecessors, George H. W. Bush regarded communism as a grave existential danger and worried that Gorbachev’s reforms would not endure. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 ...
More
Like his predecessors, George H. W. Bush regarded communism as a grave existential danger and worried that Gorbachev’s reforms would not endure. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 confirmed the demise of the “red threat,” however, the Bush administration moved “beyond containment” and sought to establish a New World Order. Although the triumph of containment did not alter U.S. assumptions about the Middle East, where oil and Israel remained top priorities, Bush #41 hoped to broker peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Prospects for a new Middle East took a grim turn in August 1990, when Saddam Hussein seized Kuwait, prompting Bush #41 to send half a million U.S. troops to reverse the Iraqi invasion. While Bush savored his victory in the Persian Gulf, critics warned that he had paid too little attention to a rising tide of Muslim extremism from Afghanistan to Algieria.Less
Like his predecessors, George H. W. Bush regarded communism as a grave existential danger and worried that Gorbachev’s reforms would not endure. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 confirmed the demise of the “red threat,” however, the Bush administration moved “beyond containment” and sought to establish a New World Order. Although the triumph of containment did not alter U.S. assumptions about the Middle East, where oil and Israel remained top priorities, Bush #41 hoped to broker peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Prospects for a new Middle East took a grim turn in August 1990, when Saddam Hussein seized Kuwait, prompting Bush #41 to send half a million U.S. troops to reverse the Iraqi invasion. While Bush savored his victory in the Persian Gulf, critics warned that he had paid too little attention to a rising tide of Muslim extremism from Afghanistan to Algieria.
Alex Weisiger
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801451867
- eISBN:
- 9780801468179
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801451867.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter examines a set of wars that were more limited in severity and duration. These include case studies of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1856–57 Anglo-Persian War, both of which match the ...
More
This chapter examines a set of wars that were more limited in severity and duration. These include case studies of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1856–57 Anglo-Persian War, both of which match the expectations of the informational mechanism. In both cases, war occurred because the participants disagreed about relative strength or resolve, and in both cases the recognition of its errors forced the loser to make rapid political concessions that allowed for a quick negotiated settlement. The chapter argues that either the informational or the principal-agent mechanism turns out to have been most significant in bringing about the war, while significant commitment problem concerns were absent.Less
This chapter examines a set of wars that were more limited in severity and duration. These include case studies of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1856–57 Anglo-Persian War, both of which match the expectations of the informational mechanism. In both cases, war occurred because the participants disagreed about relative strength or resolve, and in both cases the recognition of its errors forced the loser to make rapid political concessions that allowed for a quick negotiated settlement. The chapter argues that either the informational or the principal-agent mechanism turns out to have been most significant in bringing about the war, while significant commitment problem concerns were absent.
Trevor B. McCrisken and Andrew Pepper
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748614899
- eISBN:
- 9780748670666
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748614899.003.0008
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Media Studies
In the giddy optimism that accompanied the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the attendant disintegration of the Cold War, commentators, particularly from the American right, looked to a ...
More
In the giddy optimism that accompanied the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the attendant disintegration of the Cold War, commentators, particularly from the American right, looked to a rose-tinted future in which the United States bestrode the world as its only superpower. In recent years, Hollywood has produced a steady stream of films that focused upon the role of America in various unilateral and multilateral military interventions. The question is how these films work to produce or unsettle particular established or consensual views about the inherent ‘righteousness’ of U.S. military actions and, as a result, how they undermine or reinforce traditional understandings of the benign meta-narrative of American history. This chapter focuses on two films: Three Kings (1999), which immediately disturbs the conventional view of the Persian Gulf War, and Black Hawk Down (2001), which shows the devastating impact that modern weaponry and warfare can have on the human body.Less
In the giddy optimism that accompanied the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the attendant disintegration of the Cold War, commentators, particularly from the American right, looked to a rose-tinted future in which the United States bestrode the world as its only superpower. In recent years, Hollywood has produced a steady stream of films that focused upon the role of America in various unilateral and multilateral military interventions. The question is how these films work to produce or unsettle particular established or consensual views about the inherent ‘righteousness’ of U.S. military actions and, as a result, how they undermine or reinforce traditional understandings of the benign meta-narrative of American history. This chapter focuses on two films: Three Kings (1999), which immediately disturbs the conventional view of the Persian Gulf War, and Black Hawk Down (2001), which shows the devastating impact that modern weaponry and warfare can have on the human body.
Elizabeth Grimm Arsenault
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780231180788
- eISBN:
- 9780231543255
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231180788.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter details the history of U.S. compliance with the Geneva Conventions, and later the UN Convention Against Torture, from Vietnam through September 10, 2001. The norm of humane POW treatment ...
More
This chapter details the history of U.S. compliance with the Geneva Conventions, and later the UN Convention Against Torture, from Vietnam through September 10, 2001. The norm of humane POW treatment was solidified by U.S. experience in Vietnam as well as U.S. POW activities during the 1980s and 1990s. Military practice and doctrine from Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf War indicate a strong commitment to upholding the Geneva Conventions and the CAT. By integrating Army lawyers into operational planning and crafting a policy of widely extending POW status, the improvement in detainee treatment that occurred during these conflicts strongly reflects the redress for U.S. lapses in Vietnam.Less
This chapter details the history of U.S. compliance with the Geneva Conventions, and later the UN Convention Against Torture, from Vietnam through September 10, 2001. The norm of humane POW treatment was solidified by U.S. experience in Vietnam as well as U.S. POW activities during the 1980s and 1990s. Military practice and doctrine from Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf War indicate a strong commitment to upholding the Geneva Conventions and the CAT. By integrating Army lawyers into operational planning and crafting a policy of widely extending POW status, the improvement in detainee treatment that occurred during these conflicts strongly reflects the redress for U.S. lapses in Vietnam.
James W. Peterson
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781526105783
- eISBN:
- 9781526128553
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9781526105783.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
The two unrelated events of the break-up of the Soviet Union and the allied victory in the Persian Gulf War made the year 1991 a significant turning point for both Moscow and Washington. A full ...
More
The two unrelated events of the break-up of the Soviet Union and the allied victory in the Persian Gulf War made the year 1991 a significant turning point for both Moscow and Washington. A full fifteen nations emerged from the shell of the former Soviet Union, while revolutions in the formerly communist managed states of East Europe led to the emergence of democratic forms in all of them. The resulting Russian state was much smaller and weaker than the Soviet state that it supplanted. In contrast, American power surged forth with the coordinated victory in the Persian Gulf War over Iraq, after its invasion of Kuwait, that restored U.S. military credibility after the quagmire of the War in Southeast Asia. New doctrinal formulations emerged on both sides with the new Russian Constitution of 1993 that paralled the rise of the Yeltsin government, and with the New World Order as articulated for a time by the George H.W. Bush administration. The resulting imbalance of power was a major change from the dynamics of the Cold War but also a prod to the ambitions of Russian leaders like Vladimir Putin. However, balance remained with the mutual negotiations that characterized START diplomacy.Less
The two unrelated events of the break-up of the Soviet Union and the allied victory in the Persian Gulf War made the year 1991 a significant turning point for both Moscow and Washington. A full fifteen nations emerged from the shell of the former Soviet Union, while revolutions in the formerly communist managed states of East Europe led to the emergence of democratic forms in all of them. The resulting Russian state was much smaller and weaker than the Soviet state that it supplanted. In contrast, American power surged forth with the coordinated victory in the Persian Gulf War over Iraq, after its invasion of Kuwait, that restored U.S. military credibility after the quagmire of the War in Southeast Asia. New doctrinal formulations emerged on both sides with the new Russian Constitution of 1993 that paralled the rise of the Yeltsin government, and with the New World Order as articulated for a time by the George H.W. Bush administration. The resulting imbalance of power was a major change from the dynamics of the Cold War but also a prod to the ambitions of Russian leaders like Vladimir Putin. However, balance remained with the mutual negotiations that characterized START diplomacy.
Stacey Peebles
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801449468
- eISBN:
- 9780801460944
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801449468.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, American, 20th Century Literature
Our collective memories of World War II and Vietnam have been shaped as much by memoirs, novels, and films as they have been by history books. This book examines the growing body of contemporary war ...
More
Our collective memories of World War II and Vietnam have been shaped as much by memoirs, novels, and films as they have been by history books. This book examines the growing body of contemporary war stories in prose, poetry, and film that speak to the American soldier’s experience in the Persian Gulf War and the Iraq War. Stories about war always encompass ideas about initiation, masculinity, cross-cultural encounters, and trauma. The book shows us how these timeless themes find new expression among a generation of soldiers who have grown up in a time when it has been more acceptable than ever before to challenge cultural and societal norms, and who now have unprecedented and immediate access to the world away from the battlefield through new media and technology. Two Gulf War memoirs provide a portrait of soldiers living and fighting on the cusp of the major political and technological changes that would begin in earnest just a few years later. The Iraq War, a much longer conflict, has given rise to more and various representations. Books and other media emerging from the conflicts in the Gulf have yet to receive the kind of serious attention that Vietnam War texts received during the 1980s and 1990s. The book provokes much discussion among those who wish to understand today’s war literature and films and their place in the tradition of war representation more generally.Less
Our collective memories of World War II and Vietnam have been shaped as much by memoirs, novels, and films as they have been by history books. This book examines the growing body of contemporary war stories in prose, poetry, and film that speak to the American soldier’s experience in the Persian Gulf War and the Iraq War. Stories about war always encompass ideas about initiation, masculinity, cross-cultural encounters, and trauma. The book shows us how these timeless themes find new expression among a generation of soldiers who have grown up in a time when it has been more acceptable than ever before to challenge cultural and societal norms, and who now have unprecedented and immediate access to the world away from the battlefield through new media and technology. Two Gulf War memoirs provide a portrait of soldiers living and fighting on the cusp of the major political and technological changes that would begin in earnest just a few years later. The Iraq War, a much longer conflict, has given rise to more and various representations. Books and other media emerging from the conflicts in the Gulf have yet to receive the kind of serious attention that Vietnam War texts received during the 1980s and 1990s. The book provokes much discussion among those who wish to understand today’s war literature and films and their place in the tradition of war representation more generally.
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226043586
- eISBN:
- 9780226043463
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226043463.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
The era of public opinion polling began in the 1930s and has spanned wars great and small. Focusing on the period from 1950 to the present, this chapter provides an overview of the different wars the ...
More
The era of public opinion polling began in the 1930s and has spanned wars great and small. Focusing on the period from 1950 to the present, this chapter provides an overview of the different wars the United States has fought since the beginning of the Cold War and a picture of the broad outlines of public support for those wars. In particular, it examines public opinion regarding the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, and the wars waged in Afghanistan and Iraq in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. By expanding our historical reach to include the most important war of the twentieth century, it is possible to draw broad conclusions about the roots of public attitudes toward foreign policy more generally.Less
The era of public opinion polling began in the 1930s and has spanned wars great and small. Focusing on the period from 1950 to the present, this chapter provides an overview of the different wars the United States has fought since the beginning of the Cold War and a picture of the broad outlines of public support for those wars. In particular, it examines public opinion regarding the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, and the wars waged in Afghanistan and Iraq in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. By expanding our historical reach to include the most important war of the twentieth century, it is possible to draw broad conclusions about the roots of public attitudes toward foreign policy more generally.
Philip Towle
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206361
- eISBN:
- 9780191677090
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206361.003.0011
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History, Military History
The attempt to disarm Iraq after it was defeated by United Nations forces in the 1991 Persian Gulf War was the first major example of enforced disarmament since the destruction of the Axis armies in ...
More
The attempt to disarm Iraq after it was defeated by United Nations forces in the 1991 Persian Gulf War was the first major example of enforced disarmament since the destruction of the Axis armies in 1945. This was a typical case of the sort of forced disarmament which follows a limited war. It was tactically offensive but strategically defensive because it was part of a general struggle by the United States and its allies to maintain the status quo and prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, Iraq resisted with all the means at its disposal. As with Germany after the First World War, Iraq was defeated but not overrun. Thus, the anti-Iraqi coalition led by the United States tried to persuade the government in Baghdad to co-operate by means of threats, economic sanctions, and military incursions. This chapter looks at the genesis of the forced disarmament programme for Iraq from 1991 to 1995 and its political implications for the allies.Less
The attempt to disarm Iraq after it was defeated by United Nations forces in the 1991 Persian Gulf War was the first major example of enforced disarmament since the destruction of the Axis armies in 1945. This was a typical case of the sort of forced disarmament which follows a limited war. It was tactically offensive but strategically defensive because it was part of a general struggle by the United States and its allies to maintain the status quo and prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, Iraq resisted with all the means at its disposal. As with Germany after the First World War, Iraq was defeated but not overrun. Thus, the anti-Iraqi coalition led by the United States tried to persuade the government in Baghdad to co-operate by means of threats, economic sanctions, and military incursions. This chapter looks at the genesis of the forced disarmament programme for Iraq from 1991 to 1995 and its political implications for the allies.
Timothy D. Hoyt
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804753999
- eISBN:
- 9780804768092
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804753999.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter investigates the effect of government policies intended to control internal division on overall military effectiveness. It specifically addresses the case of Iraq from 1980 to 2004. This ...
More
This chapter investigates the effect of government policies intended to control internal division on overall military effectiveness. It specifically addresses the case of Iraq from 1980 to 2004. This case indicates that there is a distinct trade-off between improving military effectiveness and preserving internal security. Iraq was involved in three major wars from 1980 to 2004: the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and the 2003 U.S. war. The Iraq case supports the hypothesis that discrimination in training and education does adversely influence military skill and quality. Discrimination also harmed the capacity of the military to respond quickly to developments on the battlefield. In general, the Iraq case shows that discrimination on ethnic grounds can significantly affect the ability to mobilize resources in war, and policies that are less discriminatory appear to mobilize resources more efficiently and to create higher levels of military effectiveness.Less
This chapter investigates the effect of government policies intended to control internal division on overall military effectiveness. It specifically addresses the case of Iraq from 1980 to 2004. This case indicates that there is a distinct trade-off between improving military effectiveness and preserving internal security. Iraq was involved in three major wars from 1980 to 2004: the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and the 2003 U.S. war. The Iraq case supports the hypothesis that discrimination in training and education does adversely influence military skill and quality. Discrimination also harmed the capacity of the military to respond quickly to developments on the battlefield. In general, the Iraq case shows that discrimination on ethnic grounds can significantly affect the ability to mobilize resources in war, and policies that are less discriminatory appear to mobilize resources more efficiently and to create higher levels of military effectiveness.
Andrew L. Oros
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780231172615
- eISBN:
- 9780231542593
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231172615.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter examines Japan's gradual security awakening with particular focus on the post-Cold War period to 2006.
This chapter examines Japan's gradual security awakening with particular focus on the post-Cold War period to 2006.
Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801449093
- eISBN:
- 9780801460814
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801449093.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This book concludes with an analysis of what the United States did and how it fared during the momentous years that followed the end of the Cold War. It begins by discussing the evolution of strategy ...
More
This book concludes with an analysis of what the United States did and how it fared during the momentous years that followed the end of the Cold War. It begins by discussing the evolution of strategy from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the onset of Barack Obama's presidency. It then considers the accomplishments and failures of U.S. strategic planning during uncertain times, suggesting that U.S. leaders struggled to address the challenges and opportunities created by the collapse of the Wall and the terrorist attacks of 9/11, yet cites the U.S. response to the events of 1989 as one of the most notable tactical success stories in the history of U.S. diplomacy. It also examines what the repercussions of the Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 say about U.S. architecture for global affairs. Finally, it outlines some instructive lessons from the record of U.S planning since the end of the Cold War.Less
This book concludes with an analysis of what the United States did and how it fared during the momentous years that followed the end of the Cold War. It begins by discussing the evolution of strategy from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the onset of Barack Obama's presidency. It then considers the accomplishments and failures of U.S. strategic planning during uncertain times, suggesting that U.S. leaders struggled to address the challenges and opportunities created by the collapse of the Wall and the terrorist attacks of 9/11, yet cites the U.S. response to the events of 1989 as one of the most notable tactical success stories in the history of U.S. diplomacy. It also examines what the repercussions of the Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 say about U.S. architecture for global affairs. Finally, it outlines some instructive lessons from the record of U.S planning since the end of the Cold War.
Eric S. Edelman
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801449093
- eISBN:
- 9780801460814
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801449093.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter examines the origins, evolution, and consequences of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), believed to be the first draft of the Bush administration's “Grand Strategy” articulated in ...
More
This chapter examines the origins, evolution, and consequences of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), believed to be the first draft of the Bush administration's “Grand Strategy” articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS). It considers how well the DPG described the national security environment after the Cold War, how it compared with many of the academic assessments written from 1990 to 1992, and whether it influenced the development of the 2002 National Security Strategy. It also explains whether the thinking in the DPG deviated from the broad mainstream of American strategic thinking since 1945. The chapter argues that the DPG was an attempt to bring defense policy into line with George W. Bush's expressed wishes and in response to the lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War. It also suggests that the basic principles of the DPG were widely shared by both Democrats and Republicans.Less
This chapter examines the origins, evolution, and consequences of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), believed to be the first draft of the Bush administration's “Grand Strategy” articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS). It considers how well the DPG described the national security environment after the Cold War, how it compared with many of the academic assessments written from 1990 to 1992, and whether it influenced the development of the 2002 National Security Strategy. It also explains whether the thinking in the DPG deviated from the broad mainstream of American strategic thinking since 1945. The chapter argues that the DPG was an attempt to bring defense policy into line with George W. Bush's expressed wishes and in response to the lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War. It also suggests that the basic principles of the DPG were widely shared by both Democrats and Republicans.
Norrie Macqueen
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748636969
- eISBN:
- 9780748672035
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748636969.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
As the final decade of the twentieth century began, the United Nations contemplated a new role in world politics. The idea of a ‘new world order’, a term famously used by U.S. President George W. ...
More
As the final decade of the twentieth century began, the United Nations contemplated a new role in world politics. The idea of a ‘new world order’, a term famously used by U.S. President George W. Bush, became pervasive. The end of bipolarity acted as a catalyst for a changed sense of the importance of humanitarianism in world politics. In particular there seemed to be a chance to revive — or perhaps, more correctly, belatedly inaugurate — the UN's founding ambition of collective security based on military enforcement. The Persian Gulf War, coming in the immediate wake of the end of the Cold War, did not deliver a new world order of genuine UN collective security and humanitarian intervention through military enforcement. In 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali produced a major report on the state of UN peacekeeping and military intervention: An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. This was followed by a Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, issued in 1995.Less
As the final decade of the twentieth century began, the United Nations contemplated a new role in world politics. The idea of a ‘new world order’, a term famously used by U.S. President George W. Bush, became pervasive. The end of bipolarity acted as a catalyst for a changed sense of the importance of humanitarianism in world politics. In particular there seemed to be a chance to revive — or perhaps, more correctly, belatedly inaugurate — the UN's founding ambition of collective security based on military enforcement. The Persian Gulf War, coming in the immediate wake of the end of the Cold War, did not deliver a new world order of genuine UN collective security and humanitarian intervention through military enforcement. In 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali produced a major report on the state of UN peacekeeping and military intervention: An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. This was followed by a Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, issued in 1995.
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226043586
- eISBN:
- 9780226043463
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226043463.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
In early 2006, with the initial successes in Iraq a distant memory, public opinion seemed to have turned against the war. Republicans continued to support President George W. Bush's foreign policy, ...
More
In early 2006, with the initial successes in Iraq a distant memory, public opinion seemed to have turned against the war. Republicans continued to support President George W. Bush's foreign policy, but the nation as a whole did not. Although support for the war had remained fairly stable since the beginning of 2004, not since March 2004 had a majority of Americans agreed that the United States “did the right thing in taking military action against Iraq.” Bush's public reaction to this grim news was to belittle the polls. Much of our understanding of opinion during wartime has proceeded from the notion that times of war are unique moments in political history. This book rejects such thinking and instead argues that public opinion about war is shaped by the same attitudes and orientations that shape domestic politics. To support its claim, the book considers the United States' experience during six wars: World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War.Less
In early 2006, with the initial successes in Iraq a distant memory, public opinion seemed to have turned against the war. Republicans continued to support President George W. Bush's foreign policy, but the nation as a whole did not. Although support for the war had remained fairly stable since the beginning of 2004, not since March 2004 had a majority of Americans agreed that the United States “did the right thing in taking military action against Iraq.” Bush's public reaction to this grim news was to belittle the polls. Much of our understanding of opinion during wartime has proceeded from the notion that times of war are unique moments in political history. This book rejects such thinking and instead argues that public opinion about war is shaped by the same attitudes and orientations that shape domestic politics. To support its claim, the book considers the United States' experience during six wars: World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War.
Lyn Ragsdale and Jerrold G. Rusk
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190670702
- eISBN:
- 9780190670740
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190670702.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics, Democratization
Abstract: This chapter examines the period after Watergate, during which nonvoting increased. The chapter finds that the introduction of cable television into American homes was principally ...
More
Abstract: This chapter examines the period after Watergate, during which nonvoting increased. The chapter finds that the introduction of cable television into American homes was principally associated with this increase. With cable television, people could avoid politics by selecting channels that were expressly not political. In contrast, the uncertainty defined by the stagflation of the period—in which both inflation and unemployment increased in tandem—reduced nonvoting. The chapter also considers youth nonvoting in depth. The chapter continues the analysis of nonvoting at the individual level, confirming that the less people know about the campaign context and the less they make judgments about the candidates, the more likely they will be nonvoters.Less
Abstract: This chapter examines the period after Watergate, during which nonvoting increased. The chapter finds that the introduction of cable television into American homes was principally associated with this increase. With cable television, people could avoid politics by selecting channels that were expressly not political. In contrast, the uncertainty defined by the stagflation of the period—in which both inflation and unemployment increased in tandem—reduced nonvoting. The chapter also considers youth nonvoting in depth. The chapter continues the analysis of nonvoting at the individual level, confirming that the less people know about the campaign context and the less they make judgments about the candidates, the more likely they will be nonvoters.
